Pakistani Military Officers Behind Consulate Attack: Balkh Police Chief

[Amaa'n]

ACHA!!!!

 

[Areesh]

In that case you missed the context of Indian consulate,we don't make threads on shia sunni conflicts and whatever happen in somalia as a Thekedar.

Yes you are only thekedar of Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains in this world and on other planets.

 

[AyanRay]

They learn it from Indians that even before a bullet's shell touch floor, blame Pakistan. After that you don't have to work anymore.

Media will take care for further investigations. Bloody bunch of incompetents.

Afghanistan learns from India, Bangladesh learns from India even Iran learns from India. And Muslim ummah goes down the drain

Yes you are only thekedar of Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains in this world and on other planets.

Of course, more than 90% of them live in India. (Apart from Buddhists maybe)

 

[bloo]

Or you can simply accept the simple fact that your security forces are shitty and hence required 25 hours to kill them.

Time has nothing to do with how good security forces are at responding to sudden siege style attacks.
Take for example your PNS Mehran attack which too took around the same time as this attack to deescalate and still had more casualties including your special forces, every hostile situation is different.

 

[Neutron]

Terrorism is a multinational issue. These non state actors don't belong to any state or religion.

 

[AyanRay]

Time has nothing to do with how good security forces are at responding to sudden siege style attacks.
Take for example your PNS Mehran attack which too took around the same time as this attack to deescalate and still had more casualties including your special forces, every hostile situation is different.

Dude, PNS Mehran was an example of honour and courage. It takes extreme courage to hide your asses when bad terrorists are destroying your multi million dollar aircrafts.

 

[Sipahi]

Afghanistan learns from India, Bangladesh learns from India even Iran learns from India. And Muslim ummah goes down the drain



Of course, more than 90% of them live in India. (Apart from Buddhists maybe)

Indians started it.

You have 3 layer border security system and if it fails its your incompetency.

Aik tou incompetent upar se badtameez.

 

[iioal malik]

News Afghanistan???

Didn't know these backstabbing nation has new papers........ How can we trust you ...U like to su**k Indians only for money you filthy stinky shower-less dirty pig afghanis

 

[AyanRay]

Time has nothing to do with how good security forces are at responding to sudden siege style attacks.
Take for example your PNS Mehran attack which too took around the same time as this attack to deescalate and still had more casualties including your special forces, every hostile situation is different.

And also don't forget about GHQ attack when again bad terrorists took multiple officers hostage and the Pakistani terrorists had to airlift good terrorists of Jaish to negotiate with them.

Indians started it.

You have 3 layer border security system and if it fails its your incompetency.

Aik tou incompetent upar se badtameez.

Says a person who country lost half of its territory to this very incompetent nation.

 

[PARIKRAMA]

IMHO Majar E Sharif cannot be blamed on Pakistan without substantial evidence bcz

1. Mazar E Sharif is approximately 460 odd Kms from Kabul and Kabul to Pakistan border should be around 225-250Kms implying Mazar E Sharif to Pakistan border to be around 700 kms easily

2. The Passing of say an armed group which are basically Pakistani Military infiltrating and going 700 kms deep undetected, without any valid documents of entry/exit and full covert ops can be equivalent to a daylight robbery theory

3. The author if he would have claimed that its Pakistan Army trained or ISI trained Taliban elements, still that story could have been explored more.

4. The tactical value of Mazar E Sharif is more from trade routes to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Its one of the developed portion of Afghanistan implying proper building and structures. Thus its a urban combat tactic which Taliban is definitely not very good with.

5. There is a Afghan National Army Corps (209th Corps) based out of Mazar E Sharif and is hub for all northern frontier.
There are substantial peace keeping forces also in the city and around area. Thats pretty fortified in terms of soldiers and boot numbers on the field.

This implies the hostiles had evaded them if and only if they had precise information how to avoid engaging them and their necessary reaction times. Thus, a high probability of an insider playing from Hostiles team or simply a spy planted for information.

6. This city has been the target of Taliban insurgency for some good time partly bcz Taliban old leadership and provincial leaders were executed in the area and vicinity of Mazar E Sharif.

7. Mostly political attacks takes place here which implies this attack on Indian Consulate is perhaps due to India supplying the helos to attack on Taliban insurgents by Afghanistan Military.

If there is evidence showing Pakistan's involvement then Balkh police chief Sayed Kamal Sadat Should hand over such leads to Pakistan, USA and India (since its our consulate which was targeted) and let formal investigation be done to determine the people behind it..

Statements in Media will only inflame marginalization of Pakistan among Afghanistan's people. For peace to return, Afghanistan needs Pakistan's help to rein in some elements of Taliban.. Such open accusations would prove counter productive.

India should tread carefully here. Pathankot is different and Mazar E Sharif is different. Interlinking is possible if evidence is of irrefutable manner or else dont interlink it at all. Try and follow two different cases independently for better results and higher scope of any effective breakthrough.

 

[Areesh]

Time has nothing to do with how good security forces are at responding to sudden siege style attacks.
Take for example your PNS Mehran attack which too took around the same time as this attack to deescalate and still had more casualties including your special forces, every hostile situation is different.

Or we can take example of Pathankot. Where militants were allowed to enter the base by just paying RS50.

Of course, more than 90% of them live in India. (Apart from Buddhists maybe)

Yup. Looks to be a "valid" reason for your thekedari for Hindus.

 

[Eminent Mainstream Media]

IMHO Majar E Sharif cannot be blamed on Pakistan without substantial evidence bcz

1. Mazar E Sharif is approximately 460 odd Kms from Kabul and Kabul to Pakistan border should be around 225-250Kms implying Mazar E Sharif to Pakistan border to be around 700 kms easily

2. The Passing of say an armed group which are basically Pakistani Military infiltrating and going 700 kms deep undetected, without any valid documents of entry/exit and full covert ops can be equivalent to a daylight robbery theory

3. The author if he would have claimed that its Pakistan Army trained or ISI trained Taliban elements, still that story could have been explored more.

4. The tactical value of Mazar E Sharif is more from trade routes to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Its one of the developed portion of Afghanistan implying proper building and structures. Thus its a urban combat tactic which Taliban is definitely not very good with.

5. There is a Afghan National Army Corps (209th Corps) based out of Mazar E Sharif and is hub for all northern frontier.
There are substantial peace keeping forces also in the city and around area. Thats pretty fortified in terms of soldiers and boot numbers on the field.

This implies the hostiles had evaded them if and only if they had precise information how to avoid engaging them and their necessary reaction times. Thus, a high probability of an insider playing from Hostiles team or simply a spy planted for information.

6. This city has been the target of Taliban insurgency for some good time partly bcz Taliban old leadership and provincial leaders were executed in the area and vicinity of Mazar E Sharif.

7. Mostly political attacks takes place here which implies this attack on Indian Consulate is perhaps due to India supplying the helos to attack on Taliban insurgents by Afghanistan Military.

If there is evidence showing Pakistan's involvement then Balkh police chief Sayed Kamal Sadat Should hand over such leads to Pakistan, USA and India (since its our consulate which was targeted) and let formal investigation be done to determine the people behind it..

Statements in Media will only inflame marginalization of Pakistan among Afghanistan's people. For peace to return, Afghanistan needs Pakistan's help to rein in some elements of Taliban.. Such open accusations would prove counter productive.

India should tread carefully here. Pathankot is different and Mazar E Sharif is different. Interlinking is possible if evidence is of irrefutable manner or else dont interlink it at all. Try and follow two different cases independently for better results and higher scope of any effective breakthrough.

ISI used to hit USSR as far as Tajikistan back in 80s-

On one occasion, in December, 1986, some thirty Mujahideen crossed
in rubber boats near the base of the Wakhan panhandle to attack two hydro-electric power stations
in Tajikistan. This raid involved an assault on two small Soviet guard posts, during which some
eighteen Muslim soldiers surrendered and joined the Jehad. It was later reported that a number were
subsequently Shaheed in Afghanistan.

By 1986 Wali was a commander in his own right, with operational control over about 300
men. He had been inside the Soviet Union five times since his first reconnaissance mission in 1984.
The area I had chosen for him was the large region between the Amu, north of Sherkhan, and the
Soviet town of Kurgan Tyube. It was a well developed area with no less than nine airfields,
industrial facilities, railway depots, and power stations (see Map 21). It was full of potential targets
and I was hoping that Wali would be able to get much deeper inside than we had managed
previously. Not that I was able to be specific as to what to expect, or exactly where he would find a
worthwhile objective. The only guidelines I could give him were to go in on a long reconnaissance,
make contact with his friends, then find a suitable target, firing positions and routes in and out. The
detailed planning I left to Wali, who I had come to respect as a shrewd tactician.
He took two Mujahideen with him in early April. All three crossed the Amu in a small recce
boat, not far from his first crossing place nearly three years earlier. After a night at his friend’s
house they were taken up into the hills behind the village to graze sheep. Leaving one man to tend
the animals, Wali and his comrade set off north with the guide. He had a compass and binoculars,
and wanted to reach a good position from which to observe the plain below him to the west. It was a
clear spring morning. They would see the road from Pyandzh to Kurgan Tyube about 5 kilometres
from the hills on which they stood. Even at this early hour there was some military traffic. They
walked fast for several hours, keeping to the goat and sheep trails, until they had covered some 12
kilometres, and were overlooking the centre of the plain east of Kolkhozabad. They had only met a
few shepherds, to whom their guide shouted a greeting as they passed.
Wali and his companions had no map, neither did they know the names of the Soviet
industrial areas, factories or airfields that were scattered over the cotton-growing plain below them.
Wali needed to find a target, one that he would be able to get within 9 kilometres of by night, and
then withdraw from hurriedly while it was still dark. He slowly scanned the area through his
binoculars. He could see vehicles on the road about 7 kilometers from his position, and near that
what had to be a small airstrip upon which a light aircraft had just landed. Beyond, hut close to the
airfield, were a cluster of high chimneys belching black smoke. In front of the airfield, by the road,
and on the far side of it, were several long, greyish buildings with a number of shorter chimneys,
with more smoke–a factory of some sort. Wali took a bearing. From the spur on which he stood, the
factory, airfield and high chimneys were more or less lined up on 283 degrees. The range to the
factory? Hard to be sure, but not more than 9 and not less than 7 kilometres. However, it was spread
over a largish area, with what seemed to be a lot of industrial-type buildings in the vicinity of the
factory. If he missed the factory there was still a good chance of hitting something worthwhile. It
would suffice. The firing position was easy, it could be anywhere on the spur on which he stood.
Wali and his companions hurried home, rechecking the route as they went, noting the landmarks
and timing themselves over the distance. They were back well before dusk–a round trip of eight
hours.
Like most military commanders, Wali’s problems were largely centred on getting to and from
the target. The actual firing was the easy part. It was a question of time and space. He would need to
go lightly armed, with only personal weapons and two Chinese-made 107mm SBRLs. These were
ideal. With a range of 9 kilometres, they could each be manpacked by two men, one carrying the
bipod, the other the barrel. Wali considered taking only one, but the thought of it failing at the
crucial moment convinced him to play it safe. He wanted to fire up to thirty rockets, which, at one
per man, meant a total force of at least thirty-four men.
With four recce boats, he would need one night to get his men and weapons across the Amu
and safely into a scrub-covered gully in the hills beyond his contact’s village. They would shelter in
the gully that day and set off immediately it got dark at around 7.00 pm. That would give him 11
hours to do the job and return, walking at night carrying the SBRLs, rockets and rifles. By day it
had taken eight, so it was cutting it a bit fine, but if they stopped an hour before dawn to find a
suitable hide it should be enough. He was certain they would have to wait another day in the hills
before re-crossing the river on the third night.
The operation went ahead in mid-April. After pre-positioning the recce boats in the reeds near
the river bank the night before, Wali and his men crossed over and were met by their guide. He
safely led them between the Soviet border posts up into their hide in the hills. A sweltering day was
spent under blankets and rocks in a small gully, trying to sleep, occasionally nibbling at nan bread,
or drinking a little water from chugals water bottles).
It took five hours hard marching to reach the firing position. The night sky was lit by myriad
stars, while the plain below sparkled with hundreds of electric lights. Both SBRLs were set up with
fifteen rockets apiece. Wali took his bearing, then went to each launcher to check the setting. He
adjusted the elevation to give a range of 8 kilometres on one launcher and 7.5 on the other, to give
himself a better chance of hitting the factory with at least some of the rockets.
‘Allah o Akbar–Fire’. With their distinctive whoosh and roar two rockets soared up in their
graceful arcs. All eyes followed the trails until they both plunged out of sight into the blackness, the
white flash of the final explosions just visible for a split second. Wali had included ten smoke
rockets, for their incendiary properties, with the HE, as he hoped to set some buildings on fire. Now
both launchers fired indepedently until all the rockets had gone, while Wali peered through his
binoculars at the impact area. Something was burning over there, but Wali did not wait to watch for
more than a few minutes, just long enough to know the strike was successful.
The journey back to the hide was uneventful. As Wali had anticipated, they did not have
sufficient darkness left to cross the river, so spent a second day crouched among the boulders and
scrub. From there they saw the start of the Soviet reaction. Within an hour of daybreak gunships
and fighter bombers swarmed south over the Amu to pound the area around Imam Sahib and the
high ground beyond. All day the planes flew back and forth, blasting every village, every valley that
might conceal Mujahideen–not that the already ruined buildings housed more than a handful of
people. By 1987 they had long gone to Pakistan, Kunduz or Kabul. The planes kept coming for a
week. Wali’s cut into the ‘soft underbelly’ had been deep and the bear’s roar of rage was loud and
long.

The Book "The Bear Trap (Afghanistan’s Untold Story)" by Mohammad Yousaf & Mark Adkin

The person Md Yousaf Directed ISI's Afghanistan operations during the peak of mujahideen war in Afghanistan-