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The Battle of the Hydaspes: A Mystery in the Mists of Time

Ok, no pun was intended, may be you don't understand Punjabi;
khehna Tee noo tay sunana Nu noo :lol:
As of Wasabi, an alternate nick that I can adopt now is 'Jaggu Bhai' but I would prefer Jaggu Dada.:lol:
Now a question which is circling in my mind for a few days; what was the caste of Raja Porus?, Kshtriya? or Rajput? (in this case which clan), that can be evidenced from Greek sources. May be you can help me with this. Thanking you in advance.

I am right now going through "Alexander the Greart" by Arrian, translated to English by John Rooke printed in 1814. This was presented as a gift to Harvard College by some Mrs.Brandegee in 1908 available on free online library.

In this book the author speaks of one Johann Freinsheim or also known under the Latinized form of the name, Johannes Frenshemius (November 16, 1608 – August 31, 1660) a german scholar. He is best known for his famous supplements to Quintus Curtius and Livy, containing the missing books written by himself. This scholar stated that Porus's father was no more than a barber.

However there seems to be an attempt by most other historians to link him with some kshatriya clan.
 
Ok, no pun was intended, may be you don't understand Punjabi;
khehna Tee noo tay sunana Nu noo :lol:
As of Wasabi, an alternate nick that I can adopt now is 'Jaggu Bhai' but I would prefer Jaggu Dada.:lol:
Jaggu Dada it is.

Now a question which is circling in my mind for a few days;

:eek: CIRCLING IN YOUR MIND?

You might like to look up the birth of Pallas Athena. Just give us fair warning before your friendly local blacksmith takes a whack with his hammer, will you?

what was the caste of Raja Porus?, Kshtriya? or Rajput? (in this case which clan), that can be evidenced from Greek sources. May be you can help me with this. Thanking you in advance.

Kshatriya.

No need for evidence from Greek sources. There was no Rajput caste in those times, not for a few centuries more. Earliest Rajput records, in the sense of epigraphic evidence of the legendary 36 famous clans, is found around the turn of the first millennium, and shortly after. Their heyday was approximately 800 AD to 1200 AD, perhaps 1300 AD.

The descendants of the post-Bactrian Greek north-west invaders, Saka-Pahlava, Kushana, Ephthalite Hun, were retrofitted into Hindu society by the Brahmins. This process was known as sanskritization, and it is possible that the process included a ceremony accepting an individual or collection of leading individuals from a tribe or endogamous group into Hindu society. This could have been at a fire-sacrifice. The portion marked in orange is highly speculative, is based on similar processes and ceremonies that have been conducted, and are Brahminical methods intended to induct non-Hindus into Hindu society, which are never referred to when Brahmins inform us that none may be converted into Hindu, a person must be born Hindu.

Ironically, they became among the staunchest of Hindus, and defended the interests of Hindu India against all subsequent invaders. Another of history's ironies. It is another matter that all these invaders at one level or another covered their drive to pillage and plunder under a religious rubric. End of rant.

Back to Porus. Indian commentators, especially Hindu commentators tend to associate Porus with Puru, with Paurava, with descent from older families listed in the Mahabharata, and so on. This is not proven in any way.

However, for those who are interested in the proto-history of these times and places, it appears from painful piecing together of a combination of literary evidence from the Vedas, including the Vedic commentaries, the Puranas and the epics, the Mahabharata and Ramayana, that there were two branches of Vedic culture: one located in the upper-Indus and upper-Gangetic valleys, one located in the Narmada valley, more or less (strictly, on the Arabian Sea coastline and into the Vindhyas lying behind).

The two branches fought, frequently, against each other and within themselves; the northern branch was dominated by the Purus, and there was a famous battle, the Battle of the Ten Kings, reported in the Rg Veda, where the king of the Bharata sub-tribe defeated his kinsmen of the rest of the Purus and more or less established supremacy. The name 'Bharata' for India is in one account derived from this tribe and its eponymous king (not the one at the Battle of the Ten Kings).

The southern branch consisted of the powerful Turvasus and Yadus. It is significant that Dwarka, associated with the Yadu prince, Krishna, is on the coast, actually submerged; the presence of the clan in the Mathura region may represent an over-extension which attenuated their power and brought them under the sway of a powerful kingdom in Magadha, which they escaped only by retiring from their exposed salient position. The reportage takes the form of associating a powerful Yadava (born of the Yadu clan) prince named Kamsa with the kingship of the Surasena kingdom, dominated by three royal clans, the Vrishni, Bhoja and Andhaka, which clans and which kingdom Kamsa ruled with the support of the very powerful Magadhan king Jarasandha.

Krishna used the rebel or break-away faction of the Kuru clan, the sons of Pandu, the Pandavas, to break the power of Jarasandha, without necessarily risking a return to the over-extended, exposed position in Mathura, and in turn, helped them in their own battle against the established royal family, the Kauravas, the sons of Kuru.

It is not being suggested that this has parallels to our times and our situations.

It is therefore not at all clear what connection Porus had with Puru, or with that old clan, the Pauravas. He did, however, occupy more or less the same space, and the Mahabharata War did culminate in the Battle of Kurukshetra very close by. All this is suggestive but wholly inconclusive.

There is an incredible breed of scholar, Indians as well as foreigners, who have painstakingly put together king lists with the sequence collated from these literary materials, and have, some of them, found Porus in their list, others, not to be found lacking in their zeal and methodical scholarship, omitting this name.
 
After reading accounts of the same battles and/ or events written by different authors, I came to the conclusion that most writers describe the event correctly regardless of the fact whether they are for or against a certain ruler. For example if Alexander won, it would be mentioned as such and very seldom a loss would be shown as victory.

Propaganda came in the details of the event.
Victor may be credited with extra ordinary valour or would be shown to beat an army ten times the size of his own whereas in actual fact opposing armies were roughly equal in number. On the other hand a loss may be justified by saying that this was due to betrayal or because of extreme numerical inferiority. While it remains difficult to critically judged accounts of the ancient events; this becomes apparent when we read accounts of more recent battles. Mongolian invasion is case in point.

Most of the European and Iranian sources attribute Mongol victories to their numerical superiority. Any serious analyst would conclude that Mongolian Steppes was too sparsely populated (as it is to this day) to produce hundreds of thousands of Mongol soldiers that could overwhelm armies of the densely populated fertile lands of Eurasia and China. It was in fact their speed of advance and because Mongol used to split their forces and converge on a city from different directions that created the impression that Mongols were countless hordes. Needless to say that Mongols also had the good fortune of having very competent leadership.

The red part is simply don't hold true in many cases, for example, War of 1812, highly disputed results or Massacre of Armenians, 1915 whether its was a genocide or not, huge unsettled debate etc.
Some time or many times, at gross level all things are not that black or white.
Propaganda is not only the confusing factor or sole cause of inaccuracies in history books, other factors, like, availability or nonavailability of sources, nature of sources, effect of event on sources, lack of relevant info etc etc take their toll. For example, from quoted example of Mongol invasion, when were the Iranian historian able to know the condition of Asian steppes? how many years after invasions?

My purpose for this digression was to say it doesn’t make a huge difference as to which of the sources you prefer to use as reference.

It make a difference, normally a huge one, reasons mentioned in upper part. You are as good as your source, I read some where up written in the thread.

However, I am only a reader of history, not a professional historian and my views are not necessarily correct.
Yes, we all are, and our views are not necessarily correct and frankly don't need to be correct as far as we are willing to learn.
 
Joe u have asked about the differences of Tarn and Arrian. I have come up with few of my deductions on what i read , please answer these as it is not possible to move on to the battle without these being cleared:

In Tarn's narrative he says no one had travelled farther into India as a result not much was known to Alexander. However there are myths about Dionysus and/or Bacchus invading India. While these are myths , it shows some knowledge of India the Greeks had??

Tarn says that Alexander used Xenophon's Anabasis as a guide for his Indian expedition, however Xenophon's Ananbasis was used by him in early phases of his Persian expedition (according to wiki)

Tarn's narrative doesn't mention how the Greeks crossed the Indus?? isn't this important in a military point of view??

In the book i am reading it says the ships are laid parallel to the bank and against the stream however wicker baskets filled with stones and hung from their prows steady them and so on according to required to numbers.

According to Tarn the number of elephants is 56 while Arrian says 24 it seems

Then the following are my questions out of curiosity

Is porus a fool not to see the enemy splitting up and moving up the river?? Wouldn't he had his
archers stationed at such points??

again here the crossing river is not explained which is vital. If the ships were used as said in arrians
account where he states that the greeks simply took the vessels into small parts put them
together at the crossing point. The night was a stormy one says Arrian which covered their
preparations from being heard by the enemy (i.e. Porus) like clashing of armors and the commanding
officers giving orders, which can be said will not be in hushed tones. However the ships would be
swept away right in storm so magically the storm starts till their preparations are over and
subsides exactly when the Greeks wanted to cross??

how the hell did porus who was born and brought up there and who brought his army to fight
the enemy to a certain place (as a king and as a general and as a person with knowledge of terrain)
forget about these islands which could help the enemy to get a swift crossing??

if we say that the single point of local terrain knowledge he had and that he expected the enemy
to be deficient of this is the reason for defeat (effectively i am saying he is over confident)
then it is very very bad reasoning as Alexander then would not be impressed of his military acumen
and treat him so well.

Please provide your views.
 
I will try. You do see the angles in the battle opening up due to reading different accounts, don't you?

Joe u have asked about the differences of Tarn and Arrian. I have come up with few of my deductions on what i read , please answer these as it is not possible to move on to the battle without these being cleared:

In Tarn's narrative he says no one had travelled farther into India as a result not much was known to Alexander. However there are myths about Dionysus and/or Bacchus invading India. While these are myths , it shows some knowledge of India the Greeks had??

I hope you will have an opportunity to read Tarn on a lazy summer afternoon, with no pressure, no deadlines; the reason why it is very comfortable to read Tarn is precisely because of his slant; if you remember, your critique of Tarn mentions that he looks at things from the point of view of a Scots gentleman, and to me, there could be worse things to be!!!

Tarn actually has a brilliant passage where he explains that the Achaemenids, and the rest of the world through them, and the Greeks who ventured throughout the Achaemenid Empire as much as anyone else, actually knew India very well at one point of time. Tarn points out that the admiral of the first Darius, the great emperor of the Persian War, had a Greek admiral, Scylax, who sailed down the Indus and back to Egypt. Darius himself ruled a much greater part of India than did his descendants; by the time of the Alexandrian Darius, (Darius III), Paropamisadae, Gandhara, bits of Sindh and bits of the Punjab had been lost.

In addition, it is suggested that early Indian punched coins were inspired by Achaemenid coinage. Achaemenid practice was to use Aramaic script, and this was used in Taxila, and became a source of inspiration for Indian Kharoshthi. In Taxila itself, a number of Iranians remained.

But Persia in general had forgotten the details about India. Their focus and concentration on the west of their empire distracted their attention, and it was by the time of Alexander a forgotten former province of theirs - something, for instance, like the way we think about Burma, which Indians in general, particularly south Indians of the trading community, knew, but now dim memories, some place names, stories of women who smoke cheroots with the burning end inside their mouths, and so on.

Tarn says that Alexander used Xenophon's Anabasis as a guide for his Indian expedition, however Xenophon's Ananbasis was used by him in early phases of his Persian expedition (according to wiki)

It is impossible to have used the Anabasis as a guide for the Indian expedition, for the simple reason that the Anabasis covered a completely different territory. The climactic battle was at Cunaxa, in Babylon, on the way to Susa; from there, the war-band fought its way up the Tigris across the Armenian mountains to the shores of the Black Sea.

Take a look:

File:Persian_Empire,_490_BC.png


There are two references to Xenophon in Tarn, one about Alexander's mystic experience at the temple of Jupiter Ammon, the other a line stating that Xenophon mistakenly thought that Cyrus (Cyrus the Great, not Xenophon's pretender prince, Cyrus the Younger) ruled all of India up to the eastern Ocean.

Alexander might just possibly have thought, after his battle with Porus, that consolidating the boundaries of the Persian Empire, of which he was now the Emperor, would be best done by travelling up to the ends of the old Cyrus I boundaries. That is the only sense in which we can imagine that he took the Anabasis as a guide for his Indian expedition.


Tarn's narrative doesn't mention how the Greeks crossed the Indus?? isn't this important in a military point of view??

Interesting point.

"Alexander now joined Hephaestion on the Indus. Hephaestion had bridged the river at Ohind, 16 miles above Attock, and had built in sections a number of boats, including some triakontors (light warships of 15 oars a side); while Taxiles had sent 30 elephants. Alexander crossed the Indus in early spring 326....."

I can only assume that Tarn imagines that serious readers would know Arrian already, and did not bother to reproduce the details available in Arrian. Where Arrian was not so detailed, he himself went into the facts pretty closely.

In the book i am reading it says the ships are laid parallel to the bank and against the stream however wicker baskets filled with stones and hung from their prows steady them and so on according to required to numbers.

If I remember correctly, Arrian had outlined two versions of the bridge of boats; one being a placement of one boat at a time, one after the other, each lashed to the last boat placed on being put into position; the other was to float down a collection of boats sufficient to bridge the stream, and to lash them together once they reached the point where the crossing was to take place. You seem to be describing the first type.


According to Tarn the number of elephants is 56 while Arrian says 24 it seems

Different figures in different places; Tarn reports 25 being sent to Alexander during his mountain warfare campaign, and just before he crossed the Hindu Kush; then he reports another 30 being sent just before the crossing of the Indus (see above). Alexander, however, used them only for transport. I don't have Arrian open at the moment, and am too lazy to do so, as I have to rush out shortly.

Then the following are my questions out of curiosity

Is porus a fool not to see the enemy splitting up and moving up the river?? Wouldn't he had his
archers stationed at such points??

He did have such observers actually. If you read carefully, Alexander left the camp, travelled far inland, and then looped back to reach the river bank behind the cover of the wooded island - a sort of a huge 'C'. While he was inland, away from the river, nobody would have seen him.

again here the crossing river is not explained which is vital. If the ships were used as said in arrians
account where he states that the greeks simply took the vessels into small parts put them
together at the crossing point. The night was a stormy one says Arrian which covered their
preparations from being heard by the enemy (i.e. Porus) like clashing of armors and the commanding
officers giving orders, which can be said will not be in hushed tones. However the ships would be
swept away right in storm so magically the storm starts till their preparations are over and
subsides exactly when the Greeks wanted to cross?? As they say in country fairs, "Yer pays yer money, and yer takes yer chice." In another interesting account that Rafi wanted us to see, the Michael Woods version, a retired Major General reconstructs the crossing as having been done on inflated water-skins and on bales (bundles, actually) of hay floating in the water. This method had actually been used elsewhere, and it is interesting that it was suggested here. We have no ways of knowing.

We must also remember that these were not sailed ships but rowed ones, triakontors, to repeat from the description of what Hephaestion did while waiting for Alexander. The stormy weather would have had less effect on their steering and river-worthiness than on a sailed ship.


how the hell did porus who was born and brought up there and who brought his army to fight
the enemy to a certain place (as a king and as a general and as a person with knowledge of terrain)
forget about these islands which could help the enemy to get a swift crossing??


Nobody knows why Porus chose this spot and no other, except that a spur of the Salt Range came very close to the river at this point, pinching the available land so that it was less easy to flank the defending army and go past. Apparently, there are two points at which this happens, at Jhelum and at Jalalpur, and both are recommended as sites of the battle. Rafi would have it that the site was Jalalpur. That has not been ruled out.

if we say that the single point of local terrain knowledge he had and that he expected the enemy
to be deficient of this is the reason for defeat (effectively i am saying he is over confident)
then it is very very bad reasoning as Alexander then would not be impressed of his military acumen
and treat him so well.

Two points: there was sufficient space between the actual crossing point and the battle field to make an initially unobserved crossing, but we must remember that Alexander was nothing if not audacious; at the Granicus, he had crossed the river in the teeth of the arrayed Persian Army, and for him to spend several days parading up and down to fool a hill raja was a phenomenal act of respect on his part.

Yet it was not too far for the Macedonians to march down (all the way again) and give battle.

It was a question of concentration; putting some troops at the crossing point could have been done, and that would have been a cardinal error from most military points of view. it is advised to keep one's troops concentrated, and able to move as one, not distributed and prone to defeat in penny packets. What then was Porus to do? Split his forces, or keep sentries on guard and stay together in one spot? It seems to me that he had few choices, and took the best.

Coming to why Alexander gave him respect, it was not for military acumen but for sheer animal courage. And the great fight that he and his men put up.


Please provide your views.
 
I will try. You do see the angles in the battle opening up due to reading different accounts, don't you?

Yes reading more is bringing new things in to the soup.

While u have excellently explained the knowledge of this country thing i am contesting the sentence where he says the expedition on to India was just an extention of consolidation of his empire. I think that Alexander wanted to be known as the real Dionysus or Bacchus (who were just mythical to educated greeks i suppose) who subjugated the Indians.

Its true i will have to find out and read up Tarn for sure. In the few excerpts of Tarn's book u gave he seems to have used Curtius Rufus too for sure which is completely berated in the book i am reading (even this i have to understand further as to why)

Yes the going inland explains it and i am sure the Taxiles must have provided him information as said by Tarn, Arrian doesn't say this.

Thanks the triakontars things explained the storm part i wondered

The selection of the spot chosen for the purpose as u said hadn't served well right??

Joe the moving up and down the river seems to be an act of desperation rather than respect ?? elephants being the obvious answer.
 
At this point, I am compelled to say in the open something already brought to your notice in private; your posts are good, and you should stop feeling diffident. Nobody will object if you start making assertive statements, rather than asking tentative questions.

Yes reading more is bringing new things in to the soup. :)

While u have excellently explained the knowledge of this country thing i am contesting the sentence where he says the expedition on to India was just an extention of consolidation of his empire. I think that Alexander wanted to be known as the real Dionysus or Bacchus (who were just mythical to educated greeks i suppose) who subjugated the Indians.

Heh. Good one. Read Tarn on Alexander's feelings at Nysa.


Its true i will have to find out and read up Tarn for sure. In the few excerpts of Tarn's book u gave he seems to have used Curtius Rufus too for sure which is completely berated in the book i am reading (even this i have to understand further as to why)

Happy digging. And imagine what fun it will be when we come to the more recent, better reported battles!


Yes the going inland explains it and i am sure the Taxiles must have provided him information as said by Tarn, Arrian doesn't say this.

We already know that there were local Indians in his orbat.


Thanks the triakontars things explained the storm part i wondered :azn:

The selection of the spot chosen for the purpose as u said hadn't served well right??

I don't think that either of them had much choice.


Joe the moving up and down the river seems to be an act of desperation rather than respect ?? elephants being the obvious answer.

To me, it sounds like standard war-craft. The Chinese did exactly the same in Kameng in 62.

You might ask CardSharp to point you to the maps which show the Chinese positions on the other side of the shallow mountain streams, on the Thag La ridge. You can read up on what actually followed in a number of accounts thereafter, all reasonably authentic, because reasonably consistent with each other.
 
Jaggu Dada it is.
:eek: CIRCLING IN YOUR MIND?

You might like to look up the birth of Pallas Athena. Just give us fair warning before your friendly local blacksmith takes a whack with his hammer, will you?

:oops: It comes with being Jaggu Dada. Foreign blacksmith might fancy his chances in these dire times.

Joe Shearer said:
Kshatriya.

No need for evidence from Greek sources.
:undecided: but that was exactly my request. What was his (Porus) caste according to Greek sources?
Ok, no Rajput at those times, as you say so, but what the Greeks wrote (If anything at all ) regarding the caste of Porus? Was word Kshatriya mentioned? or what term (if any) was used, to describe/identify the caste?
 
:oops: It comes with being Jaggu Dada. Foreign blacksmith might fancy his chances in these dire times.


:undecided: but that was exactly my request. What was his (Porus) caste according to Greek sources?
Ok, no Rajput at those times, as you say so, but what the Greeks wrote (If anything at all ) regarding the caste of Porus? Was word Kshatriya mentioned? or what term (if any) was used, to describe/identify the caste?

AFAIK, none of the classical authorities mentioned a caste, or even mentioned caste. A thorough search will take a couple of days; we will see if anything turns up.
 
For he was informed that Porus,with the whole of his army was on the other side of that river, having determined either to prevent him from making the passage, or to attack him while crossing. When Alexander ascertained this, he sent Coenus, son of Polemocrates, back to the river Indus, with instructions to cut in pieces all the vessels which he had prepared for the passage of that river, and to bring them to the river Hydaspes. Coenus cut the vessels in pieces and conveyed them thither, the smaller ones being cut into two parts, and the thirty-oared galleys into three. The sections were conveyed upon waggons, as far as the bank of the Hydaspes; and there the vessels were fixed together again, and seen as a fleet upon that river. Alexander took the forces which he had when he arrived at Taxila, and the 5,000 Indians under the command of Taxiles and the chiefs of that district, and marched towards the same river.

Alexander encamped on the bank of the Hydaspes, and Porus was seen with all his army and his large troop of elephants lining the opposite bank.2 He remained to guard the passage at the place where he saw Alexander had encamped; and sent guards to all the other parts of the river which were easily fordable, placing officers over each detachment, being resolved to obstruct the passage of the Macedonians. When Alexander saw this,

1 The kingdom of Porus lay between the Hydaspes and Acesines, the district now called Bari-doab with Lahore as capiial. It was conquered by Lords Hardinge and Gough in 1849.

'biodorus (xvii. 87) says that Porus had more than 50,000 infantry, about 3,000 cavalry, more than 1,000 chariots, and 130 elephants. Curtius.(via. 44) says he had about 30,000 infantry, 300 chariots, and 85 elephants.



he thought it advisable to move his army in various directions, to distract the attention of Porus, and render him uncertain what to do. Dividing his army into many parts, he led some of his troops now in one direction and now in another, at one time ravaging the enemy's country, at another looking out for a place where the river might appear easier for him to ford it. The rest of his troops he entrusted1 to his different generals, and sent them about in many directions. He also conveyed corn from all quarters into his camp from the land on this side the Hydaspes, so that it might be evident to Porus that he had resolved to remain quiet near the bank until the water of the river subsided in the winter, and afforded him a passage in many places. As his vessels were sailing up and down the river, and skins were being filled with hay, and the whole bank appeared to be covered in one place with cavalry and in another with infantry, Porus was not allowed to keep at rest, or to bring his preparations together from all sides to any one point if he selected this as suitable for the defence of the passage. Besides at this season all the Indian rivers were flowing with swollen and turbid waters and with rapid currents; for it was the time of year when the sun is wont to turn towards the summer solstice.2 At this season incessant and heavy rain falls in India; and the snows on the Caucasus, whence most of the rivers have their sources, melt and swell their streams to a great degree. But in the winter they again subside, become small and clear, and are fordable in certain places, with the exception of the Indus, Ganges, and perhaps one or two others. At any rate the Hydaspes becomes fordable.

1 imTpixj/as is Kriiger's reading instead of ^jriTdfai.

3 About the month of May. See chap. 12 infra; also Curtius, viii. 45, 46. Strabo (xv. 1) quotes from Aristobulus describing the rainy season at the time of Alexander's battle with Porus at the Hydaspes.



Alexander therefore spread a report that he would wait for that season of the year, if his passage was obstructed at the present time; but yet all the time he was waiting in ambush to see whether by rapidity of movement he could steal a passage anywhere without being observed. But he perceived that it was impossible for him to cross at the place where Porus himself had encamped near the bank of the Hydaspes, not only on account of the multitude of his elephants, but also because his large army, arranged in order of battle and splendidly accoutred, was ready to attack his men as they emerged from the water. Moreover he thought that his horses would not be willing to mount the opposite bank, because the elephants would at once fall upon them and frighten them both by their aspect and trumpeting; nor even before that would they remain upon the inflated hides during the passage of the river; but when they looked across and saw the elephants they would become frantic and leap into the water. He therefore resolved to steal a crossing by the following manoeuvre :—In the night he led most of his cavalry along the bank in various directions, making a clamour and raising the battle-cry in honour of Enyalius.1 Every kind of noise was raised, as if they were making all the preparations necessary for crossing the river. Porus also marched along the river at the head of his elephants opposite the places where the clamour was heard, and Alexander thus gradually got him into the habit of leading his men along opposite the noise. But when this occurred frequently, and there was merely a clamour and a raising of the battle-cry, Porus no longer continued to move about to meet the expected advance of the cavalry; but perceiving that his fear had been groundless,1 he kept his position in the camp. However he posted his scouts at many places along the bank. When Alexander had brought it about that the mind of Porus no longer entertained any fear of his nocturnal attempts, ho devised the following stratagem.



There was in the bank of the Hydaspes, a projecting headland, where the river makes a remarkable bend. It was densely covered by a grove,2 containing all sorts of trees; and over against it iu the river was an island full of trees and without a foot-track, on account of its being uninhabited. Perceiving that this island was right in front of the headland, and that both the spots were woody and adapted to conceal his attempt to cross the river, he resolved to convey his army over at this place. The headland and island were 150 stades distant from his great camp.3 Along the whole of the bank, he posted sentries, separated as far as was consistent with keeping each other in sight, and easily hearing when any order should be sent along from any quarter. From all sides also during many nights clamours were raised and fires were burnt. But when he had made up his mind to undertake the passage of the river, he openly prepared his measures for crossing opposite the camp. Craterus had been left behind at the camp with his own division of cavalry, and the horsemen from the Arachotians and Parapamisadians, as well as the brigades of Alcetas and Polysperchon from the phalanx of the Macedonian infantry, together with the chiefs of the Indians dwelling this side of the Hyphasis, who had with them 5,000 men. He gave Craterus orders not to cross the river before Porus moved off with his forces against them, or before he ascertained that Porus was in flight and that they were victorious.1 "If however," said he, "Porus should take only a part of his army and march against me, and leave the other part with the elephants in his camp, in that case do thou also remain in thy present position. But if he leads all his elephants with him against me, and a part of the rest of his army is left behind in the camp, then do thou cross the river with all speed. For it is the elephants alone," said he, "which render it impossible for the horses to land on the other bank. The rest of the army can easily cross."


Passage Op The Hydaspes.

Such were the injunctions laid upon Craterus. Between the island and the great camp where Alexander had left this general, he posted Meleager, Attalus, and Gorgias, with the Grecian mercenaries, cavalry and infantry, giving them instructions to cross in detachments, breaking up the army as soon as they saw the Indians already involved in battle. He then picked the select bodyguard called the Companions, as well as the cavalry regiments of Hephaestion, Perdiccas, and Demetrius, the cavalry from Bactria, Sogdiana, and Scythia, and the Daan horse-archers; and from the phalanx of infantry the shield-bearing guards, the brigades of Clitus and Coenus, with the archers and Agrianians, and made a secret march, keeping far away from the bank of the river,


in order not to be seen marching towards the island and headland, from which he had determined to cross. There the skins were filled in the night with the hay which had been procured long before, and they were tightly stitched up. In the night a furious storm of rain occurred, by which his preparations and attempt to cross were rendered still more unobserved, since the noise of the thunder and the storm drowned with its din the clatter of the weapons and the noise which arose from the orders given by the officers. Most of the vessels, the thirty-oared galleys included with the rest, had been cut in pieces by his order and conveyed to this place, where they had been fixed together again1 and hidden in the wood. At the approach of daylight, both the wind and the rain calmed down; and the rest of the army went over opposite the island, the cavalry mounting upon the skins, and as many of the foot soldiers as the boats would receive getting into them. They went so secretly that they were not observed by the sentinels posted by Porus, before they had already got beyond the island and were only a little way from the other bank.



Alexander himself embarked in a thirty-oared galley and went over, accompanied by Perdiccas, Lysimachus, the confidential body-guards, Seleucus, one of the Companions, who was afterwards king,3 and half of the shield-bearing guards; the rest of these troops being conveyed in
other galleys of the same size. When the soldiers got beyond the island, they openly directed their course to the bank; and when the sentinels perceived that they had started, they at once rode off to Porus as fast as each man's horse could gallop. Alexander himself was the first to land, and he at once took the cavalry as they kept on landing from his own and the other thirty-oared galleys, and drew them up in proper order. For the cavalry had received orders to land first; and at the head of these in regular array he advanced. But through ignorance of the locality he had effected a landing on ground which was not a part of the mainland, but an island, a large one indeed and where from the fact that it was an island, he more easily escaped notice. It was cut off from the rest of the land by a part of the river where the water was shallow. However, the furious storm of rain, which lasted the greater part of the night, had swelled the water so much that his cavalry could not find out the ford; and he was afraid that ho would have to undergo another labour in crossing as great as the first. But when at last the ford was found, he led his men through it with much difficulty; for where the water was deepest, it reached higher than the breasts of the infantry; and of the horses only the heads rose above the river.1 When he had also crossed this piece of water, he selected the choice guard of cavalry, and the best men from the other cavalry regiments, and brought them up from column into line on the right wing.2 In front of all the cavalry he posted the horse-archers, and placed next to the cavalry in front of the other infantry the royal shield-bearing guards under the command of Seleucus. Near these ho placed the royal foot-guard, and next to The Battle at the Hydaspes.
these the other shield-bearing guards, as each happened at the time to have the right of precedence. On each side, at the extremities of the phalanx, his archers, Agrianians and javelin-throwers were posted.

Having: thus arranged his army, ho ordered the infantry to follow at a slow pace and in regular order, numbering as it did not much under 6,000 men; and because he thought he was superior in cavalry, he took only his horse-soldiers, who were 5,000 in number, and led them forward with speed. He also instructed Tauron the commander of the archers, to lead them on also with speed to back up the cavalry. He had come to the conclusion that if Porus should engage him with all his forces he would easily be able to overcome him by attacking with his cavalry, or to stand on the defensive until his infantry arrived in the course of the action; but if the Indians should be alarmed at his extraordinary audacity in making the passage of the river and take to flight, he would be able to keep close to them in their flight, so that the slaughter of them in the retreat being greater there would be only a slight work left for him. Aristobulus says that the son of Porus arrived with about sixty chariots, before Alexander made his later passage from the large island, and that ho could have hindered Alexander's crossing (for he made the passage with difficulty even when no one opposed him); if the Indians had leaped down from their chariots and assaulted those who first emerged from the water. But he passed by with the chariots and thus made the passage quite safe for Alexander; who on reaching the bank discharged his horse-archers against the Indians in the chariots and these were easily put to rout, many of them beiDg wounded. Other writers say that a battle took place between the Indians who came with the son of Poms and Alexander at the head of his cavalry, that the son of Porus came with a greater force, that Alexander himself was wounded by him, and that his horse Bucephalas, of which he was exceedingly fond, was killed, being wounded like his master by the son of Porus. But Ptolemy, son of Lagus, with whom I agree, gives a different account. This author also says that Porus despatched his son, but not at the head of merely sixty chariots; nor is it indeed likely that Porus hearing from his scouts that either Alexander himself or at any rate a part of his army had effected the passage of the Hydaspes, would despatch his son against him with only sixty chariots. These indeed were too many to be sent out as a reconnoitring party, and not adapted for speedy retreat; but they were by no means a sufficient force to keep back those of the enemy who had not yet got across, as well as to attack those who had already landed. Ptolemy says that the son of Porus arrived at the head of 2000 cavalry and 120 chariots; but that Alexander had already made even the last passage from the island before he appeared.



Arrangements or Porus.

Ptolemy also says that Alexander in the first place sent the horse-archers against these, and led the cavalry himself, thinking that Porus was approaching with all his forces, and that this body of cavalry was marching in front of the rest of his army, being drawn up by him as the vanguard. But as soon as he had ascertained with accuracy the number of the Indians, he immediately made a rapid charge upon them with the cavalry around him. When they perceived that Alexander himself and the Arrangements of Porus. 289

body of cavalry around him had made the assault, not in line of battle regularly formed, but by squadrons, they gave way; and 400 of their cavalry, including the son of Porus, fell in the contest. The chariots also were captured, horses and all, being heavy and slow in the retreat, and useless in the action itself on account of the clayey ground. When the horsemen who had escaped from this rout brought news to Porus that Alexander himself had crossed the river with the strongest part of his army, and that his son had been slain in the battle, he nevertheless could not make up his mind what course to take, because the men who had been left behind under Craterus were seen to be attempting to cross the river from the great camp which was directly opposite his position. However, at last he preferred to march against Alexander himself with all his army, and to come into a decisive conflict with the strongest division of the Macedonians, commanded by the king in person. But nevertheless he left a few of the elephants together with a small army there at the camp to frighten the cavalry under Craterus from the bank of the river. He then took all his cavalry to the number of 4,000 men, all his chariots to the number of 300, with 200 of his elephants and 30,000 choice infantry, and marched against Alexander. When he found a place where he saw there was no clay, but that on account of the sand the ground was all level and hard, and thus fit for the advance and retreat of horses, he there drew up his army. First he placed the elephants in the front, each animal being not less than a plethrum1 apart, so that they might be extended in the front before the whole of the phalanx of infantry, and produce terror everywhere among Alexander's cavalry. Besides he thought that none of the enemy would have the audacity to push themselves into the spaces between

1 100 Greek and 101 English feet.

the elephants, the cavalry being deterred by the fright of their horses; and still less would the infantry do so, it being likely they would be kept off in front by the heavy-armed soldiers falling upon them, and trampled down by the elephants wheeling round against them. Near these he had posted the infantry, not occupying a line on a level with the beasts, but in a second line behind them, only so far distant that the companies of foot might be pushed forward a short distance into the spaces between them. He had also bodies of infantry standing beyond the elephants on the wings; and on both sides of the infantry he had posted the cavalry, in front of which were placed the chariots on both wings of his army.

CHAPTER XVI. Alexander's Tactics. Such was the arrangement which Porus made of his forces. As soon as Alexander observed that the Indians were drawn up in order of battle, he stopped his cavalry from advancing farther, so that he might take up the infantry as it kept on arriving; and even when the phalanx in quick march had effected a junction with the cavalry, he did not at once draw it out and lead it to the attack, not wishing to hand over his men exhausted with fatigue and out of breath, to the barbarians who were fresh and untired. On the contrary, he caused his infantry to rest until their strength was recruited, riding along round the lines to inspect them.1 When he had surveyed the arrangement of the Indians, he resolved not to advance against the centre, in front of which the elephants had been posted, and in the gaps between them a dense phalanx of men; for he was alarmed at the very arrangements which Porus had made here with that express design. But as he was superior in the number

of his cavalry, he took the greater part of that force, and marched along against the left wing of the enemy for the purpose of making an attack in this direction. Against the right wing he sent Coenus with his own regiment of cavalry and that of Demetrius, with instructions to keep close behind the barbarians when they, seeing the dense mass of cavalry opposed to them, should ride out to fight them. Seleucus, Antigenes, and Tauron were ordered to lead the phalanx of infantry, but not to engage in the action until they observedl the enemy's cavalry and phalanx of infantry thrown into disorder by the cavalry under his own command. But when they came within range of missiles, he launched the horse-archers, 1000 in number, against the left wing of the Indians, in order to throw those of the enemy who were posted there into confusion by the incessant storm of arrows and by the charge of the horses. He himself with the Companion cavalry marched along rapidly against the left wing of the barbarians, being eager to attack them in dank while still in a state of disorder, before their cavalry could be deployed.

CHAPTER XVII. Defeat Op Porus. Meantime the Indians had collected their cavalry from all parts, and were riding along, advancing out of their position to meet Alexander's charge. Coenus also appeared with his men in their rear, according to his instructions. The Indians, observing this, were compelled to make the line of their cavalry face both ways3; the largest and best part against Alexander, while the rest wheeled round against Coenus and his forces. This therefore at once threw the ranks as well as the decisions of the Indians into confusion. Alexander, seeing his opportunity, at the very moment the cavalry was wheeling round in the other direction, made an attack on those opposed to him with such vigour that the Indians could not sustain the charge of his cavalry, but were scattered and driven to the elephants, as to a friendly wall, for refuge. Upon this, the drivers of the elephants urged forward the beasts against the cavalry; but now the phalanx itself of the Macedonians was advancing against the elephants, the men casting darts at the riders and also striking the beasts themselves, standing round them on all sides. The action was unlike any of the previous contests; for wherever the beasts could wheel round, they rushed forth against the ranks of infantry and demolished the phalanx of the Macedonians, dense as it was. The Indian cavalry also, seeing that the infantry were engaged in the action, rallied again and advanced against the Macedonian cavalry. But when Alexander's men, who far excelled both in strength and military discipline, got the mastery over them the second time, they were again repulsed towards the elephants and cooped up among them. By this time the whole of Alexander's cavalry had collected into one squadron, not by any command of his, but having settled into this arrangement by the mere effect of the struggle itself; and wherever it fell upon the ranks of the Indians they were broken up with great slaughter. The beasts being now cooped up into a narrow space, their friends were no less injured by them than their foes, being trampled down in their wheeling and pushing about. Accordingly there ensued a great slaughter of the cavalry, cooped up as it was in a narrow space around the elephants. Most of the keepers of the elephants had been killed by the javelins, and some of the elephants themselves had been wounded, while others no longer kept apart in the battle on account of their sufferings or from being destitute of keepers. But, as if frantic with Losses of the Combatants.

pain, rushing forward at friends and foes alike, they pushed about, trampled down and killed them in every kind of way. However, the Macedonians retired whenever they were assailed, for they rushed at the beasts in a more open space, and in accordance with their own plan; and when they wheeled round to return, they followed them closely and hurled javelins at them; whereas the Indians retreating among them were now receiving greater injury from them. But when the beasts were tired out, and they were no longer able to charge with any vigour, they began to retire, facing the foe like ships backing water, merely uttering a shrill piping sound. Alexander himself surrounded the whole line with his cavalry, and gave the signal that the infantry should link their shields together so as to form a very densely closed body, and thus advance in phalanx. By this means the Indian cavalry, with the exception of a few men, was quite cut up in the action; as was also the infantry, since the Macedonians were now pressing upon them from all sides. Upon this, all who could do so turned to flight through the spaces which intervened between the parts of Alexander's cavalry.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Losses Op The Combatants.—Porus Surbenders. At the same time Craterus and the other officers of Alexander's army who had been left behind on the bank of the Hydaspes crossed the river, when they perceived that Alexander was winning a brilliant victory. These men, being fresh, followed up the pursuit instead of Alexander's exhausted troops, and made no less a slaughter of the Indians in their retreat. Of the Indians little short of 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry were killed in this battle.1 All their chariots were broken

1 Diodorus (xvii. 89) says that more than 12,000 Indians were killed in this battle, over 9,000 being captured, besides 80 elephants.

to pieces; and two sons of Porus were slain, as were also Spitaces, the governor of the Indians of that district, the managers of the elephants and of the chariots, and all the cavalry officers and generals of Porus's army. All the elephants which were not killed there, were captnred. Of Alexander's forces, about 80 of the 6,000 foot-soldiers who were engaged in the first attack, were killed; 10 of the horse-archers, who were also the first to engage in the action; about 20 of the Companion cavalry, and about 200 of the other horsemen fell.1 When Porus, who exhibited great talent in the battle, performing the deeds not only of a general but also of a valiant soldier, observed the slaughter of his cavalry, and some of his elephants lying dead, others destitute of keepers straying about in a forlorn condition, while most of his infantry had perished, he did not depart as Darius the Great King did, setting an example of flight to his men; but as long as any body of Indians remained compact in the battle, he kept up the struggle. But at last, having received a wound on the right shoulder, which part of his body alone was unprotected during the battle, he wheeled round. His coat of mail warded off the missiles from the rest of his body, being extraordinary both for its strength and the close fitting of its joints, as it was afterwards possible for those who saw him to observe. Then indeed he turned his elephant round and began to retire. Alexander, having seen that he was a great man and valiant in the battle, was very desirous of saving his life. He accordingly sent first to him Taxiles the Indian; who rode up as near to the elephant which was carrying Porus as seemed to him safe, and bade him stop the beast, assuring him that it was no longer possible for him to flee, and bidding him listen to Alex

1 According to Diodorus there fell of the Macedonians 280 cavalry and more than 700 infantry. Plutarch (Alex. 60) says that the battle lasted eight hours.

ander's message. But when he saw his old foe Taxiles, he wheeled round and was preparing to strike him with a javelin; and he would probably have killed him, if he had not quickly driven his horse forward out of the reach of Porus before he could strike him. But not even on this account was Alexander angry with Porus; but he kept on sending others in succession; and last of all Meroes an Indian, because he ascertained that he was an old friend of Porus. As soon as the latter heard the message brought to him by Meroes, being at the same time overcome by thirst, he stopped his elephant and dismounted from it. After he had drunk some water and felt refreshed, he ordered Meroes to lead him.withouv. delay to Alexander; and Meroes led him thither.1

CHAPTER XIX.

Alliance With Porus.—Death Op Bucephalas.

When Alexander heard that Meroes was bringing Porus to him, he rode in front of the line with a few of the Companions to meet Porus; and stopping his horse, he admired his handsome figure and his stature,2 which reached somewhat above five cubits. He was also surprised that he did not seem to be cowed in spirit,8 but advanced to meet him as one brave man would meet another brave man, after having gallantly struggled in defence of his own kingdom against another king. Then indeed Alexander was the first to speak, bidding him say what treatment he would like to receive. The report goes that Porus replied: "Treat me, 0 Alexander, in a kingly way 1" Alexander being pleased at the expresrsion, said: "For my own sake, O Porus, thou shalt be thus treated; but for thy own sake do thou demand what is pleasing to thee!" But Porus said that everything was included in that. Alexander, being still more pleased at this remark, not only granted him the rule over his own Indians, but also added another country to that which he had before, of larger extent than the former.1 Thus he treated the brave man in a kingly way, and from that time found him faithful in all things. Such was the result of Alexander's battle with Porus and the Indians living beyond the river Hydaspes, which was fought in the archonship of Hegemon at Athens, in the month Munychion2 (18 April to 18 May, 326 B.c.).

source:The anabasis of Alexander; or, The ... - Google Books
 
After a long interval, a truly original contribution. Congratulations to the contributor who has discovered a novel method of adding value: citations from the original sources themselves!

How is it that nobody else thought of it before?

SEPARATED AT BIRTH?
From post 68:
THERE was in the bank of the Hydaspes, a projecting point, where the river makes a remarkable bend. It was densely covered by a grove of all sorts of trees; and over against it in the river was a woody island without a foot-track, on account of its being uninhabited. Perceiving that this island was right in front of the projecting point, and that both the spots were woody and adapted to conceal his attempt to cross the river, he resolved to convey his army over at this place. The projecting point and island were 150 stades distant from his great camp. Along the whole of the bank, he posted sentries, separated as far as was consistent with keeping each other in sight, and easily hearing when any order should be sent along from any quarter. From all sides also during many nights clamours were raised and fires were burnt. But when he had made up his mind to undertake the passage of the river, he openly prepared his measures for crossing opposite the camp. Cratetus had been left behind at the camp with his own division of cavalry, and the horsemen from the Arachotians and Parapamisadians, as well as the brigades of Alcetas and Polysperchon from the phalanx of the Macedonian infantry, together with the chiefs of the Indians dwelling this side of the Hyphasis, who had with them 5,000 men. He gave Craterus orders not to cross the river before Porus moved off with his forces against them, or before he ascertained that Porus was in flight and that they were victorious.’ “If however,” said he, “Porus should take only a part of his army and march against me, and leave the other part with the elephants in his camp, in that case do thou also remain in thy present position. But if he leads all his elephants with him against me, and a part of the rest of his army is left behind in the camp, then do thou cross the river with all speed. For it is the elephants alone,” said he, “which render it impossible for the horses to land on the other bank. The rest of the army can easily cross.”
From post 101:
There was in the bank of the Hydaspes, a projecting headland, where the river makes a remarkable bend. It was densely covered by a grove,2 containing all sorts of trees; and over against it iu the river was an island full of trees and without a foot-track, on account of its being uninhabited. Perceiving that this island was right in front of the headland, and that both the spots were woody and adapted to conceal his attempt to cross the river, he resolved to convey his army over at this place. The headland and island were 150 stades distant from his great camp.3 Along the whole of the bank, he posted sentries, separated as far as was consistent with keeping each other in sight, and easily hearing when any order should be sent along from any quarter. From all sides also during many nights clamours were raised and fires were burnt. But when he had made up his mind to undertake the passage of the river, he openly prepared his measures for crossing opposite the camp. Craterus had been left behind at the camp with his own division of cavalry, and the horsemen from the Arachotians and Parapamisadians, as well as the brigades of Alcetas and Polysperchon from the phalanx of the Macedonian infantry, together with the chiefs of the Indians dwelling this side of the Hyphasis, who had with them 5,000 men. He gave Craterus orders not to cross the river before Porus moved off with his forces against them, or before he ascertained that Porus was in flight and that they were victorious.1 "If however," said he, "Porus should take only a part of his army and march against me, and leave the other part with the elephants in his camp, in that case do thou also remain in thy present position. But if he leads all his elephants with him against me, and a part of the rest of his army is left behind in the camp, then do thou cross the river with all speed. For it is the elephants alone," said he, "which render it impossible for the horses to land on the other bank. The rest of the army can easily cross."

Note to readers: This is the complete text of Arrian; note 69 ends with Chapter XII, and there were at that point, seven more chapters left to be transcribed. These have been done obligingly by an unexpected volunteer; please therefore read note 101 for a continuous account; chapters XIII to XIX are contained in that extract.
 
Alexander returned Paurava’s kingdom to him and shortly after the death of the king of Taxila asked Paurava to look after the affairs of that kingdom as well. Just three years after this great battle on the Jhelum, Alexander died under mysterious circumstances in Babylon. That was June 323 BCE. Within years, the great Raja Paurava was assassinated and the story seems to have ended. But not quite.


In 44 CE, Taxila was visited by a Greek philosopher named Apollonius. The philosopher’s account (kept by his diarist) tells us of two temples, one outside the city walls and the other by the main street leading to the king’s palace. Both temples had large copper plate murals adorning their walls. The murals depicted scenes of battle from the struggle that had taken place on the banks of the Jhelum River three hundred and sixty-seven years earlier.


The account marvels at the finesse of the renditions: the colours and the forms were as though one were watching a real scene frozen in time. The murals in both the temples depicted Raja Paurava in defeat. The account goes on to tell us that these murals were commissioned by Raja Paurava when news of the death of Alexander arrived in Taxila. Consider: Alexander was dead in distant Babylon, his Greek garrisons in the Sindhu Valley had deserted and Paurava was now the unquestioned master of this country. As sole sovereign, he could have ordered the murals to turn history around and depict him in glorious victory and Alexander in abject and shameful defeat.


But the Punjabi king was not just great in physical stature; he possessed also a soaring spirit and largesse of the heart that few of us know. The king ordered the murals, so it is recorded by Apollonius’ diarist, in order not only to acknowledge his friendship with Alexander, but also to preserve history as it had actually unfolded. In his wisdom the king knew that the creative passage of time was bound to alter history.


When the murals were put up, Taxila was what we today know as the Bhir mound. Two hundred years later, the Indo-Greeks shifted it to the remains we today call Sirkap. It is evident that the murals were admired to be moved to the new city. In the subsequent two hundred odd years the city was rebuilt several times as the various cultural layers show. Each time the murals were safely removed to a new site or they would not have survived three and a half centuries. Finally, in 25 CE Taxila was levelled by a severe earthquake. And when nineteen years later Apollonius arrived, the city was being rebuilt under a Parthian king and the murals had faithfully been reinstalled at the brand new temples. History was not permitted to be tainted
Doodh Patti: Raja Paurava and Alexander
 
If you mean a teacher/lecturer/professor now, Nope.
I had some teaching experience but that was many many years ago.

Sounds like the rest of us are in deep trouble. If this is the level of information you have without formal credentials, I'm packing it in.
 

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