The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRV

[HRK]

Complete essay by Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor Ahmed
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Pakistan, MIRVs, and Counterforce Targeting

Strategic competition between Pakistan and India is intensifying. Both countries have now entered into a phase of modernization and expansion of their respective strategic forces, reflecting significant investments in strategic programs. Their fissile material production capacities have grown substantially and they have inducted a plethora of new delivery systems. Both are in the process of fielding nuclear triads. Technological advancements are underway in: modern combat aircraft and air defense capabilities; cruise and ballistic missiles; sea-based deterrents; tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs); ballistic missile defense (BMD); and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). India and Pakistan now possess more new types of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles than the United States. To complement these developments, there are advancements in: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technologies; communications and navigation; precision-strike weapons; antisatellite (ASAT) technology; and cyberwarfare capabilities. These technological innovations have the potential to erode strategic stability on the subcontinent. While all of these technologies are of crucial interest to Pakistan, India’s twin pursuits of MIRVs and BMD challenge the effectiveness of Pakistani strategic deterrent and force Pakistan to make choices either to cede ground or engage in a continuing strategic arms competition. If history is a reliable guide, in the event that India places MIRVs atop its missiles, Pakistan is likely to do so as well. (comment: just reverse the sequence, though I still believe Pakistan is still far behind in operationalisation of MIRV)

As Joshua T. White and Kyle Deming have concluded, the immediate consequence of India’s MIRVing is a possible “acceleration of the arms race between India and Pakistan.” One reason for such a course would be that the MIRV-BMD combination swings the pendulum in favor of the attacker. If New Delhi chooses to deploy BMD to defend vital areas and protect command centers, its threshold for launching conventional military strikes could be lowered. MIRVed missiles could expand India’s targeting capabilities. The synergy of these two technologies significantly increases India’s ability to engage Pakistani nuclear hard targets in a first strike and degrade Pakistani retaliatory capacity. As former Indian strategic force commander Lieutenant General B. S. Nagal has written, “the [BMD] system will provide security to important command and control centers besides protecting value centers. The BMD increases the credibility of the command and control mechanisms by protection as well as denial to the adversary.”

Pakistan will face tough choices in the not-too-distant future as India’s modernization programs proceed. Pakistani strategic anxieties are influenced by India’s continued pressure on its eastern front, at a time when its military commitments on the Afghan borderlands and internal security contingencies are sapping its security resources. While the Pakistani military continues to balance these contingencies, the role of its nuclear weapons is limited to deterring Indian military adventures. It is within this context that Pakistan introduced short-range, nuclear-capable weapons systems, which are designed to complicate Indian conventional attack plans at the tactical/operational level. Given conventional force imbalances and the growing technological gap vis-à- vis India, Pakistan has adopted what South Asian nuclear scholar Vipin Narang has described as a nuclear posture of “asymmetric escalation.”

This essay examines this competition and analyzes Pakistan’s options and responses should India decide to follow China’s lead in MIRVing, thereby increasing its counter force targeting options. We consider three Pakistani responses to Indian MIRVs and BMD: not to respond (the “ignore” option); responding, but in a measured way (the “tortoise” option); or responding quickly (the “hare” option). We conclude that Islamabad will most definitely respond with MIRVs, as and when resources permit. Nonetheless, despite the enduring history of the strategic competition on the subcontinent, the “tortoise” option is most likely, given the weak state of the economy and the potential negative impact of the allocation of resources for research and development on such high-cost technologies.

The first section of this essay briefly explores the impact of Indian strategic modernization programs on Pakistan’s deterrence posture. The second section undertakes a brief technological assessment of the current state of Pakistan’s missile capability and assesses candidate missiles amenable for MIRVing and the pursuit of additional counterforce capabilities. The third section analyzes the external and internal factors that will inform Pakistan’s choices. The fourth section analyses options that Pakistan has to respond to India’s pursuit of MIRVs and counterforce targeting. The final section summarizes our key arguments.

India’s Strategic Modernization and Pakistan’s Deterrence Posture

Open-source assessments indicate that India might follow China in MIRVing medium- and long-range ballistic missiles along with developing and flight- testing missile defense interceptors. Chinese developments may have been influenced in part by parallel Indian strategic modernization. As India has the capability to improve the guidance and accuracy of its missiles, counter-force targeting using enlarged and upgraded missiles is clearly within its reach. Counterforce targeting for nuclear- or dual-capable delivery systems implies warfighting roles.

Pakistan is carefully watching nuclear and technological developments in India. The natural impulse of Pakistan’s decision makers, given the intense rivalry with India, is to match destabilizing offensive technological advancements where possible by resorting to available options. Since Pakistan will have great difficulty affording missile defense deployments, the instinct to respond by increasing warhead totals and enhancing the effectiveness of existing missile systems will be quite strong. This is already being demonstrated through flight tests of improved versions of ballistic and cruise missiles. A limiting factor would be prioritization and spending for conventional force modernization. In sum, Pakistan’s strategic planners have hard choices to allocate resources between deterrent force developments and conventional force investment in the near future.

 

[HRK]

India’s MIRVing and Counterforce Targeting Capabilities

India’s strategic ambitions are to compete with China and to modernize its strategic forces under an ambitious program that demonstrates its burgeoning power-projection capabilities. These ambitions increase power asymmetries with Pakistan. India’s rationale for MIRV development is predicated, in part, on the expectation that China might deploy missile defenses. As Avinash Chander, former head of India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), explained, “our future missiles should counter the threat of interceptions.” A second rationale for MIRVs would be as a force multiplier. From Dr. Chander’s statement, we infer that Pakistan is not in the focus of Indian strategic planners because Pakistan has shown no indication of acquiring missile defenses. However, the “force multiplier” effect of prospective Indian MIRVs is certainly a factor that would not go unnoticed in Pakistan.

In April 2012, India tested the Agni-V, with a stated range of 5,000 kilometers (km). This missile was ready for induction in 2015. India could begin flight testing the Agni-VI, with greater range and payload, in 2017. Dr. Chander declared that “the Agni-VI will carry a massive 3-ton warhead, thrice the weight of the 1-ton warhead that Agni missiles have carried so far.” Chinese analysts assessed that this test was deliberately designed not to reveal the Agni-V’s actual range of 8,000 km. India’s announcement indicated that the system was expected to be operational in 2015. Although the Agni-VI is reportedly designed to be of the same length as the Agni-V, it will be two meters larger in diameter, which will increase payload capability, and will facilitate payloads for multiple warheads, whether independently targeted or not.

India’s pursuit of MIRVing is not limited to land-based missiles. India is developing a 4,000-km-range K-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) for its Arihant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). MIRVing the K-4 SLBM missile might be technologically challenging, but is not beyond reach with technical assistance from any of India’s strategic partners. The advent of such capability will provide India with counterforce capabilities on all three legs of its triad, thus meeting India’s power-projection ambitions to match China’s achievements. The K-15 Sagarika SLBM which has preceded the development of the K-4 is reportedly designed to be launched from the Arihant-class SSBN and to carry a 1,000-kg nuclear warhead to a range of 700- 1,500 km. Each Arihant-class submarine would be able to carry 12 K-15 missiles that would later be replaced by K-4 variants with a range of 3,500-5,000 km. Each Arihant SSBN can either carry four K-4 or 12 K-15 SLBMs. Three Arihant class SSBNs are currently under construction one at Visakhapatnam and two in Vadodara, India. The first Arihant-class boat has successfully completed user trials and is ready to enter the Indian submarine fleet for operations which signals the completion of the country’s nuclear triad. The build-out of India’s sea-based leg of the triad is ostensibly to counter China, but it provides the capability to target Pakistan from standoff distances as well.

India’s emerging heavy-lift satellite launch capabilities also suggest that it has developed the basis for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and MIRV technology. This capability was demonstrated when the Indian polar satellite launch vehicle (PSLV) in its 23rd flight successfully placed seven satellites into sub-synchronous orbit in early 2013. The DRDO is believed to have made progress in developing multiple warhead technology, and is geared toward equipping advanced versions of the Agni-V and Agni-VI with different MIRV configurations. Presumably the number of MIRVs carried by the Agni-V and the Agni-VI and its SLBMs would, as with land-based missiles, depend on missile payloads, success in warhead miniaturization, and range.

India enjoys a head start over Pakistan in ISR and space-based capabilities, and is rapidly expanding and improving these capabilities, which have counterforce targeting ramifications. This was exemplified with the launch of a dedicated military communications satellite by India in 2015. In contrast, Pakistan lacks such a dedicated satellite. Existing and projected asymmetries in ISR, cyber, and space capabilities are likely to raise Pakistan’s concerns about the viability of its strategic deterrent. Nonetheless, it will remain quite difficult for India to gain real-time targeting information on all of Pakistan’s mobile missiles in order to conduct counterforce targeting.

Therefore, to achieve credible counterforce capabilities, both countries must improve targeting accuracy against hard targets and mobile targets/launchers through real-time ISR capabilities and better access to space-based assets. India is clearly ahead in this field, but still a long way from having constant, realtime surveillance of all possible mobile missile deployment areas. Pakistan lags well behind India in ISR capabilities, which makes precision-targeting ability during crisis or wartime inconceivable. To lower this gap, Pakistan might seek assistance from China, as explained below.

 

[PaklovesTurkiye]

In sum, Pakistan’s strategic planners have hard choices to allocate resources between deterrent force developments and conventional force investment in the near future.

If we opt for balancing both? Pakistan can't choose single option...Both needs to pursued with same determination and passion...It will be long and patient journey as resources will be scattered but will bear results in both fields...

I pray our economy gets more stable...Army/LEAs needs to enforce peaceful environment in Pakistan for FDIs...

 

[Safriz]

Indias K-15 has no thrust vectoring, uses fins for syeering, has no stage sepetation except booster. Only K-4 will be credible SLBM.
Although India has yet to demonstrate any MIRV capability as conical nose cannot carry MIRV

 

[HRK]

Bhaiooo poora tu post ker ne dooo....
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^^ In continuation
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Threat Perceptions

From a Pakistani perspective, India’s evolving force posture is indicative of a palpable shift toward more counterforce targeting along with countervalue targeting. Pakistan’s threat perceptions will drive countervailing responses, which will also be influenced by: the modernization of the Indian Air Force; integration of the Brahmos and Nirbhay land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) to its SU-30 and Mig- 29K fleet; development of the hypersonic Brahmos-II cruise missiles; and their integration into India’s nuclear submarine fleet along with SLBMs

New Delhi’s advances, not just in strategic capabilities, but also as a result of access to Western technologies and arms sales, could provide the impetus for revisions to India’s nuclear doctrine or a differentiated doctrine for Pakistan and for China. A number of Indian strategic analysts have expressed dissatisfaction with India’s declared doctrine, including retired Rear Admiral Raja Menon, who proposes doctrinal revisions based on India’s growing capabilities. In his opinion, “against China where our capabilities are undeveloped, a certain amount of ambiguity is sensible, but against a country which is openly wedded to first use, and is introducing battlefield weapons, an untended 10-year-old piece of paper is inadequate… Nuclear signaling from the Indian government is hugely overdue.

India’s counterforce targeting would seek to disrupt, degrade, and destroy Pakistan’s ability to mobilize and deploy its strategic forces during a crisis or during warfare. The degree of intent might be measured by the extent to which New Delhi chooses to place MIRVs on its missiles, as well as by quantitative increases and qualitative upgrades in the Indian Air Force. Essentially, India’s land-based and sea-based capabilities and its MIRVing options could raise concerns in Pakistan about the credibility, if not the survivability, of its deterrent.

This worst-case scenario of an all-out preemptive attack would be unlikely to succeed completely, but the correlation of surviving forces could be in India’s favor, thereby deterring a Pakistani second strike. Thus, Pakistan’s decision makers cannot be oblivious to the growth of India’s MIRV and counterforce capabilities.

Those who believe this scenario to be far-fetched might recall how big a role such concerns played during the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. While the strategic competition on the subcontinent is at a far lesser scale, the pursuit of MIRVs and added counterforce capabilities can still be destabilizing, as the state leading the competition might be perceived as having strategic and operational advantages, while the state that has fallen behind might perceive itself as being disadvantaged. MIRVed missiles also can be destabilizing if they become more attractive and time-urgent targets, prompting preemptive strikes and preventive war in a deep crisis. Pakistan would carefully calibrate its responses based on assessments of India’s developments.

A serious pursuit of MIRVs and counterforce capabilities requires the availability of large stocks of fissile material and the engineering potential to weaponize these stockpiles for a variety of warheads of different yields and designs. It is also possible that more than one design might be earmarked for different delivery vehicles. In our assessment, India enjoys the advantage in fissile material stockpiles, production capacities, and new fissile material production capacities. Pakistan’s calculus of India’s existing stocks and potential for future fissile material production will be an important factor in determining its requirements for force structure, warhead totals, and fissile material production.

Pakistan’s Potential to MIRV: A Technical Assessment

MIRVing poses many challenges and a broad degree of technical sophistication. Should Pakistan choose to develop MIRV technology, it will face engineering and technical challenges. Pakistan would need to design guidance mechanisms, compact warheads, and a “bus” that could carry and release multiple warheads. The miniaturization of warheads seems achievable, as is evident by the nuclear-capable, 60-km-range Nasr ballistic missile. Counterforce targeting for MIRVs would necessitate dependence on satellites and advanced ISR capabilities. Pakistani choices will be influenced by many factors, beginning with India’s choices, but also Pakistan’s internal situation, economic strength, and strategic partnerships.

Missile-Centric Deterrence

Pakistani engineers and scientists have had a quarter-century of experience in developing and producing ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. Pakistan’s initial experience with space and missile technology began in the 1960s when the Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission (SUPARCO) blossomed under the guidance and stewardship of Abdus Salam and I. H. Usmani. Collaboration between the US National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) and SUPARCO resulted in the Rehbar series of sounding rockets. But this series remained very basic, at best. The wars of 1965 and 1971 took a toll on both the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and SUPARCO two premier organizations when nearly half of their work forces, consisting of Bengali talent, left when Pakistan was dismembered and Bangladesh was created. In the 1970s and 1980s, Pakistan’s focus was on development of the nuclear fuel cycle, fissile material production, and the development of nuclear weapons in the face of obstacles from the nonproliferation regime. Lack of funding compounded these problems. In the 1990s, Pakistan’s focus shifted toward acquiring ballistic missiles, especially after receiving a shock when its then-principal delivery means F-16 aircraft was withheld by the United States as a consequence of the Pressler amendment, while India’s missile programs were proceeding apace

Over the past quarter-century, Pakistan’s strategic thinking has been based on three key premises. The first is that the reliance on Western technology and arms sales is a risky strategy. The demise of the Soviet Union reduced Pakistan’s strategic significance, while Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear deterrent capabilities ran counter to Western nonproliferation objectives. The second premise is that Pakistan must become self-reliant in matching India’s missile threat. But achieving self-reliance takes time, and the window began to close for Pakistan. Technology transfer deals could only be struck with China and North Korea. China joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992, and soon thereafter joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The third premise is that ballistic missiles would become the premier delivery means of Pakistan’s strategic arsenal. Pakistan’s deterrence strategy involved buying technology off the shelf to fulfill immediate requirements; the transfer of technology from China and North Korea were necessary steps toward long-term self-reliance. Pakistan’s missile quest began with the development and testing of the 80-km range Hatf-I in 1989. In the 1990s, the focus shifted to intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) with the acquisition of the Ghauri (HatfV) from North Korea by Khan Research Laboratories, and the development of the Ghaznavi (Hatf-III) and Shaheen-I (Hatf-IV) by a subsidiary of the PAEC the National Development Complex (NDC). These missiles were earmarked for countervalue strikes inside India in response to India’s development and deployment of the Pakistan-specific 150-km-range Prithvi-I, the 250-km-range Prithvi-II, and the 350-km-range Prithvi-III (Dhanush), along with 700-kmrange Agni-I ballistic missiles.

Pakistan’s acquisition of solid fuel technology eventually led to solid propellant baselines and the foundation of future missiles. The first flight test of the Ghauri, conducted on April 6, 1998, was a failure, with the missile burning up on re-entry. Another Ghauri test a year later also ended in failure, resulting in the immediate need for a redesign of the missile’s navigation and guidance system by the NDC, which merged into the National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) a new organization distinct from the NDC in 2001

Pakistan’s missile arsenal currently includes 11 different types of ballistic and cruise missiles:
1. Hatf-1A — 100-km range
2. Abdale — 180-km range
3. Ghaznavi — 290-km range
4. Shaheen-I — 750-900-km range
5. Shaheen-1A — 1,100-km range
6. Ghauri — 1,150-1,300-km range
7. Shaheen-II — 1,500-2,500-km range
8. Shaheen-III — 2,750-km range
9. Nasr — 60-km range

Two types of cruise missiles have been tested and deployed:

10. Subsonic Babur LACM — 500-700-km range
11. Subsonic Raad air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) — 350-km range

A version of the Babur (Hatf-X) is believed to be under development and might have been tested by the Pakistan Navy from naval platforms along with other LACMs following the creation of the Naval Strategic Force Command in May 2012. Among ballistic missiles, the Ghauri is Pakistan’s only liquid fueled system; all others use solid propellants. Several flight tests of each of these systems have been conducted over the past 15 years to achieve improved performance, targeting, and accuracy parameters.

As ballistic missiles became the mainstay of Pakistan’s deterrent strategy, fissile material production requirements gradually shifted from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to lighter and more compact plutonium-based warheads. With the advent of cruise missiles and warheads for short-range delivery systems, Pakistan’s shift to plutonium production became more pronounced. The LACMs and ALCMs are now part of Pakistani strategic forces. In a few years, Pakistan is expected to field a sea-based deterrent on ships and submarines, completing the triad (comment: essay was published in MAY-2016 before the test of SLCM BABUR-III & MIRV capable ABABEEL missile). In addition, Pakistan has introduced short-range, nuclear capable missiles to respond to India’s conventional force advantages with “full spectrum deterrence.”

 

[Bratva]

I had always wondered if Feroz H khan is the same, that is on Pakdef as well

 

[HRK]

Candidates for MIRVing (comment: essay was published in MAY-2016 before the test of SLCM BABUR-III & MIRV capable ABABEEL missile)

Pakistan’s experience in developing missiles in the past quarter-century indicates the versatility and design capabilities of its missile engineers. Assessing Pakistan’s technological prowess is still difficult because all missile production information is classified. Press releases issued by the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Directorate are the primary source of information regarding the technical evolution of Pakistani missiles and improvements in their operational effectiveness in response to evolving threats. Supplementary information comes from sporadic interviews of retired scientists and research reports comprising photo-interpretation and analysis of various missile tests. Our assessment is based on information in the public record.

Of the nine ballistic missile systems in Pakistan’s arsenal, five are short-range the Hatf-1A, Abdali, Ghaznavi, Shaheen-I, and Nasr. The three cruise missile systems the Babur, Raad, and the prospective naval variant of the Babur are also only suitable for short-range counterforce targeting. Only four ballistic missile types in the entire inventory appear to have been tested with enhanced guidance and penetration capabilities. These four are intermediate-range systems the Shaheen-1A, Ghauri, Shaheen-II, and Shaheen-III which possess ranges suitable for deep strikes inside India. These missiles could be utilized for countervalue or counterforce targeting. Given their payload capacity, at least two of these — the Shaheen-II and Shaheen III — are likely to have the potential to carry MIRVs.

The Shaheen series of solid-fueled ballistic missiles constitutes the mainstay of Pakistan’s road-mobile, deterrent capability. The Shaheen-I was first flight-tested in April 1999, followed by newer versions the Shaheen-1A, the Shaheen-II, and the Shaheen-III. Since the 1998 tests, Pakistan has conducted more flight tests of shorter-range ballistic and cruise missiles than longer- or intermediate-range systems. These tests were carried out to validate improved guidance, propulsion, and control features, along with enhanced penetration and reduced circular error probabilities. Such tests are part of the research and development process required before the army’s Strategic Force Command the repository of Pakistan’s land based missile systems — accepts new missiles for induction and deployment.

Since Indian officials announced an interest in BMD, Pakistan’s declarations following some ballistic missile flight tests indicated the incorporation of advanced technologies possibly designed to defeat missile defenses. On April 25, 2012, for example, the ISPR issued a statement indicating that the 900 - 1,100 km range Shaheen-1A was tested with “improved range and technical parameters.”

Of particular note was the testing of the 180-km-range Abdali and 60-km-range Nasr short-range ballistic missiles. Following the testing of the Abdali, the ISPR declared that the missile had “varied maneuverability options,” providing an “operational level capability.” Other ballistic missiles, such as the Shaheen-II, are reportedly equipped with a terminal guidance system, which allows for evasive in-flight maneuvers to penetrate BMD systems. It is likely that these technologies will be incorporated into the Shaheen series of missiles.

Ballistic missiles can also be flown on depressed trajectories that are designed to confuse and defeat missile defense systems and achieve assured destruction of high-value targets. Depressed trajectory missiles can also be fitted with penetration aids and other countermeasures. They are also compatible with the introduction of maneuverable re-entry vehicles (MaRVs) on single-warhead ballistic missiles. However, nuclear-weapon states typically view MIRVs as the most effective method of achieving assured destruction of high-value targets

Pakistan’s cruise missile programs offer better counterforce targeting options over ballistic missiles because of their ability to achieve precision strikes. Cruise missiles are difficult to detect and intercept and less expensive to build and maintain; moreover, they can carry any type of warhead with greater precision and can be quickly deployed. Launched from standoff ranges, LACMs provide greater targeting flexibility and possess “high maneuverability” to penetrate anti-missile systems while striking targets with “pin-point accuracy.” Pakistan views its cruise missiles as central to “counterforce precision strike capability, with or without conventional warheads.”

Pakistan’s flight-testing of air and land cruise missiles, as well as the Nasr, implies the capability to field miniaturized nuclear warheads. The diameter of the Nasr’s warhead about 11.8 inches suggests that Pakistan has developed an implosion-type miniaturized warhead. Given that Pakistan has maintained a nuclear test moratorium since 1998, the technical parameters of warhead designs would presumably have been validated by means of computer simulations and hydrodynamic testing based on data accumulated from previous hot tests.

Pakistan has also advanced its in-flight maneuvering techniques for the 60-km range Nasr. According to an ISPR press release, a salvo-launch test-firing of the Nasr was conducted on February 11, 2013, in which the missile was stated to have been “specially designed to defeat all known anti-tactical missile defense systems.” This was an obvious reference to India’s possible acquisition of anti tactical ballistic missile systems, such as the Israeli Iron Dome that can intercept short-range incoming rockets and ballistic missiles with ranges up to 70 km. This also implies that Pakistan is determined to find countervailing responses to India’s air defense systems even at short ranges.

Should Pakistan decide to MIRV, the Shaheen-II and Shaheen-III are its best candidates for MIRVing. This might entail redesigning existing warheads of these medium-range missiles, significantly improving terminal guidance systems, and ensuring the robustness of the re-entry vehicles that must rely upon heat-shielding metallurgies. After several experiments and failures, Pakistan has improved its re-entry shielding, guidance, and accuracy for its ballistic missiles. The most likely candidate for MIRVing might be the Shaheen-III ballistic missile, with a declared range of 2,750 km. Pakistani officials have explained that the range is pegged to target the farthest of India’s strategic safe-havens — implying India’s tri-service base at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. In our assessment, Shaheen-III is in the same league as the Agni-V. If DRDO’s interest in developing a MIRVed Agni-V is realized, it is possible that Pakistan’s NESCOM may be tempted to match India’s achievements. The Shaheen-III’s bus, however, might carry fewer warheads than the Agni-V. However, MIRVing of the Shaheen-III would require a comprehensive and extensive re-configuration of its overall design and performance parameters, which would in effect make it an altogether new version of the missile. (comment: essay was published in MAY-2016 before the test of SLCM BABUR-III & MIRV capable ABABEEL missiles)

I had always wondered if Feroz H khan is the same, that is on Pakdef as well

.....

 

[nik141993]

China joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992, and soon thereafter joined the Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR)

Author knowledge about the subject he is discussing is surely high & thanks for rating @HRK

 

[HRK]

Pakistan’s ISR Capacity and Net-Centric Warfare: An Assessment

Effective counterforce targeting, either through ballistic or cruise missiles, largely depends on reliable navigation and guidance with in-built redundancies. Emerging force-multiplier technologies in ISR, communications, and navigation may make the difference in the event of a future conflict between India and Pakistan. Technological asymmetries in favor of India have grown in net-centric warfare gaps where Pakistan’s capabilities are lacking. Pakistan is, however, working to close these gaps. On May 31, 2012, following the flight test of the Raad ALCM, the ISPR declared:

A major additional feature of today’s test was the effective employment of the National Command Authority’s fully automated Strategic Command and Control Support System (SCCSS). It has enabled robust Command and Control capability of all strategic assets with round-the clock situation awareness in a digitized network centric environment to decision makers at National Command Centre (NCC). The system has the added capability of real time remote monitoring of missile flight path.

A similar statement was released on November 28, 2012, following the Ghauri test. Missiles typically rely on satellite-based global positioning systems (GPS) and/ or inertial guidance for achieving accurate targeting. Pakistan’s Shaheen-II ballistic missile (2,000-km range) uses GPS for minimizing circular error probability. Pakistani cruise missiles use inertial guidance and terrain contour mapping. In the absence of an indigenous GPS system, Pakistan possibly uses commercial GPS, which means the GPS provider can switch off or deny access at any point during a crisis. In such an eventuality, Pakistan would be left with no choice but to employ inertial navigation that is built into every missile system in its inventory.

A reliable ISR architecture is considered to be an essential prerequisite for a credible delivery capability of Pakistan’s operational deterrent. Open sources indicate that Pakistan has adopted China’s Beidou-II satellite (BDS-II) navigation system, but it is not clear if access will be guaranteed in all situations. Beidou is believed to provide more accurate navigation than available commercial systems, and can help Pakistan augment its precision-strike and counterforce targeting capabilities. This system is already providing commercial navigation services to Pakistan along with several other Asian countries, and military navigation services to Pakistan and Thailand. At present, the BDS-II system is operating 23 satellites; by 2020, it is expected to double that number, improving precision by up to two meters. Several of Pakistan’s missile-delivery vehicles would likely switch from GPS to Beidou in due course, if this has not already occurred.

Beidou would be particularly effective for Pakistan’s sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). SLCMs are expected to be deployed on board Pakistan’s air independent propulsion–equipped conventional attack submarines. As Mansoor Ahmed has noted, “Beidou’s value will mainly be through the accurate positioning of the launch submarine rather than the guidance of the missile itself, because inertial navigation should still be sufficient for a submarine-launched weapon as long as the submarine’s position is accurately determined.” The naval Babur is dubbed as the “custodian of the country’s second-strike capability.” Its utilization of the Beidou satellite network will, therefore, be of immense strategic value during a crisis. Presumably, as reported in the Kanwa Defense Review, Pakistan
… applies BDS-II technologies to all of its strategic assets and submarine fleet whereas the country’s surface fleet will soon be able to integrate these technologies. The BDS-II system will therefore enable precision positioning of Pakistani cruise missiles launched from conventional submarines in mid-course of flight, which will significantly improve their overall strike accuracy.

It is believed that both China and Pakistan have incorporated data from Beidou satellites in their respective military exercises. Most of the GPS-guided weaponry on the Sino-Pakistan JF-17 Thunder fighter-bombers is also supported by the BDS-II satellite system. In terms of overall targeting, the BDS-II offers coverage of all of India, which will greatly improve the accuracy of Pakistan’s existing missiles and help assist in precision targeting through MaRVed and MIRVed ballistic missiles — should Pakistan choose to go down this route.

Pakistan is also likely to reduce existing asymmetries in its ISR and satellite navigation capabilities under its 2040 space program, and is expected to launch its own independent satellites in orbit in the near future. The development of space-based navigational and communications capability is vital to maintaining effective command and control over deployed strategic forces during a crisis and counterforce targeting involving ballistic and cruise missiles

Internal and External Factors Informing Pakistani Strategic Choices

This section analyzes various factors that affect Pakistan’s deterrence posture, including external and internal dynamics that would inform Pakistan’s choices. Pakistan’s assessment that India’s emerging technological capability upsets the strategic balance contributes foremost to decision making. Islamabad lacks sympathetic support from Western countries for technological purchases to counter the Indian threat. Consequently, for hardware purchases and technological transfers, Islamabad relies mostly on non-Western powers, primarily China. Further, oil-rich Muslim states have historically supported Pakistan’s strategic weapons program. Uncertainties about whether they will be forthcoming in the future might also affect Pakistan’s choices. Four intertwined factors are considered below: domestic politics and decision making; diplomatic and external factors; economic and technical challenges; and perceived national security imperatives.

Domestic Politics and Decision making

Since the mid-1970s, when Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto elaborated on how nuclear weapons would serve as Pakistan’s ultimate security, preserving nuclear deterrence has been an indelible narrative in Pakistan’s domestic political discourse.

Nuclear issues are politically charged, and frank discussions on nuclear related issues are considered sensitive. The nuclear bureaucracy tightly controls this narrative, and dissenting views are generally discouraged. Consequently, despite the emergence of a vibrant civil society and bright young scholars in recent years, debates on strategic modernization programs and alternative requirements for deterrence are matters still considered to be too technical or sensitive to be publicly debated. Pakistan’s political elite would not risk their political capital by questioning the course preferred by the Pakistani strategic enclave.

The demonstration of new technology and the formal induction of tested missile systems are essentially the purview of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) at the Joint Services Headquarters (JSHQ), which has been functional since 1999. The most important committee in Pakistan’s Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) in peacetime is the Development Control Committee, which is a military-scientific body headed by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC). The daily functioning of the Secretariat of the NCA, staffed by the SPD, is directly under the CJCSC. The CJCSC also allocates the budget of the tri-services. The locus of strategic planning and budgetary decisions, therefore, lies in the JSHQ where various strategic programs and projects are carefully prioritized. It is believed that various programs are subject to periodic reviews, given the changing strategic environment that affects force goals. The nuclear bureaucracy the SPD and scientific organizations work closely with the civil bureaucracy (the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Finance) on strategic projects. Conventional military plans rest with respective service headquarters and are coordinated at the JSHQ.

The peaceful transfer of power from the military to a civilian-led government in 2008, and between one civilian government to the next for the first time in Pakistan’s history in 2013, reflects a modus vivendi between the political rulers and the military leadership on national security issues. Successive political leaders have deferred three areas to the military: foreign relations with the United States and China; regional security policy, most notably in India and Afghanistan; and strategic weapons policy and military affairs. In return, the civilian leaders have created space to pursue domestic policies and politics, complete their terms in office, and conduct regular elections. The direction of the strategic program remains the preserve of the military. Military prerogatives are perceived to be reinforced by the presumption that civilian and political leaders lack the capacity and understanding of the complex nexus of technology and nuclear deterrence. Political leaders who have de jure authority do not question the preference and direction of the strategic program determined by the military. Across the political spectrum there is an informal consensus that nuclear issues are best left to the most robust institution in the country. There is scant public questioning of nuclear force goals and requirements, budgetary costs, and trade offs with other strategic programs or other areas of national power. If debates occur, they are held in camera.

 

[Safriz]

Very long and detailed commentry about Pakistani missile capabilities and options .
However the assumption of Shaheen3 being MIRVd in box standard form with a new or te designef post boost vehicle has been partially provef to be correct.
Ababeen has a box standard first stage of Shaheen-3 then half size second stage, a liquid fueled third stage and a post boost vehicle which seems massive and probably dedigned for SLV not a missile.
India doesnt need MIRV against Pakistan as the later doesnt have ABM and dont intend to have.

 

[Bratva]

Pakistan reason for not getting an ABM

 

[HRK]

@HRK

don't mention you are welcome any time .... 'every time'

=======================================================

Diplomacy and External Factors:

The lack of sufficient resources, the existence of technological barriers, and the export control restrictions of supplier states affect Pakistan’s technological progression. Political friction with the West has been a constant shadow over Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, exacerbated by the legacy of the A. Q. Khan proliferation network. Consequently, Pakistanis perceive China to be their only reliable and steadfast ally. Despite internal security predicaments, economic challenges, and external handicaps, Pakistan has shown resilience in meeting its strategic needs. Taken together, ongoing geostrategic shifts, technological challenges, and the absence of any strategic restraint arrangements with India have resulted in continued increases in Pakistan’s strategic capabilities

Pakistan’s predicament is accentuated by the limited options available to acquire state-of-the-art conventional weapons from supplier states. India’s strategic partnership with the United States, its large market, and fast-growing economy place Pakistan at a growing disadvantage. India has the purchasing power to choose from Russian, French, Israeli, and, more recently, US military equipment. India also has a booming domestic defense industry now buttressed by pledges of technology transfers in high-tech areas. Pakistan does not have the market or the economy to match India’s growing conventional counterforce capabilities that relieve pressures to employ battlefield nuclear weapons.

US arms sales to Pakistan continue, but are diminishing and subject to congressional opposition. Russia has lately shown interest in commercial arms sales, but China is increasingly the only major power upon which Pakistan can rely. India’s strategic development provides common ground to determine countervailing responses. Oil-rich Muslim states in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East have been traditionally sympathetic to Pakistan’s quest for a nuclear deterrent after India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, when Islamabad faced sanctions and a Western-led nonproliferation regime. The Islamic world has changed greatly since then, and Pakistan is unlikely to receive the same kind of “Islamic brotherhood” support as in the past.

Economic and Technical Considerations

Pakistan’s economy, while improving, suffers from many deficiencies, including a poor tax base. Nonetheless, defense programs will continue to be a high priority. Sunk costs will not diminish prospective costs to maintain and upgrade Pakistan’s strategic forces. If Pakistan decides to MIRV some of its ballistic missiles, added costs will be incurred. The weakest technological link, as indicated above, is in the realm of ISR, which suggests dependence on external sources. As observed by Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon, “India’s conventional military capabilities are forecast to grow relative to Pakistan’s, whereas Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities are forecast to grow relative to India’s.” The United States’ silent encouragement of India’s strategic ambitions to challenge China further incentivizes China to deepen strategic relations with India’s neighbors, especially archrival Pakistan.

National Security Imperatives

India and Pakistan have been embroiled for decades in mutual rivalry and distrust. Their competition has not diminished over time and has evolved with geostrategic shifts resulting from the rise of China and the US decision to rebalance its posture to the Asia-Pacific region. The latter has catapulted India into a lynchpin role in the emerging geopolitical balancing game in Asia. The drawdown of US forces from Afghanistan, the reduced threat of al Qaeda, and the relaxation of US tensions with Iran also point toward a gradual fading of Pakistan’s significance to US national security policies.

Pakistan’s sense of vulnerability is growing along with the reduced US footprint in Afghanistan and its strategic engagement with India. India is investing in the modernization of its military far more than Pakistan. Pakistan’s security managers are convinced that India will find Pakistan vulnerable as it struggles to balance multiple security contingencies from within and lacks resources to compete with India’s growing conventional capabilities. Left with few choices, Islamabad thus relies on nuclear weapons to offset conventional force imbalances and on China to secure external balancing as a source for political and strategic succor. Pakistan’s nuclear history is awash with defiance of the West, dependency on China, and financial support from Saudi Arabia and, at times, other Muslim countries. Given Pakistan’s history, security considerations will likely trump all other considerations.

Pakistan’s Choices

The past five decades have shown that India and Pakistan have been locked in an action-reaction syndrome. India and Pakistan have operationalized their respective deterrents and are building triads. Even as both countries profess a doctrinal posture of credible minimum deterrence, they continue to develop capabilities that demonstrate an emphasis on maintaining and enhancing credibility rather than on minimalism. In Pakistan, this is characterized as a full-spectrum deterrence posture. In the event that India pursues MIRVs and BMD, Pakistan has three options, described below

The “Ignore” Option:

To ignore India’s MIRV and BMD developments would be a major departure from Pakistan’s traditional approach toward national security. Pakistan’s inclination is to match or compensate for every military-technological development in India. What factors might result in such uncommon restraint other than a significant shift in the civil-military balance, which is not likely in the near term?

First, Pakistan would need to have sufficient confidence in the survivability of its strategic deterrent and its sufficiency to dissuade India from undertaking risky initiatives. Second, economic resources would need to be deemed insufficient for a costly undertaking to MIRV ballistic missiles and add significantly to counterforce targeting. As an alternative, Islamabad could simply decide to rely on existing capabilities that would provide a mix of countervalue and counterforce targeting. Third, Pakistan could decide to rely increasingly on China for assurance in the event of a war with India. Fourth, Pakistan could decide to respond to Indian MIRVs and BMD with the accelerated production of single-warhead ballistic and cruise missiles, while taking additional steps to increase the survivability of its deterrent, such as the multiplication of missile storage sites. Mixing real with dummy sites would complicate India’s targeting ability. Fifth, Pakistan could add to its stockpiles of TNWs and short-range systems to complicate India’s military plans. With Pakistan retaining capacity to devastate major cities with countervalue targeting, its deterrence posture would deny India a war-winning capability or advantages in a limited war scenario. In terms of nuclear diplomacy, Islamabad could offer yet another strategic restraint regime proposal to India to include the mutual prohibition of targeting military nuclear facilities.

The ignore option might or might not allow Pakistan to escape the trap of an arms race with India. As noted above, Pakistan could decide to ignore MIRVing, but still engage in an increased competition by other means. Nor is it clear that Pakistan would gain diplomatic benefits, such as entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), by opting not to MIRV some of its ballistic missiles. Pakistan’s insecurities would persist as long as India continues to proceed with major conventional force deployments on its western border, increasing its capacity to launch a surprise attack and modernizing weapons that are clearly more Pakistan- than China-specific.

Given the domination of the military-bureaucratic-scientific enclave in Pakistan, and Pakistan’s history of competing with India in nuclear capabilities, the ignore option is unlikely. If India is perceived as gaining advantages from MIRVing, Pakistan is likely to MIRV as well if resources permit.

The “Tortoise” Option

This option presumes that, given the history of strategic competition, Pakistan will likely match India if it flight-tests and inducts missiles carrying multiple warheads, but at a measured pace. Rather than sprinting to acquire technologies, which would require dependency on external sources, greater budgetary outlays, and increased international pressure, Pakistan might choose to take a long view of the emerging Indian threat. By choosing this option, Pakistan would be cognizant of India’s significant advantages in resources, indigenous technological base, and access to Western technological cooperation. In contrast, Pakistan is dependent on only one reliable defense supplier China and lacks comparable purchasing power. In this option, Pakistan would decide on a middle course of slow, but steady, technological acquisition and indigenous development.

The choice of a middle course would be dictated by resource constraints, including available stockpiles and production rates of fissile material. With 11 different nuclear-capable means of missile delivery, Pakistan has to make tough choices in distributing its fissile material resources. According to a Princeton University study, Pakistan might face natural uranium constraints in the absence of foreign supplies and fresh discoveries at home. This study estimates that by 2020, Pakistan will have accumulated about 450 kg of weapons-grade plutonium from the four production reactors at the Khushab Complex. This would be sufficient for perhaps 90 warheads,76 which would have to be distributed on a priority basis among delivery vehicles. MIRVing would multiply the number of warheads. In the absence of additional fissile material production, constraints on warhead allocation would grow. Advanced compact warheads for MIRVs would necessarily compete with warheads for short-range ballistic and cruise missiles — particularly the Nasr, Babur, Raad, and Abdali. If a projected Pakistani nuclear arsenal includes perhaps 200 miniaturized warheads, this might require at least 800 kg of weapons-grade plutonium. Pakistan, unlike India, is disadvantaged with respect to existing stocks of weapons-grade plutonium. This factor, among others, suggests the tortoise option.

By choosing the tortoise option, Pakistan could still employ countervailing strategies to defeat the twin threat of Indian MIRVs and missile defenses. Pakistan’s strategic deterrent would still pose a threat to India if, first, it were to employ increased dispersal and a higher state of readiness. Second, Pakistan could increase production of missiles carrying single warheads. Third, Pakistan could undertake less costly countermeasures to assure penetration and destruction of Indian targets. For example, Pakistan’s strategic forces could: employ depressed trajectories for ballistic missiles; rely increasingly on cruise missiles; resort to simultaneous launches; develop maneuvering reentry vehicles that are not MIRVs; increase electronic warfare capabilities; and acquire rudimentary stealth technologies. Pakistan will most certainly undertake countermeasures such as decoys and chaff. All of these steps could be taken while the technological maturation of MIRVs occurs at a measured pace

An increased reliance on cruise missiles seems likely, whatever option Pakistan chooses. In this respect, the Babur and the Raad are likely candidates for technological upgrades, and strategic planners might choose to also add supersonic capabilities to match India’s Brahmos missiles. Cruise missiles are less vulnerable to missile defenses and can strike with greater precision and accuracy. If Pakistan chooses this option, it can deploy cruise missiles in greater numbers than ballistic missiles on a variety of platforms, thus making it more difficult for India to degrade or decimate Pakistan’s strategic forces or its command and control system.

The “Hare” Option

Pakistan could also opt for the hare option, but this would necessarily entail the increased production of fissile material. Under this option, Islamabad would spend and do what it takes to deploy MIRVs as quickly as possible. In responding to India’s capability in MIRVs and to counter prospective Indian BMD deployments, a number of steps included in the tortoise option could also be pursued in the hare option. The hare option is most likely if security managers conclude that the strategic balance would tilt in India’s favor, making New Delhi more inclined toward risk-taking. Strategic planners would then, as discussed earlier, be likely to task scientific organizations NESCOM and SUPARCO to develop an adequate response to the DRDO in four key areas. First would be Pakistan’s satellites and ISR capabilities. Second would be improved missile guidance capabilities. Third would be further development of compact nuclear warheads. Fourth would be developing a missile bus that could carry the independent miniaturized warheads for multiple targeting and to develop synergies in all the identified areas.

History also informs us that Pakistan’s scientific organizations are always ready to be challenged. Scientific pride and Pakistani strategic culture, coupled with the urgency to neutralize a perceived existential threat, prompt competition with India. Resources have not been a constraining factor. In the early 1990s, Pakistan quickly matched India’s quest for ballistic missiles, initially with help from China and North Korea, before being able to attain indigenous capabilities. Pakistan also demonstrated to the world its resolve to produce fissile material, particularly by significantly increasing its plutonium production capacity. Characterized by some as the “fastest-growing” nuclear arsenal in the world a label Islamabad resents and contests Pakistan has shown a dogged resolve in the face of opposition to pursue full-spectrum deterrence.

The hare option would mimic the US choice of expanding its arsenal without greatly expanding the number of its delivery vehicles. In addition to MIRVing, Pakistan is likely to marginally, but not significantly, increase the number of its delivery vehicles and transporter-erector launchers. Pakistan might raise no more than a few additional batteries to enhance survivability and redundancy. Since India’s primary purpose of fielding the Agni-V and Agni-VI with MIRVs would be oriented toward China, Pakistan would hope that this would incentivize Beijing to bolster its ally. China could offer its ISR and satellites to assist Pakistan where necessary. Beijing could send this signal to New Delhi in indirect ways, especially if the United States chooses to share missile defense technology with India. For Pakistan to become self-reliant in ISR and complimentary technologies, China is the most likely and only source on which it can rely.

If Islamabad decides on the hare option, it will encounter resource and technological challenges. Pakistan will have to divert resources from other priority projects and also face criticism from the international community. Pakistan’s acquisition of MIRVs and hard-target-kill capabilities on a rapid course is likely to draw far more attention than India’s strategic modernization programs. Islamabad would have to brace for such criticism.

The hare option is fraught with obstacles and risks for Pakistan at a time when it wants to be recognized as a legitimate, normal, de facto nuclear power like India. Islamabad is struggling to counter India’s efforts to prevent Pakistan’s entry into the NSG. It is trying to project an image as a responsible nuclear power, making significant efforts on nuclear security and safety while tightening export and custodial controls. Pakistan’s utmost desire is to be treated on par with India. Islamabad would rather avoid spending additional sums for Pakistan’s nuclear program in addition to avoiding additional challenges to its nuclear legitimacy. Further, this option requires significant help from China that is not assured especially during periods of crisis given China’s evolving strategic outlook and priorities in the world.

Conversely, if Pakistan seems unlikely to gain legitimacy via NSG membership, and if it is unlikely to secure equal treatment to India as a “mainstreamed” nuclear state, then there would be no incentive for self-restraint if India were to embrace MIRVs and BMD. Pakistan’s strategy would also be contingent on other variables, such as budget constraints, technological challenges, and the willingness of friends to extend financial or technical cooperation.

 

[Safriz]

About Denial of GPS signal during a conflict, it is not switched off instead random errors are injected on purpose or refresh rate reduced.
During second gulf war i myself observed 8 mile error in GPS position at random.
Reducing refresh rate is bad for missiles as 5 second delay in GPS update or the satellite shutting down for 5 seconds will not effect land venhicles,boats or even aircrafts, but a Ballistic missile relying solely on GPS will be thrown off 10-15 miles. Enough to miss the target entirely.
Remedy is differential GPS

 

[HRK]

Conclusion

A constant feature of Pakistan’s evolving nuclear posture is to cope with and match India’s strategic modernization programs. Pakistan is convinced that India will endeavor to be able to checkmate Pakistan’s strategic deterrent and punish Pakistan in a short, decisive conventional war. Pakistan’s defense posture is designed to negate New Delhi’s options. Nuclear weapons play an essential role in negating Indian conventional and nuclear military options. Islamabad has consequently shifted its nuclear posture from minimum credible deterrence to credible minimum deterrence to full-spectrum deterrence.

If India proceeds with MIRVs and BMD, Pakistan would feel compelled to diversify its delivery methods and develop penetration aids. Pakistan is also likely to flight-test the release of multiple warheads on some of its ballistic missiles

These warheads could be unguided, maneuverable, or independently targetable. It is also likely to expand its inventories of cruise missiles. If Pakistan develops capabilities to place multiple warheads atop some of its ballistic missiles, they will likely be deployed in limited numbers as a result of fissile material constraints in addition to other inhibiting factors, including financial resources.

Pakistan’s most likely strategic trajectory will be geared toward completing its triad and maintaining the effectiveness and robustness of existing capabilities. MIRVs could be a cost-effective way to achieve these objectives, without trying to match Indian ballistic-missile-carrying submarines or aircraft carriers. If pressed by India, Pakistan is likely to move toward multiple warhead missiles but not before it is able to achieve the best bang for the buck through improvements in its existing missile capabilities, especially its cruise missile program. This is not likely to be for power projection, but to deny India strategic advantages that it might seek to exploit, and to maintain the credibility of Pakistan’s deterrent in the face of evolving threats.

Under these circumstances, it is inconceivable that Pakistan will ignore India’s pursuit of MIRVs and BMD. If India flight-tests MIRVs or deploys limited BMD, the only question is whether Pakistan will choose the tortoise or hare option. Pakistan’s dilemma is to contest India’s strategic modernization programs and yet avoid engaging in a debilitating arms race. But given the choice of negating India’s options or avoiding an arms race, Pakistan will choose the former. In our assessment, Pakistan will continue to factor in the evolving nature of technological asymmetries with India, and is likely to respond to the extent that it can in terms of available resources. We conclude that, based on past experience, and keeping in view the emerging imbalance in resources and access to technology, Pakistan’s most likely choice when faced with the prospect of Indian MIRVs and limited BMD will be the tortoise option.

 

[Falgrine]

Remedy is differential GPS

Yes, but dont you think that DGPS correction broadcast could be jammed, especially in the wider vicinity of a tentative target location. Also since the transmitters required will need to broadcast at higher power levels, DGPS broadcast stations could themselves become potential targets via aerial strikes ( SEAD or DEAD type).