PKK n 2012

[Vatoz]

PKK in 2012

In an analysis I made in January, I argued that 2012 would be a tense year and it would be a blessing if we survived the year without a hitch, let alone make any reforms.
I further asserted that there were efforts to “pave the way for Kurdish and Turkish nationalists to attack the [Gülen] Community.” I wrote that the groups which had started to advertize themselves as “pro-government” might attempt to sow seeds of dissension between the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and its traditional supporters. The “perfect operation” devised by a group within the Nationalist Intelligence Party (MİT) prove that my concerns had a merit.

As a matter of fact, before making a consistent and spruce analysis about the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) strategy in 2012, I wanted to see the developments during and after Nevruz. Indeed, any annual projection about the PKK should take into consideration the incidents that might occur during and after Nevruz. I think it is high time I made a 2012 projection for the PKK.

1) The PKK is no longer an organization fighting for the “rights of Kurds.” This is already acknowledged by the PKK leaders. This is because the PKK has realized that it is no longer meaningful to wage an armed clash for the sake of Kurdish rights. Particularly after the Silvan attack, the PKK launched the “status war” which it defined as its fourth strategic move. Thus, it is no coincidence that the Democratic Society Congress (DTK), masterminded by Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed PKK leader, declared “democratic autonomy” on the same day as the Silvan attack. In this way, in line with the PKK’s new strategy, the “status war” commenced in an extremely symbolic way.

2) The most fundamental difference between the war for status and the war for rights is this: In the past, the PKK was fighting for the rights of all Kurds. Therefore, it would refrain from entering into polemics or conflicts with other Kurdish opposition groups. Now, the PKK is fighting for the political status, “democratic autonomy,” it proposed. This is a war for “ruling the region.” Therefore, the PKK’s enemy has changed. Now, the state that says, “Let us grant fewer rights to Kurds, but recognize the PKK, albeit indirectly,” is its friend while the liberal Turkish and Kurdish intellectuals who argue that, “the rights of Kurds should not be an instrument in negotiating with the PKK, but they should be granted independently of the PKK,” are the greater enemies of the PKK.

3) In 2012, the PKK will wage a war on two fronts as a result of its status war strategy. The first one may be named as “conjuncture-based violence.” This is the war against the war. This is war is justified by the PKK’s argument that the state is more inclined to negotiate with it if it escalates the violence. Given the developments since 2009, it is hard to say that the PKK’s argument is flawed. The state’s strategy mainly seeks to prevent the PKK from stepping up violence. And this gives an upper hand to the PKK. The PKK has always secured, and continues to secure, new gains from the state by launching a new wave of terrorist attacks to create a “conjuncture-based dilemma” whenever the state refuses to comply with the PKK’s demands. The conjuncture-based dilemma means, the PKK says: “You don’t comply with my demands, but the equilibrium is changing in the Middle East. The Kurdish issue is your soft spot, and you cannot act freely in the Middle East without settling this problem. If you don’t grant me the status I want, I will continue to wage a conjuncture-based war depending on the developments and put you behind the eight ball.” As long as the state and the PKK meet on the same logical plane, this war will never end. Indeed, the balances in the Middle East are very volatile. As long as it has weapons in its hands, the PKK will seek to turn every opportunity into a war for more status. In this context, in the coming days, the PKK will wage war based on the conjuncture concerning the developments in Syria. The PKK will escalate the war when Turkey tries to interfere with Syria. The PKK’s conjuncture-based violence will become more complicated with each new input.

4) The PKK’s other war will be against the Kurdish opposition. As a consequence of the war for status, the PKK will target all intellectuals who don’t recognize the PKK’s status and dominant identity and who oppose the PKK’s violent methods and advocate for the rights of Kurds. As it did in 2004, the PKK will launch a large-scale war against the intellectuals who promote the rights of Kurds. As you might remember, in 2004, the PKK launched its third strategic move by killing Kurdish nationalists such as Kani Yılmaz and Hikmet Fidan, who had left the PKK, arguing that violence would solve nothing. Now, in its fourth strategic move, the PKK will try to discredit, intimidate, silence or kill the Turkish and Kurdish intellectuals who would oppose the PKK’s war for status. Therefore, the PKK’s greatest enemy is no longer the state, but the Kurdish intellectuals like Musin Kızılkaya, Orhan Miroğlu, and Kemal Burkay as well as the Turkish intellectuals who, like me, advocate the rights of Kurds and raise objection to the PKK’s war for status.

5) In 2012, the PKK will target, in the first place, the police, and then, the liberal intellectuals -- to silence them -- and metropolitan cities -- to create the sense of exasperation in the public so that they will tell the government to sit at the table with the PKK. As the state will take other Kurdish groups as addressees in the negotiations under its new strategy, the PKK will specifically try to intimidate them. In response, the state will launch operations against the PKK’s strategic camps in northern Iraq. This is what post-Nevruz developments imply.

PKK in 2012

The Marxist Kurdistan worker party PKK seem to gonna be a pain in the a..s.

 

[Saithan]

You forgot that the government and the US has made an agreement to strangulate the PKK financially, which means all monetary transaction are going to be traced and monitored more thoroughly.

However PKK targetting people who don't accept their status isn't a new thing it's always been there. It might stand out more now though, and it'll only be a good thing if they do because the people will not stand for it.