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The mountain is now a molehill : DEFENCE - India Today
The mountain is now a molehill
The government pares down its ambitious Mountain Strike Corps meant to capture Chinese territory in the event of a border war.
Last December, Prime Minister Narendra Modi triggered off a bout of anxiety within the Indian army. "At a time when the major powers are reducing their forces and relying more on technology, we are still constantly seeking to expand the size of our forces," he said, addressing the Combined Commanders' Conference, a crucial once-a-year gathering of commanders from the three services, onboard the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya. "Modernisation and expansion of forces, both at the same time, is a difficult and unnecessary goal." The PM's reference was to the army, which had been raising a new mountain strike corps (MSC) comprising 90,000 soldiers since 2014.
In 2013, the UPA had sanctioned the corps-an offensive formation meant to cross the Himalayas and capture Chinese territory on the Tibetan plateau in the event of a border war-but did not allot the Rs 64,000 crore required to get it off the ground. The army equipped the new formations from their War Wastage Reserves in the hope of enhanced budgetary support at a later date.
On January 13, less than a month after the PM's speech, army chief General Dalbir Singh told the media that the strike corps was on course and would be raised by 2021. The truth is somewhat different. The 17 Corps-India's Fourth Strike Corps, in addition to the three Corps that face Pakistan, temporarily headquartered in Ranchi, Jharkhand, is far from being on course.
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The 59 Mountain Division with 16,000 soldiers has already been raised in Panagarh, West Bengal, but the proposed 72 Mountain Division in Pathankot has been stalled. One general terms the 17 Corps as "defunct" since it has just one division as against a minimum requirement of two. The future looks bleak. Union finance minister Arun Jaitley's budget on February 29 is expected to only modestly hike outlays for the armed forces. It is unlikely to bring the army any cheer, because, as the PM warned, increasing manpower and simultaneously modernising will be near impossible. Here's why. The army consumes half the Rs 2.46 lakh crore defence budget, but spends nearly 70 per cent of it in salaries and maintenance, leaving just 20 per cent to buy new equipment. It requires at least Rs 10,000 crore each year to buy new equipment, but is left with only Rs 1,500 crore for new purchases after paying off pre-committed liabilities. It has a backlog of over Rs 4 lakh crore in new equipment-rifles, vehicles, missiles, artillery guns and helicopters-that have not been acquired for decades. Much of this equipment is also meant to give teeth to its new corps.
The Frozen Strike Corps
Prime Minister Modi's worries over the growing size of the Indian army began long before China's President Xi Jingping announced this January that he was trimming the world's largest army by 3,00,000 soldiers and transforming it into a more agile, lethal and technologically superior force. Sometime before the Union budget of 2015, the PM pored over a list of major expenditure items, looking for cost heads to prune so that budgetary allocations to the states could be hiked. His eyes hovered over the Rs 64,000 crore proposal for upgrading border infrastructure and to fully equip the still-under-raising strike corps. The PM balked at the proposal and reportedly asked for a review. One of the key findings of an internal review carried out by National Security Advisor Ajit Doval is believed to have recommended freezing the 17 Corps raisings at its present levels and absorbing it into the present holding corps along the China border.
In a media interview last April, Union defence minister Manohar Parrikar said that the government had halved the size of the corps-down to Rs 38,000 crore over eight years and 35,000 men. He blamed the previous government for making the higher estimates without catering for budgetary allocations, but clarified in another interview the following month that the strike corps was only being slowed down, not scrapped. A senior army official denies there has been any reduction in the funding or equipping of the corps. "Everything is going on at full steam," he says. The only delay, he says, has been caused by the Ordnance Factory Board that has been slow to replenish ammunition stocks from its War Wastage Reserves. The army has good reason to deny a slowdown of the corps. They claim the offensive deterrent capability had unsettled the Chinese even before it had been fully raised. Defence analyst Mandeep Bajwa warns the slowdown could have long term implications on the border. "The new corps had worried China which then toned down its belligerence along the border," he says.
Stalled Counter-Punch
The strike corps are offensive formations which, the army is fond of saying, has no tasks on its own soil. It is a purely offensive force directed at the enemy. A general who did the spadework for the Mountain Strike Corps explains its logic. Imagine a boxing bout, he says, where one contestant is constantly on the defensive even as his opponent rains blows, finally beating him to a pulp. "When you fight a defensive battle," he says, "you lose flexibility." The Strike Corps was to radically alter the army's traditionally defensive stance since the humiliating defeat in the 1962 border war with China. It was to be the Indian army's left and right hook, launched on the high altitude deserts of Ladakh or through the mountains of Arunachal Pradesh. Backed by artillery, Brahmos missiles, light tanks, special forces and helicopters, these two mountain infantry divisions would break through Chinese defences, cross over into the Tibetan plateau and capture territory that would be a bargaining chip in a post-conflict settlement.
The challenges are formidable though. Right now, the divisions would have to ascend from the plains at 500 metres up to heights of over 5,000 metres on the Tibetan plateau. Unlike the plains where strike corps attack in ratios of 1:3, three attackers for every defender, manpower intensive mountain warfare needs a ratio of 1:9. The strike corps evolved under NDA-I after the Kargil War of 1999 and the massive 11-month Operation Parakram deployment on the Pakistan border, which began in December 2001. The Indian army prepared new doctrines for limited wars under the nuclear umbrella.
The rapid Chinese infrastructure build-up across the disputed 4,000-km line of control with China revived the spectre of a simultaneous war with that country and Pakistan. The army, they believed, could no longer rush troops from the LAC with China, towards the Pakistan border, as it had done during Operation Parakram. Through its massive network of all-weather roads on the Tibetan plateau and the new Qinghai-Tibet railway line, the PLA could now mobilise against the Indian army anywhere it chose. "We war-gamed the scenarios dozens of times," says a general commanding a strike corps, "the conclusions were always the same. The Chinese could get us wherever they wanted. We had nothing to deter them with, no high-value target we could seize and hold."
These fears manifested in the raksha mantri's operational directive to the armed forces in 2009, a Top Secret 'eyes only' document, asked the armed forces to prepare themselves for a 'two-front war' simultaneously against Pakistan and China. That year, the army raised two more divisions, the 56th and the 71 mountain divisions, comprising over 30,000 troops to bolster the eastern front's defences.
Army planners built upon the model of Operation Falcon in 1986 when then army chief General Sundarji airlifted an infantry brigade to a face-off with intruding Chinese troops in the Sumdorong Chu valley in Arunachal Pradesh. Under then army chief General N.C. Vij in 2003, the army came up with the Cold Start doctrine for rapid shallow thrusts on the border with Pakistan, and a mountain strike corps that would be raised by the 12th Plan (2012-2017). The corps was fine-tuned by successive army chiefs over the years, but were stonewalled by the UPA, unsettled by its cost and offensive nomenclature. That was until PLA soldiers intruded 19-km deep into eastern Ladakh's Depsang Valley in April-May 2013, triggering a 21-day face-off and setting alarm bells off in South Block. The army seized the opportunity. Then army chief General Bikram Singh personally briefed the cabinet committee on security headed by then prime minister Manmohan Singh to urgently sanction the strike corps to deter Chinese adventurism. The generals shot holes in the Indian navy's scenarios that its submarines could choke China's energy lifelines in the Malacca Straits.
The international community would not allow the blockading of such a key global commons, the army reasoned, and the war would be over even before such a blockade could take effect. The army had its way. In July 2013, the UPA cleared the proposal for the corps as part of its plan for 'capability development along the northern borders', a catch-all phrase for enhancement of roads, railways, airfields and communication facilities. The strike corps would be raised over eight years, by 2021, hopefully by when nearly 3,000 km of border roads, sanctioned over a decade ago but being built at a sluggish pace, will finally be completed.
The corps was headquartered in Panagarh, West Bengal, ironically a key Allied airbase during World War II from where 'over the hump' resupply missions were flown into China. The corps headquarters would handle two offensive divisions spread nearly 3,000 km apart. In the event of a conflict with China, these divisions would strike across into Tibet and capture enemy territory in areas lightly held by the PLA; this territory would provide a face-saver and a bargaining chip to be used in post-conflict resolution. The danger, of course, was that it risked enlarging the area of conflict.
Analysts say it would be unreasonable to expect the strike corps to produce viable results in the limited time-frames of a future conflict. This is particularly true since the critical road axis along which the strike corps would advance is yet to be completed. Last year, Parrikar informed the Lok Sabha that only 19 of the 73 strategic road links on the Chinese border had been completed.
With budgetary dangers hovering over the force, analysts call for more prudent measures to deter China. Vice-Admiral Shekhar Sinha (retired) points at a slew of stalled proposals (see box) that would help the armed forces fight jointly. "Only a permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff will be able to allot resources to tackle threats and prevent single-service solutions to complex threats." Air Vice-Marshal Manmohan Bahadur of the Centre for Air Power Studies calls for making air power an integral part of the solution. "Fighter aircraft, helicopters to swiftly move troops and beef up surveillance capabilities along the border."
Military analyst Colonel Ajay Singh (rtd), author of A Spectrum of Modern Warfare, calls for building up existing capabilities. "Instead of a massive strike corps, it would be better to develop the limited offensive capabilities of the holding corps in both Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, by the infusion of additional independent infantry and armoured brigades," he says. But with the government yet to clear the air, the strike corps' first battle for survival, it seems, will be on its own soil.
Know it's a long read but a good one . its from the latest India Today .
The mountain is now a molehill
The government pares down its ambitious Mountain Strike Corps meant to capture Chinese territory in the event of a border war.
Last December, Prime Minister Narendra Modi triggered off a bout of anxiety within the Indian army. "At a time when the major powers are reducing their forces and relying more on technology, we are still constantly seeking to expand the size of our forces," he said, addressing the Combined Commanders' Conference, a crucial once-a-year gathering of commanders from the three services, onboard the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya. "Modernisation and expansion of forces, both at the same time, is a difficult and unnecessary goal." The PM's reference was to the army, which had been raising a new mountain strike corps (MSC) comprising 90,000 soldiers since 2014.
In 2013, the UPA had sanctioned the corps-an offensive formation meant to cross the Himalayas and capture Chinese territory on the Tibetan plateau in the event of a border war-but did not allot the Rs 64,000 crore required to get it off the ground. The army equipped the new formations from their War Wastage Reserves in the hope of enhanced budgetary support at a later date.
On January 13, less than a month after the PM's speech, army chief General Dalbir Singh told the media that the strike corps was on course and would be raised by 2021. The truth is somewhat different. The 17 Corps-India's Fourth Strike Corps, in addition to the three Corps that face Pakistan, temporarily headquartered in Ranchi, Jharkhand, is far from being on course.
Ads by ZINC
The 59 Mountain Division with 16,000 soldiers has already been raised in Panagarh, West Bengal, but the proposed 72 Mountain Division in Pathankot has been stalled. One general terms the 17 Corps as "defunct" since it has just one division as against a minimum requirement of two. The future looks bleak. Union finance minister Arun Jaitley's budget on February 29 is expected to only modestly hike outlays for the armed forces. It is unlikely to bring the army any cheer, because, as the PM warned, increasing manpower and simultaneously modernising will be near impossible. Here's why. The army consumes half the Rs 2.46 lakh crore defence budget, but spends nearly 70 per cent of it in salaries and maintenance, leaving just 20 per cent to buy new equipment. It requires at least Rs 10,000 crore each year to buy new equipment, but is left with only Rs 1,500 crore for new purchases after paying off pre-committed liabilities. It has a backlog of over Rs 4 lakh crore in new equipment-rifles, vehicles, missiles, artillery guns and helicopters-that have not been acquired for decades. Much of this equipment is also meant to give teeth to its new corps.
The Frozen Strike Corps
Prime Minister Modi's worries over the growing size of the Indian army began long before China's President Xi Jingping announced this January that he was trimming the world's largest army by 3,00,000 soldiers and transforming it into a more agile, lethal and technologically superior force. Sometime before the Union budget of 2015, the PM pored over a list of major expenditure items, looking for cost heads to prune so that budgetary allocations to the states could be hiked. His eyes hovered over the Rs 64,000 crore proposal for upgrading border infrastructure and to fully equip the still-under-raising strike corps. The PM balked at the proposal and reportedly asked for a review. One of the key findings of an internal review carried out by National Security Advisor Ajit Doval is believed to have recommended freezing the 17 Corps raisings at its present levels and absorbing it into the present holding corps along the China border.
In a media interview last April, Union defence minister Manohar Parrikar said that the government had halved the size of the corps-down to Rs 38,000 crore over eight years and 35,000 men. He blamed the previous government for making the higher estimates without catering for budgetary allocations, but clarified in another interview the following month that the strike corps was only being slowed down, not scrapped. A senior army official denies there has been any reduction in the funding or equipping of the corps. "Everything is going on at full steam," he says. The only delay, he says, has been caused by the Ordnance Factory Board that has been slow to replenish ammunition stocks from its War Wastage Reserves. The army has good reason to deny a slowdown of the corps. They claim the offensive deterrent capability had unsettled the Chinese even before it had been fully raised. Defence analyst Mandeep Bajwa warns the slowdown could have long term implications on the border. "The new corps had worried China which then toned down its belligerence along the border," he says.
Stalled Counter-Punch
The strike corps are offensive formations which, the army is fond of saying, has no tasks on its own soil. It is a purely offensive force directed at the enemy. A general who did the spadework for the Mountain Strike Corps explains its logic. Imagine a boxing bout, he says, where one contestant is constantly on the defensive even as his opponent rains blows, finally beating him to a pulp. "When you fight a defensive battle," he says, "you lose flexibility." The Strike Corps was to radically alter the army's traditionally defensive stance since the humiliating defeat in the 1962 border war with China. It was to be the Indian army's left and right hook, launched on the high altitude deserts of Ladakh or through the mountains of Arunachal Pradesh. Backed by artillery, Brahmos missiles, light tanks, special forces and helicopters, these two mountain infantry divisions would break through Chinese defences, cross over into the Tibetan plateau and capture territory that would be a bargaining chip in a post-conflict settlement.
The challenges are formidable though. Right now, the divisions would have to ascend from the plains at 500 metres up to heights of over 5,000 metres on the Tibetan plateau. Unlike the plains where strike corps attack in ratios of 1:3, three attackers for every defender, manpower intensive mountain warfare needs a ratio of 1:9. The strike corps evolved under NDA-I after the Kargil War of 1999 and the massive 11-month Operation Parakram deployment on the Pakistan border, which began in December 2001. The Indian army prepared new doctrines for limited wars under the nuclear umbrella.
The rapid Chinese infrastructure build-up across the disputed 4,000-km line of control with China revived the spectre of a simultaneous war with that country and Pakistan. The army, they believed, could no longer rush troops from the LAC with China, towards the Pakistan border, as it had done during Operation Parakram. Through its massive network of all-weather roads on the Tibetan plateau and the new Qinghai-Tibet railway line, the PLA could now mobilise against the Indian army anywhere it chose. "We war-gamed the scenarios dozens of times," says a general commanding a strike corps, "the conclusions were always the same. The Chinese could get us wherever they wanted. We had nothing to deter them with, no high-value target we could seize and hold."
These fears manifested in the raksha mantri's operational directive to the armed forces in 2009, a Top Secret 'eyes only' document, asked the armed forces to prepare themselves for a 'two-front war' simultaneously against Pakistan and China. That year, the army raised two more divisions, the 56th and the 71 mountain divisions, comprising over 30,000 troops to bolster the eastern front's defences.
Army planners built upon the model of Operation Falcon in 1986 when then army chief General Sundarji airlifted an infantry brigade to a face-off with intruding Chinese troops in the Sumdorong Chu valley in Arunachal Pradesh. Under then army chief General N.C. Vij in 2003, the army came up with the Cold Start doctrine for rapid shallow thrusts on the border with Pakistan, and a mountain strike corps that would be raised by the 12th Plan (2012-2017). The corps was fine-tuned by successive army chiefs over the years, but were stonewalled by the UPA, unsettled by its cost and offensive nomenclature. That was until PLA soldiers intruded 19-km deep into eastern Ladakh's Depsang Valley in April-May 2013, triggering a 21-day face-off and setting alarm bells off in South Block. The army seized the opportunity. Then army chief General Bikram Singh personally briefed the cabinet committee on security headed by then prime minister Manmohan Singh to urgently sanction the strike corps to deter Chinese adventurism. The generals shot holes in the Indian navy's scenarios that its submarines could choke China's energy lifelines in the Malacca Straits.
The international community would not allow the blockading of such a key global commons, the army reasoned, and the war would be over even before such a blockade could take effect. The army had its way. In July 2013, the UPA cleared the proposal for the corps as part of its plan for 'capability development along the northern borders', a catch-all phrase for enhancement of roads, railways, airfields and communication facilities. The strike corps would be raised over eight years, by 2021, hopefully by when nearly 3,000 km of border roads, sanctioned over a decade ago but being built at a sluggish pace, will finally be completed.
The corps was headquartered in Panagarh, West Bengal, ironically a key Allied airbase during World War II from where 'over the hump' resupply missions were flown into China. The corps headquarters would handle two offensive divisions spread nearly 3,000 km apart. In the event of a conflict with China, these divisions would strike across into Tibet and capture enemy territory in areas lightly held by the PLA; this territory would provide a face-saver and a bargaining chip to be used in post-conflict resolution. The danger, of course, was that it risked enlarging the area of conflict.
Analysts say it would be unreasonable to expect the strike corps to produce viable results in the limited time-frames of a future conflict. This is particularly true since the critical road axis along which the strike corps would advance is yet to be completed. Last year, Parrikar informed the Lok Sabha that only 19 of the 73 strategic road links on the Chinese border had been completed.
With budgetary dangers hovering over the force, analysts call for more prudent measures to deter China. Vice-Admiral Shekhar Sinha (retired) points at a slew of stalled proposals (see box) that would help the armed forces fight jointly. "Only a permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff will be able to allot resources to tackle threats and prevent single-service solutions to complex threats." Air Vice-Marshal Manmohan Bahadur of the Centre for Air Power Studies calls for making air power an integral part of the solution. "Fighter aircraft, helicopters to swiftly move troops and beef up surveillance capabilities along the border."
Military analyst Colonel Ajay Singh (rtd), author of A Spectrum of Modern Warfare, calls for building up existing capabilities. "Instead of a massive strike corps, it would be better to develop the limited offensive capabilities of the holding corps in both Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, by the infusion of additional independent infantry and armoured brigades," he says. But with the government yet to clear the air, the strike corps' first battle for survival, it seems, will be on its own soil.
Know it's a long read but a good one . its from the latest India Today .
