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The BJP opposed the Indo-US nuclear deal, tooth and nail. When he became Prime Minister, Narendra Modi hailed the Indo-US nuclear deal as the centerpiece of a new strategic partnership between the world's largest and oldest democracies. Now, it falls to him to reap two fruits of the nuclear deal: membership of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime. It would show statesmanship, were Modi to acknowledge the role of his predecessor Manmohan Singh , who staked his government on getting the deal through, in laying the ground for India's forthcoming diplomatic achievements.
The Indo-US nuclear deal was never primarily about nuclear energy, although that was how the deal had been pitched to the public. It was about liberating India from the technological denial regime to which it had been consigned after its nuclear tests. The US took the initiative because it wanted to create a strategic counterweight to China in the Asia-Pacific.
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The world's four major technology control regimes are the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, the Missile Control Technology Regime, the Australian Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. The names of the first two are a good guide to what these seek to regulate. The Australia group seeks to prevent the spread of chemical and biological weapons and control the sale and export of chemicals and their precursors that can be used for chemical/biological weapons.
The Wassenaar Arrangment seeks to regulate the export of conventional arms and dual use technologies, to deny regimes deemed inimical to global stability sensitive technologies that can be procured in the name of civilian use but can then be used to build nasty weapons.
If India were to remain constrained by the restrictions enforced by these technology control regimes, India could not build up the strategic capability to project power on a scale needed to become a credible counterweight to China. The US understood this, as did India's political leadership. This is why Manmohan Singh was determined to cash in on the Bush administration's enthusiasm to release India from technology denial and was willing to defy the UPA's crucial ally, the Left, and even risk losing a confidence vote in Parliament on the subject. While sections of the BJP were also perfectly aware of the implications of the nuclear deal, they chose to oppose the deal, hoping to trip the UPA government up as it struggled with infantile Left opposition to anything American.
The Chinese were well aware of the implications of the Indo-US nuclear deal, but were incapable of registering anything more than passive aggression in the face of determined US efforts to grant India the clean waiver required for a non-signatory to the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to gain quasi-membership of the nuclear club that the treaty entailed.
The Indo-US nuclear deal opened the gate for India to walk down the path to membership of these four technology control regimes. An embattled UPA2 and a world community struggling to contain the fallout of the financial crisis of 2008 did not have the energy needed to complete that membership process.
It is up to Indian diplomacy to complete the process of emancipating the country from technology denial initiated by the Indo-US deal on civil nuclear cooperation. Membership of MTCR is nearly in the bag. China remains the lone opposition to India's membership of NSG . The Great Wall could prove a hurdle low enough for India to cross, given the unanimous support India has from the rest of the major powers and the obvious lack of credibility China's argument for treating Pakistan on par with India has, given the track record of the two countries on matters that affect global security.
Once NSG and MTCR membership is in the bag, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group should be relatively easy. Then, the rapprochement between India and the US that began
The Indo-US nuclear deal was never primarily about nuclear energy, although that was how the deal had been pitched to the public. It was about liberating India from the technological denial regime to which it had been consigned after its nuclear tests. The US took the initiative because it wanted to create a strategic counterweight to China in the Asia-Pacific.
MUST READ: PM Modi embarks on whirlwind 5-nation tour
The world's four major technology control regimes are the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, the Missile Control Technology Regime, the Australian Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. The names of the first two are a good guide to what these seek to regulate. The Australia group seeks to prevent the spread of chemical and biological weapons and control the sale and export of chemicals and their precursors that can be used for chemical/biological weapons.
The Wassenaar Arrangment seeks to regulate the export of conventional arms and dual use technologies, to deny regimes deemed inimical to global stability sensitive technologies that can be procured in the name of civilian use but can then be used to build nasty weapons.
If India were to remain constrained by the restrictions enforced by these technology control regimes, India could not build up the strategic capability to project power on a scale needed to become a credible counterweight to China. The US understood this, as did India's political leadership. This is why Manmohan Singh was determined to cash in on the Bush administration's enthusiasm to release India from technology denial and was willing to defy the UPA's crucial ally, the Left, and even risk losing a confidence vote in Parliament on the subject. While sections of the BJP were also perfectly aware of the implications of the nuclear deal, they chose to oppose the deal, hoping to trip the UPA government up as it struggled with infantile Left opposition to anything American.
The Chinese were well aware of the implications of the Indo-US nuclear deal, but were incapable of registering anything more than passive aggression in the face of determined US efforts to grant India the clean waiver required for a non-signatory to the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to gain quasi-membership of the nuclear club that the treaty entailed.
The Indo-US nuclear deal opened the gate for India to walk down the path to membership of these four technology control regimes. An embattled UPA2 and a world community struggling to contain the fallout of the financial crisis of 2008 did not have the energy needed to complete that membership process.
It is up to Indian diplomacy to complete the process of emancipating the country from technology denial initiated by the Indo-US deal on civil nuclear cooperation. Membership of MTCR is nearly in the bag. China remains the lone opposition to India's membership of NSG . The Great Wall could prove a hurdle low enough for India to cross, given the unanimous support India has from the rest of the major powers and the obvious lack of credibility China's argument for treating Pakistan on par with India has, given the track record of the two countries on matters that affect global security.
Once NSG and MTCR membership is in the bag, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group should be relatively easy. Then, the rapprochement between India and the US that began
