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The most violent of Zia’s opponents was Murtaza Bhutto, elder son of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who founded a small terrorist group, initially claiming to be the armed wing of the PPP, to avenge his father’s death. While in jail, Bhutto senior had famously remarked, ‘My sons are not my sons if they do not drink the blood of those who dare shed my blood today.’80 In May 1979, a month after his father’s execution, Murtaza visited Kabul to seek the help of the Taraki government in setting up a base in Afghanistan from which his guerrillas could launch attacks against the Zia regime.81 Murtaza was allowed to receive a large arms shipment from Yasir Arafat and to house a small band of apprentice guerrillas, his so-called ‘revolutionary army’, in a derelict building which the volunteers called ‘Dracula House’. His first attempt to smuggle some of his arms cache into Pakistan ended in disaster when the man chosen to take them across the border turned out to be a Pakistani agent. Murtaza was reduced to scouring Pakistani newspapers and claiming to his Afghan hosts that accidents and fires reported in them were the work of his guerrillas. After the Soviet invasion, however, Murtaza established a close relationship with Muhammad Najibullah, head of KHAD, the newly founded Afghan intelligence service, who as a goodwill gesture paid the costs of Murtaza’s wedding to a young
Afghan woman.82
Murtaza and Najibullah had a series of discussions on joint covert operations against Pakistan.83 Since KHAD was operating under KGB direction, there is no doubt that
their discussions were fully approved by the Centre.84 Given the risks of operating with the volatile Murtaza, however, the Centre preferred to deal with him at one remove through KHAD. Murtaza may never have realized that, in his dealings with him, KHAD was acting as a KGB surrogate.85 His first successful operations inside Pakistan, agreed with Najibullah, were a bomb attack on the Sindh high court and the destruction of a Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) DC-10 aircraft at Karachi airport in January 1981. He also planned to disrupt the
visit of Pope John Paul II to Pakistan in February by exploding a bomb during the pontiff’s address in a Karachi stadium. But the bomb went off prematurely at the entrance to the stadium, killing the bomber and a policeman.86
In December Murtaza Bhutto and Najibullah decided on what was to be their most spectacular joint operation, codenamed ALAMGIR (‘Swordbearer’) by the KGB.87 It was agreed that Murtaza’s guerrillas would hijack a PIA airliner over Pakistan and divert it to Damascus or Tripoli.
The three novice hijackers who boarded a plane at Karachi on 2 March 1981, however, made the mistake of choosing an internal flight which had insufficient fuel to reach Damascus or Tripoli. The leading hijacker, Salamullah Tipu, ordered the pilot to land at Kabul instead. As the plane landed, Tipu informed the control tower that he was a member of the armed wing of the PPP, which was fighting for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan, and wished to speak to ‘Dr Salahuddin’, Murtaza’s codename in Kabul. Murtaza, who chose the occasion to rename his terrorist group Al-Zulfikar (‘The Sword’), came to meet Tipu at the bottom of the aircraft
steps88 and was joined by Najibullah, who was disguised in the clothes of an airport worker. Both the KGB mission and the Kabul residency advised Najibullah on the best methods of using the hijack to discredit the Zia regime.89
On 4 March Anahita Ratebzad, President of the Afghan- Soviet Friendship Association and Minister of Education, who was a ‘confidential contact’ of the KGB,90 came tothe airport surrounded by TV cameras, to express support for the ‘just demands’ of the hijackers and to ask for the release of the women and children on the aircraft to mark International Women’s Day. In a pre-arranged gesture, Tipu announced that he was happy to accede to Ratebzad’s request. On 5 March the Afghan leader and long-standing KGB agent, Babrak Karmal, who had just returned from Moscow, conducted a live televised phone conversation with Tipu from the control tower. Like Ratebzad, Karmal gave strong backing to the hijackers’ ‘just demands’. Tipu replied in an emotional voice that Karmal was the greatest man in the whole of Asia.91
Among the hijackers’ demands was the release of over fifty ‘political prisoners’ from Pakistani jails. When Zia refused, one of the passengers was beaten, shot and thrown onto the tarmac, where he writhed in agony as he lay dying. The victim, Tariq Rahim, was a devoted former ADC to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, but the paranoid tendencies of both Tipu and Murtaza convinced them that Rahim had really been in league with Zia.92 This gruesome episode may well have persuaded the KGB that it was time for the aircraft to move on. Before the plane was refuelled for a flight to Syria, then the Soviet Union’s closest major ally in the Middle East, further arms were taken on board unseen by the TV cameras. The three hijackers, who had arrived in Kabul armed only with pistols, left equipped with Kalashnikovs, grenades, explosives, a timing device
and $4,500.93 After the aircraft landed in Damascus, Zia initially continued to refuse to release political prisoners but was eventually persuaded to do so by Washington in order to save the lives of American hostages on board.
Murtaza hailed the freeing of fifty-four PPP members from Pakistani jails as a triumph for Al-Zulfikar. KHAD and the KGB appeared to agree. Al-Zulfikar’s base was moved from the derelict ‘Dracula House’ to new palatial headquarters, which received a steady stream of refugees
from Zia’s regime anxious to become guerrillas and fight for its overthrow.94
As well as supporting Al-Zulfikar, KHAD was also used by the KGB to channel arms to separatist and dissident groups in the Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan and Sindh. At the end of 1980 the leader of a Baluchi separatist group based in Afghanistan had secret talks
with Najibullah who promised to provide the separatists with arms, 400 military instructors and three training camps. After talks between another Baluchi leader and the Afghan President, Babrak Karmal, in April 1982, KHAD opened two more camps to train Baluchi guerrillas to
fight the Pakistani and Iranian regimes.95
The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the the Third World
Afghan woman.82
Murtaza and Najibullah had a series of discussions on joint covert operations against Pakistan.83 Since KHAD was operating under KGB direction, there is no doubt that
their discussions were fully approved by the Centre.84 Given the risks of operating with the volatile Murtaza, however, the Centre preferred to deal with him at one remove through KHAD. Murtaza may never have realized that, in his dealings with him, KHAD was acting as a KGB surrogate.85 His first successful operations inside Pakistan, agreed with Najibullah, were a bomb attack on the Sindh high court and the destruction of a Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) DC-10 aircraft at Karachi airport in January 1981. He also planned to disrupt the
visit of Pope John Paul II to Pakistan in February by exploding a bomb during the pontiff’s address in a Karachi stadium. But the bomb went off prematurely at the entrance to the stadium, killing the bomber and a policeman.86
In December Murtaza Bhutto and Najibullah decided on what was to be their most spectacular joint operation, codenamed ALAMGIR (‘Swordbearer’) by the KGB.87 It was agreed that Murtaza’s guerrillas would hijack a PIA airliner over Pakistan and divert it to Damascus or Tripoli.
The three novice hijackers who boarded a plane at Karachi on 2 March 1981, however, made the mistake of choosing an internal flight which had insufficient fuel to reach Damascus or Tripoli. The leading hijacker, Salamullah Tipu, ordered the pilot to land at Kabul instead. As the plane landed, Tipu informed the control tower that he was a member of the armed wing of the PPP, which was fighting for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan, and wished to speak to ‘Dr Salahuddin’, Murtaza’s codename in Kabul. Murtaza, who chose the occasion to rename his terrorist group Al-Zulfikar (‘The Sword’), came to meet Tipu at the bottom of the aircraft
steps88 and was joined by Najibullah, who was disguised in the clothes of an airport worker. Both the KGB mission and the Kabul residency advised Najibullah on the best methods of using the hijack to discredit the Zia regime.89
On 4 March Anahita Ratebzad, President of the Afghan- Soviet Friendship Association and Minister of Education, who was a ‘confidential contact’ of the KGB,90 came tothe airport surrounded by TV cameras, to express support for the ‘just demands’ of the hijackers and to ask for the release of the women and children on the aircraft to mark International Women’s Day. In a pre-arranged gesture, Tipu announced that he was happy to accede to Ratebzad’s request. On 5 March the Afghan leader and long-standing KGB agent, Babrak Karmal, who had just returned from Moscow, conducted a live televised phone conversation with Tipu from the control tower. Like Ratebzad, Karmal gave strong backing to the hijackers’ ‘just demands’. Tipu replied in an emotional voice that Karmal was the greatest man in the whole of Asia.91
Among the hijackers’ demands was the release of over fifty ‘political prisoners’ from Pakistani jails. When Zia refused, one of the passengers was beaten, shot and thrown onto the tarmac, where he writhed in agony as he lay dying. The victim, Tariq Rahim, was a devoted former ADC to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, but the paranoid tendencies of both Tipu and Murtaza convinced them that Rahim had really been in league with Zia.92 This gruesome episode may well have persuaded the KGB that it was time for the aircraft to move on. Before the plane was refuelled for a flight to Syria, then the Soviet Union’s closest major ally in the Middle East, further arms were taken on board unseen by the TV cameras. The three hijackers, who had arrived in Kabul armed only with pistols, left equipped with Kalashnikovs, grenades, explosives, a timing device
and $4,500.93 After the aircraft landed in Damascus, Zia initially continued to refuse to release political prisoners but was eventually persuaded to do so by Washington in order to save the lives of American hostages on board.
Murtaza hailed the freeing of fifty-four PPP members from Pakistani jails as a triumph for Al-Zulfikar. KHAD and the KGB appeared to agree. Al-Zulfikar’s base was moved from the derelict ‘Dracula House’ to new palatial headquarters, which received a steady stream of refugees
from Zia’s regime anxious to become guerrillas and fight for its overthrow.94
As well as supporting Al-Zulfikar, KHAD was also used by the KGB to channel arms to separatist and dissident groups in the Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan and Sindh. At the end of 1980 the leader of a Baluchi separatist group based in Afghanistan had secret talks
with Najibullah who promised to provide the separatists with arms, 400 military instructors and three training camps. After talks between another Baluchi leader and the Afghan President, Babrak Karmal, in April 1982, KHAD opened two more camps to train Baluchi guerrillas to
fight the Pakistani and Iranian regimes.95
The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the the Third World
by Christopher Andrew
