Prompt Global Strike

[AMDR]

Before I start I want to say that I am not an expert, and this was done based on article research. If you see something incorrect, please let me know so it can be corrected.

Prompt Global Strike​

The Prompt Global Strike (PGS) program is the US military's effort to create weapons capable of striking a target anywhere in the world with a non-ballistic conventional warhead or projectile in less than 60 minutes. Proposed platforms include:

• Long-Range Hypersonic Cruise Missiles
• Land or Submarine-Launched missiles with a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV)
• Kinetic Bombardment from Space

Hypersonic Cruise Missiles​

The use of Hypersonic cruise missiles as quick-strike weapon is being considered by many nations around the world today. However America's global military presence gives it unique opportunities for weapons deployment, especially for the US Navy.
One proposed concept for a Hypersonic Cruise Missile is the "High-speed strike weapon", or HSSW. The HSSW will build on the lessons learned from the X-51A Waverider, a technology demonstration program for air-breathing hypersonic propulsion. HSSW is planned to have a speed of mach 6+ and a range of about 600 miles, and will fit into the internal weapons bay of the F-35, B-2, and upcoming LRSB. A VLS variant may also be procured.

X-51A Waverider

HSSW Concept : Lockheed Martin

This weapon would allow USN carrier strike groups to strike targets much more quickly than before, all over the world. Any target not in range or not hit quickly enough for the 60 minute dealine of PGS would be covered by a more expensive and longer range weapon, the AHW.

Advanced Hypersonic Weapon​

The Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW) is a weapon currently being tested by the US Army as an aim to demonstrate future technologies that could be used to fulfill the PGS mission. It uses a 3-stage system to boost the glide vehicle high up into the atmosphere. The glide vehicle is released and then flies at Mach 20 on a flat, non-ballistic trajectory. When it reaches it terminal stage, the glide vehicle will roll and dive into its intended target with a CEP of less than 10 meters.

Theoretically you could launch a ICBM with a conventional warhead to the same final effect, but it is Impossible to discern a Nuclear warhead from a Conventional warhead while it is being tracked in a ballistic trajectory. This would then prompt a nuclear response. An HGV would be discernible from an ICMB because of its flatter flight path, therefore there will be no misunderstanding, and no nukes.

The first test of AHW (FT-1A) was conducted on the 18th of November, 2011 and was successful. AHW was was launched from the Kauai Test Facility in Hawaii and struct its target at the Reagan Test Site on Kwajalein Atoll. It covered a distance of 3700 kilometers in less than 30 minutes. The test collected useful data about hypersonic flight that can be used in future hypersonic weapons development.

The second test of AHW was conducted on August 25, 2014 at the Kodiak Launch Facility in Alaska. It was aborted shortly after launched when an anomaly was detected in the launch vehicle.

IMO Putting something like this on a submarine would be useful, any point on the globe would not be safe a submarine-launched version of this. It would give the United States the ability to strike high-priority and time-sensitive targets quickly around the world in a non-nuclear manner. However the strike time would be limited by the time it takes to gather Intelligence and targeting information at the start of a conflict.

Kinetic Bombardment​

Yes, a mach 20 glide vehicle is scary, but to me this is the most disturbing. The basic idea behind orbital kinetic bombardment is to drop a tungsten rod 6 meters long from a satellite or other space platform onto a target on the surface of the earth. No nukes, No explosives, no nothing, just sheer kinetic energy. During the cold-war both the US and the USSR had plans for such a weapon, but did not go through with it. Some reports state the destructive power of KSW is equal to a small tactical nuclear bomb.

A few months ago the X-37B Unmanned Space plane returned from a 670-day flight in orbit around the earth. Could the X-37B and its follow on projects hold small kinetic projectiles in the future? I don't know. Tell me what you guys think!

 

[Thəorətic Muslim]

Nicely done.

Who knew wild GI Joe 2 movie plots could be done in real life?

But there's a treaty that bans weaponization of space.

 

[SvenSvensonov]

Russia had a concept like this way back, they called it the Fractional Orbital Bombardment:

Introduction

The Soviets conducted a long running campaign of strategic deception against the West through the whole Cold War period, and the protracted development of the Soviet FOBS nuclear weapon system presents an excellent case study of such.

The Soviet RVSN or Strategic Rocket Forces were involved in a sustained and intensive arms race against the US Air Force Strategic Air Command, the intent being to provide a decisive advantage in ballistic missile exchanges in the event of a full scale nuclear conflict. An important part of this campaign was the deployment of large phased array Ballistic Missile Early Warning (BMEW) radar systems by both sides. The BMEW radars would track incoming ballistic missiles and Re-entry Vehicles (RV) as they rose above the radar horizon and then re-entered the atmosphere, track these, and provide estimated impact points, impact times, and with lesser accuracy, locations of launchers. The systems of BMEW radars deployed by both sides were critical in providing early warning of a nuclear attack in progress, and data to support decisions on what retaliatory strikes should be launched at what targets. Both sides considered launching strikes against empty ICBM silos to be an ineffective strategy.

Soviet RVSN strategists quickly recognised that the first generation of BMEW radars deployed by the US were oriented to track Soviet attacks on direct trajectories, in which ICBMs were launched from sites in European Russia and Siberia, and would reach their apogees over the northern polar regions. Without BMEW coverage through the southern geographical arc, US nuclear warfighting staffs were blind to attacks from other directions. This presented an opportunity for the Soviets, as a wave of strikes on key US facilities without warning could permit defacto decapitation of the US command, control and communications systems, and if sufficient warheads were delivered, key silo fields could be heavily damaged reducing residual US retaliatory capability. Given the nuclear warfighting imperative of “use them or lose them”, the player who could knock out as many opposing ICBMs in the opening round of a nuclear conflict had an important advantage.

The Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) as it was known in the West, was a Soviet innovation intended to exploit the limitations of US BMEW radar coverage. The idea behind FOBS was that a large thermonuclear warhead could be inserted into a steeply inclined low altitude polar orbit, such that it would approach the CONUS from any direction, but primarily from the southern hemisphere, and following a programmed braking manoeuvre, re-enter from a direction which was not covered by US BMEW radars. The first warning the US would have of such a strike in progress would be the EMP transients produced by the nuclear devices initiating over their programmed targets in the CONUS.

FOBS Development

Development of the 8K713 GR-1 (Globalnaya Raketa -1 or Global Missile 1) was initiated in 1962 by OKB-1, led by Sergei Pavlovich Korolyov. This was to be the last ballistic missile design produced by Korolyov, best known in the West for his effort in the Soviet space program.

The development effort on the 8K713 GR-1 ceased in 1964, without a single test launch having been performed. Despite, as part of a strategic deception effort, the Soviets displayed this missile as an operational weapon system during their annual Red Square military parade. Western analysts were convinced that this system was in use, and it was allocated the US/NATO designation of SS-10 SCRAG.

What the Soviets did deploy operationally was an entirely different FOBS system, the R-36-O or 8K69 developed by SKB-586, led by Mikhail Kuzmich Yangel’. Based then and since in Dnepropetrovsk, in the Ukraine, the design bureau was co-located with the Yuzhniy Mashinostoryenniy Zavod manufacturing plant.

Development of a FOBS derivative of the existing R-36 heavy ICBM design was authorised in 16th April, 1962, leading to approval and assignment of the 8K69 designation in December, 1962, and subsequently, initial prototypes in the third quarter of 1964.

In January, 1965, the government authority directed that the missile be redesigned for an “encapsulated” launch system. Until then, Soviet ICBMs were stacked in situ in a silo, and then fuelled for operation with the toxic and corrosive liquid propellant mix. The new encapsulated packaging scheme would see the ICBMs stacked, and then installed in a hermetic launch container, which was inserted into a silo for long duration standby operation. Prior to sealing, the missile was pumped full of the inhibited propellant mix, which would allow it to sit in a silo for 7.5 years, ready for launch at five minutes notice, before it needed to be extracted, defueled, and overhauled.

In introduction of this scheme was intended to increase the operational readiness of the RVSN ICBM force, which was at that time largely equipped with liquid fuelled missiles. ICBMs could sit in silos ready for immediate launch, within minute of a launch order arriving at the hardened Launch Control Centre for the silo.

Design bureau test launches of the R-36-0 / 8K69 commenced in December, 1965, from the Baikonur LC-160 and LC-162 silo complexes. The R-36-O / 8K69 FOBS was accepted into operational service on the 19th November, 1968, and remained operational until January, 1983.

The R-36-O was designated in the US/NATO system as the SS-9 Mod 3 SCARP or “SS-9 FOBS”, and is sometimes labeled the R-36orb. The principal difference compared to the basic R-36 was redesigned terminal stage, with a liquid propellant de-orbit engine, designed to decelerate the RV.

The missile’s flight profile comprised four phases – boost phase, orbital phase, braking phase and finally, the re-entry phase. The weapon’s 1,700 kg orbital stage was designated the 8F021 OGCh, which comprised a fuselage, an instrument section with an inertial guidance system, the de-orbit engine section, and an 8F673 ~5 Megatonne nuclear warhead section.

The 8F021 would, as it neared the de-orbit manoeuvre entry point, start the AT/UDMH liquid fuelled de-orbit engine turbopump using a solid propellant gas generator. Exhaust gasses from the turbine were used for vehicle attitude control, using a 4 + 4 thruster arrangement. This de-orbit engine design later formed the basis of the Tsiklon 3 ELV S5.23/RD-861 third stage orbital engine, rated at 78.710 kN / 17,695 lbf. The cited CEP for the RV was 1.1 km.

Conceived at the peak of the Cold War, the Soviet FOBS effort showed the extreme lengths to which the Soviets were prepared to go in order to gain a decisive advantage over the West in a nuclear confrontation.

The usefulness of the FOBS declined very rapidly, as the US deployed early warning satellites capable of tracking missile launch signatures, and the expanded coverage BMEWS network, with the new phased array AN/FPS-115 PAVE PAWS detection and precision tracking radars.

While the FOBS had unlimited range and could attack targets anywhere on the globe, the loss of the element of surprise due to improved early warning systems relegated it to the position of an expensive single warhead missile with limited 5 Megatonne yield with 1,100 metre CEP, and longer flight time, compared to later MRV/MIRV ICBM variants of the R-36. Eighteen silos at Baikonur were loaded with these weapons until 1983, when they were decommissioned under the terms of the SALT-2 treaty.

From The Soviet Fractional Orbital Bombardment System

As far as the US PGS system... still a long way to go, despite all the hype about these systems from some of our "Eastern Neighbors" - they still lack maturity, range, accuracy, maneuverability, reliability and well, just about anything else that is needed to make them a useful weapon.

Also @AMDR - check the math and physics on these HGV systems:

Analysis of optimal initial glide conditions for hypersonic glide vehicles

The flight path tolerances on HGVs are brutally slim. Too high or fast and you rip the vehicle apart. Too slow or low and your HGV fails to achieve the necessary lift to sustain flight and falls to the ground. You need very precise conditions to make them work... as the above article will explain.

 

[AMDR]

As far as the US PGS system... still a long way to go, despite all the hype about these systems from some of our "Eastern Neighbors" - they still lack maturity, range, accuracy, maneuverability, reliability and well, just about anything else that is needed to make them a useful weapon.

Also @AMDR - check the math and physics on these HGV systems:

Analysis of optimal initial glide conditions for hypersonic glide vehicles

The flight path tolerances on HGVs are brutally slim. Too high or fast and you rip the vehicle apart. Too slow or low and your HGV fails to achieve the necessary lift to sustain flight and falls to the ground. You need very precise conditions to make them work... as the above article will explain.

That article seems interesting but is beyond my level. You are right about the HGV tho, they are decades away from operational deployment. Both China and the US have tested HGVs with mostly failed tests. The Wu-14's second test (I think) broke apart when it started its glide. The Falcon HTV-2 only had partial success in its test, lasting only 9 minutes out of the planned 30.

If it was easy everybody would do it

 

[F-22Raptor]

That article seems interesting but is beyond my level. You are right about the HGV tho, they are decades away from operational deployment. Both China and the US have tested HGVs with mostly failed tests. The Wu-14's second test (I think) broke apart when it started its glide. The Falcon HTV-2 only had partial success in its test, lasting only 9 minutes out of the planned 30.

If it was easy everybody would do it

Hypersonics are notoriously difficult to master. The US has conducted decades of research over a number of programs and the technology still has not matured to the point of IOC. With that said, based on the open source information I've read, the US feels the technology will have matured to the point of IOC by the early 20's. Funding is set to increase yearly through the end of the decade, as the Air Force and DOD has identified hypersonics as a top priority going forward. The Air Force wants to begin testing of hypersonic cruise missiles by 2020. The final successful flight of the X-51 was critical to move forward with HCM's.

I think we are close. We've successfully tested both hypersonic glide vehicles and scramjets. I believe we will have a primitive hypersonic strike capability within a decade.

7,000 U.S. Cruise Missiles Pose 'Dominant Threat to the Modern World'

The U.S. will have the capability to unleash a barrage of up to 7,000 cruise missiles at nuclear defense objects in Russia by 2016, a Russian air defense constructor said Monday.
About 5,000 of those will be launched from submarines, Pavel Sozinov, chief designer at the Almaz-Antey arms maker, was cited by Interfax as saying.
"A mass cruise missile strike in the first phase [of a conflict] is the dominant threat in the modern world," Sozinov said.
He cited recent conflicts in Libya and Iraq as examples of this approach.
Russia must take the U.S. strategy into account in planning its air defense agenda, said Sozinov, whose state-run holding is the country's leading producer of air and missile defense systems.
He also said the U.S. missile capabilities are expected to reach a new level by 2020 with hypersonic and orbital launch systems.
Sozinov cited as examples the X-37 reusable manned spacecraft and DARPA/U.S. Air Force's joint Falcon Project to produce a hypersonic vehicle.
The plans call for a revamp of Russia's missile warning system, which is also set for a sweeping update by 2020, he said.

7,000 U.S. Cruise Missiles Pose 'Dominant Threat to the Modern World' | News | The Moscow Times

This Russian air defense spokesman believes the US will have a hypersonic capability in the 2020 timeframe.