knight11
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No body is going to do anything to China, its the China which will do something like it did during the Kargil war aka gave the recorded conversation of the Gen Musharraf, when he was in Beijing (Gone to China for asking Help) to India.
After Mumbai and Parliament attack, there was the pressure from the people of the India on the govt. to take strict action against the so called terrorist who were getting training in the training camps in Pakistan, who attacked India in coward and proxy way. There was no intention of India to Invade Pakistan ever, the mobilization was done to secure the border to prevent any Pakistani Army action, and strike the training camps in the P0K in Pakistani held kashmir. But at that time, our strike core based on the Jabalpur which is at the heart of the India, thousands of KM away from the border took so much time with its all heavy Gears and equipments, that the surprise factor was not there. Therefore, you can see various training for the fast and quick mobilization, transport aircraft deal M777 guns deal, and combat helicopters, which created a hype called cold start doctrine but in reality it was the demand of the present requirement and you are not going to wage the war like the World War.
Does India need TNWs?
Pakistan’s introduction of TNWs in South Asia
raises the question whether India should develop
the same to counter Pakistan’s TNWs. Strategic
thinkers and experts across India have strictly
believed that India should refrain from developing
such weapon systems. There are several reasons
for this belief. Firstly, there is the complexity of
distinguishing between strategic and tactical
nuclear weapons. In fact, India’s foremost
strategic thinker Late Air Commodore Jasjit Singh
never drew any distinction between tactical and
strategic nuclear weapons. According to him, “any
nuclear weapon, of any quality, mode of delivery
or yield, used against any type of target, will result
in a strategic impact to which the logical response
would be the use of nuclear weapons, more often
than not, on an overwhelming scale.”17
He further states that these weapon systems
“evolved” from Cold War theologies and that
the “artificial division of nuclear weapons into
tactical and strategic is not only irrelevant for us
[India], but carries with a danger that a belief
system could grow in a way that might justify
the use and utlity of such weapons for actual
war-fighting.”18 Professor P.R. Chari, another
nuclear veteran also seconds the Air
Commodore’s opinion that “the real danger
from TNWs arises from the psychology it
engenders that nuclear war is possible.”19 Lt.
General V.R. Raghavan also of the view that “the
Indian position (if TNWs are used in conflict) may
well be that a nuke is a nuke and the use of even a
tactical one is a strategic strike.”20 He further
states, “[t]he Indian decision makers may not
attach importance to either the yield of the
weapon used, or the territory on which it is
detonated. The response could well be strategic
on the lines indicated in the India doctrine.”21
Therefore, the response to Pakistan’s first-use of
nuclear weapons on Indian territory irrespective of
whether the weapon used is tactical or strategic
should be ‘massive retaliation’ as mentioned in
our doctrine. This philosophy is more so crucial
since the distinction between TNWs and strategic
nuclear weapons is only in technical terms and not
in material terms given the short flight times of
delivery systems and geographical contiguity of
India and Pakistan.
Secondly, India’s nuclear doctrine, strategy and
nuclear posturing also leave minimal scope for the
introduction of TNWs in its nuclear strategy.
India’s nuclear strategy of Mutual Assured
Destruction (MAD), premised on counter-value
targeting, does not allow any scope for the development of TNWs of MAD. TNWs are
usually confined to counter-force roles and
therefore, defy India’s nuclear deterrence strategy
of MAD. India’s nuclear posture is premised on
the principle of ‘credible minimum deterrence
posture’, which does not concentrate on the
number game, but on developing minimum
survivable nuclear weapons. If TNWs were to
strengthen nuclear deterrence, India would need a
great number of them to be deployed in the
battlefield, which would defy its ‘credible
minimum deterrence’ posture.
Also, if TNWs in India could restrict adversary
from using their TNWs,22 this strategy holds no
significance for India. This is because a state can
only avert its adversary from using TNWs first, if
the state has a ‘first-use’ doctrine. With India’s
‘no-first use’ doctrine, the TNWs would pose no
advantage to India’s military strategy. Moreover,
TNWs attach with them, the dilemma of ‘use them
or lose them’. India’s ‘no-first use’ doctrine on the
other hand, reduces any scope for this sort of
dilemma to arise. Thus, the possession of TNWs
would only weaken India’s stand on ‘no-first use’
doctrine. New Delhi’s ‘no-first use’ doctrine and
explicit mention of ‘massive retaliation’ in its
nuclear doctrine also put lesser burden on the
command and control and on the armed forces,
especially the Indian Army. This is because once
nuclear weapons are used by the adversary on
Indian Territory, the response is as stated in the
doctrine. Introduction of TNWs would pose an
added burden on the command and control.
Thirdly, is the issue of India’s threat perceptions,
which are not only confined to Pakistan but also
China. In fact, it was the presence of the Chinese
nuclear threat right from 1964 that became the
crucial factor behind India’s nuclear program
following the 1962 Indo-China war. Jaswant
Singh writes, “the nuclear age entered India's
neighborhood when China became a nuclear
power in October 1964. From then on, no
responsible Indian leader could rule out the option
of following suit.”23 The Chinese nuclear threat
continues to loom and is a major factor that affects
India’s nuclear thinking and planning.
Introduction of TNWs by India would not only
lower the nuclear threshold vis-à-vis Pakistan, but
also against China. In fact, India should take the
lead to discuss nuclear arms control measures with
China and never encourage such destablizing
weapons that would only instigate nuclear arms
race. Since Beijing refuses to recognize India as a
nuclear weapon state (NWS), the scope for any
nuclear arms control measures or nuclear
confidence building measures (NCBMs) between
India and China has been restricted. India and
China have a lot in common in their nuclear
weapons policies, in that both practice ‘no-first
use’ doctrine and both have resorted to de-mated
and de- alerted nuclear weapons. Both have
vouched strong for the implementation of a global
‘no-first use’ treaty and hence, there is a scope for
cooperation in these aspects. There could also be a
scope for a bilateral agreement de-targeting each
other’s assets in the future and these scopes of
future cooperation could get jeopardized should
India develop TNWs.
Fourthly, for Pakistan, nuclear weapons serve as a
tool to promote proxy wars against India. From
India’s side, introducing TNWs in its strategy
would mean confining nuclear conflict to a
localized or battlefield level. This would only
increase the frequency of Pakistan’s proxy wars
against Indian Territory should Pakistan become
aware that a limited conflict leading to the use of
nuclear weapons, would be confined to battlefield
level. Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal, a veteran on
nuclear issues, argues the same that limiting
India’s response to TNWs would “play straight
into Pakistan's hands and give that country the
freedom to continue to interfere in India's internal
affairs through its 'proxy war' in J&K, including
the launching of Kargil-type misadventures.”24
Fifthly, is the issue of lowering the nuclear
threshold and also inviting catastrophe for Indian
troops with TNWs. India’s nuclear deterrence is
strengthened in its ability to be able to survive an
enemy first-strike and be able to retaliate causing
‘unacceptable damage’. As long as New Delhi is successful in developing survivable nuclear
forces, there is little need to respond to TNWs
with TNWs. Strategic nuclear delivery systems
are farther from border regions and therefore,
more survivable. A 700kms range Agni-I can be
fired from deep within the territory than a 60kms
range missile and therefore, the Agni-I is less
susceptible to being destroyed by enemy attacks.
Also, such strategic nuclear delivery system in
India’s nuclear arsenal could be tactically
employed, that is, tactical employment of strategic
weapons. This means that the strategic weapon
systems are not restricted to serve strategic
purposes but can be used against counter-force
targets. This would strengthen India’s ‘credible
minimum deterrence’ posture, and at the same
time keep the nuclear threshold high, thereby
strengthening stability in the region even as
Islamabad continues to lower the same.
Moreover, the Indian Army’s doctrinal shift from
attrition-based warfare to maneuver warfare,
evident from its Cold Start Doctrine, requires
rapid movement of the Integrated Battle Groups
(IBGs) to save their deployment time in crisis
situation. The aim is to launch “offensive
operations to a shallow depth” without crossing
Pakistan’s nuclear red lines. Possessing TNWs
complicate the rapid deployment of forces by
attaching with them the hassle to deploy the
TNWs too close to the borders. As India refrains
from crossing Pakistan’s nuclear red lines, an
introduction of TNWs in its strategy could
jeopardize this attempt of not crossing the nuclear
threshold. In addition, should India deploy TNWs
in its territory, any effort on Islamabad’s side to
destroy TNWs deployed on forward positions,
even with conventional weapons could lead to a
nuclear catastrophe on the Indian territory and
therefore, catastrophic for the Indian troops also.
Moreover, capturing of an Indian missile battery
by enemy could be detrimental since the same
nuclear tipped missiles could be used against
Indian troops.
Sixthly, India’s superiority in its conventional
military might vis-à-vis Pakistan allows it to
refrain from venturing into TNWs. India must
continue to affirm Pakistan that her conventional
superiority is sufficient to deter Pakistan’s
conventional forces. In fact, New Delhi should
concentrate on modernizing her conventional
forces, especially, conventional firepower
capability, artillery in particular, whose
modernization process continues to be a
desideratum. Modernization of conventional
forces by India would result in Pakistan not only
having to increase the number of TNWs in its
arsenal, but put an added burden on Pakistan’s
conventional military development to keep pace
with India’s conventional military superiority.
