GEMINI
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Following is a reference to a book i found on internet. You may please follow the link and read further.
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Abstract
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal – the fastest growing in the world – raises concerns on many grounds. Although far from the scale of the Cold War, South Asia is experiencing a strategic arms race. And the more weapons there are, the more potential for theft, sabotage and nuclear terrorism. Worries that Pakistan's nuclear-weapons technology might again be transferred to nuclear aspirants have not been expunged. Being outside the nuclear club makes it harder to ensure nuclear safety. Of gravest concern is the potential for a nuclear war, triggered by another large-scale terrorist attack in India with Pakistani state fingerprints, as in the 2008 Mumbai atrocity, this time followed by an Indian Army reprisal. Lowering the nuclear threshold, Pakistan has vowed to deter this with newly introduced battlefield nuclear weapons.
Mark Fitzpatrick evaluates each of the potential nuclear dangers, giving credit where credit is due. Understanding the risks of nuclear terrorism and nuclear accidents, Pakistani authorities have taken appropriate steps. Pakistan and India have devoted less attention, however, to engaging each other on the issues that could spark a nuclear clash. The author argues that to reduce nuclear dangers, Pakistan should be offered a formula for nuclear legitimacy, tied to its adoption of policies associated with global nuclear norms.
Nuclear specialists are often asked which country presents the greatest source of concern. One might say Russia, because it holds the largest inventory of nuclear weapons (followed closely by the United States) and because, together with other former Soviet republics, it is the source of the greatest amount of trafficked nuclear material. One could point to China, because it has the fastest-growing nuclear industry and because it is the least transparent among the five declared nuclear-weapons states. North Korea is often put at the top of the list because of its nuclear threats and propensity for provocation. Meanwhile, the most media attention has been focused on Iran because of its growing nuclear capabilities in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions.
For many experts, however, the answer is Pakistan. Nowhere is there a greater potential nexus between nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Pakistan has both the world's fastest-growing nuclear arsenal and the largest concentration of groups bent on acts of terrorism. Growing fundamentalism, ethnic violence, weak political institutions and a fragile economy combine to raise questions about the very security of the state and thus the security of its nuclear crown jewels. Pakistan is often seen to have the world's worst record of nuclear stewardship,1 having allowed, and in some cases assisted, the sale of its nuclearweapons related technology to at least three so-called ‘rogue states’. As explained in Chapter Five, Pakistan nuclear metallurgist Abdul Qadeer Khan transferred uranium-enrichment equipment and know-how to North Korea, Iran and Libya, and attempted to sell them to Iraq. US arms-control expert Joseph Cirincione put it baldly: ‘Pakistan is the most dangerous country on Earth,’ with South Asia the region most likely to experience nuclear combat.2 US President Barack Obama reportedly told aides once that it was Pakistan that worried him the most.3
Yet Western leaders rarely fret publicly about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. There is good reason not to. Pakistan is a partner of the US in the once-labelled ‘war on terrorism’, and a ‘major non-NATO ally’, a designation shared with only 14 other countries. It is impolite to speak ill of one's friends. There is also a strong policy imperative to keeping discreet: public expressions of concern can be counter-productive. Foreign expressions of concern about nuclear dangers in Pakistan are interpreted there to mean censure and censure is met with determined resistance. Brig. (Retd) Feroz Khan, a US-based national-security expert who once headed the arms-control unit of the Strategic Plans Division of the Pakistani military, writes that ‘the more assiduously the [nuclear] program was opposed by India and the West, the more precious it became. It evolved into the most significant symbol of national determination and a central element of Pakistan's identity.’4 Thus from the US president on down through the ranks of US military and civilian officials, the common refrain is an expression of confidence in Pakistan's nuclear security.5
These expressions of reassurance are at sharp variance with the popular view in Pakistan, where most citizens believe the United States seeks to denude the country of its nuclear arsenal. Western expressions of concern about Pakistani nuclear security, especially when coupled with talk of Pakistan as a failing state, are misinterpreted as proof of this desire. The May 2011 raid in which US Navy SEALs penetrated deep into Pakistan to kill Osama bin Laden and remove his body was widely seen in Pakistan as a practice run to extract their nuclear weapons. Given the population's deep anti-Americanism and proclivity to conspiracy theories, it takes little to fan the flames of paranoia.
Western non-governmental experts who write about proliferation and terrorism are sometimes seen as part of the supposed foreign conspiracy. Yet academic integrity argues for candour. How though to analyse Pakistan's nuclear issues in a way that does not make things worse? The constructive answer is to combine intellectual honesty with fairness to Pakistan's position. Like a previous volume on Pakistan's nuclear programme edited by the current author,6 this book is informed by Pakistani perspectives on the steps taken to reduce nuclear risks. The analysis has benefitted from several discussions with Pakistani officials, including at the highest levels of the strategic establishment, although the assessments, naturally, are the author's own.
Pakistani officials would surely prefer that this book address not only their country's nuclear posture but also India's. Pakistan's nuclear-weapons programme, based as it is on the perceived Indian threat, cannot be adequately discussed outside the bilateral context. India thus features prominently in many of the chapters, particularly those dealing with the potential for a nuclear exchange in South Asia, the motivations behind Pakistan's growing arsenal and the nuclear-arms competition. Yet several of the concerns posed by Pakistan's nuclear programme do not have a bilateral context. India did not spark Pakistan's transfer of nuclear technology. Nor does India have a direct role regarding the dangers of nuclear terrorism or the potential for nuclear accidents.
Solutions to the set of dangers surrounding Pakistan's nuclear programme will necessarily involve India, both directly and indirectly. Western powers will also have a major role to play. As argued in the final chapter, they should be ready to recognise Pakistan as a normal nuclear state and to offer nuclear cooperation, if it adopts policies associated with responsible nuclear behaviour.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf.
6 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks – A net assessment (London: IISS, 2007).
An Error Occurred Setting Your User Cookie
Abstract
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal – the fastest growing in the world – raises concerns on many grounds. Although far from the scale of the Cold War, South Asia is experiencing a strategic arms race. And the more weapons there are, the more potential for theft, sabotage and nuclear terrorism. Worries that Pakistan's nuclear-weapons technology might again be transferred to nuclear aspirants have not been expunged. Being outside the nuclear club makes it harder to ensure nuclear safety. Of gravest concern is the potential for a nuclear war, triggered by another large-scale terrorist attack in India with Pakistani state fingerprints, as in the 2008 Mumbai atrocity, this time followed by an Indian Army reprisal. Lowering the nuclear threshold, Pakistan has vowed to deter this with newly introduced battlefield nuclear weapons.
Mark Fitzpatrick evaluates each of the potential nuclear dangers, giving credit where credit is due. Understanding the risks of nuclear terrorism and nuclear accidents, Pakistani authorities have taken appropriate steps. Pakistan and India have devoted less attention, however, to engaging each other on the issues that could spark a nuclear clash. The author argues that to reduce nuclear dangers, Pakistan should be offered a formula for nuclear legitimacy, tied to its adoption of policies associated with global nuclear norms.
Nuclear specialists are often asked which country presents the greatest source of concern. One might say Russia, because it holds the largest inventory of nuclear weapons (followed closely by the United States) and because, together with other former Soviet republics, it is the source of the greatest amount of trafficked nuclear material. One could point to China, because it has the fastest-growing nuclear industry and because it is the least transparent among the five declared nuclear-weapons states. North Korea is often put at the top of the list because of its nuclear threats and propensity for provocation. Meanwhile, the most media attention has been focused on Iran because of its growing nuclear capabilities in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions.
For many experts, however, the answer is Pakistan. Nowhere is there a greater potential nexus between nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Pakistan has both the world's fastest-growing nuclear arsenal and the largest concentration of groups bent on acts of terrorism. Growing fundamentalism, ethnic violence, weak political institutions and a fragile economy combine to raise questions about the very security of the state and thus the security of its nuclear crown jewels. Pakistan is often seen to have the world's worst record of nuclear stewardship,1 having allowed, and in some cases assisted, the sale of its nuclearweapons related technology to at least three so-called ‘rogue states’. As explained in Chapter Five, Pakistan nuclear metallurgist Abdul Qadeer Khan transferred uranium-enrichment equipment and know-how to North Korea, Iran and Libya, and attempted to sell them to Iraq. US arms-control expert Joseph Cirincione put it baldly: ‘Pakistan is the most dangerous country on Earth,’ with South Asia the region most likely to experience nuclear combat.2 US President Barack Obama reportedly told aides once that it was Pakistan that worried him the most.3
Yet Western leaders rarely fret publicly about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. There is good reason not to. Pakistan is a partner of the US in the once-labelled ‘war on terrorism’, and a ‘major non-NATO ally’, a designation shared with only 14 other countries. It is impolite to speak ill of one's friends. There is also a strong policy imperative to keeping discreet: public expressions of concern can be counter-productive. Foreign expressions of concern about nuclear dangers in Pakistan are interpreted there to mean censure and censure is met with determined resistance. Brig. (Retd) Feroz Khan, a US-based national-security expert who once headed the arms-control unit of the Strategic Plans Division of the Pakistani military, writes that ‘the more assiduously the [nuclear] program was opposed by India and the West, the more precious it became. It evolved into the most significant symbol of national determination and a central element of Pakistan's identity.’4 Thus from the US president on down through the ranks of US military and civilian officials, the common refrain is an expression of confidence in Pakistan's nuclear security.5
These expressions of reassurance are at sharp variance with the popular view in Pakistan, where most citizens believe the United States seeks to denude the country of its nuclear arsenal. Western expressions of concern about Pakistani nuclear security, especially when coupled with talk of Pakistan as a failing state, are misinterpreted as proof of this desire. The May 2011 raid in which US Navy SEALs penetrated deep into Pakistan to kill Osama bin Laden and remove his body was widely seen in Pakistan as a practice run to extract their nuclear weapons. Given the population's deep anti-Americanism and proclivity to conspiracy theories, it takes little to fan the flames of paranoia.
Western non-governmental experts who write about proliferation and terrorism are sometimes seen as part of the supposed foreign conspiracy. Yet academic integrity argues for candour. How though to analyse Pakistan's nuclear issues in a way that does not make things worse? The constructive answer is to combine intellectual honesty with fairness to Pakistan's position. Like a previous volume on Pakistan's nuclear programme edited by the current author,6 this book is informed by Pakistani perspectives on the steps taken to reduce nuclear risks. The analysis has benefitted from several discussions with Pakistani officials, including at the highest levels of the strategic establishment, although the assessments, naturally, are the author's own.
Pakistani officials would surely prefer that this book address not only their country's nuclear posture but also India's. Pakistan's nuclear-weapons programme, based as it is on the perceived Indian threat, cannot be adequately discussed outside the bilateral context. India thus features prominently in many of the chapters, particularly those dealing with the potential for a nuclear exchange in South Asia, the motivations behind Pakistan's growing arsenal and the nuclear-arms competition. Yet several of the concerns posed by Pakistan's nuclear programme do not have a bilateral context. India did not spark Pakistan's transfer of nuclear technology. Nor does India have a direct role regarding the dangers of nuclear terrorism or the potential for nuclear accidents.
Solutions to the set of dangers surrounding Pakistan's nuclear programme will necessarily involve India, both directly and indirectly. Western powers will also have a major role to play. As argued in the final chapter, they should be ready to recognise Pakistan as a normal nuclear state and to offer nuclear cooperation, if it adopts policies associated with responsible nuclear behaviour.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf.
6 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks – A net assessment (London: IISS, 2007).
