The capabilities of the Egyptian air defense in dealing with low footprint targets and stealth targets

[dbc]

Didn't you go a little too far with atomic clocks.. GPS and satellites can do..

CSAC (atomic clock on a chip) does not have the precision for TDOA. GPS itself relies on a highly accurate atomic clock.

Each of these satellites has several atomic clocks aboard. These clocks keep time very accurately (to within three billionths of a second) and are regularly corrected using even more accurate atomic clocks that are kept on the ground. They need to be synchronized because accurate time is the basis of GPS location and navigation services.

How Do You Measure Your Location Using GPS?

Satellites beam signals at the speed of light toward Earth, and your device receives the signals at slightly different times, based on how far away each satellite is from your location. These times can be used to determine your location on Earth.

www.nist.gov

 

[Ceylal]

It is good education specifically for the PDF community

Depends what you talk about..the content or the grammar?

 

[Ceylal]

This has been the sole threat for the last 40 years for Egypt.. I would say NATO is the only existential threat that looms over majority of countries in the world today.. It necessarily doesn't have to be an enemy but the fact alone that it can wage a huge war on your territory makes them lethal and formidble it is just not one but multiple enemy or I would call it a large pack of wolf. Countries avoid miscalculate them and each country finding a counter-measure lifts a huge pressure off their backs

NATO? Most of the countries in the middle act, save Iran are a vassal of NATO..Egypt included…Egypt, has been pressured to backtrack on the Su35 by the US and replaced them with a batch of Rafales…Egypt has no voice, just as Turkey , she is under the thumb of Washington and will follow to the letter Washington’s directives.

 

[Abid123]

History could repeat itself in one way.... If the Pharonic rule has the game'ness and coalition.

Example.. You need a large coalition to confront NATO example Russia has been trying this but failed to do so and won't ever be a chellenge for NATO if an actual war were to break out Russia will always be defeated. As Sun-Tzu said every battle is won before it even begins. Russia has lost on all barometers before even the first bullet is fired.

You could gather a team.. Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Algeria, Qatar, Morocco, Bahrain, Turkmenistan, Tunisia, Oman, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Uzebkistan, Jordan, Azerbaijan, Sudan, kyrgyzstan, Egypt, Tajikistan, Bangladesh...

That is 23 able countries you could even expand that coalition to 40+ but it could not only face off with NATO but defeat it in the next 2 decades but not currently as it stands. These countries mentioned need to mature atleast for 2 decades more and most of them are solid and formidble as it stands but they just need further maturing..

Another country who could not only face NATO but defeat it is one country called China.. Despite being one country they are 1.4 billion so they have the manpower to compete with NATO and seems to have matured but still needs 2 decades to mature also

Why does it have to be Israel tho.. It says stealth targets not Israel.. It could be anyone with stealth.. Egypt is facing some foreign security threat like any other country but Israel ain't one of them.. The sole existential threat Egypt is facing is called NATO and it is only logical that the hardware is paired against that.

NATO is not necessarily an enemy to Egypt but it is still an existential threat as it remains the only outside force that can threaten Egypt's existence. It is only logical that Egypt's tech is paired up against that and tailored towards overcoming the sole existential threat

Very few NATO members in Europe have credible military capability that could actually fight a peer power for more than two weeks. Like 80% of them are generally small/weak. You have countries like Montenegro, Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Denmark, Portugal and Belgium.

 

[Mohamed Bin Tughlaq]

Very few NATO members in Europe have credible military capability that could actually fight a peer power for more than two weeks. Like 80% of them are generally small/weak. You have countries like Montenegro, Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Denmark, Portugal and Belgium.

This is actully true and something rarely noticed.. Majority of members in the alliance are weak except.. Poland, Germany, UK, France, US, Spain, Canada, Turkey and Italy.. The remaining are not worth mentioning or just make up the numbers. Where as the other coalition has a more broad stronger line-up across the broad.

 

[The SC]

CSAC (atomic clock on a chip) does not have the precision for TDOA. GPS itself relies on a highly accurate atomic clock.

Each of these satellites has several atomic clocks aboard. These clocks keep time very accurately (to within three billionths of a second) and are regularly corrected using even more accurate atomic clocks that are kept on the ground. They need to be synchronized because accurate time is the basis of GPS location and navigation services.

How Do You Measure Your Location Using GPS?

Satellites beam signals at the speed of light toward Earth, and your device receives the signals at slightly different times, based on how far away each satellite is from your location. These times can be used to determine your location on Earth.

www.nist.gov

Bro.. How did you know if these systems have TDOA or not.. these are very sophisticated systems with up to date technologies..

 

[dbc]

Bro.. How did you know if these systems have TDOA or not.. these are very sophisticated systems with up to date technologies..

TDOA is not a device it is an algorithm to passively geo locate a emitter or reflector of electromagnetic emission. You mentioned passive radar in your opening post and hence my response. I repeat passive radars are easy to deceive, unreliable, difficult to deploy and calibrate.

 

[CrazyZ]

​

In principle, no system alone is capable of countering a hostile air threat, especially stealth fighters and fighters that have a low footprint, as systems such as the S-300 and S-400 cannot stand alone against an attack or a hostile air invasion. Does this mean that these systems do not have the ability to deal with stealth targets or targets with a low footprint?

Of course, it has the ability to do so and have excellent capabilities, but doing that alone is almost impossible, because the S-300 and S-400 systems operate within an integrated air defense network, and with full coordination between all systems and early warning radars.

In a clearer sense, to deal with stealth targets requires joint work and effort from all air defense systems and radars, short, medium and long range systems, and all of this is connected and linked to early warning and air surveillance stations, of which there are specialized systems intended for monitoring stealth targets such as VHF radars, passive radars and thermal sensors / Electro-optical means to deal with a hostile stealth target. Work and coordination will be made between all air defense units, systems and radars.

For your information, the Egyptian air defense network is one of the most complex air defense systems in the world, and this complexity is represented in its possession of American, Russian, French, German, British, Chinese, and Egyptian missile systems and radar systems, and all these systems and radars are linked to the command and control network.

During the past 6 years, the air defense has acquired a very strong set of systems and radars that have the ability to detect and deal with targets with a very low footprint and stealthy targets, as all systems are linked and integrated into the main command and control network C4I / C5I.

As for the stealth target counter, it needs radars that have the ability to detect stealthy targets and targets that have a very low footprint, and Egypt has a very strong set of radars and missile systems, most notably the Russian Protivnik-GE early warning radar, which has an air scan range of up to 400 km and altitude up to 200 km, the Rezonans-NE radar above the horizon radar station, which is designed to carry out early warning and air space surveillance missions, it operates in the very high frequency range, which allows the detection of stealth targets in various weather conditions, it has two modes of aerial surveillance with a range of 1100 Km against ballistic missiles, and 600 km against air targets with low and very low radar sections.

Of course, there are many operating radars in the Egyptian air defense system with very respectable ranges, only the most prominent of them were mentioned here, in addition to missile systems that have special air scanning radars, with the most prominent of these systems being the Russian S-300VM long-range air defense system, which has the ability to deal with all air targets in a range of + 250 km and a height of 30 km, it has also a group of very powerful aerial scanning radars with respectable ranges of up to 500 km to detect stealthy targets with a very low footprint, , and has a very large capacity and strong immunity against electronic interference.

In addition to the German IRIS-T SLM air defense system, which is capable of dealing with various air threats in a range of 40 km and an altitude of 20 km, the system has a variety of "German, Swedish and French" radars with ranges of up to 250 km.

The Russian Buk M2E medium-range air defense system, highly effective against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, anti-radar missiles and various types of aircraft and helicopters, has a range of 45 km and an altitude of 25 km.

The Russian Tor M2E short-range air defense system, highly effective against cruise missiles, various projectiles, aerial munitions, combat aircraft, helicopters and drones, has a range of 15 km and a maximum altitude of 10 km.

All the systems and radars that have been mentioned beside the stations of radars and wireless electronic countermeasures, signal stations and systems and wireless communications are all linked within the main command and control network, and coordination is made between them to deal with hostile targets.

If the radars detect a stealth fighter, the target coordinates are immediately transferred to the missile systems, and the systems track the coordinates and deal with the hostile target, the coordinates are transferred within a highly secure and encrypted communications network, at the same time the command network transmit the coordinates to the air force fighters, and the fighters are directed to the enemy target to deal with it.


https://www.defense-arabic.com/2021/05/30/قدرات-الدفاع-الجوي-المصري-في-التعامل-م/

Israeli runways are easily observed with modern air surveillance from neighboring Arab states. Egypt must include air based radar, thermal, and electro-optical surveillance of Israel in addition to its ground based assets as part of its AD network. Best chance to detect and engage Israeli stealth AC is during take off and landing, IMO.

 

[The SC]

TDOA is not a device it is an algorithm to passively geo locate a emitter or reflector of electromagnetic emission. You mentioned passive radar in your opening post and hence my response. I repeat passive radars are easy to deceive, unreliable, difficult to deploy and calibrate.

Yes it is an algorithm .. but does anyone have a monopoly on TDOA??? the specification of it go much further than that it depends how many receivers you've got and much much more..
Chinese use Radars and satellites to track US chips and even target them with Ballistic missiles..

My friend we are not talking just about passive radars Egypt has a forest of active radars mainly..supplemented with passive radars, satellites and what have you..

** "Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance is a key element in modern warfare. Being able to gather intelligence to detect and locate the enemy while continuing to monitor the target in real time plays a key role in providing decision makers situational awareness.

With the use of the traditional monostatic radar today having the transmitter and receiver collocated, we encounter two major issues. The first is not having the capability to detect the stealth aircraft due to reduced radar cross section as observed by the radar receiver. Secondly, the monostatic radar can be located by the enemy using counter measure techniques hence revealing one’s position and thus giving the enemy an advantage to bring down the radar surveillance capability.

A solution to this problem is the use of multistatic radar where receivers, transmitters and transceivers are scattered across a plane. The advantage of this is that the enemy cannot spot the location of the receivers. Also the use of readily available transmitters, such as radio broadcasts, reduces the cost of the radar setup and the possibility of being detected. Secondly, the stealth aircraft can now be detected with the distributed receiver antennas as part of the multistatic radar setup due to the fact that stealth aircraft deflect signals away from the point of source. This gives a larger SNR signal to be picked by receivers positioned around the target away from the transmitter.

The technique used to gather data from the multistatic radar setup is called the multilateration technique of which the Time Difference of Arrival and the Frequency Difference of Arrival are a part of this research to geolocate the stealth target.

The TDOA is measured by taking the difference in time the same signal coming from the target arrives at each pair of receivers. With a pulsed signal, the rising or falling edge of the signal can be used as a reference mark for the time of arrival. Taking the difference in the time of arrival gives rise to the time difference of arrival. The FDOA is measured using FFT. A peak in the spectrum will indicate the frequency of arrival, note there maybe harmonics that will have to be ignored. Taking the difference in the frequency of arrival between any two receivers gives rise to the frequency difference of arrival.

The modified Hough Transform is used to fuse two or more multilateration technique measurements and translate them to a Cartesian coordinate with a peak forming at the measured target location. The next target position is measured the same way except this time, because the target is in motion, the measurement will change to reflect the update in position. In order to keep track of the target and improve the SNR of the target location over multiple measurement samples, the Kalman Filter is used. The Kalman Filter helps in reducing the least squared error that can be observed through the reduction in root mean squared error.

In this thesis, the first focus was on the hybrid geolocation and tracking of a moving stealth target where the initial target location and the velocity are unknown. The dual stage method was used to address this problem while using minimum number of receivers. Most of the extant literature (for example [9], [12]) covers geolocation of a static target or moving target with known velocity, using receiver sensors that move with known velocity in order to use the Doppler dependent multilateration technique such as the FDOA. The second focus was in transitioning from the use of three receivers to geolocate the target in a two dimensional space down to two receivers using the dual stage method. This ensures continued surveillance in the event one of three receivers goes down due to enemy attack or loses connection with central processing center.

Chapter 5 covers simulation on how a velocity estimate is formed using three receiver antennas with the TDOA multilateration technique. In order for the measurement of the target location to take place, a range of distance has to be provided for the voting array covered in Chapter 3. The target will not be geolocated if this voting array lies outside the target location plus or minus noise. The Kalman Filter was used to refine the target position, hence velocity estimation was computed. With the velocity prediction remaining fairly steady (assuming velocity is constant), we arrive at the second stage. Now, the use of the FDOA multilateration technique can take place as it is a function of velocity and hence the dual stage method allows for the transition down to two receiver antennas. This is because the TDOA and FDOA multlateration techniques provide lines of position that are orthogonal.

Simulation results indicate that the FDOA multilateration technique is sensitive not only to frequency of arrival measurement noise but also to the estimated velocity from the prior stage. This is evident in the downrange RMSE of the location measurement. We can also see the effect of geometric dilution of precision or GDOP on measurement noise. As long as the target remains within the multistatic radar baseline we have good GDOP. This shows that if we want a larger area of surveillance coverage, we need a wider baseline defined by distance between receiver pairs.

6.2 Recommendations

One of the best ways of gathering intelligence today is by using passive radar techniques. This not only ensures enemy awareness but it allows one to continuously monitor without enemy counter measure disruptions. This, however, poses challenges and I have demonstrated in this thesis with assumptions a method to geolocate a stealth target in a two dimensional space.

It would be interesting to implement this thesis in three dimensions and see how the dual stage method may be applied to reduce the number of receiving antennas. It would also be interesting to see if other multilateration technique(s) such as angle of arrival, could be used to enhance measured data at each target location.

The choice of wavelength has not been studied in reference to detecting stealth aircraft such that we see the highest RCS and yet being optimal to be used by multistatic radar for the purposes of different multilateration techniques such as time of arrival, frequency of arrival and angle of arrival.

A Gaussian Measurement Mixture filter should be explored where passive measurements taken due to multilateration techniques such as TDOA and FDOA cause a non-Gaussian distribution in the observation space. Hence this filter will model any non-Gaussian distribution as a Gaussian mixture. This is because the Hough Transform is computationally intensive.

A feasibility study on synchronization and transfer of received signals from each receiver to be processed at a central station should be explored. The delays introduced due to transfer and processing of the signal may require reduction in the sampling size and thus effect the accuracy of filtered target geolocation.

Furthermore, instead of making various assumptions, like in this research, which does not paint a detailed picture, a more realistic model not bound with assumptions would enhance the experimental model. Finally, by performing the experiment with multiple targets, non-line of sight, effects of clutter and by introducing various noise sources into the model such as antenna receiver, a more realistic model would be arrived at from which further analysis could be conducted."


https://curve.carleton.ca/system/fi...ltilaterationandkalmanfilteringtechniques.pdf

 

[The SC]

Israeli runways are easily observed with modern air surveillance from neighboring Arab states. Egypt must include air based radar, thermal, and electro-optical surveillance of Israel in addition to its ground based assets as part of its AD network. Best chance to detect and engage Israeli stealth AC is during take off and landing, IMO.

Everything you've mentioned is there..:
Example:

 

[Titanium100]

Yes it is an algorithm .. but does anyone have a monopoly on TDOA??? the specification of it go much further than that it depends how many receivers you've got and much much more..
Chinese use Radars and satellites to track US chips and even target them with Ballistic missiles..

My friend we are not talking just about passive radars Egypt has a forest of active radars mainly..supplemented with passive radars , satellites and what have you..

"Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance is a key element in modern warfare. Being able to gather intelligence to detect and locate the enemy while continuing to monitor the target in real time plays a key role in providing decision makers situational awareness.

With the use of the traditional monostatic radar today having the transmitter and receiver collocated, we encounter two major issues. The first is not having the capability to detect the stealth aircraft due to reduced radar cross section as observed by the radar receiver. Secondly, the monostatic radar can be located by the enemy using counter measure techniques hence revealing one’s position and thus giving the enemy an advantage to bring down the radar surveillance capability.

A solution to this problem is the use of multistatic radar where receivers, transmitters and transceivers are scattered across a plane. The advantage of this is that the enemy cannot spot the location of the receivers. Also the use of readily available transmitters, such as radio broadcasts, reduces the cost of the radar setup and the possibility of being detected. Secondly, the stealth aircraft can now be detected with the distributed receiver antennas as part of the multistatic radar setup due to the fact that stealth aircraft deflect signals away from the point of source. This gives a larger SNR signal to be picked by receivers positioned around the target away from the transmitter.

The technique used to gather data from the multistatic radar setup is called the multilateration technique of which the Time Difference of Arrival and the Frequency Difference of Arrival are a part of this research to geolocate the stealth target.

The TDOA is measured by taking the difference in time the same signal coming from the target arrives at each pair of receivers. With a pulsed signal, the rising or falling edge of the signal can be used as a reference mark for the time of arrival. Taking the difference in the time of arrival gives rise to the time difference of arrival. The FDOA is measured using FFT. A peak in the spectrum will indicate the frequency of arrival, note there maybe harmonics that will have to be ignored. Taking the difference in the frequency of arrival between any two receivers gives rise to the frequency difference of arrival.

The modified Hough Transform is used to fuse two or more multilateration technique measurements and translate them to a Cartesian coordinate with a peak forming at the measured target location. The next target position is measured the same way except this time, because the target is in motion, the measurement will change to reflect the update in position. In order to keep track of the target and improve the SNR of the target location over multiple measurement samples, the Kalman Filter is used. The Kalman Filter helps in reducing the least squared error that can be observed through the reduction in root mean squared error.

In this thesis, the first focus was on the hybrid geolocation and tracking of a moving stealth target where the initial target location and the velocity are unknown. The dual stage method was used to address this problem while using minimum number of receivers. Most of the extant literature (for example [9], [12]) covers geolocation of a static target or moving target with known velocity, using receiver sensors that move with known velocity in order to use the Doppler dependent multilateration technique such as the FDOA. The second focus was in transitioning from the use of three receivers to geolocate the target in a two dimensional space down to two receivers using the dual stage method. This ensures continued surveillance in the event one of three receivers goes down due to enemy attack or loses connection with central processing center.

Chapter 5 covers simulation on how a velocity estimate is formed using three receiver antennas with the TDOA multilateration technique. In order for the measurement of the target location to take place, a range of distance has to be provided for the voting array covered in Chapter 3. The target will not be geolocated if this voting array lies outside the target location plus or minus noise. The Kalman Filter was used to refine the target position, hence velocity estimation was computed. With the velocity prediction remaining fairly steady (assuming velocity is constant), we arrive at the second stage. Now, the use of the FDOA multilateration technique can take place as it is a function of velocity and hence the dual stage method allows for the transition down to two receiver antennas. This is because the TDOA and FDOA multlateration techniques provide lines of position that are orthogonal.

Simulation results indicate that the FDOA multilateration technique is sensitive not only to frequency of arrival measurement noise but also to the estimated velocity from the prior stage. This is evident in the downrange RMSE of the location measurement. We can also see the effect of geometric dilution of precision or GDOP on measurement noise. As long as the target remains within the multistatic radar baseline we have good GDOP. This shows that if we want a larger area of surveillance coverage, we need a wider baseline defined by distance between receiver pairs.

6.2 Recommendations

One of the best ways of gathering intelligence today is by using passive radar techniques. This not only ensures enemy awareness but it allows one to continuously monitor without enemy counter measure disruptions. This, however, poses challenges and I have demonstrated in this thesis with assumptions a method to geolocate a stealth target in a two dimensional space.

It would be interesting to implement this thesis in three dimensions and see how the dual stage method may be applied to reduce the number of receiving antennas. It would also be interesting to see if other multilateration technique(s) such as angle of arrival, could be used to enhance measured data at each target location.

The choice of wavelength has not been studied in reference to detecting stealth aircraft such that we see the highest RCS and yet being optimal to be used by multistatic radar for the purposes of different multilateration techniques such as time of arrival, frequency of arrival and angle of arrival.

A Gaussian Measurement Mixture filter should be explored where passive measurements taken due to multilateration techniques such as TDOA and FDOA cause a non-Gaussian distribution in the observation space. Hence this filter will model any non-Gaussian distribution as a Gaussian mixture. This is because the Hough Transform is computationally intensive.

A feasibility study on synchronization and transfer of received signals from each receiver to be processed at a central station should be explored. The delays introduced due to transfer and processing of the signal may require reduction in the sampling size and thus effect the accuracy of filtered target geolocation.

Furthermore, instead of making various assumptions, like in this research, which does not paint a detailed picture, a more realistic model not bound with assumptions would enhance the experimental model. Finally, by performing the experiment with multiple targets, non-line of sight, effects of clutter and by introducing various noise sources into the model such as antenna receiver, a more realistic model would be arrived at from which further analysis could be conducted."


https://curve.carleton.ca/system/fi...ltilaterationandkalmanfilteringtechniques.pdf

Another great post. Assumptions are laregely a pandemic on PDF but geninuely happy to know that such posters like you occupy some space on this board it gives this place some hope..

 

[Abid123]

What radar does Egypt use and what is its range?

 

[Saddam Hussein]

This is actully true and something rarely noticed.. Majority of members in the alliance are weak except.. Poland, Germany, UK, France, US, Spain, Canada, Turkey and Italy.. The remaining are not worth mentioning or just make up the numbers. Where as the other coalition has a more broad stronger line-up across the broad.

They just scaled down military spending.

Netherlands used to operate 210+ F16's till the early 90s. Once the Soviet threat faded they reduced till 60 F16's today. Some of these small countries have enough purchasing power to built a large air force.

 

[Falcon29]

I cannot stop thinking that no matter how complex your AD systems are, Israel must have thought about how to get through it somehow.
ideally Egypt must develop something on their own and use it if a war break out.

It's more likely US has thought about how to disable the AD systems for Israel .... And of course Israeli's will pretend to have achieved some marvelous feat on their own ....

 

[Titanium100]

Everything you've mentioned is there..:
Example:

F-35s were always far more vulnerable then the common PDF laymen knew.. Not only Egypt but majority of the region can neutralize them