Modern Protection for Combat Vehicles
(Part 2)
IBD Deisenroth Engineerings AMAP-ADS protection at a glance.
Armour Configuration Types of Combat Vehicles with State-of-the Art Protection Concepts
The following examples will outline how state-of-the-art protection concepts for combat vehicles have been implemented for military operations in urban terrain.
Passive Protection
Passive protection with an interior liner is the basic design for any vehicle protection concept. Due to the diversity of threats, the required multi-hit capability, the procurement costs in relation to performance, its possible combination, the low danger of collateral damage, and the possibility of an adaptable increase of protection, it will remain the basic concept of choice. The protection developer should be allowed to contribute to the vehicle concept from the beginning of the developing process for an armoured vehicle in order to design a weight- and space-saving system, but also a low-priced and user-friendly system without logistical restrictions (refuelling, reloading, maintenance, and repair work in the field).
A successful example is the IVECO LMV (Light Multi-Role Vehicle), of which more than 2,500 vehicles have been produced after only about two years of serial production, and which is currently in service in nine countries as a 4x4 command and multi-purpose vehicle. As the protection developer, IBD Deisenroth Engineering has been involved in the development of the LMV from the beginning. As a result, and in addition to weight reduction, parts of the ceramic-composite protection, integrated in a tube frame, could also adopt a stabilising performance. The ballistic multi-hit capability, in particular at intersections and technical weak spots, has been tested with different threats. In combination with the adaptable mine protection and in accordance to STANAG 4569, the integrated armour system has also proven its tremendous effectiveness against considerable anti-tank mines, detonating under the wheel as well as under the floor plate without the vehicle overturning. Due to the integrated, modular passive protection concept that also provides a considerable signature reduction, the armoured vehicle cannot be optically distinguished from an unprotected vehicle. It creates trust in the field, as the level of protection is not obtruded.
The Renault VAB, of which more than 2,200 vehicles have already been delivered, and which has certainly proven itself in numerous areas of operations with the French Armed Forces, is a further example of modern, adaptable protection for wheeled vehicles. But also the German Armed Forces FUCHS (6x6) and BOXER (8x8), as well as the US M1117 GUARDIAN Armoured Security Vehicle (ASV) that can be found in all current operation areas and is considered one of the safest vehicles, must be mentioned in this context.
An armour solution that can be stacked in transport containers, transported by helicopter, and provides protection against ballistic threats and mines has been developed for driving cabs of transport and engineering vehicles. If required, the segments can be exchanged by soldiers without special tooling and not exclusively by the contractors. The partly dismountable driving cabs reduce procurement, user, and transport costs while providing high operational mobility.
After the initial disappointment from the deployment of light vehicles to crisis areas, the opinion that heavy MBTs are indispensable throughout the entire scope of operations due to their high level of protection, their armament and their breaching capability in urban operations established itself in many Armed Forces.
After heavy losses in Afghanistan, the Canadian Armed Forces, in early 2002, recalled the few remaining LEOPARD 1 C2 MBTs and heavy armour, developed by IBD in 1995/96 and until then rejected for its weight. It soon turned out that it was the only protection that was effective against both the RPG-7 and IEDs. In a quick campaign, these heavy armoured MBTs were deployed to Afghanistan. Their deployment was a complete success.
Based on this concept, IBD developed a protection kit for the LEOPARD 2 A4 MBT with a ballistic protection that was also a match for the RPG-27 and -30, heavy mine protection and an accessible roof protection against all currently known urban threats, including shaped charge grenades (RKG-3). With a battle weight of less than 62t, customers for the EVOLUTION MBT were quickly found. The impressive silhouette, the high mobility, the relatively low weight in relation to the high level of protection and the logistical concept are the advantages over other known solutions that feature a significantly higher battle weight.
For the time being, solid passive armour will continue to be the only solution against all non-incoming threats. Among these passive threats are, in particular, explosive belts and explosives hidden in vehicles, the so-called car bombs. Other protective measures, for now, can only be categorised as add-on armour. Therefore, the question of mobility vs. weight will continue to have a topical importance in the development of protection concepts.
Bar or slat armour should also be mentioned in the context of passive protection concepts. It was specially developed and adapted to protect against RPG attacks on wheeled and tracked vehicles deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq. The effectiveness of these fence elements, which also reduce mobility, can only be judged statistically as it depends crucially on the point of impact on the armour. Further, depending on the type of slat armour, the level of protection is between 50 and 75%. An example of all-around slat armour is the US 8x8 STRYKER combat vehicle. This type of armour can only be considered as a temporary solution for passive protection and, what is more, only against the RPG-7 family.
RUAG Land Systems SidePRO-RPG is an add-on RPG-7 protection system designed for logistic as well as armoured infantry fighting vehicles. The protection modules can be mounted directly on the vehicle or on top of existing add-on armour. The easy mounting of the modules, the low weight and the profile of the design are key features, which provide enhanced protection without impairing the vehicles mobility. The goal of this development was to deliver higher protection degree while at the same time holding on to easy usage without increasing vehicle weight. Just like SidePRO-LASSO, it is a passive system, neutralising the effect of the shaped charges of different types of RPG-7. SidePRO-RPG functions as follows. The shaped charge penetrates the first of three protective layers and is then neutralised by the second layer at which the projectile short circuits so that it combusts instead of exploding. The last protection layer distributes the resulting pressure and diverts the force away from the armour of the vehicle. RUAG Land Systems SidePRO-LASSO (Light Armour System against Shaped Ordnance) is an adaptive and highly efficient side protection against the widespread RPG-7 anti-tank grenade and its derivatives. Due to the simple and intelligent design SidePRO-LASSO is lightweight and reliable. It has been tested and verified during dynamic firing trials. In September 2008 the Danish Army awarded RUAG with a contract to protect its M-113 APCs with SidePRO-LASSO in Afghanistan.
Reactive Protection
The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) began to equip light and heavy combat vehicles with reactive armour in the mid 1980s due to the heavy loss of MBTs in the Yom Kippur War. The ERA boxes mounted onto the vehicles provided a high level of protection against single shaped charge warheads. With a sandwich structure of steel and an explosive sheet, the shaped charge was blown off when impacting the box, creating numerous fragments. Until the box could be exchanged, a ballistic hole remained at the point of impact. Because of the high collateral effect on dismounted soldiers, vehicles in its proximity or non-involved crowds and individuals, Western Armed Force, at first did not use reactive armour, although the Soviet Army began to equip its MBTs with reactive armour in 1983. NATO, however, did not have an effective system to counter Soviet missiles. Only the high US and British casualties in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan led to a partial retrofitting of combat vehicles with reactive add-on armour.
Even if fragmentation could be largely avoided by means of the German CLARA reactive armour technology, the missing multi-hit capability still causes a considerable gap. Further shortcomings are the insufficient protection envelope of the applied boxes and the possibility of an ignition of the explosives when an impact occurs in the edge zones; this can lead to the combat vehicles total breakdown or burning out. Due to the lack of a multi-hit capability, CLARA also is ineffective against threats such as the RPG-30, which triggers the reactive armour by means of a small-calibre decoy and then penetrates the passive armour with the actual warhead. Therefore, reactive armour currently cannot be considered as modern protection technology.
Active Protection
The development of sensor-controlled active protection systems was begun almost at the same time as in the Soviet Union. Active protection systems also just add-on armour - come into effect before the threat impacts the vehicle. This eliminates the shock, noise and impulse transfer onto the soldiers and sensitive equipment, to a large extent. It does not only increase survivability but also sustainability and assertiveness. When evaluating the protection effectiveness, no longer just the scope of ammunition, but primarily the MDD of the respective threat and the IP are of importance. These system parameters, which are crucial in urban operations, are exclusively determined by the SRT.
An active protection system that operates within a few seconds time, such as the MUSS soft-kill system, is not available for operations as they are currently being carried out by NATO and the EU. Systems that operate in a period of milliseconds are suitable for threats with a velocity of <350m/s. Only systems with an SRT that can be measured in µs are suitable against all threats, including those with a velocity of >1,800m/s.
While Russian systems, such as the DROZD 2 and ARENA, have already been integrated with Russian MBTs, series-production of the Israeli TROPHY system for heavy combat vehicles, developed by Rafael, could only begin in 2007. All other active protection systems are within one to three years from series-production readiness; this is to say, prototypes are being tested.
The SRT of the more than 20 currently known systems is at 200-400ms. Hence, the MDD, which must always be considered, depending on the velocity of the approaching threat, lies within a scope of >30m even up to >200m. These active protection systems are ineffective when used in an urban environment to counter the RPG-7 (launched at a range of less than 30m), as they do not have enough time to react. The possibility that the sensor systems will be detected by enemy reconnaissance is very high due to the integrated active radar systems. After the threat has been detected, it is countered by a mechanically directed blast or fragmentation grenades and intercepted at a range of 10-30m. Average collateral damage by blast grenades and high collateral damage by fragmentation grenades must be taken into account. Moreover, this can significantly affect tactical mobility due to damages inflicted upon wheels or tracks.
In Germany, the LEOPARD 2 A4 was used as a test vehicle for the AWiSS system; in Israel, the TROPHY and IRON FIST systems were tested on the MERKAVA MBT. Israel has also experimentally integrated the IRON FIST system onto the WILDCAT wheeled vehicle.
Currently, there is only one active protection system which operates in the µs scope and which, as add-on armour, can counter all currently known threats. The AMAP-ADS active protection system, developed by IBD Deisenroth Engineering, can be integrated onto both light as well as heavy combat vehicles due to its relatively low weight (light vehicles: ca. 150kg, heavy vehicles: ca. 500kg). The multiple, intensive tests at home and abroad, and the results obtained so far, give rise to hope that this system will be ready for series-production by the end of 2010.
The AMAP-ADS consists of a two-staged sensor system in which the warning sensor scans its particular sector for all approaching objects within a range of approximately 10m and then transfers the data to a second sensor. The sensor system that is responsible for countering the threat tracks, measures, and identifies the projectile. All relevant data is then transferred to the protected central computer via a highly jamming-resistant data bus system. The central computer then activates the determined countermeasure, which ejects an electronically directed energy charge with a high energy density, spatially limited, into the direction of the point of interaction. The required electrical energy is so low that is does not strain the vehicles power circuit. This countermeasure fully destroys shaped charges and partially destroys other threats such as kinetic energy penetrators and EFPs and deflects created fragments. The remaining effects are absorbed by the basic armour. AMAP-ADS requires 560µs (hence, only 0,56ms) for the entire defence procedure, beginning with the detection and completed with the elimination of the threat. The configuration of the countermeasures depends on the vehicle that is to be protected and the specifications of the user or purchaser and can be expanded to a hemispheric protection shield. The individually operating sensor and energy modules, applied all around the combat vehicle, frequently overlap each other, thereby providing a tremendous multi-hit capability and, hence, increased safety. As no fragments are produced by the AMAP-ADS system itself when countering a threat, collateral damage will only occur from the destroyed threat, the energy of which, however, is directed at the vehicle and, as a ricochet, will cause little noteworthy damage.
To date, attacks against vehicles have to be signalled by radio, while neither the type of threat nor the sector, from which the threat was launched, could be immediately determined. As the on-board computer generates and records a protocol that can be analysed, these systems can transfer the time, type, launch sector of the threat, and location (when equipped with GPS) without delay to other combat vehicles or to the operations centre via an online interface. This enables an immediate, targeted engagement of the origin of the threat and the initiation of the pursuit. A rapid response can prevent the aggressor from retreating in an ordered and low-risk way and unsettle him.
The system compatibility, as well as functionality and configurability have been successfully demonstrated with different threats on the IVECO LMV (dubbed CARACAL in Germany), the MARDER IFV (statically as well as dynamically), the French VAB, the FUCHS 6x6 APC, the LEOPARD 1 and 2 MBT, the M-113 APC, and other vehicles. Based on the gained experience, it is not a complicated task for IBD to equip other sufficiently protected combat vehicles with this active add-on armour by late 2010.
Conclusion
In the long term, passive protection, as a basic protection against all types of threats, will continue to be irreplaceable. Its operating weight will be reduced by the use of intelligent materials and by its arrangement and allocation. That implies that, already during vehicle construction, the exchange of protection modules or armoured parts by means of pre-emptive measures should be considered. Explosive belts, mines and blast charges are difficult to detect and to dynamically eliminate in urban operations.
A greater emphasis must be placed on the reduction of the vehicle signature, as the concealed operating enemy will increasingly use technical reconnaissance solutions such as heat imaging or IR, even if these may, at first, be of lesser quality.
Reactive and active protection systems are and will continue to be add-on armour systems. Reactive armour systems still have limited protection potential, as they are only effective against certain threats. Active protection systems will govern the future, as they possess a great potential for future development. Development and operation of these new protection measures are only at the beginning stages. As the engagement distance in urban operations lies within 5-50m, depending on the employed resources, only systems with an extremely short reaction time and special capabilities in close-range defence will be sustainable. The latter provides defensive measures against threats before it impacts the vehicle and not upon impact on the vehicle.
Collateral damage caused when countering a threat must be eliminated to a large extent to protect non-involved persons as well as possible and not to provide propaganda arguments for the enemy. The weaker the aggressor, the more often he will attack from within a crowd of people. Everybody, even only indirectly involved persons, must know that collateral damage can never be ruled out during these types of operations.
The envelope of protection should be extremely large, as neither the type of threat nor its direction can be estimated or determined and since a simultaneous, unexpected threat from different directions is possible. Therefore, the sensors and effectors should be arranged all around and also hemispherically on the combat vehicle and should be able to operate in an overlapping and individually manner.
Protection systems that are not multi-hit capable are ineffective in an urban environment, as they do not offer protection against state-of-the-art weapon systems such as the RPG-30. If the armour is ineffective, the soldier will lose his trust in his combat system after the first attacks and become demoralised. This reduces sustainability. It must be the opposite; the aggressor must be surprised and demoralised by the effective countering of his attack.
Efficient combat vehicles can only be introduced if a trusting cooperation between the general contractor and the developer, normally a small or medium-sized business, is established at an early stage. Continuing effective technological development is only possible when the developer, along with the general contractor, is involved as early as possible in the evaluation of accidents.
Despite all the ingenuity and the joining of forces, there will never be perfect protection, as threats and armour are competitive forces that have their own dynamics. However, good training can significantly contribute to attaining optimal protection.