Beyond the nuclear veil

[BATMAN]

Beyond the nuclear veil
Beyond the nuclear veil

By Farah Zahra

The author of an award-winning masterpiece on nuclear safety is about to reveal what lies "inside" the nuclear state of affairs in the South Asian region. The grey-eyed professor in his forthcoming (edited) book on South Asia is sure to give us yet another brilliant book in his series of simply extraordinary books on nuclear issues. An encounter with him on nuclear issues is bound to broaden anyone's intellectual horizons and hence an educative meeting with him last week left me pondering upon his one perspective that seems inconsonant with his erudite perspectives. He believes that Pakistan should go ahead and formally publish its nuclear doctrine now.

This belief has been echoed by lesser mortals in the field along with the assertion that: if Pakistan was to issue a written nuclear doctrine it would (a) make nuclear deterrence in South Asia more stable and (b) prevent red-lines from receding in times of a crisis. The contention seems to be that the publication of nuclear plans and proclamations by a pool of Pakistani strategists and officials will alleviate nuclear 'instability' in South Asia. Two immediate assumptions become apparent. First, nuclear deterrence in South Asia in its present form is unstable. Second, Pakistan's repeated mention of its nuclear 'first use' prerogative is not clear enough.

Before proceeding further it is important to take a bird's eye view of the Cold War scenario in which many of these assumptions and assertions are rooted. Ambivalence in nuclear doctrines persisted on both sides nearly till the Cold War ended and was something that could not be handled by the cold warriors. In fact both sides had a tendency to maintain two separate doctrines, a declaratory one and an actual one, and both states were aware that the other side was trying to fool them with incorrect declaratory doctrines.

Can we therefore simply deduce that there was to be a great deal of 'clarity' (through a paper) in nuclear doctrines, which would make 'stable' any nuclear deterrence relationship? Nuclear deterrence was never really meant to make things easier for the other side and there has inherently been much else besides merely ambivalence -- duality, dishonesty and purposeful misguidance -- all of which was practiced by the United States and the Soviet Union with regards to nuclear doctrines.

Indian analysts are to be commended for having incisively grasped this duality of doctrines during the Cold War. In a recent study, senior Indian strategist Raja Menon finds that "American policy might be justified as telling a lie for a good cause" with regards to the dichotomy in the declaratory and actual nuclear doctrines. He cites McNamara in 1961 who prepared a doctrine that would permit a controlled thermo-nuclear war. In this new doctrine the United States would not target Soviet cities, Soviet C3 and nuclear facilities would retain a controlled response. However, McNamara then conducted a secret briefing with the American military calmly clarifying that this would serve only as a "declaratory" policy and would certainly not be used for target planning.

Indeed if Pakistan is still criticised for any 'ambivalence', one could infer that Pakistan too would be better off telling doctrinal lies "for a good cause". Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is accused of an uncomfortable degree of ambivalence, in spite of the fact that from time to time there are bold assertions of a first strike/pre-emptive strike in case the national security of the country is at stake. But more interesting are speculations of what Pakistan's nuclear doctrine would look like (if the veil of truth was removed for a good cause). Or what could Pakistan's nuclear doctrine look like in terms of 'severity' ("minimum" deterrence) and degree of clarity and specifications.

India on the other hand has in fact issued such a paper and therefore (by implication) distanced itself from this allegation of ambivalence. The only non-generality in the Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine, still in circulation without an official stamp nearly after a decade, is its "policy of 'retaliation only'" where the "survivability of (Indian) arsenal is critical". In this doctrine of retaliation where the development of a second strike capability is mandatory and is a "dynamic concept" whereby it can be stretched to extremes in accordance with nuclear ambitions. It does not seem to offer any 'red-lines' either, beyond the proposition that if attacked with a nuclear first-strike India will strike back with "punitive retaliation".

In a nutshell Pakistan is poised for a nuclear first strike if it feels it cannot handle a military threat with its conventional arms, while India will indulge in self-imposed abstinence until struck first, even outside India (undeniably the most interesting revelation in the whole Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine!) and then respond with "punitive retaliation". Nevertheless, both states hold the official view that their nuclear doctrines are "defensive". While Pakistan cannot define how far it can be pushed before launching its nuclear weapons, India cannot define who the enemy can be; therefore its nuclear capability is open-ended.

The clarifications afforded by the Indian doctrine (adding to the stability of South Asian nuclear deterrence) stretch out beyond this Indian Draft Nuclear Doctrine itself. The heavy jargon of credibility, survivability and punitive retaliation and much else contained in this draft doctrine may have achieved primarily political aims in the minds of its formulators. It is indeed debatable whether it was meant to, or has in reality, contributed much towards any military clarification or to our (awaited) "stable" nuclear deterrence.

In the long run, nuclear doctrines could be of paramount significance to deal with maintenance of stable nuclear deterrence even under conditions of asymmetry. 'First Use' and 'No First Use' are simple words, answers and many times part of declared doctrines. However, the blocks which make the pyramids on which these words stand are very significant for formulating nuclear doctrines in South Asia.

Pakistan retains the option of formally publishing a (lengthy) nuclear doctrine document if and when it seems beneficial to do so. Yet, speculations and calculations will persist regardless of whether a paper is in circulation or not. Real motives and intentions can be camouflaged by declaratory positions. In a time of crisis, a number of factors produce the action considered necessary to deal with the threat in the most efficient manner. Expecting a doctrine on paper to bolster nuclear stability in the region or attaching total credibility to any doctrine already in existence needs re-examination.