The hot reality of India’s Cold Start Doctrine

[commander jain]

The writer is an assistant professor at NUST in Islamabad

In 2002, the Indian armed forces massed 500,000 troops at Pakistan’s border in response to the deadly December 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, for which the Indians held Pakistan responsible.

The operation against Pakistan was code named Parakram. It was designed for quick retaliation against Pakistan, possibly even with the goal of capturing a part of the country to be used as a bargaining chip. But by the time the Indians mobilised their forces on the border, the Pakistani armed forces had already taken up defensive positions, neutralising Operation Parakram. This incident forced the Indians to rethink their military planning.

During Parakram, the Indian forces had to be deployed from central India and it took them longer than expected to reach the western border. Their deployment from the centre provided Pakistan enough time to shore up its defences. The massive deployment cost of an estimated $3.2 billion dollars was absolutely astronomical.

Knowing that the Indian armed forces could not afford another failure like Parakram, the Indian military leadership sat down to develop a new military doctrine that would ensure a surprise, rapid mobilisation against Pakistan to capture a part of the country without threatening its existence, keeping the conflict limited to preclude the use of nuclear weapons. This would give India the upper hand in any future conflict and would force Pakistan to negotiate on India’s terms.

The Indians began moving away from their traditional defensive posture towards a more offensive posture against Pakistan in 2004. By May 2011, the Indian dream of quick mobilisation against Pakistan for a limited war involving rapid armoured thrusts had become a reality. The Indian armed forces proved the credibility of Cold Start when they conducted exercise Vijayee Bhava, in which the Indian military was able to mobilise 50,000 troops within 48 hours at Pakistan’s border.

The Indian civil and military leaderships were quick to dismiss the allegations that Cold Start was real after the exercise. At the time India’s Chief of Army Staff, General V K Singh stated that there is no such thing as Cold Start, but acknowledged that India does have a ‘proactive strategy’, “which takes steps in a proactive manner.” No matter what the Indians called it – a pro-active strategy or a Cold Start Doctrine – they proved that they could engage Pakistan in a limited war, which would fare well for them.

This put Pakistan in a difficult position: the financial and resource constraints meant that Pakistan had to come up with an unconventional solution to ensure a continued balance of military power.

Facing limited options and the very real threat of Cold Start, Pakistan developed a short-range, low-yield nuclear weapon. Pakistan introduced HATF-IX or Nasr, a short-range ballistic missile to deter any READ MORE AT :> http://www.indiandaily.in/hot-reality-indias-cold-start-doctrine/

 

[Jamwal's]

Conventional war/outright Invasion can never be the answer to a Proxy war.

 

[commander jain]

Article by By Muhammad Umer

In 2002, the Indian armed forces massed 500,000 troops at Pakistan’s border in response to the deadly December 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, for which the Indians held Pakistan responsible.

The operation against Pakistan was code named Parakram. It was designed for quick retaliation against Pakistan, possibly even with the goal of capturing a part of the country to be used as a bargaining chip. But by the time the Indians mobilised their forces on the border, the Pakistani armed forces had already taken up defensive positions, neutralising Operation Parakram. This incident forced the Indians to rethink their military planning.

During Parakram, the Indian forces had to be deployed from central India and it took them longer than expected to reach the western border. Their deployment from the centre provided Pakistan enough time to shore up its defences. The massive deployment cost of an estimated $3.2 billion dollars was absolutely astronomical.

Knowing that the Indian armed forces could not afford another failure like Parakram, the Indian military leadership sat down to develop a new military doctrine that would ensure a surprise, rapid mobilisation against Pakistan to capture a part of the country without threatening its existence, keeping the conflict limited to preclude the use of nuclear weapons. This would give India the upper hand in any future conflict and would force Pakistan to negotiate on India’s terms.

The Indians began moving away from their traditional defensive posture towards a more offensive posture against Pakistan in 2004. By May 2011, the Indian dream of quick mobilisation against Pakistan for a limited war involving rapid armoured thrusts had become a reality. The Indian armed forces proved the credibility of Cold Start when they conducted exercise Vijayee Bhava, in which the Indian military was able to mobilise 50,000 troops within 48 hours at Pakistan’s border.

The Indian civil and military leaderships were quick to dismiss the allegations that Cold Start was real after the exercise. At the time India’s Chief of Army Staff, General V K Singh stated that there is no such thing as Cold Start, but acknowledged that India does have a ‘proactive strategy’, “which takes steps in a proactive manner.” No matter what the Indians called it – a pro-active strategy or a Cold Start Doctrine – they proved that they could engage Pakistan in a limited war, which would fare well for them.

This put Pakistan in a difficult position: the financial and resource constraints meant that Pakistan had to come up with an unconventional solution to ensure a continued balance of military power.

Facing limited options and the very real threat READ MORE ABOUT IT AT :> http://www.indiandaily.in/hot-reality-indias-cold-start-doctrine/

 

[Hellfire]

@waz close this thread/merge it with others ... Cold Start has been flogged to death ....!!!! @commander jain the topic has enuff threads, merge this there.