Raphael
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A picture we’ve seen before – Indian Punchline
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/SOU-01-031214.html
A picture we’ve seen before
M K Bhadrakumar
The 18th session of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation ended in Kathmandu, Nepal, November 27. When the curtain comes down, a sense of déjà vu becomes unavoidable.
The IndiaPakistan tensions holding the SAARC processes to ransom; the other seven in the eight-member grouping getting arrayed on an issue that puts India in isolation; the tepid outcome; the vague hint that an exasperated India is increasingly left with no option but to throw in the towel and opt for subregional cooperation — all these templates appeared at Kathmandu.
What happened has been a replay of what has happened time and again.
The good thing has been that the summit was held at all after a gap of three years that seemed an eternity, when it was in hopeless drift.
Most certainly, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was the focus of attention at the Kathmandu summit, because this was his first appearance on the South Asian forum, and his enthusiasm for regional cooperation is by now a legion.
Modi did not disappoint his regional audience by outlining an alluring dream he has of the infinite realms of possibility if the eight countries were to move shoulder to shoulder with the eye cast on the horizons of an integrated, wellknit, dynamic, prosperous region.
Looking closer, however, it is unfair to pin the blame for the SAARC’s inertia on Pakistan — as we Indians are wont to. Some honest introspection is in order.
Take the proposals on ‘connectivity’ — free unhindered surface transportation that knocks down the borders. It holds strategic implications insofar as it could open up India’s access route to the Central Asian and Eurasian regions, and even to China. Now, it is too much to expect that Islamabad would tamely go along without examining minutely the longterm implications, since the backlog of the ‘great game’ in Afghanistan cannot be wished away.
Having said that, Pakistan has still not rejected the proposals out of hand but merely pleads that it needs more time to reflect. The remarks of the Pakistani officials suggested that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif might have relented at the last minute if a better ambience had prevailed at the Kathmandu summit.
The picture that is etched in memory is the photograph of Sharif walking past Modi on the podium of the conference and the two statesmen strenuously looking away from each other with a studied look of indifference.
Why do statesmen behave like petulant, sulking children?
But that is not alone where the (continuing) failure of India’s leadership role lies. Modi’s speech was an honest attempt to move the SAARC narrative into the future and he was brutally frank about the cynicism with which the South Asian public views SAARC. He outlined measures that India could take to address its embarrassing trade surpluses with its neighbors, to address easier travel for businessmen, and so on. But, at the end of the day, he failed to announce any unilateral initiatives.
The Kathmandu summit was Modi’s ‘Maritime Silk Road’ moment, as he harped on the criticality of infrastructure development in the region, but he didn’t follow up with a grand historic bargain.
It seems Delhi dithered and shied away from announcing any dramatic moves of increased market access or transit regimes so that the neighbors can trade through India. Somehow, the impression lingers that Delhi is satisfied with an incremental, bilateral approach rather than a radical road map that may not be under India’s ‘control’.
Indeed, the core issue very much remains. Namely, that India has been a control freak. Embedded nicely within the argument that India’s ‘interests’ are at stake, India has so far insisted on keeping the SAARC as its parish — despite the seven other countries’ refusal to fall in line.
This became very evident at the Kathmandu summit where all seven countries sought a more active role for China in the grouping while India was forced onto the back foot and had to resort to a pedantic view that SAARC needed to deepen its cooperation first before thinking about expansion.
If there was some hope that Delhi would reciprocate China’s decision to back India’s full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, it was not to happen at Kathmandu.
Why is India so diffident? Ironically, China is already expanding its footprints in the South Asian region even without being a member of the SAARC, and it is entirely conceivable that in a near future China may emerge as the number one partner for all countries in the region in trade and investment.
And if that were to happen, that is not because China’s South Asian strategies are ‘Indiacentric’.
In fact, it is presumptuous on the part of our pundits to imagine that India is at the epicenter of the Chinese regional and global strategies.
China’s apprehensions over the United States’ ‘pivot’ strategy in Asia and the competitive spirit that imbues the ‘new type of relationship’ emerging between the two big powers assumes global dimensions and spills over to the Indian Ocean region, where fastening the sea lanes through which China conducts much of its foreign trade is a compelling necessity for Beijing.
Thus, the pressures that Washington brings to bear on the Sri Lankan government on the human rights issues are a calibrated attempt to get Colombo to roll back the island’s ties with China.
Nonetheless, India holds on to archaic notions of the South Asian region being its ‘sphere of influence’ and remains averse to ‘outsiders’ establishing significant presence in a way that may affect Indian hegemony. Is this tenable in a globalized word that is increasingly talking about interconnectivity and interdependence in a milieu where global challenges have assumed new character (and the efficacy of any single power being able to tackle them is doubtful), and where development is widely recognized as the leitmotif of security?
Besides, India’s South Asian neighbors are sovereign countries that have a fair grasp of the emergent ‘multipolar’ world order realities and their place in it. To be sure, India needs to mull over its entrenched beliefs as to what constitutes ‘influence’ in its neighborhood.
If SAARC has no credibility, it is also a reflection of India’s lack of credibility in the eyes of its neighbors. There is a glaring mismatch between what India has promised and its actual performance.
The point is, as a noted Indian thinker, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, wrote last week, ‘much of our neighbors’ interest in us will depend on how well or economy does in the next decade.’
Second, infrastructure is vital for strengthening regional security, but India itself is in ground zero.
China’s role in South Asia actually serves India’s longterm interests insofar as infrastructure development enhances the region’s security, connectivity and globalization.
In sum, it can promote regional growth and development (which is even consequential to the future of the values of democracy and secularism that India values and would preserve in its own self-interests.) Often we ourselves seem to fail to recognize this complex, multilayered paradigm and remain rooted to the outmoded doctrines of ‘sphere of influence’ and absolute security.
The Indian Ocean is no doubt extremely vital for India’s security. But that does not make the Indian Ocean ‘India’s ocean’. The regional community and the world community will only ridicule India’s pretensions.
The fact that all countries surrounding India — ranging from Thailand in the east to Iran in the west — have warmed up to China’s Maritime Silk Road strategy should be an eyeopener.
India lets China test regional comfort zone
By Narayani Basu
The conclusion of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in Nepal last week highlighted a couple of trends that India should be keen to change.
As the largest member of the regional grouping, India has, so far, been quite comfortable in its contemplation of the number one position in the eight-member club. But that thinking needs to change if New Delhi is to capitalize on the existing window of opportunity to strengthen ties across South Asia.
For most of its three-decade existence, SAARC has been prey to the reverberations in bilateral ties between India and Pakistan. Given the fraught nature of that relationship, there is small wonder that there have rarely been concrete outcomes from SAARC summit meetings. This considerably short-sighted view on New Delhi's part has left the door wide open for the entry of a larger, well-heeled neighbor.
China became an observer at the regional grouping in 2006, but it has been pushing for a permanent membership - which comes with the power to veto key agreements - since then. For this year's summit, the Asia-Pacific Daily, published by the Xinhua news agency's Kathmandu bureau, brought out a 12-page special edition, in which at least three Nepal cabinet ministers and two former foreign ministers supported China's case for joining SAARC. This move came just days after Beijing promised to provide 10 million yuan (US$1.63 million) annually, from 2014 to 2018, to help Nepal develop its northern districts on the border of the Tibet Autonomous Region.
The MoU states that the funds will be spent on small-scale projects in the areas of health, education and road connectivity. These are areas vital for the development of almost all South Asian countries, and will naturally be nothing but tempting prospects for SAARC members. Small wonder, then, that on Wednesday, three members - Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives - called for an increased role for observers like China at the summit.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi is certainly attempting to revamp India's regional policy discourse towards South Asia. One of his government's key strategic priorities is to reestablish India as the regional leader in South Asia. Despite reaching out to China on key bilateral economic and geopolitical issues, there is no doubt that Modi has no desire to allow Beijing to impinge on India's position at SAARC. His invitation to SAARC heads of government to attend his swearing-in ceremony in May was a definite move to rejuvenate ties with India's neighbors, who have, of late, been rather willing to accommodate Chinese overtures.
Modi's first overseas visits were to Bhutan and Nepal, where he, too, was generous with his doling out of credit lines and other financial sops. By the close of the summit in Kathmandu, India had pledged a slew of regional investments in the areas of infrastructure, health facilities, and communications satellites. New Delhi also promised to open up its markets to exporters from smaller South Asian countries.
Despite this, a bigger question still looms over India, and over SAARC itself - can it think out of the box as far as South Asian regional strategy is concerned? Critics of the previous Congress government in New Delhi argue that it allowed India to become too complacent of its position in the region, allowing China - a clear economic giant which shares borders with not one, but four of India's neighbors - a clear window of opportunity. Roads, ports and power projects have been set up by Beijing across the region in the last few years. Chinese investments into South Asia amount to US$30 billion, while Chinese loans at concessional rates to countries in the region add up to $25 billion. Beijing is providing 10,000 scholarships to South Asian students, along with skills training for thousands of others. Indeed, the venue where SAARC leaders met this year in Kathmandu was built with Chinese funds.
Meanwhile, New Delhi remains embroiled in bitter tensions with Islamabad, which upstaged this year's summit as well. The leaders of the two countries spent much of their time cold-shouldering each other, only to meet briefly at the very end of the summit. During the summit itself, Pakistan blocked three major connectivity projects due to be signed on November 26, besides pushing for Chinese membership in the regional grouping. Worse still, the only outcome of the summit has been a lone agreement, on energy cooperation, which was collectively signed by SAARC members.
If India wants to present itself as a viable regional leader, it will have to do better than this. While it is true that China has deeper pockets, it is equally inevitable that given the liberal way that Beijing is wooing the region, smaller South Asian countries will be tempted by the avenues for development that China offers. Despite a free trade pact that has been in existence since 2006, cross-border trade between SAARC nations is only 5%, and there are few transport or power links between them. Beijing's offers of grant assistance, logistical support and investments in key areas like hydropower are critical for the advancement of the region. Most South Asian countries are fully aware of this, and there is little chance that such offers will be rebuffed.
Merely objecting to China's handouts to the region, or complaining about China's push to raise its status from observer to permanent member will not get India too far. What is required is to prove to the region that it is not on the foreign policy backburner as far as New Delhi is concerned. The promise to open up Indian markets to South Asian exporters is a step in the right direction, but whether Modi's government can put aside bilateral bitterness with Pakistan, and play the economic game as well as China is doing at the moment is still open to question.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/SOU-01-031214.html
A picture we’ve seen before
M K Bhadrakumar
The 18th session of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation ended in Kathmandu, Nepal, November 27. When the curtain comes down, a sense of déjà vu becomes unavoidable.
The IndiaPakistan tensions holding the SAARC processes to ransom; the other seven in the eight-member grouping getting arrayed on an issue that puts India in isolation; the tepid outcome; the vague hint that an exasperated India is increasingly left with no option but to throw in the towel and opt for subregional cooperation — all these templates appeared at Kathmandu.
What happened has been a replay of what has happened time and again.
The good thing has been that the summit was held at all after a gap of three years that seemed an eternity, when it was in hopeless drift.
Most certainly, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was the focus of attention at the Kathmandu summit, because this was his first appearance on the South Asian forum, and his enthusiasm for regional cooperation is by now a legion.
Modi did not disappoint his regional audience by outlining an alluring dream he has of the infinite realms of possibility if the eight countries were to move shoulder to shoulder with the eye cast on the horizons of an integrated, wellknit, dynamic, prosperous region.
Looking closer, however, it is unfair to pin the blame for the SAARC’s inertia on Pakistan — as we Indians are wont to. Some honest introspection is in order.
Take the proposals on ‘connectivity’ — free unhindered surface transportation that knocks down the borders. It holds strategic implications insofar as it could open up India’s access route to the Central Asian and Eurasian regions, and even to China. Now, it is too much to expect that Islamabad would tamely go along without examining minutely the longterm implications, since the backlog of the ‘great game’ in Afghanistan cannot be wished away.
Having said that, Pakistan has still not rejected the proposals out of hand but merely pleads that it needs more time to reflect. The remarks of the Pakistani officials suggested that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif might have relented at the last minute if a better ambience had prevailed at the Kathmandu summit.
The picture that is etched in memory is the photograph of Sharif walking past Modi on the podium of the conference and the two statesmen strenuously looking away from each other with a studied look of indifference.
Why do statesmen behave like petulant, sulking children?
But that is not alone where the (continuing) failure of India’s leadership role lies. Modi’s speech was an honest attempt to move the SAARC narrative into the future and he was brutally frank about the cynicism with which the South Asian public views SAARC. He outlined measures that India could take to address its embarrassing trade surpluses with its neighbors, to address easier travel for businessmen, and so on. But, at the end of the day, he failed to announce any unilateral initiatives.
The Kathmandu summit was Modi’s ‘Maritime Silk Road’ moment, as he harped on the criticality of infrastructure development in the region, but he didn’t follow up with a grand historic bargain.
It seems Delhi dithered and shied away from announcing any dramatic moves of increased market access or transit regimes so that the neighbors can trade through India. Somehow, the impression lingers that Delhi is satisfied with an incremental, bilateral approach rather than a radical road map that may not be under India’s ‘control’.
Indeed, the core issue very much remains. Namely, that India has been a control freak. Embedded nicely within the argument that India’s ‘interests’ are at stake, India has so far insisted on keeping the SAARC as its parish — despite the seven other countries’ refusal to fall in line.
This became very evident at the Kathmandu summit where all seven countries sought a more active role for China in the grouping while India was forced onto the back foot and had to resort to a pedantic view that SAARC needed to deepen its cooperation first before thinking about expansion.
If there was some hope that Delhi would reciprocate China’s decision to back India’s full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, it was not to happen at Kathmandu.
Why is India so diffident? Ironically, China is already expanding its footprints in the South Asian region even without being a member of the SAARC, and it is entirely conceivable that in a near future China may emerge as the number one partner for all countries in the region in trade and investment.
And if that were to happen, that is not because China’s South Asian strategies are ‘Indiacentric’.
In fact, it is presumptuous on the part of our pundits to imagine that India is at the epicenter of the Chinese regional and global strategies.
China’s apprehensions over the United States’ ‘pivot’ strategy in Asia and the competitive spirit that imbues the ‘new type of relationship’ emerging between the two big powers assumes global dimensions and spills over to the Indian Ocean region, where fastening the sea lanes through which China conducts much of its foreign trade is a compelling necessity for Beijing.
Thus, the pressures that Washington brings to bear on the Sri Lankan government on the human rights issues are a calibrated attempt to get Colombo to roll back the island’s ties with China.
Nonetheless, India holds on to archaic notions of the South Asian region being its ‘sphere of influence’ and remains averse to ‘outsiders’ establishing significant presence in a way that may affect Indian hegemony. Is this tenable in a globalized word that is increasingly talking about interconnectivity and interdependence in a milieu where global challenges have assumed new character (and the efficacy of any single power being able to tackle them is doubtful), and where development is widely recognized as the leitmotif of security?
Besides, India’s South Asian neighbors are sovereign countries that have a fair grasp of the emergent ‘multipolar’ world order realities and their place in it. To be sure, India needs to mull over its entrenched beliefs as to what constitutes ‘influence’ in its neighborhood.
If SAARC has no credibility, it is also a reflection of India’s lack of credibility in the eyes of its neighbors. There is a glaring mismatch between what India has promised and its actual performance.
The point is, as a noted Indian thinker, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, wrote last week, ‘much of our neighbors’ interest in us will depend on how well or economy does in the next decade.’
Second, infrastructure is vital for strengthening regional security, but India itself is in ground zero.
China’s role in South Asia actually serves India’s longterm interests insofar as infrastructure development enhances the region’s security, connectivity and globalization.
In sum, it can promote regional growth and development (which is even consequential to the future of the values of democracy and secularism that India values and would preserve in its own self-interests.) Often we ourselves seem to fail to recognize this complex, multilayered paradigm and remain rooted to the outmoded doctrines of ‘sphere of influence’ and absolute security.
The Indian Ocean is no doubt extremely vital for India’s security. But that does not make the Indian Ocean ‘India’s ocean’. The regional community and the world community will only ridicule India’s pretensions.
The fact that all countries surrounding India — ranging from Thailand in the east to Iran in the west — have warmed up to China’s Maritime Silk Road strategy should be an eyeopener.
India lets China test regional comfort zone
By Narayani Basu
The conclusion of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in Nepal last week highlighted a couple of trends that India should be keen to change.
As the largest member of the regional grouping, India has, so far, been quite comfortable in its contemplation of the number one position in the eight-member club. But that thinking needs to change if New Delhi is to capitalize on the existing window of opportunity to strengthen ties across South Asia.
For most of its three-decade existence, SAARC has been prey to the reverberations in bilateral ties between India and Pakistan. Given the fraught nature of that relationship, there is small wonder that there have rarely been concrete outcomes from SAARC summit meetings. This considerably short-sighted view on New Delhi's part has left the door wide open for the entry of a larger, well-heeled neighbor.
China became an observer at the regional grouping in 2006, but it has been pushing for a permanent membership - which comes with the power to veto key agreements - since then. For this year's summit, the Asia-Pacific Daily, published by the Xinhua news agency's Kathmandu bureau, brought out a 12-page special edition, in which at least three Nepal cabinet ministers and two former foreign ministers supported China's case for joining SAARC. This move came just days after Beijing promised to provide 10 million yuan (US$1.63 million) annually, from 2014 to 2018, to help Nepal develop its northern districts on the border of the Tibet Autonomous Region.
The MoU states that the funds will be spent on small-scale projects in the areas of health, education and road connectivity. These are areas vital for the development of almost all South Asian countries, and will naturally be nothing but tempting prospects for SAARC members. Small wonder, then, that on Wednesday, three members - Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives - called for an increased role for observers like China at the summit.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi is certainly attempting to revamp India's regional policy discourse towards South Asia. One of his government's key strategic priorities is to reestablish India as the regional leader in South Asia. Despite reaching out to China on key bilateral economic and geopolitical issues, there is no doubt that Modi has no desire to allow Beijing to impinge on India's position at SAARC. His invitation to SAARC heads of government to attend his swearing-in ceremony in May was a definite move to rejuvenate ties with India's neighbors, who have, of late, been rather willing to accommodate Chinese overtures.
Modi's first overseas visits were to Bhutan and Nepal, where he, too, was generous with his doling out of credit lines and other financial sops. By the close of the summit in Kathmandu, India had pledged a slew of regional investments in the areas of infrastructure, health facilities, and communications satellites. New Delhi also promised to open up its markets to exporters from smaller South Asian countries.
Despite this, a bigger question still looms over India, and over SAARC itself - can it think out of the box as far as South Asian regional strategy is concerned? Critics of the previous Congress government in New Delhi argue that it allowed India to become too complacent of its position in the region, allowing China - a clear economic giant which shares borders with not one, but four of India's neighbors - a clear window of opportunity. Roads, ports and power projects have been set up by Beijing across the region in the last few years. Chinese investments into South Asia amount to US$30 billion, while Chinese loans at concessional rates to countries in the region add up to $25 billion. Beijing is providing 10,000 scholarships to South Asian students, along with skills training for thousands of others. Indeed, the venue where SAARC leaders met this year in Kathmandu was built with Chinese funds.
Meanwhile, New Delhi remains embroiled in bitter tensions with Islamabad, which upstaged this year's summit as well. The leaders of the two countries spent much of their time cold-shouldering each other, only to meet briefly at the very end of the summit. During the summit itself, Pakistan blocked three major connectivity projects due to be signed on November 26, besides pushing for Chinese membership in the regional grouping. Worse still, the only outcome of the summit has been a lone agreement, on energy cooperation, which was collectively signed by SAARC members.
If India wants to present itself as a viable regional leader, it will have to do better than this. While it is true that China has deeper pockets, it is equally inevitable that given the liberal way that Beijing is wooing the region, smaller South Asian countries will be tempted by the avenues for development that China offers. Despite a free trade pact that has been in existence since 2006, cross-border trade between SAARC nations is only 5%, and there are few transport or power links between them. Beijing's offers of grant assistance, logistical support and investments in key areas like hydropower are critical for the advancement of the region. Most South Asian countries are fully aware of this, and there is little chance that such offers will be rebuffed.
Merely objecting to China's handouts to the region, or complaining about China's push to raise its status from observer to permanent member will not get India too far. What is required is to prove to the region that it is not on the foreign policy backburner as far as New Delhi is concerned. The promise to open up Indian markets to South Asian exporters is a step in the right direction, but whether Modi's government can put aside bilateral bitterness with Pakistan, and play the economic game as well as China is doing at the moment is still open to question.
