UAVs at the Forefront of Future Warfare

[Manticore]

UAVs at the Forefront of Future Warfare -

[ retired Air Commodore Azfar A Khan, who served in the Pakistan Air Force for 31 years ]

n the modern world, technology is the name of the game. Until recently, piloted aircraft were thought to be the core strength of any air force. Now, that concept is changing as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) enter the field.

The pace of technological progress in the development of UAVs is astonishing, and they are already supporting ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over the next few years, however, their use is likely to become even more widespread. It is estimated that that the UAV market could soar to $160bn over the next ten years

There are two countries that have made spectacular progress in the field of UAVs – the US and Israel. In the US, two companies, Northrop Grumman and General Atomics, dominate the production of the UAVs, while in Israel, the most prominent company for producing world-class pilotless machines is Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI).

There are two main UAVs in great demand – the Heron and the Reaper. Produced by Israel and the United States, respectively, these UAVs are able to be in one country with their control team in another, allowing the UAV to fly over Iraq and Afghanistan while being controlled by ground forces in the home nation.

The effectiveness of the UAV as a weapon was demonstrated when one fired two Hellfire missiles on the Pakistani Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud and killed him when he was in his relative's home in South Waziristan in August.

Heron vs Reaper

Heron is a medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAV that has been developed by IAI. It has an endurance of up to 52 hours at an altitude of 35,000ft.
It is used for land surveillance, maritime patrol missions and wide-area real-time intelligence and can carry a payload of 250kg.

Heron TP is a new version of Heron, which is focused on reconnaissance and is a larger-than-traditional model. It is designed to fly at high altitude, on missions lasting for several days. It is a low-cost competitor to the more expensive Global Hawk UAV, which has far more range than required by most countries. Heron TP can operate at 45,000ft and carries sensors that can give a detailed view of the ground even from that high altitude. Long endurance of 36 hours makes Heron TP a competitor for the US MQ-9 Reaper.



The Reaper MQ-9, also known as Predator B, was developed by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems in the US and is the first hunter-killer type that has a long endurance of 30 hours. It can carry out surveillance at an altitude of 50,000ft and its strength lies in better intelligence, target acquisition and reconnaissance capabilities (ISTAR).
In size, the Reaper is similar to a small business jet and can carry 14 Hellfire missiles. The cost of the craft and associated ground stations is $100m a system. Each Reaper drone is operated remotely by two people, a pilot and a sensor operator that are positioned at a ground control station. The pilot flies the plane, while the sensor operator monitors the performance of various sensor systems used by the Reaper.


Extra competitors

Also making its mark on the UAV field is the Predator (MQ-1), which is produced by General Atomics (GA) and comprises four sensored air vehicles, a ground control station and a satellite link.

Also from GA is the Avenger (Predator C), which is slightly bigger than the Reaper. The Avenger is jet-powered and can fly up to 460mph while the Reaper has a top speed of 230mph. It also uses stealth technology to rise to an altitude of more than 60,000ft. In short, it is designed to operate in the same hunter-killer role as Reaper but its response time is much faster.

Global Hawk (RQ-4) is also used by the US Air Force as a surveillance aircraft for intelligence collection and is of a similar concept to the U-2 spy plane of the 1950s.
Global Hawk has a range of 14,000nm with an endurance of 42 hours. Like the Avenger it also flies at 60,000ft and the RQ-4A variant has the distinction of being the first to fly non-stop from the US to Australia.

Euro Hawk, a European Version of the US Global Hawk UAV, is being developed for Germany by the European Aeronautic Defence and Space company (EADS) and Northrop Grumman to replace its aging fleet of Atlantique ATL1 aircraft. It is equipped with an EADS-built SIGINT mission system that will be the heart of the Euro Hawk's intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance system. It has an endurance of 30 hours.

Around the world

France has developed a competitor for the US Predator. Its EADS SIDM is actually a modified version of the Israeli Eagle. SIDM can stay in the air for up to 24 hours, at an altitude of up to 30,000ft and has a total payload capacity of 600lb.

France-based Aeroart has unveiled a very-low-cost micro UAV known as Featherlite. The entire system, including control, visual systems and an on-board video camera, costs only $11,400. This model is powered by an electric engine, is 1.2m long with a wingspan of 1.9m, weighs just 1.5kg and can carry a 250g payload for an hour and a half. It is used for training UAV pilots and for conducting surveillance or taking photographs.

Rather than going into the space alone Pakistan and Italy have teamed up to produce the Falco, an advanced tactical UAV. It is being produced by Selex Galileo with Pakistan manufacturing many parts of it and is due to roll out shortly. Meanwhile, back in the US, the innovation just keeps on coming, with the nation developing a bomber that will be flown by ground personnel.

Wherever in the world they are being produced, UAVs are expected to change the total scenario of future warfare.

Predictions are that human pilots will soon be obsolete and with the introduction of UAVs, the risk to pilot life and costly air to air combats will be eliminated.

UAVs are being used to monitor the border to check infiltration, identifying and attacking those who plant roadside IEDs and locating and killing the most wanted terrorists. It's a game of innovation in technology; with whoever possesses the state-of-the-art model, with better lethal power, likely to prove the eventual winner.

As prior intelligence is a force multiplier in any warfare scenario, the UAVs will provide such intelligence to the theatre commander and enable him take action with confidence. Efforts are now in hand to build solar-powered UAVs which will bring a revolution in this field. In short, it could be said that the UAVs are the mainstay of the future warfare.

UAVs at the Forefront of Future Warfare - Air Force Technology

 

[Manticore]

The New Breed of Pilot - By Richard Gasparre.

1. What qualities are important for traditional pilots but not UAV operators?

In contrast to their surface-bound warrior colleagues, pilots are presumably better able to perform while travelling very fast in midair, which in evolutionary terms is an alien environment for humans. Consequently, the distinguishing attributes of pilots are primarily physical and emotional. Physiologically, for example, pilots need good vision and the ability to withstand g-forces. Emotionally, they need to make decisions quickly and manage fear and stress, which are amplified by the fact that aircraft, unlike ships or land vehicles, have to move fast or crash – there is no off switch in mid air.

2. What qualities are equally important for both pilots and operators?

In contrast to the physical and emotional attributes, the cognitive talents of good aircraft drivers ought to be the same whether they are the air or on the ground. All aircraft, whether manned or not, still operate in the real world and are thus subject to gravity and other natural physical laws that are universal. Therefore, flight management and mission execution for manned and unmanned aircraft require the same knowledge.

or less useful for the ground operator than for the airborne pilot. In both cases, the drivers are neither building nor testing the aircraft but rather flying it, just as a Formula 1 driver can win races without being the best automotive engineer on the track. Even spatial awareness is cognitively similar: managing a UAV's orientation in flight is not much different from a pilot flying by instrument on a cloudy night.

The 'driving' tasks are converging because over the past four decades, automated systems have done more and more of the actual work, just as computer programmes have progressed from low-level compiling to high-level artificial intelligence.

Ever since the F-16 debuted in 1976, combat aircraft have been 'fly-by-wire'. The exponential growth of electronics and sensor technology also means that the mechanics of targeting have become increasingly automated. Air power is so lethal now not because man has become superman but because weapons have become superweapons. But there is nothing shabby about doing the meta-work of controlling the machines that do the actual work.

3. What qualities could be more important for operators than for pilots?

If pilots still have the more demanding job, in practice it's because UAV capabilities haven't advanced to the level of manned aircraft – yet. Eventually, however, UAVs will outperform manned aircraft precisely because they don't have to carry people around. At that point, operators will confront cognitive challenges just as demanding as those facing today's pilots.

Indeed, remote flying may end up requiring more cognitive skill because operators have no visceral stimuli. In other words, operators can't fly instinctively but must instead interpret the UAV's environment through the filter of its own sensors, thus adding a metacognitive overlay to the basic flying job.

Different sorts for different sports

A fairer assessment, however, is that pilots are neither better nor worse than operators, just different, and these differences will arise from the distinctive capabilities of UAVs.

Long loiter times are currently one of the most important features of UAVs but protracted mission timeframes place new demands on operators.

The standard unit of UAV battlefield presence is the orbit, which is a 24-hour combat flight by a single UAV. Orbits over Iraq and Afghanistan have risen from 12 in 2007 to 27 in 2008 and 35 to date in 2009; the official goal for 2011 is 50 orbits. Because human fatigue limitations require at least two shifts to execute an orbit, the USAF needs to increase the operators for its high-tier fleet (the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper and RQ-4 Global Hawk) from 350 to 800 by 2013.

UAVs have rotating operator teams even now, but as UAV endurance increases, the US Air Force will need to accelerate its training of operators or find ways for operators to work longer shifts. In either case, the traditional aircrew workload will change: where pilots were sprinters operators will either be relay runners or marathoners.

Simultaneous flying of multiple UAVs will probably become an equally critical feature of future UASs.

Currently, one crew at a single ground control station controls one UAV at a time, but this is a 'very Neanderthal way of operating' according to Schwartz, who stated that flying 'more than one Predator from the same ground station with one crew' is possible. The US Air Force also wants operators to fly different types of UAVs in the future. Ultimately, operators could fly up to 12 different UAVs simultaneously, according to studies by MIT's humans and automation lab.

More generally, removing the pilot from the UAV means that mission crew size is completely independent of plane size. Equally significant, more capable electronics packages on UAVs mean that larger crews are needed to process all the data. As larger crews thus become more necessary and more feasible, one pilot flying one plane will seem as quaint as a phonograph, and crews of several operators and specialists controlling flocks of UAVs will become the norm. The iconic pilot as matinee idol will be out; the team player with programming talent and 'mad gamer skills' will be in.

Revenge of the nerds - Air Force Technology

 

[Old School]

With all due respect to Air Commodore (rtd) Azfar A Khan , UAV were never meant to be at the forefront of the tactical warfare . It has been used till date primarily for the purpose of ISR , IPB, I&W, vulnerability assessments for force protection,targeting, and BDA. It is also an important tool in the IEW(Intelligence & Electronic Warfare) and PsyOPS ( like the drone attacks). Eversince the beginning of history of mankind, human will continue to be at the forefront of all warfare where as UAV will be used as a tool only. Nothing can replace human.

 

[Manticore]

the source site seemed a good one and i dont think it was posted earlier

 

[Manticore]

UCAVs: The Future of Air Warfare


UCAVs: The Future of Air Warfare

26th December, 2010
Meinhaj Hussain
Defense Analyst
Kuala Lumpur
Malaysia
Email: m.hussain@grandestrategy.com


Abstract:

The Indian Air Force is projected to induct a large number of 5th generation fighter aircraft within the timeframe of 2025. This poses serious challenges for the numerically smaller Pakistan Air Force (PAF). The paper suggests UCAVs as a possible solution in countering India’s military aviation threat to Pakistan. Pakistan can develop UCAVs in the same manner they developed the JF-17. The argument is in favor of UCAVs to supplement 4th generation fighters and enumerates an active and specific solution for PAF.

Introduction

Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs) are a category of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) that are designed to fire munitions and are characterized by increased autonomy of operation. Key attributes coupled with UCAVs, as defined in conventional military jargon, include an unmanned counterpart of a manned attack or fighter aircraft. This necessitates such capabilities as range, high speeds and a significant weapon load. Another key salient of UCAVs is the broad requirement for UCAVs to survive engagements rather than be used in one-way kamikaze strikes. UCAVs operational today are largely restricted to small, lightly armed derivatives of more conventional UAVs.[1]

UCAVs are an emerging technology that has the potential to revolutionize air warfare. While the 5th generation of combat planes today is the pinnacle of military aviation, UCAVs present paradigms that can supplement if not supplant them. Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) who discuss a potential 6th generation inevitably mention unmanned aircraft as a possible key salient.[2]

This paper focuses on UCAVs in a function as air-to-air combat vehicles focused on air superiority missions. The paper is in exclusion of other roles such as air-to-ground and Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR). It is recognized that UAVs are highly effective in both these roles and this exclusion in no way implies the belittlement of these key aspects to UCAV and UAV technology.

The paper considers the advantages, disadvantages, technology and politics and how this relates to Pakistan and her threat perception. It offers a specific solution tailored for the Subcontinent.

 

[Manticore]

The Advantages of UCAVs
Long Range Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Combat

The world is increasingly converging towards long range air-to-air combat, not only with increasingly sophisticated radars[3] that negate stealth[4], but also AAMs like the ASRAAM and the A-Darter that provide an improvement in range of IR-based missiles (Defense Industry Daily, 2010). Pilots engaged in BVR combat perhaps have the least value added to combat; essentially, they monitor their sensor-suite, communicate with controllers and then fire a missile which then takes over the task of actually destroying the target. An F-pole style maneuver or other similar maneuvers are limited by the G-forces that the pilots can sustain. Dodging incoming BVR missiles, fired from enemy aircraft is again limited by the G-forces the pilot can handle. The case for a UCAV in this form of combat is arguably the strongest after ISR.

Short Range within Visual Range Combat:

To consider WVR combat, let us visualize what is achievable with the state-of-the-art at present in the form of the F-35. We will later consider how much better a UCAV can exploit these advantages than a manned pilot.

In a post-merge scenario where a large number of friendly and enemy aircraft are embroiled in a dogfight, identifying friend-or-foe and firing at a target can become both critical and yet complicated. When a fraction of a second counts, the human pilot has to analyze his MMI and make a quick choice. The F-35 helps this critical process by providing an MMI that keeps track of all aircraft embroiled in the fight and displaying them in the most user-friendly method possible.
The process sounds difficult, but is only so for a human. A computer can analyze aircraft shapes easily. Situational awareness, whether human or computer-enabled, allows a fighter aircraft to assign missiles for targets as soon as a picture of the battle-space has been formed. With HOBS missiles, the execution is relatively simple even for a less maneuverable combat aircraft.

Another element added by the F-35 is interconnectivity or swarm logic. Once situational awareness has been achieved by man or machine and the fighter aircraft knows where the friends or foes are, and at the same time can communicate with the rest of the friendly fighter aircraft who also share the same picture of the battle-space, computers can execute complex plays in a team format. This creates a veritable soccer match were one side knows exactly what is going on in the entire football field and the location of its players. As a result, they can significantly outplay the opposing team. Such strategies may include providing cover fire, cross fires, gambits and other game-theory based plays[5]. All such maneuvers can take place pre-programmed and at speeds, G-forces and time frames not possible by human operators. Swarm tactics have already been demonstrated by US aircraft manufacturers in their UCAV programs (Jaquish, 2004).

Can a human operator compete? Kasparov may or may not be able to beat Deep Blue on a given day. However, to do so while sitting in a fighter cockpit, facing G-forces and in the time constraint of fractions of a second, the victor becomes all too obvious.

Human operators can always be put in the loop where necessary, but a UCAV can easily handle many tasks autonomously, and like an attack dog, only need to be pointed at the enemy. The UCAV can take off, fly a designated route, destroy targets and awaiting instruction or flying back to base, dodging missiles and being fully aware of many factors pilots often forget – being aware of status of weapons, fuel supply, location of enemies and friendly forces, ground units and whether weapons doors are open or closed. It can think of all this simultaneously and do so without mistakes, under any amount of stress, either physical or sensory.

 

[Manticore]

Low Costs:
UCAVs can be manufactured and operated at a tiny fraction of the cost of manned fighters. Quality pilots are a rare commodity and are hard to find, train and keep operationally ready. They also take a considerable amount of lead-time to train effectively. Another aspect is the low maintenance and operational costs due to not having a requirement to constantly fly aircraft. This also means that many important systems do not need to be as reliable or have high MTBF (Mean Time Before Failure). After all, if the UCAV is not endangering a pilot’s life, does not fly frequently and is cheap to manufacture, they need not be as durable. UCAVs need only be flown during wartime or during high tension periods.
This means that their subsystems can be built more cheaply, a key cost element particularly in combat aircraft engine technology. However, some caution needs to be placed as to how far reliability can be compromised as this can be a double-edged sword with accidents and mishaps also effecting costs (Lewis, 2002).

UCAVs may also be cheaper because many expensive elements in a modern fighter relate to the pilot. For instance, cockpit glass is an exceedingly expensive item. Ejection seats, life support systems, cockpit avionics and targeting systems and the sheer space, bulk and weight savings all go to make UCAVs significantly cheaper than manned alternatives[6].
Due to modern network centric warfare, not all UCAVs need have sensors. Expensive AESA radars for instance can be avoided in but a few aircraft within a “pack”. These can often be a manned fighter that orchestrates the package, perhaps preferably a twin-seater, or even be managed by ground controllers / radars or airborne AWACS.
A small UCAV built from an existing parts bin of spare parts can lower costs significantly. We shall discuss further about this aspect later in the paper.
Quantity versus Quality:
Most nations including the United States and China are increasingly fielding sharply smaller quantities of later generation fighters because of the cost and complexity. UCAVs can be produced cheaply, at a small fraction of the cost of modern fighters and can be mass produced for war. As Joseph Stalin once said, quantity has a quality all its own. As modern 5th generation aircraft increasingly resemble flying Tiger tanks, a cheap, simple solution may just prove be the equivalent T-34 equivalent in modern warfare.
Kamikaze:
UCAVs can go into combat disregarding whether they need to come back or not. While fighter pilots may have similar patriotism, operationally air forces for moral and morale reasons prefer to have an exit strategy unless in the most extreme of circumstances. UCAVs make kamikaze strategies practical not only during desperate phases of the war but viable from Day 1. In BVR combat, this becomes an interesting aspect as there is always a tradeoff between the distance a fighter shoots its missile from (and thus how effective this shot will be), and how likely the plane is to come back intact.
This proposition is even more tenable because UCAVs may prove to be significantly cheaper than their manned enemies and the tradeoff would favor the UCAV operator. Most vitally, UCAVs employing such tactics would have a drastic impact on the enemy’s psychology. The Rand Corporation expresses this doctrine best in the following words:
Aerospace power will tend to perform best when the desired outcome involves affecting adversary behavior rather than seizing and holding terrain.
-RAND Corporation

The Disadvantages of UCAVs
Tackling the Problem of Jamming:

One of the first responses to proposals for UCAVs is whether they will be able to communicate in the event of jamming by the enemy. When we discuss UCAVs, we often have the image of a Predator operator sitting in some trailer guiding the plane and wonder what would happen to the Predator if that link was lost. The first element to consider is that today’s Air-to-Ground based UAVs such as the Predator need a high proportion of the human element because of the vagaries of today’s COIN and CAS operations. High bandwidth data transfer such as video streaming is assumed to be an integral part of UAV operation. This does not have to be true for UCAVs. Identifying friend-or-foe can be significantly easier in an air-to-air battle, particularly with mature IFF technologies. This is true particularly in a Pakistan-India scenario, where the direction of enemy inbound fighters is well known and the environment is best described as sensor rich.

The end result is that, a highly autonomous UCAV will not need constant connectivity but will need to be assigned a task and given instructions for post-task completion. For instance, if after destroying enemy aircraft no other enemy aircraft are found in the vicinity and no instructions are forthcoming from friendly forces, the UCAV may simply be programmed to return to base. In case of fear of electronic warfare incapacitating or overriding the UCAV, a controller may pre-program the UCAV to not accept signals from a specified time period forward. To accomplish the given mission and either go back to base or move to a specific geographical area deep inside Pakistani territory and receive specific directional signals for further instructions.

In this scenario, a UCAV can still be jammed from being operationally effective, but manned aircraft will suffer to the same extent as the UCAV. Even a 5th generation aircraft without AWACS or other auxiliary support will be vulnerable. Another point is that modern communications, even Link 16 is exceedingly hard to jam. Directional communication links are also increasingly mature and near ideal for UCAV use.

 

[Manticore]

Human Element:

Despite all the advantages of a UCAV, the human element cannot be fully substituted, whether one with Artificial Intelligence (AI-UCAV) or a more conventional model. There will always be an opportunity for a fighter pilot to think outside the box. This will continue to remain a weakness of UCAVs. Carlo Kopp mentions the two ideological extremes in UCAV literature, one looking at UCAVs as a “dumb RPV” while the other trying to build a James Cameron’s “Terminator” and suggests a moderate approach between them may be most appropriate (Kopp, 2001).


Reasons Why the West is Being Held Back
Their Politics:
Many technology choices made by the United States and her allies are not based on merit alone but are made because of political reasons. USAF officers for instance, would not like UAVs to take over jobs of their pilots. An example is the Congressional deadline for the USAF to field a third of its force as UAVs by 2010 (Jaquish, 2004). The USAF considered a Predator that can fire its own missile a bad idea and this was not overturned until the CIA used them with great success. Even when forced to fly UAVs, they have insisted on using pilots to fly the UAVs. The US Army proved otherwise when they began using NCOs instead. Another glaring example of the organizational hubris of the US armed services is in their Joint Vision 2020. There is not one mention of UAVs or UCAVs, nor a single picture of one in a paper that has over 50 images of tanks, submarines, fighter jets, warships, transports and refugee camps[7]. William Lewis (Lewis, 2002) also complains about the long lead times in acquisition and procurement within the US armed services.
This bias in the USAF and perhaps in other Western air forces is a key reason for why UAVs in general and UCAVs in particular, have not made breakthroughs in the scale anticipated with technologies now available. History has shown that it often takes a major shock in the form of a war to change perceptions, as was seen in WWI, WWII and to a lesser extent the subsequent wars up to Gulf War II. What we do know is that the people closest to knowing the feasibility of technology in building operational UCAVs are putting their money in this technology. Boeing, Northrop Grumman and General Atomics have spent their own hard cash in researching and developing new UCAVs without formal requests or interest from the USAF.


The Technology behind UCAVs
The technology for fielding real UCAVs has many critical areas that are already proven and mature. Many of the technologies are in fact only waiting to be integrated together. Consider the example of autopilot computers that can now takeoff, fly to a destination and land a commercial aircraft. This technology is operational in the commercial airline industry and is considered mature today. Pilots can merely take control when something untoward happens and requires out-of-the-box thinking.

An American Global Hawk today can take off, fly around the world, accomplish its ISR mission and come back to base making a perfect landing, with no manual input. A JSF is being designed with the ability to visually track a large number of targets, identify and categorize them without any human input. Modern missiles can defeat maneuvering fighters by employing multiple tactics, even being able to come back in case it missed the designated aircraft in its first pass. Again, all this is accomplished without input from a human.

Diffusion of Technology Worldwide:The technology to build manned fighter aircraft has traditionally remained within a handful of nations such as Russia, USA, China, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. This monopoly of technology has been a major issue particularly vis-à-vis the West and the Rest of the World. UAV and UCAV technology on the other hand, has been far more diffused throughout the world. Smaller countries and countries with little previous record of aircraft manufacture, such as Israel, Austria, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Switzerland, Turkey, among others are making significant contributions. For instance, Camcopter, a product by a small, hitherto unknown Austrian company Siebel, has sold a large number of its UAVs including over 80 to the UAE (Wezeman, 2007). What is even more interesting is that a number of parts will be manufactured by such an unknown as the UAE Research and Technology Center. It may also be noted that even within the US military-industrial complex, it is General Atomics as opposed to Boeing or Lockheed Martin that has stolen the lead. From these examples and a number of others, the technology behind UCAVs is realizable by firms outside of the traditional countries and corporations that had earlier dominated military aviation. The UAV industry is by all indications Schumpeterian and remains wide open to any country or company.

 

[Manticore]

Golden Opportunity to Pull Ahead:
If the Pakistan Air Force can do better and avoid institutional and political barriers that the West is plagued with, they can make a relative leap in capabilities and meet their goals and objectives far better than a linear and asymmetric solution could. Pakistan has achieved a significant milestone with the JF-17. With a UCAV, Pakistan will have achieved the next major milestone. Pakistan’s aircraft manufacturing industry would remain relevant rather than become outdated and relegated to obsolescence. Pakistan does not have the technology or the resources to build an expensive and complex 5th generation plane. A UCAV however, is a far more achievable goal. As we shall see later, the technologies involved allow far greater flexibility and can be said almost ideally suited to Pakistan’s military-industrial complex’s strengths.

Pakistan’s Threat Scenario 2025
Before considering an active solution and the technologies relevant to that solution, it may be helpful to first consider the threat scenario for Pakistan. A 15 year forward plan may be relevant to our discussion. This is based on the perceived change in the quality of the threat in Pakistan’s neighborhood in that timeframe and allocates time to field a response for Pakistan’s aeronautical industries.
India will begin to field PAKFA fighter jets from Russia and may also develop her own from technology bought from the Russians. While the latter may be discounted as another employment opportunity for DRDO and related third-rate Indian bureaucracies, PAKFA and any specific design built for India by the Russians will provide a challenge that would be wholly new to the subcontinent: a 5th generation fighter. Further, it may not be farfetched to imagine a JSF purchase for the IAF, given the blossoming long-term partnership developing between India and the United States.
While the credentials for the JSF are still unclear and the jury may be out on its air-to-air combat capabilities, the PAKFA is a clear threat. The PAKFA was designed to counter the F-22 in air combat. The threat is perhaps best defined as reasonable stealth, super cruise, high altitude and high speed. The PAKFA takes BVR combat to a new level that the airframe of the JF-17, by design, cannot compete with. BVR missiles launched from a high-high profile aids missile range and speed, and reduces the threat, range and effectiveness of Pakistani BVR launches in response. With AWACs and refuelers in the sky, such threats would be a menace, particularly with longer ranged BVR missiles from Russia.
A major political and geo-strategic to consider is the War on Terror (WOT) in Afghanistan may be winding down by then and aid from the United States and other Western countries are likely to dry up. Pakistan’s Afghanistan leverage vis-à-vis the international community could be drastically reduced. In a worst case scenario, sanctions may once again be imposed in one form or another.
By 2025, India could field PAKFAs and perhaps even JSFs in the hundreds, drastically changing the military balance in the Subcontinent. Pakistan can either go bankrupt attempting to counter this new threat or she can become obsolete, back to a decade similar to the 1990s. Or Pakistan can develop UCAVs.
In the next section of this paper we consider UCAVs as a solution to Pakistan’s air defense needs.

 

[Manticore]

Possible UCAV solutions for Future Air Combat
Establishing a requirement first requires the establishment of a doctrine. This is a critical weakness for the European Union were divergent needs are hard to align and researchers often have to work on the basis of practicality (Freitas, et al., 2009). As concerns PAF, there is a clear threat scenario and easier possibilities of establishing a doctrine. Based on an outlined doctrine, we can consider a number of possible UCAV solutions for the PAF in tackling the future threat scenario of an Indian PAKFA and other possible 5th generation aircraft.
Let us start with a quick recap of possible strategies. The general approach has been to counter India’s provocative procurements on a largely symmetric basis. Increasing number of manned fighter jets have been reciprocated by increases in Pakistan’s inventory of manned jets. Purchase of AEW assets have been matched by an equivalent purchase. Nuclear tests were responded to with equivalent nuclear tests as were ballistic missile tests. However, this asymmetry is increasingly impractical because of differing size and economic development between the two countries.

Meanwhile, India is now slated to acquire a large number of 5th generation planes in a 50-50 partnership with the Russians. Instead of attempting to break the bank and procure increasingly complex (and expensive) 5th generation fighters with the added exponential increase in maintenance and other operational costs, a solution may be to respond asymmetrically.

Two possible scenarios appear within a broad asymmetric strategy – positive asymmetry or negative asymmetry. Examples of implementing a negative asymmetric scenario against an IAF fielding significant numbers of 5th generation fighters would be to push back defenses further away from the border, rely more on LR-SAMs and resort to hardening major assets against the inevitable.

A strategy of positive asymmetry is also possible. This would imply responding asymmetrically but in a more proactive, aggressive and positive manner. This paper will outline such a strategy. As an example of such a strategy, Pakistan can choose to skip the 5th generation concepts and move towards combining the most practical of the 3rd, 4th and 5th generation with concepts deriving from the 6th generation; a simplified UCAV to supplement PAF’s 4+ generation fighters. This approach will not be unique. Japan for instance, may choose to skip the 5th Generation concept with its i3 fighter concept (Perrett, 2010). Evidence of responding with positive asymmetry can perhaps be found in the Quran:
The good deed and the evil deed are not alike. Repel the evil deed with one which is better.
Al Quran, 41:33

A Practical UCAV for Pakistan
The attempt forward will be to propose a solution in the form of a UCAV for the PAF. We will first focus on some basic parameters that need to be fulfilled. The focus will then shift to defining a specific solution that meets those requirements in a most balanced manner.
We identify the following characteristics as imperative for the discussed UCAV solution:
1. Unmanned Platform
2. Simple construction and achievable technology
3. Simplified single-engine buildable in Pakistan
4. Relatively Low Cost
5. Economy and asymmetry in sensor load
6. Using parts bin of existing aircraft and from industry partners
7. Designed for high altitude, high speed f-pole BVR combat
8. Structure can operate in and sustain high G-forces
9. Artificial Intelligence
10. Network centric
11. Swarm & Group Tactics
12. Low Observable
13. Combat Air Patrol efficiency
14. Interceptor suitability

 

[Manticore]

The X-47 Pegasus is a design that broadly appears suitable for Pakistan’s requirements. The design features a simple, single engine, well-swept, diamond-shaped delta. The large delta provides low wing-loading, ideal for high altitude flight and maneuverability. The high sweep mitigates the delta’s drag, allowing a classic high-high aerodynamic profile to counter the PAKFA. Inherent structural integrity of the diamond-shape delta simplifies construction and allows the design to be strengthened for high G-forces[8] at a smaller weight and cost penalty.
http://dc191.*******.com/img/DHzomzrm/X-47.jpg
While a tailless design appears most efficient in terms of drag and RCS, developing a maneuverable fighter may prove problematic and high-risk from the perspective of keeping the project within the meager budget and time constraint of the PAF. A proportionately small twin tail is proposed instead (not illustrated). This twin tail may or may not be supplemented by thrust vectoring. Developmentally, this suggests a safer choice and allows greater control authority.

A single engine solution is proposed for the J-UCAV to be cost effective in acquisition and maintenance. As discussed earlier, since UCAVs do not need to fly frequently because of pilot training requirements and has to maintain a simple, cost effective solution. Simplicity of design and manufacture is important since the J-UCAV must be built in, and afforded by Pakistan.


The J-UCAV design proposed in this paper makes the hypothetical assumption of using an RD-93 or a WS-13 / WS-12 size engine. Taking a standard fighter aircraft engine as the benchmark can help allow the program to use the engine parts bin of an existing system. Assuming the stringent requirements for metallurgy, advanced composites and other advanced materials and manufacture processes can be relaxed, degraded or substituted to an extent, the UCAV engine can then perform adequately in the same thrust range with the tradeoff of degraded MTBF and reliability in lieu of low cost and simplicity.


A problem faced by a high-sweep delta design is poor CAP performance. This problem exists because of higher cruise speed as a result of sweep and greater drag because of delta wings. The solution proposed thus compromises our CAP requirements. To alleviate this issue and allow the J-UCAV better CAP performance, one possible solution is using non-movable, disposable canards. The reasoning behind such a solution is explainable as a fighter does not need to pull high Gs while on CAP, nor does it need to fly particularly fast. In fact, the slower and higher it can fly the better. Such flight profiles allow a balanced tradeoff between fuel efficiency and endurance, on the one hand, and potential kinetic energy from the high altitude profile. Adding high aspect ratio disposable canards can help slow and high flight profiles. In case of a threat, the fighter can dispose its canards in-flight and engage.

The diagram indicates possible locations for such canards. The canards may be added to the wing tips and / or forward of the wings. In the latter case, one anticipated issue is of clearance during disposal; avoiding the disposed canards from hitting the airframe. Some possible solutions are listed below:

1. Having an ejector mechanism that pushes the canards away from the airframe.
2. Building the forward disposable canards with light composite material and coating them with softer material to avoid damage in case of accidental collision.
3. Carefully planning disposal flight profile. For instance, a high angle-of-attack release profile, particularly possible with thrust vectoring, may allow seamless separation.


DSI intakes may also be incorporated to decrease RCS, increase performance, and reduce weight and costs. A possible improvement to DSI intake design that PAF, PAC Kamra and Chengdu engineers can look into may be a variable DSI. At first glance, this sounds contradictory given that DSI intakes are meant to supplant variable intake designs. However, a DSI bump that can enlarge or contract using pneumatic, hydraulic or other mechanisms can improve flight performance in a wide variety of flight profiles. These can possibly be significantly cheaper and lighter than more traditional variable inlet designs and simultaneously be stealthier. However, given Pakistan’s budget constraints, any J-UCAV program should not be stalled because of risky technology choices and men better qualified than this author can perhaps decide better whether to pursue such technologies.


Using off-the-shelf parts from existing platforms can reduce such development risks further and reduce costs and time. The F-117 program is testament to the usefulness of this strategy. The approach can be extended to the maximum possible parts from the JF-17 and Chinese combat aircraft, UAVs and UCAVs. A UCAV designed around an RD-93-class engine can possibly use a large number of subsystems from the JF-17; the landing gear is a possible example

Other technology choices for the J-UCAV may include a 360 degree sensor suite similar to the F-35 and asymmetric sensor payloads. The latter implies that only a portion of the UCAVs / manned aircraft in a pack will have expensive systems such as AESA radars installed. Others will be more dispensable missile careers. This strategy is sometimes referred to as cloud shooting (Perrett, 2010) and is similar in concept to naval engagements. The Japanese concept is illustrated and shows relevance to our strategy with the exception that instead of 6th generation manned fighters guiding UCAV swarms, 4th generation fighters available to PAF may provide the equivalent UCAV guidance authority.

Figure 1 Japanese i3 6th generation fighter

Given the ability today of remotely launching AAMs and the highly sensor rich environment over Pakistani air space in the time-frame of deployment, such auxiliaries would provide cheap force multipliers for Pakistan. There is some discussion among observers that at least some of PAF’s Mirage and F-7 fleets have been upgraded in a similar manner to launch BVR missiles using input from external sensors through the C4I network. While there is doubt about the feasibility and usefulness of maintaining older jets in this role with due consideration to pilot training and maintenance costs, J-UCAVs would provide ideal substitutes and appear to be perfect platforms for this role.
In the Grande Strategic view, PAF can use large numbers of J-UCAVs as a cheap and ideal counter for IAF and any other air force that seeks to undermine Pakistani airspace. They could form a picket line that are the first to deal with enemies and are reinforced with manned fighters where necessary. Such J-UCAVs would require very low maintenance, near zero training costs and may be cheap enough to not worry about being put outside hardened shelters, a valued commodity for PAF. Armed with 2 BVRs and 2 WVRs, J-UCAVs could prove to become the foot soldier of the skies, lightly armed and yet overwhelming in their numbers.

In Conclusion

UCAVs are an emerging technology that has the potential to revolutionize air warfare. While the 5th generation of combat planes is today the pinnacle of military aviation, UCAVs present paradigms that can supplement if not supplant manned fighters of the 4th and 5th generations. People who discuss a potential 6th generation inevitably mention unmanned aircraft as a likely salient. Unlike the 5th generation of aircraft that are extremely expensive and complex to build and maintain UCAVs provide the potential of finding an equivalent solution with significant reduction in complexity and cost.
The PAF has until now not considered UCAVs in the air-to-air role. With the systematic addition of net-centric warfare with platforms such as Erieye, ZDK03, ground radars, future planned communication satellite and the necessary middleware for a superior C4I, Pakistan has managed to transform the battle environment to one were UCAVS can multiply the effectiveness and flexibility of the entire air defense system.


UCAVs: The Future of Air Warfare - Grande Strategy

 

[Manticore]

Pakistan

* Ababeel Aerial Drone[22]
* Baaz UAV Aerial drone[22]
* Border Eagle[23]
* Burraq UAV
* Explorer UAV[23]
* Firefly UAV Rocket Propelled UAV
* Hawk UAV[23]
* Hornet UAV[23]
* Jasoos
* Mukhbaar
* Nishan MK-II[23]
* Rover UAV[23]
* Shadow MK-II[23]
* Tornado UAV[23]
* Uqab UAV
* falco uav


Deadly PAF Birds without Pilots
Deadly PAF Birds without Pilots | Pakistan Times

 

[Chogy]

Air-air combat is far too complex (IMO) for effective UCAVs both today and in the foreseeable future. They can be decoys, and they might even be able to fire a missile, but for an A2A UCAV to be effective, it needs the following, at a bare minimum:

1) An envelope from seal level to 65,000+ feet, high supersonic

2) A large and powerful AI radar

3) Potent A-A missiles like the AMRAAM

If it lacks any of these, it is going to be pretty much useless. Given that, I have just described an F-15/16/18/22 or Su-27/30 in terms of an airframe, engine(s), and weaponry. On these potent aircraft, the space occupied by a human is not that significant as a % of both weight and volume. Since human volunteers are not lacking to fly these jets, it makes no sense to me to build such an airframe and not stick a person in it.

 

[Muhammad-Bin-Qasim]

Air-air combat is far too complex (IMO) for effective UCAVs both today and in the foreseeable future. They can be decoys, and they might even be able to fire a missile, but for an A2A UCAV to be effective, it needs the following, at a bare minimum:

1) An envelope from seal level to 65,000+ feet, high supersonic

2) A large and powerful AI radar

3) Potent A-A missiles like the AMRAAM

If it lacks any of these, it is going to be pretty much useless. Given that, I have just described an F-15/16/18/22 or Su-27/30 in terms of an airframe, engine(s), and weaponry. On these potent aircraft, the space occupied by a human is not that significant as a % of both weight and volume. Since human volunteers are not lacking to fly these jets, it makes no sense to me to build such an airframe and not stick a person in it.

The only place where drones can be functional is countries with corrupt governments which allow foreign powers to kill their own people using drones which fly from their airfields...

 

[mughaljee]

all wars will be conduct with the help of UAV ?