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Why China's C919 is flying while Japan's Mitsubishi's SpaceJet isn't
Beijing's direct and indirect support carried COMAC through challengesBradley Dailey and Yuichi Takayama
April 13, 2023 05:00 JST
Design, flight testing and certification issues repeatedly delayed the SpaceJet's entry-into-service timelines. (Photo courtesy of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries)
Bradley Dailey is director at Alton Aviation Consultancy. Yuichi Takayama is Alton's Japan practice leader.
In 2008, Japan's Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China each launched their first commercial aircraft development programs.
Fifteen years later, state-owned COMAC has begun deliveries of its midsized C919 airliner, while Mitsubishi has abandoned its smaller SpaceJet, previously the Mitsubishi Regional Jet, and retreated from commercial aircraft building without ever having shipped a single plane.
The highly complex nature of developing these new aircraft required significant financial support and a long-term commitment from each company's stakeholders.
Even with such support, the success of any new program is far from guaranteed as experienced manufacturers like Boeing and Airbus have exhibited varying degrees of success managing the process and timeline for regulatory certification, on-time delivery, sustaining supply-chain quality control and supporting in-service fleets effectively.
Critical operational competencies support aircraft program development and execution. These include aircraft design and development expertise, program management, aircraft certification expertise, supply chain management and an ability to set up a strong customer support network.
In launching the MRJ, Mitsubishi sought to leverage its position as a key supplier to the Boeing 787 program to develop a composite aircraft that would be powered by new generation engines. Initially, it aimed to have the planes in service by 2013 and to profitably capture about 20% of the global market for 70 to 100-seat regional jets.
Mitsubishi's notion was to offer two models, the 70-seat MRJ70 and the 90-seat MRJ90. Under contracts negotiated by American pilots' unions, the planes operated by U.S. regional airlines are limited in size by what are known as scope clauses. The MRJ models were intended in part to target the U.S. regional market, but changes to the scope clauses in 2012 made both MRJ models less attractive to the major U.S. carriers.
While the MRJ was a stand-alone aircraft program, COMAC intended the C919, with 160 to 175 seats, to be the first of a planned series of commercial jets from the beginning. COMAC also leveraged the experience of a predecessor company in developing the ARJ21 regional jet to facilitate the design process for the C919.
Ultimately neither the MRJ nor the C919 was positioned perfectly within their respective commercial jet submarkets.
In the C919's case, the model is smaller than its main competitors. But a strong commitment from the Chinese government, in the form of both direct financial support and a built-in customer base derived from state-owned airlines, gave the C919 program the necessary leeway to work through program design and development challenges.
Mitsubishi's MRJ attracted orders for hundreds of planes, but design, flight testing and certification issues repeatedly delayed the planes' entry-into-service timelines.
With both Mitsubishi and the Japan Civil Aviation Bureau lacking recent experience in certifying commercial aircraft, the process proceeded bumpily. At the same time, Mitsubishi's underdeveloped supplier network resulted in inadequate supplies of spare parts during the process.
The C919 also experienced certification delays, with the aircraft's initial flight being delayed more than three years. But relatively recent program certification experience, especially with the ARJ21, likely positioned the Civil Aviation Administration of China well to work with COMAC to rectify any issues that arose.
China Eastern Airlines is the first carrier to deploy the C919, here seen In Nanchang, China on Jan. 28. © Getty Images
From its first flight in 2017, the C919's path to CAAC certification took more than five years. During much of this period, the aircraft was grounded to implement modifications and redesigns.
Flight testing took two more years than initially envisioned. CAAC certification, however, was finally granted last September and the first delivery of a completed C919 was made to China Eastern Airlines in December.
In a final attempt to save its program in 2019, Mitsubishi redesigned some aspects of the MRJ70 to facilitate broader acceptance in the U.S. market, rebranded the plane as the SpaceJet M100. Mitsubishi also bought parts of Bombardier's regional jet program to demonstrate that its planes would exhibit the features and characteristics desired by its customers.
But ultimately, limited demand, sprawling development costs and an inability to get its aircraft certified led Mitsubishi to cut its losses and officially cancel the program this past February.
By contrast, the C919 benefited from state ownership and a significant domestic market. The aircraft has received nearly 50% more orders than the SpaceJet did, almost exclusively from China-based customers.
While the C919 will not initially be as reliable, exhibit the same level of customer support or be as efficient as aircraft produced by more experienced manufacturers, completing the project and building the requisite support network will be critical building blocks that will facilitate the growth of COMAC's business for decades to come. The reality is that a manufacturer's initial foray into aircraft production is more about learning and developing expertise than competing with established global players.
Looking at the divergent outcomes seen with the C919 and SpaceJet, solid stakeholder backing for the long run combined with an easily accessible customer base were key differentiators in the eventual end state of the two programs.
While the SpaceJet's failure is discouraging, Japan's illustrious history of innovation and manufacturing, combined will lessons learned during the development process, could be drawn upon in future Japanese aerospace ventures.
Rectifying the difficulties encountered by Mitsubishi and affording substantial financial support while accepting that, ultimately, the success of commercial aircraft manufacturing should be measured over decades will be prerequisites for the success of a future program.
Why China's C919 is flying while Mitsubishi's SpaceJet isn't
Beijing's direct and indirect support carried COMAC through challenges
asia.nikkei.com
