What made IAF Stand down in Kargil

[Windjammer]

IAF was operating at will inside its own airspace and not in Pakistan's. You skipped that part, eh? lol..

Kaiser Tufail never said otherwise. I've read his account---multiple times. Please post the relevant parts where he somehow implied that iaf operated inside Pakistani territory 'at will' ? iaf never did.

And the same PM who claimed that he didn't even know about Kargil operations claimed 4000 number and you are willing to accept it even when this number has been shown to be thoroughly wrong? Offcourse, it's called being willfully naive. You seriously think Pakistan army deployed 4000 soldiers with all the ammunition and equipment on small, freezing peaks of Kargil--that too, in an operation that was supposed to be an infiltration of Indian posts left by their Army? Do you really believe that it's even possible?

You are in a defence forum, stop making a fool out of yourself by claiming things that aren't even logistically logical. No shame in accepting the fact that indians lost many more men than us--we were on top and indians were amassed on the ground. Nothing unusual here.

But offcourse, indians killed 4000 men on peaks (where 4000 men can't even be deployed!!!)..while indians lost fewer men climbing up...sure.

Since all the fighting took place on the Indian side, it's only logical that all the casualties also occurred there... wonder how many bodies did Indians recovered or did Pakistan managed to retrieve some 4000 bodies. LoL.

 

[AUz]

Kargil discussion and Kaiser Tufail's account always make my heart grow a little...why?

Because irrelevant of what happened 17 years ago (fanbodys from both sides can continue their gibberish--I'll do my part as well)--this part reveals how far we have came in terms of air power and capability to defend all corners of our airspace..

Actually, this will prove you right in this very post:


It also must be noted too that other than F-16s, the PAF did not have a capable enough fighter for patrolling, as the minimum requirement in this scenario was an on-board airborne intercept radar, exceptional agility and sufficient staying power. F-7s had reasonably good manoeuvrability but lacked an intercept radar as well as endurance, while the ground attack Mirage-III/5s and A-5s were sitting ducks for the air combat mission.

In sum, the PAF found it expedient not to worry too much about minor border violations and instead, conserve resources for the larger conflagration that was looming. All the same, it gave the enemy no pretext for retaliation in the face of any provocation, though this latter stance irked some quarters in the Army that were desperate to ‘equal the match’. Might it strike to some that PAF’s restraint in warding off a major conflagration may have been its paramount contribution to the Kargil conflict?

Today, we not only have more superior F-16s in larger numbers than in 1999--today, we also have hundreds of other jets capable of carrying out air-to-air mission with advance radars on board and even BVRs. Moreover, our previously "sitting ducks" assets have also been upgraded with air-to-air radars on board and sophisticated weaponry backed with powerful AWACS and all of the integrated into a network centric war fighting mechanism guarding every inch of our aerial borders.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Kargil discussion and Kaiser Tufail's account always make my heart grow a little...why?

Because irrelevant of what happened 17 years ago (fanbodys from both sides can continue their gibberish--I'll do my part as well)--this part reveals how far we have came in terms of air power and capability to defend all corners of our airspace..



Today, we not only have more superior F-16s in larger numbers than in 1999--today, we also have hundreds of other jets capable of carrying out air-to-air mission with advance radars on board and even BVRs. Moreover, our previously "sitting ducks" assets have also been upgraded with air-to-air radars on board and sophisticated weaponry backed with powerful AWACS and all of the integrated into a network centric war fighting mechanism guarding every inch of our aerial borders.

Ah, if only you had these in time to make the IAF stand down in Kargil!

And if only you could see how you would be making up stories to explain what happens to you next time around as well!

Kargil discussion and Kaiser Tufail's account always make my heart grow a little...why?

Because irrelevant of what happened 17 years ago (fanbodys from both sides can continue their gibberish--I'll do my part as well)--this part reveals how far we have came in terms of air power and capability to defend all corners of our airspace..



Today, we not only have more superior F-16s in larger numbers than in 1999--today, we also have hundreds of other jets capable of carrying out air-to-air mission with advance radars on board and even BVRs. Moreover, our previously "sitting ducks" assets have also been upgraded with air-to-air radars on board and sophisticated weaponry backed with powerful AWACS and all of the integrated into a network centric war fighting mechanism guarding every inch of our aerial borders.

And, while you can buy all the shiny little toys your dear little hearts desire, you can't buy the brains, you can't buy the healthy atmosphere in which sensible and workable plans can be evolved. To end my series of citations from Tufail Sahib, here is the summation of why you will continue to lose, irrespective:

In a country where democratic traditions have never been deep-rooted, it is no big exposé to point out that the military is steeped in an authoritarian, rather than a consensual approach. To my mind, there is an urgent need to inculcate a more liberal culture that accommodates different points of view – a more lateral approach, so to speak. Disagreement during planning should be systemically tolerated and, not taken as a personal affront. Unfortunately, many in higher ranks seem to think that rank alone confers wisdom and, anyone displaying signs of intelligence at an earlier stage is, somehow, an alien in their ‘star-spangled’ universe.

Kargil, I suspect, like the ‘65 and ‘71 Wars, was a case of not having enough dissenters (‘devil’s advocates’, if you will) during planning, because everyone wanted to agree with the boss. That single reason, I think, was the root cause of most of the failures that were apparent right from the beginning. If this point is understood well, remedial measures towards tolerance and liberalism can follow as a matter of course. Such an organisational milieu, based on honest appraisal and fearless appeal, would be conducive to sound and sensible planning. It would also go a long way in precluding Kargil-like disasters.

It's not about the machines; it's not about the technology. It never was.

 

[Sneaker]

Please post the relevant parts where he somehow implied that iaf operated inside Pakistani territory 'at will'

Here you go..
"....While the photo-recce missions typically did not involve deliberate border violations, there were a total of 37 ‘technical violations’ (which emanate as a consequence of kinks and bends in the geographical boundaries). Typically, these averaged to a depth of five nautical miles, except on one occasion when the IAF fighters apparently cocked-a-snoot at the PAF and came in 13 miles deep...."

"In sum, the PAF found it expedient not to worry too much about minor border violations ..."

But offcourse, indians killed 4000 men on peaks (where 4000 men can't even be deployed!!!)..while indians lost fewer men climbing up...sure.

You are in a military forum. You should know the difference between "casualties" and "KIA/killed/dead". You should also know that artys travel lot further than the peaks...

 

[Thorough Pro]

Plenty of pea brained Indians with big talk, the REALITY is that not only did indian air force stood down multiple times it's army also didn't find one pair of balls among the million-man strong fully armed, war ready army on our borders for two full years. Do all the big talk you want, your coward army and air force will always shit in your face.

 

[Hamza913]

.
I really, sincerely wish that you wouldn't open your pie-hole until you've done your background homework.
.

How many times did you reply to the same post I made? Anyway, I'm not going to bother replying after this since you again started off with insults. I will leave it at the fact that no matter what you say, India couldn't attack Pakistan and win. That's undisputable fact, because if it could have it would have. These stand offs don't just happen for no reason, and the intricate plans that people have shown all of a sudden just not happening cannot just be because India changed its mind. India realised just what it was getting into, and backed away. End of story.

 

[Ultima Thule]

How many times did you reply to the same post I made? Anyway, I'm not going to bother replying after this since you again started off with insults. I will leave it at the fact that no matter what you say, India couldn't attack Pakistan and win. That's undisputable fact, because if it could have it would have. These stand offs don't just happen for no reason, and the intricate plans that people have shown all of a sudden just not happening cannot just be because India changed its mind. India realised just what it was getting into, and backed away. End of story.

Don't live in your wet dreams

 

[Hamza913]

Don't live in your wet dreams

I'm not living in "wet dreams", I'm living in reality.

 

[Gregor Clegane]


Ex CIA officer on IAF strike on NLI's Munto Dhalo Depot.
Airpower at 18,000’: The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War
Benjamin Lambeth
REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2012
A Successful Endgame for India.
By the time Operation Vijay had reached full momentum in early June, the Indian Army had marshaled nearly a corps’ worth of dedicated troop strength in the Kargil area, including the Third and Eighth Mountain Divisions and a substantial number of supporting artillery units. The overriding objective of those forces was to recapture the high ground from which the intruders had a direct line of sight to highway NH1A, allowing them to lay down sustained artillery fire on it and on adjacent targets. Toward that end, after more than a week of hard fighting, units of Eighth Mountain Division recaptured the strategically important Tololing ridge complex and the adjacent Point 5203 in the Batalik sector on June 13, in what one informed account later described as “probably the turning point” in India’s land counteroffensive.67
Four days later, on June 17, another important breakthrough in the joint campaign was achieved when a formation of 7 Squadron Mirage 2000Hs struck and destroyed the enemy’s main administrative and logistics encampment at Muntho Dhalo in the Batalik sector by means of accurately placed 1,000-pound general-purpose bombs delivered in high-angle dive attacks using the aircraft’s computer-assisted weapons-aiming capability. For this pivotal attack, the IAF waited until the encampment had grown to a size that rendered it strategically ripe for such targeting. The AOC-in-C of Western Air Command at the time, Air Marshal Patney, affirmed later that the essentially total destruction by the IAF of the NLI’s rudimentary but absolutely life-sustaining infrastructure at Muntho Dhalo “paralyzed the enemy war effort, as it was their major supply depot.”68 In characterizing the attack as “perhaps the most spectacular of all the [campaign’s air] strikes,” a serving IAF air commodore reported at the end of 1999 that it resulted in as many as 300 enemy casualties within just minutes.69 Figure 3 shows pre- and post-strike aerial imagery of the enemy camp at Muntho Dhalo. In the first image, a dense array of tents and structures, as well as tracks leading up the hillside from the encampment, are clearly visible. In the second, after completion of the IAF’s attacks, all that remain are bomb craters and rubble.
A week later, on June 24, a two-ship element of Mirage 2000Hs, in the first-ever combat
use of laser-guided bombs by the IAF, struck and destroyed the NLI’s command and control bunkers on Tiger Hill, the direction center for the forward-based artillery that had
been fired against the Indian Army’s brigade headquarters at Dras. !ey used two 1,000-
pound Paveway II laser-guided munitions, with other fighters striking additional targets
with unguided bombs.
In these attacks, the target was acquired through the Litening
pod’s electro-optical imaging sensor at about 12 miles out, with weapon release occurring
at a slant range of about 5 miles and the aircraft then turning away while continuing to
mark the target with a laser spot for the weapon to guide on.

https://defence.pk/threads/ex-cia-officer-on-iaf-strike-on-nlis-munto-dhalo-depot.208907/

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/20/airpower-at-18-000-indian-air-force-in-kargil-war/dvc4#

 

[rockstarIN]

Is the meaning of 'stand down' changed?

 

[surya kiran]

India couldn't attack Pakistan and win

Do not mistake intent for capability. We do not want to attack Pakistan. We have done it once. And it ended up in Bangladesh. There is no incentive for India to invade Pakistan.

 

[Hamza913]

Do not mistake intent for capability. We do not want to attack Pakistan. We have done it once. And it ended up in Bangladesh. There is no incentive for India to invade Pakistan.

That one time you did it was when Pakistan was at an utter disadvantage, there was no possible way for us to protect East Pakistan. It was literally surrounded by India. If India controlled, let's say, Quetta, and Pakistan blockaded it, would India be able to do anything? No. And please don't forget we still gave you a good enough beating to make you pursue nuclear weapons.

As to whether or not India can invade Pakistan now (or in 99, 02 or 08), you can't. You put on such a big show and were going to numerous times, but realised it wasn't exactly a smart move. India wouldn't just halt an attack because it all of a sudden didn't feel like it, the only possible reason is that India realised it was not capable.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Plenty of pea brained Indians with big talk, the REALITY is that not only did indian air force stood down multiple times it's army also didn't find one pair of balls among the million-man strong fully armed, war ready army on our borders for two full years. Do all the big talk you want, your coward army and air force will always shit in your face.

<ahem>

Those were citations from an Air Commodore in the PAF, who retired with honour. Where in his account did you find corroboration for your empty-headed brag that the IAF stood down multiple times? Of course, he didn't talk about the IA, so that, we must conclude, is your speculation. As for the cowardice, brave men don't have to die to prove anything to creatures like you.

Thorough Pro, I believe. At what? Blowing up balloons?

How many times did you reply to the same post I made? Anyway, I'm not going to bother replying after this since you again started off with insults. I will leave it at the fact that no matter what you say, India couldn't attack Pakistan and win. That's undisputable fact, because if it could have it would have. These stand offs don't just happen for no reason, and the intricate plans that people have shown all of a sudden just not happening cannot just be because India changed its mind. India realised just what it was getting into, and backed away. End of story.

Why should India attack Pakistan? Not once in our mutual history of warfare has India done that. In this case, too, India took back the outposts that Pakistani troops had occupied while they were vacated during winter.

As for saying that India couldn't attack Pakistan and win, because if it could have it would have, it's like saying that China couldn't attack Burma and win, because if it could have it would have. The logic is sadly absent.

It is true that these stand-offs don't happen for no reason; which part of Tufail Sahib's explanation of the addle-headed plan by three addle-pated Pakistani generals did you not understand? What intricate plans are you talking about? Pakistan occupied Indian territory, India threw the occupiers out. What was intricate about that? And where was the backing away? All the outposts are now back in our hands, so what did we back away from?

Talk sense, and you will be heard. Not otherwise.

Is the meaning of 'stand down' changed?

For @Thorough Pro and @dsr478 , yes, they don't like the conversation any more, it isn't going their way, they have no clue where to look for information once they run out of Internet fanboy forum anecdotes, and what was printed was not comfortable for them. So they've put out some defiant, we-shall-fight-them-on-the-beaches, kind of perorations and quit. @AUz has hit back, pointing out correctly the vast improvements made by the PAF, and used that to cover the fact that when it comes to the topic that we are discussing, what we said was essentially correct; he acknowledges that by avoiding the subject and dwelling on the glorious future.

That one time you did it was when Pakistan was at an utter disadvantage, there was no possible way for us to protect East Pakistan. It was literally surrounded by India. If India controlled, let's say, Quetta, and Pakistan blockaded it, would India be able to do anything? No. And please don't forget we still gave you a good enough beating to make you pursue nuclear weapons.

As to whether or not India can invade Pakistan now (or in 99, 02 or 08), you can't. You put on such a big show and were going to numerous times, but realised it wasn't exactly a smart move. India wouldn't just halt an attack because it all of a sudden didn't feel like it, the only possible reason is that India realised it was not capable.

Think about it yourself. Go up to the border and realise that we are not capable? Are you seriously saying that this can happen?

 

[Ultima Thule]

I'm not living in "wet dreams", I'm living in reality.

 

[AUz]

Ah, if only you had these in time to make the IAF stand down in Kargil!

And if only you could see how you would be making up stories to explain what happens to you next time around as well!

No stories here.

It's harder for IAF to break-in into our airspace today than it was in 1999. The quality and scale of our airpower has significantly increased post-2006..

Offcourse it wouldn't make IAF stand down if india principally decides to launch a war against us...

And from our pov, "next time" already happened. In 2001-02, and in 2008---both times, indian military "stood down" as we moved our military elements towards war-time locations and started Combat Air Patrols over our cities and around our aerial borders. With our nuclear warheads increasing in number, quality, and our missile's range now covering even Eastern most Islands of India , rest assured, indian military will continue to "stand-down" and a certain threshold will be maintained in subcontinent.

And, while you can buy all the shiny little toys your dear little hearts desire, you can't buy the brains, you can't buy the healthy atmosphere in which sensible and workable plans can be evolved. To end my series of citations from Tufail Sahib, here is the summation of why you will continue to lose, irrespective:

In a country where democratic traditions have never been deep-rooted, it is no big exposé to point out that the military is steeped in an authoritarian, rather than a consensual approach. To my mind, there is an urgent need to inculcate a more liberal culture that accommodates different points of view – a more lateral approach, so to speak. Disagreement during planning should be systemically tolerated and, not taken as a personal affront. Unfortunately, many in higher ranks seem to think that rank alone confers wisdom and, anyone displaying signs of intelligence at an earlier stage is, somehow, an alien in their ‘star-spangled’ universe.

Kargil, I suspect, like the ‘65 and ‘71 Wars, was a case of not having enough dissenters (‘devil’s advocates’, if you will) during planning, because everyone wanted to agree with the boss. That single reason, I think, was the root cause of most of the failures that were apparent right from the beginning. If this point is understood well, remedial measures towards tolerance and liberalism can follow as a matter of course. Such an organisational milieu, based on honest appraisal and fearless appeal, would be conducive to sound and sensible planning. It would also go a long way in precluding Kargil-like disasters.

It's not about the machines; it's not about the technology. It never was.

PAF's culture was never authoritarian. PAF's strategic insight and planning have always been of top quality amongst all services of subcontinent---leading PAF to preempt 1965 indian invasion and launching multiple successful attacks on enemy--and even achieving a better kill ratio over larger enemy in 1971.

However, Army has been the dominant service in our military and their strategic insight has been questionable at times. However, this culture has changed. PAF-Army have become increasingly synchronized over last decade and disagreements at Corps commander meetings isn't unusual anymore. Example of it can be seen in Pakistan Army's decisions regarding Waziristan operations.

Anyways...