The MiG-35 Zhuk AE AESAmultimode radar designed by Phazotron is the first Russian AESA design and is expected to spawn AESA upgrade packages for a number of regional Flanker variants (RSK MiG).
he latest Russian MiG-35 Fulcrum F and Su-35-1 Flanker E+ both illustrate this in a very convincing manner.
NIIP Irbis E Prototype (Tikhomirov NIIP).
Radar – the MiG-35 Fulcrum F is equipped with a Phazotron Active Electronically Steered Array (AESA) which is the same basic technology used in the F-22A's APG-77, the F/A-18E/F's APG-79, the F-16E's APG-80 and the Eurofighter's AMSAR. The Su-35-1 Flanker E+ is currently intended to carry a 20 kW hybrid ESA Irbis E radar, which is comparable to the technology in the Rafale, but boasts the largest antenna in any agile fighter, and peak power and range performance claimed to be competitive against the F-22A's APG-77. The Russians have also invested considerable effort into modern radar pseudo-noise waveform coding techniques, a key feature in recent US radars. In terms of technology the US now has only an incremental lead in active TR module technology and software, and EU little if none. Given the larger size of Russian radars compared to their US peers, in terms of raw range performance the Russians equal or better all except the F-22A's APG-77.
The Zhuk MSF/MSFE (above) is a passive ESA design intended to compete against the NIIP N011M BARS. It uses a Phazotron unique radial distribution arrangement in the backplane waveguide feed, and proprietary radiating element placement. The Zhuk MSFE has a .98 meter diameter aperture with 1662 radiating elements, and was developed for the Su-30MK3 Flanker G avionic suite intended for the PLA-AF.
Radio Frequency Threat Warning – RF threat warning systems, comprising radar warning receivers, Radar Homing and Warning Systems, and Electronic Support Measures, have seen aggressive growth over the last decade with the advent of high density Gallium Arsenide or GaAs chips, commercially used in TV and mobile telephony. The most capable Western system is the F-22A's ALR-94 which is a channelised receiver, while the latest Russian Khibiny M system intended for Su-35-1 Flanker E+ is also a channelised receiver. What incremental lead the US and EU retain is primarily in GaAs chip packaging and software.
Russian manufactured GaAs 4-bit phase shifter MMIC die.
Radio Frequency Jammers – the most important developments over the last decade have been the advent of Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) and towed decoy technologies. The Russians have mastered the former and have offered it for export (MSP-418K) some years ago, and are now offering the Lobushka towed decoy, claimed to be comparable to the US ALE-50. Some Russian jamming equipment is much more refined than Western equivalents, the KNIRTI Sorbstiya jam pod carried by numerous Flanker subtypes boasts a wideband phased array RF stage, much more effective against monopulse emitters, and more sophisticated than the wideband horn or lens emitters in Western equivalents.
Monolithic Thermal Imagers – the EU holds the lead in this technology with production dual band Quantum Well Imaging Photodetector (QWIP) technology, unlike the US and Russia still in the latter development stages. In deployed systems, the US generally still retains a lead with midwave InSb technology. Given the commercial accessibility of such devices, Russia is likely to be integrating them into systems within 3-4 years.
Al-41FU supercruise powerplant.
Supercooled Engine Blades – the Russians announced over a year ago low rate Initial Production (LRIP) of the AL-41F engine, designed originally as a supersonic cruise equivalent to the F-22A's P&W F119-PW-100. The hot end technology used in the AL-41F core has since migrated also into the AL-31F-117C variant for the Su-35-1. Cited performance figures for these engines indicate the Russian industry has closed much of the gap the US opened with the F119/F135 family of the engines.
Engine FADEC – Full Authority Digital Engine Control systems are now available for a range of more recent Russian engines, including the AL-31F-117C. Whatever lead US and EU manufacturers may have is now only incremental, and mostly in maturity of software.
Thrust Vectoring Nozzles – to date the only full production Western air combat fighter with TVC capability is the F-22A, while the Russians have exported 2D TVC in the Su-30MKI, and offered 3D TVC for other types. Russian TVC is integrated with the flight controls, not unlike the F-22A arrangement.
Digital Flight Control Systems – the Russians demonstrated their first quadruply redundant DFCS in the Su-37 during the 1990s and now offer it as an option for the Su-30MK series, Su-35 and likely as an MLU option for Su-27SKM rebuilds. The only incremental advantage held by US and EU manufacturers is in greater maturity of embedded software, an advantage which will not last.
Radar Absorbent Materials and Structures – the US still retains a lead in this technology, but the Russians continue to make robust advances in coatings, laminates, and other controlled impedance technologies. Much of the Russian effort to date has been focussed on reducing the signature of conventional aircraft, rather than the US focus on fully shaped new designs. Russian Kazantsev laminates have demonstrated 100 fold signature reduction in the X-band, and recent citations indicate that robotically applied inlet tunnel coatings (Flanker) have achieved a 30 fold reduction in X-band signature. These are significant performance achievements, insofar as they challenge existing reduced signature US designs like the F/A-18E/F. While the US still leads at the top end of this technology, the Russians have closed much of the gap in 'commodity' technologies for treating conventional and legacy fighters.
Airborne Datalinks and Networks – the Russians have long been users of digital datalinks, primarily for GCI and AWACS support of interceptors. During the 1990s they invested heavily in intraflight datalink technology intended to network flights of fighters, and the TKS-2 system currently exported on Flankers provides the capability to share sensor data between multiple aircraft. The Russians are now offering an equivalent to the JTIDS/Link-16 system on their latest fighters. What advantage the US and EU retain in this technology is primarily in the maturity of software and protocol designs, another gap which will not last.
Inertial and Satellite Navigation Equipment – the advantage held by the US over Russia at the end of the Cold War has largely evaporated in this area, in part due to the wide availability of RLG and GPS technology in the global market. The US still retains a strong lead in wide area differential GPS technology.
Comparisons
If we compare a late model AESA equipped
F-15K/SG subtype against the late model
Su-35BM/Su-35-1, both likely to be rolled off a production line at the same time, these Flankers will outperform these F-15s in much of the flight envelope, especially at transonic speeds. With the AL-41F engine the Flanker will be able to sustain decent supersonic speed on dry thrust, giving it an energy advantage throughout the envelope. How much supercruise capability the hybrid AL-31F-117 series engine will provide remains to be seen. With conformal fuel tanks the F-15 will have comparable range to the Flanker with external PTB-2000 drop tanks. Equipped with the Irbis E the Sukhoi will achieve a first look / shot capability over the F-15 with an APG-63(V)2 AESA radar. In terms of EWSP capability, the Sorbstiya jammers will deliver better EIRP than the legacy ALQ-135 series, and the Khibiny-M will be comparable to the ALR-56M series. An area of uncertainty is how much of their newer radar signature suppression technology the Russians will incorporate in export Flankers.
In performing an overall summary, the Flanker will outperform or match the F-15 in most cardinal parameters and capabilities.
The other production Boeing fighter is the
F/A-18E/F Block II Super Hornet with its much vaunted APG-79 AESA radar. The Su-35BM/Su-35-1 outperforms it on all cardinal parameters, including radar range, but excluding the somewhat academic measure of clean radar signature – academic since in combat external stores must be carried by both fighters.
Lockheed's
F-16E / Block 60 subtype with AESA and conformal fuel tanks is not competitive against the Su-35BM/Su-35-1 on any parameters, the Sukhoi cleanly outclasses it across the board.
The
Lockheed-Martin F-35 JSF will be outclassed in all cardinal performance parameters, with the exception of radar signature when the JSF is flown clean with internal stores only. That advantage may also be entirely academic if the Flanker is networked with low frequency band radar to cue it to the JSF. It is also not entirely clear whether the radar signature of the export variants of the JSF will be low enough to deny lock-on by the powerful Irbis E at useful missile ranges.
The
Eurofighter Typhoon with AMSAR will compete with the Su-35BM/Su-35-1 in terms of close combat agility and dash speed, but it does not have a decisive advantage in systems and sensors and cannot match the radar range of the Irbis E, and will not match a supercruise engine equipped Flanker.
The
Dassault Rafale share many qualities with the Typhoon, but is smaller, and much the same comparisons apply to the Su-35BM/Su-35-1.
A key advantage the Flanker will possess against all but the conformal tank equipped F-15 is combat persistence, which provides far more flexibility in choosing engagements and the opportunity to run an opponent out of gas.
The smaller
MiG-35 shares the high agility of the Su-35BM/Su-35-1, but lacks its brute force in raw performance, combat persistence, radar range, and internal volume for mission avionics. All of the Western fighters will compare more favourably against the MiG-35 series, but this may be another entirely academic comparison given that none have been ordered as yet.
