pakistani342
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Article on Politico here, excerpts below:
A week ago, Kunduz, a provincial capital of 300,000 in northern Afghanistan, was not considered of particular strategic importance in the war against the Taliban. The Afghan government’s focus has been primarily on the fight in river valleys of southern Afghanistan to protect Kandahar, and in the mountain passes of eastern Afghanistan to protect Jalalabad.
But the fall of Kunduz to the Taliban for two days last week—and the struggle that may still be underway continuing for control of the city—marks a new phase in the war and a critical test for the effort by the United States and NATO to leave the bulk of the fighting to Afghan security forces. Kabul is now threatened from the north, and we are hearing reports of Taliban attacks in adjacent provinces, such as Baghlan, whose capture would cut off Kunduz and other key northern towns from Kabul. So the first consequence of Kunduz is that the already over-stretched Afghan security forces will now need to spread out even more thinly to cover the north. Beyond that, the accidental U.S. strike on a Doctors-Without-Borders hospital that killed at least 19 people—which has prompted calls for a war-crimes investigation by the U.N.—points up how very hard it is to co-ordinate air strikes accurately when there are so few NATO troops on the ground coordinating them.
...
Kunduz is potentially a game changer because it exposes the gap between the paper plan for the defense of Afghanistan and the reality on the ground, particularly in two key areas: first, the capability Afghan ground forces; and ...
...
As in Iraq, the West seems to be out of ideas in dealing with this problem. Sure, NATO could up-scale its training mission in Afghanistan, as the U.S. has done recently in Iraq; but that’s not going to address the structural problems of corruption in the system that destroys soldiers’ confidence in their leadership. The vast equipment losses the Iraqi Army has experienced since the Islamic State attacked Mosul should tell us that a stand-off approach in Afghanistan of simply replenishing a broken logistics chain is just throwing money down the drain: you can’t buy morale. What we’ve seen in Iraq is a tacit U.S. acceptance of the role of militias, who now are performing most of the front line combat against the Islamic State. Of course, this comes with big political trade-offs, which in Iraq is accepting the extent of Iranian influence in Baghdad, given they sponsor most of the Shia militias there. In Afghanistan militias might well be more effective than conventional forces, but they are predatory forces, and accepting them would mean abandoning any pretense of democratic reform in Afghanistan. Of course, if you take the view that Afghanistan is about Western national security, and democratic values are irrelevant, then backing militias may appeal to you. But this is a fantasy: The Taliban came to power from 1994-96 precisely because of popular hatred of militia warlords.
...
The main issue here is that this is already the plan on paper–and what Kunduz exposes is NATO’s inability to execute it on the ground . On paper, we are told that the Afghan security forces stand at 350,000, of which 7000 were supposedly garrisoned in Kunduz itself. Those numbers become hard to believe when Kunduz was captured by a Taliban force numbering only hundreds. In most smaller Afghan outposts, there are no NATO forces at all. NATO was already having difficulty supporting Afghan outposts with air support due to legal complexities surrounding the rules of engagement used to support Afghan forces, in particular how to extend the law of self-defense to third parties. Now the risk of civilian casualties from air strikes in areas without effective co-ordination with NATO spotters on the ground will further complicate the situation, particularly in urban areas.
...
Until now, NATO’s assumption has been that, analogous to the Soviet back-up for Najibullah, in providing enough air support to Afghan security forces, the Taliban would prove unable to capture major urban centers, and so would eventually have to negotiate. Whether for lack of intelligence, co-ordination with local forces, or asset availability, NATO obviously was unable to break up Taliban formations massing for a conventional attack on Kunduz. Now the insurance policy offered by NATO air support is in doubt, and with it the credibility of all the isolated Afghan positions throughout Afghanistan to resist conventional as opposed to guerrilla style attacks from the Taliban.
A week ago, Kunduz, a provincial capital of 300,000 in northern Afghanistan, was not considered of particular strategic importance in the war against the Taliban. The Afghan government’s focus has been primarily on the fight in river valleys of southern Afghanistan to protect Kandahar, and in the mountain passes of eastern Afghanistan to protect Jalalabad.
But the fall of Kunduz to the Taliban for two days last week—and the struggle that may still be underway continuing for control of the city—marks a new phase in the war and a critical test for the effort by the United States and NATO to leave the bulk of the fighting to Afghan security forces. Kabul is now threatened from the north, and we are hearing reports of Taliban attacks in adjacent provinces, such as Baghlan, whose capture would cut off Kunduz and other key northern towns from Kabul. So the first consequence of Kunduz is that the already over-stretched Afghan security forces will now need to spread out even more thinly to cover the north. Beyond that, the accidental U.S. strike on a Doctors-Without-Borders hospital that killed at least 19 people—which has prompted calls for a war-crimes investigation by the U.N.—points up how very hard it is to co-ordinate air strikes accurately when there are so few NATO troops on the ground coordinating them.
...
Kunduz is potentially a game changer because it exposes the gap between the paper plan for the defense of Afghanistan and the reality on the ground, particularly in two key areas: first, the capability Afghan ground forces; and ...
...
As in Iraq, the West seems to be out of ideas in dealing with this problem. Sure, NATO could up-scale its training mission in Afghanistan, as the U.S. has done recently in Iraq; but that’s not going to address the structural problems of corruption in the system that destroys soldiers’ confidence in their leadership. The vast equipment losses the Iraqi Army has experienced since the Islamic State attacked Mosul should tell us that a stand-off approach in Afghanistan of simply replenishing a broken logistics chain is just throwing money down the drain: you can’t buy morale. What we’ve seen in Iraq is a tacit U.S. acceptance of the role of militias, who now are performing most of the front line combat against the Islamic State. Of course, this comes with big political trade-offs, which in Iraq is accepting the extent of Iranian influence in Baghdad, given they sponsor most of the Shia militias there. In Afghanistan militias might well be more effective than conventional forces, but they are predatory forces, and accepting them would mean abandoning any pretense of democratic reform in Afghanistan. Of course, if you take the view that Afghanistan is about Western national security, and democratic values are irrelevant, then backing militias may appeal to you. But this is a fantasy: The Taliban came to power from 1994-96 precisely because of popular hatred of militia warlords.
...
The main issue here is that this is already the plan on paper–and what Kunduz exposes is NATO’s inability to execute it on the ground . On paper, we are told that the Afghan security forces stand at 350,000, of which 7000 were supposedly garrisoned in Kunduz itself. Those numbers become hard to believe when Kunduz was captured by a Taliban force numbering only hundreds. In most smaller Afghan outposts, there are no NATO forces at all. NATO was already having difficulty supporting Afghan outposts with air support due to legal complexities surrounding the rules of engagement used to support Afghan forces, in particular how to extend the law of self-defense to third parties. Now the risk of civilian casualties from air strikes in areas without effective co-ordination with NATO spotters on the ground will further complicate the situation, particularly in urban areas.
...
Until now, NATO’s assumption has been that, analogous to the Soviet back-up for Najibullah, in providing enough air support to Afghan security forces, the Taliban would prove unable to capture major urban centers, and so would eventually have to negotiate. Whether for lack of intelligence, co-ordination with local forces, or asset availability, NATO obviously was unable to break up Taliban formations massing for a conventional attack on Kunduz. Now the insurance policy offered by NATO air support is in doubt, and with it the credibility of all the isolated Afghan positions throughout Afghanistan to resist conventional as opposed to guerrilla style attacks from the Taliban.
