A.Rafay
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President Obama stands re-elected. And that means a whole lot of things to Pakistan. His security doctrine concerning Af-Pakistan will continue to be the touchstone of US policies towards Pakistan. Security and economic assistance would remain on a tight leash. But these are not bad things per se. A lot will depend on the operational outcome of the declaratory principles.
The key element being whether Obama, armed with a fresh presidential mandate, will modify the endgame in Afghanistan to accommodate the lobbies, which are sceptical of the precise timetable for the withdrawal of the US forces.
If the answer is in the affirmative, the withdrawal would cease to be an end in itself and may be modulated to achieve a specific political goal in Afghanistan. Knowing the Pakistani apprehensions about a quick US withdrawal, without a viable political dispensation in Afghanistan, adjustments in Obama’s plans would signal interesting prospects for Islamabad. But the need would be to make a cool assessment of the redistribution of cards and not seek to punch above weight that has often been the tendency of our strategists.
President Putin was to visit Pakistan recently for a regional summit. It became a perfect occasion for some spin gurus to spring into action and we were hearing about a leap in Pak-Russia cooperation. The euphoria suddenly died as Putin, who has installed a revolving door to serve alternatively as the head of state and government of a major world power, sent his regrets. According to some, it was none other than India that reportedly drew Russia’s attention to their historic friendship, urging Putin not to rush to Pakistan. More recent accounts speak of his ill health as the reason for his inability to travel to Pakistan.
The reason for taking up Obama’s re-election or Putin’s non-visit is not so much to dissect these developments but to recall the historic context of Pakistan’s relations with the big powers to visualise the likely prospects in the years ahead so as to adjust to our expectations.
The civil and military leadership of the first decade following independence chose to align with the US. However, the India-China war in 1962 demonstrated the sketchy nature of the US sponsored alliance. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, as the industries and natural resources minister and later as foreign minister, worked hard on forging ties with the Soviet Union to lessen the dependence on the US. The Kennedy administration’s embrace with India and its activism in extending India political and material support as a bulwark against communist China, and admonitions to Pakistan against getting too close to Beijing, produced complications we all know too well.
Pakistan’s leadership of the time was quick in deducing that the pro-India lobby in the US had finally found its chance to build close ties with India, which had till then been committed to a policy of non-alignment. Secondly, the change was permanent and it was for Pakistan to diversify its economic and military partnerships. Looking back at events half a century later, while the expectations were fulfilled in case of China, progress with the Soviet Union was slower and confined to fewer areas.
If Pakistan’s tactic was to convey to Washington not to take its alliance for granted, it had the opposite effect. The US, rather than accommodating Pakistan’s concerns, became more implacable and assumed a rather vindictive stance.
Reportedly, US became rather personal and started to hold Bhutto responsible for Pakistan going adrift. If Islamabad had any hope of its Russia or China cards winning points with the US, like cooling its passion for India that did not happen. The aftershocks of the India-China war on Pak-US relations were probably responsible for Pakistan’s calculation that a major effort must be made to liberate Kashmir before the balance of power moved totally in India’s favour.
The 1965 war only added to Pakistan’s problems. It brought home the scenario about a lack of America’s commitment to help in roles other than serving as a link in the chain of containment around the Soviet Union and China. The US did not turn to Pakistan again until the Soviet Union upset the buffer status of Afghanistan. But again, it had no use of Pakistan after the Soviets retreated.
America’s return to Afghanistan and Pakistan twelve years later was in a different context. It was wounded and humiliated by 9/11 and came charging in the role of the sole superpower. But as the US contemplates its departure from Afghanistan, Pakistan is a changed country. The eleven years old war on terror has decapitated the Al-Qaeda leadership but increased militancy and extremism in general. The military’s belated move to “own” the war still leaves many questions unanswered.
We may hope that the forthcoming election in Pakistan will provide a new mandate on the critical question of effectively dealing with militancy and sectarianism. A victory of the right wing parties, including the PTI, will bring a certain readjustment of the tactics in the fight against militancy. It will aggravate the problematic relationship with the US without viable alternatives.
The US has the potential of hurting or helping Pakistan. While Pakistan takes steps to improve ties with its big neighbour, strives for more links with Russia and consolidates the existing friendship with China, it must also maintain friendship with the US and the EU, which remain the biggest sources of assistance, as well as account for half of our export markets and foreign remittances.
Obama
The key element being whether Obama, armed with a fresh presidential mandate, will modify the endgame in Afghanistan to accommodate the lobbies, which are sceptical of the precise timetable for the withdrawal of the US forces.
If the answer is in the affirmative, the withdrawal would cease to be an end in itself and may be modulated to achieve a specific political goal in Afghanistan. Knowing the Pakistani apprehensions about a quick US withdrawal, without a viable political dispensation in Afghanistan, adjustments in Obama’s plans would signal interesting prospects for Islamabad. But the need would be to make a cool assessment of the redistribution of cards and not seek to punch above weight that has often been the tendency of our strategists.
President Putin was to visit Pakistan recently for a regional summit. It became a perfect occasion for some spin gurus to spring into action and we were hearing about a leap in Pak-Russia cooperation. The euphoria suddenly died as Putin, who has installed a revolving door to serve alternatively as the head of state and government of a major world power, sent his regrets. According to some, it was none other than India that reportedly drew Russia’s attention to their historic friendship, urging Putin not to rush to Pakistan. More recent accounts speak of his ill health as the reason for his inability to travel to Pakistan.
The reason for taking up Obama’s re-election or Putin’s non-visit is not so much to dissect these developments but to recall the historic context of Pakistan’s relations with the big powers to visualise the likely prospects in the years ahead so as to adjust to our expectations.
The civil and military leadership of the first decade following independence chose to align with the US. However, the India-China war in 1962 demonstrated the sketchy nature of the US sponsored alliance. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, as the industries and natural resources minister and later as foreign minister, worked hard on forging ties with the Soviet Union to lessen the dependence on the US. The Kennedy administration’s embrace with India and its activism in extending India political and material support as a bulwark against communist China, and admonitions to Pakistan against getting too close to Beijing, produced complications we all know too well.
Pakistan’s leadership of the time was quick in deducing that the pro-India lobby in the US had finally found its chance to build close ties with India, which had till then been committed to a policy of non-alignment. Secondly, the change was permanent and it was for Pakistan to diversify its economic and military partnerships. Looking back at events half a century later, while the expectations were fulfilled in case of China, progress with the Soviet Union was slower and confined to fewer areas.
If Pakistan’s tactic was to convey to Washington not to take its alliance for granted, it had the opposite effect. The US, rather than accommodating Pakistan’s concerns, became more implacable and assumed a rather vindictive stance.
Reportedly, US became rather personal and started to hold Bhutto responsible for Pakistan going adrift. If Islamabad had any hope of its Russia or China cards winning points with the US, like cooling its passion for India that did not happen. The aftershocks of the India-China war on Pak-US relations were probably responsible for Pakistan’s calculation that a major effort must be made to liberate Kashmir before the balance of power moved totally in India’s favour.
The 1965 war only added to Pakistan’s problems. It brought home the scenario about a lack of America’s commitment to help in roles other than serving as a link in the chain of containment around the Soviet Union and China. The US did not turn to Pakistan again until the Soviet Union upset the buffer status of Afghanistan. But again, it had no use of Pakistan after the Soviets retreated.
America’s return to Afghanistan and Pakistan twelve years later was in a different context. It was wounded and humiliated by 9/11 and came charging in the role of the sole superpower. But as the US contemplates its departure from Afghanistan, Pakistan is a changed country. The eleven years old war on terror has decapitated the Al-Qaeda leadership but increased militancy and extremism in general. The military’s belated move to “own” the war still leaves many questions unanswered.
We may hope that the forthcoming election in Pakistan will provide a new mandate on the critical question of effectively dealing with militancy and sectarianism. A victory of the right wing parties, including the PTI, will bring a certain readjustment of the tactics in the fight against militancy. It will aggravate the problematic relationship with the US without viable alternatives.
The US has the potential of hurting or helping Pakistan. While Pakistan takes steps to improve ties with its big neighbour, strives for more links with Russia and consolidates the existing friendship with China, it must also maintain friendship with the US and the EU, which remain the biggest sources of assistance, as well as account for half of our export markets and foreign remittances.
Obama
