On way out, Manmohan gave PM Modi file on hush-hush Kashmir talks with Pakistan

[Bang Galore]

Files recording unsigned documents exchanged by the two sides were personally handed over to PM Modi by his predecessor at a May 27, 2014 meeting

Written by Praveen Swami | New Delhi | Updated: October 8, 2015 7:21 am
Manmohan Singh and L K Advani at the book launch of Khurshid Kasuri in New Delhi Wednesday. (Express Photi by: Anil Sharma)

Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistani military ruler General Pervez Musharraf had hammered out a draft framework agreement on Jammu and Kashmir in secret talks, a senior Indian diplomat familiar with the negotiations has told The Indian Express.

Files recording unsigned documents exchanged by the two sides were personally handed over to Prime Minister Narendra Modi by his predecessor at a May 27, 2014 meeting, the diplomat said.

The official spoke even as former Pakistan Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri is in New Delhi to release the Indian edition of his book, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove — the first insider account of India-Pakistan secret diplomacy on Kashmir.

Kasuri’s book quotes General Musharraf as stating that the secret Kashmir agreement envisaged joint management of the state by India and Pakistan, as well as demilitarisation of the territory.

The Indian negotiator said the final draft of the framework agreement in fact spoke of a “consultative mechanism”, made up of elected representatives of the governments of Jammu and Kashmir and Azad Kashmir, as well as officials of the two national governments. The consultative mechanism, he said, was mandated to address regional “social and economic issues”, like tourism, religious pilgrimages, culture and trade.

New Delhi, the official said, had rejected General Musharraf’s push for institutions for joint management of Kashmir by the two states, arguing it would erode Indian sovereignty.

Prime Minister Singh’s hand-picked envoy, Ambassador Satinder Lambah, and General Musharraf’s interlocutors, Riaz Muhammad Khan and Tariq Aziz, held over 200 hours of discussions on the draft agreement, during 30 meetings held in Dubai and Kathmandu.

Lambah, a former intelligence official recalled, was also flown to Rawalpindi on a Research and Analysis Wing jet as negotiations reached an advanced stage, travelling without a passport or visa to ensure the meetings remained secret.

“In early talks,” the Indian diplomat said, “Pakistan reiterated its public positions, calling for international monitoring of the Line of Control, and so on. However, it became clear that both General Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh were keen on arriving at an agreement that would allow them to focus on their respective agendas, without conflict over Kashmir sapping their energies.”

“Each paper exchanged between the two sides,” the diplomat said, “was read by him personally, and his instructions were then given to Lambah. There were just two people in the Cabinet, and perhaps three more in the bureaucracy, who were privy to what was going on.”

Later, Prime Minister Singh’s interlocutor on Kashmir, now Governor N N Vohra, was also tasked with briefing secessionist leaders in the state on the looming deal. “I think the agenda is pretty much set,” Kashmir leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq said in an April 2007 interview. “It is September 2007,” he went on, “that India and Pakistan are looking at, in terms of announcing something on Kashmir.”

Prime Minister Singh, a former aide involved in the talks said, was scheduled to begin consultations with his Cabinet and opposition leaders on the deal, when a tide of protest unleashed by Pakistani lawyers pushed General Musharraf into a corner in March, 2007. “He seemed confident the talks would soon be able to revive,” the aide said, “but ended up being swept out of office”.

Former Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari had sought to revive the talks when he took power in 2008, but was prevented from doing so by Musharraf’s successor as army chief, General Pervez Ashfaq Kayani.

“At one time,” Singh admitted at a press conference in 2014, “it appeared that an important breakthrough was in sight. Events in Pakistan — for example, the fact that General Musharraf had to make way for a different setup — I think that led to the process not moving further.”

Key to the agreement, the Indian negotiator said, was an understanding that it would not require ratification by Parliament, or a Constitutional amendment. Thus, the two sides agreed to treat the Line of Control “like an international border”, with agreements to allow for the free movement of goods and people.

Following cessation of “violence and terrorism”, the two sides were to draw down military forces on both sides of the Line of Control to a minimum though India was permitted to maintain full-scale defensive positions

Lambah declined to be interviewed for this article, but the official said the language of speech he delivered at Kashmir University in 2014 “was near-identical to that used in the final draft”.

Earlier notes exchanged by the negotiators, seen by The Indian Express, also agreed on self-governance for both sides of Kashmir, a proposal first moved by the PDP which now rules the state in alliance with the BJP.

On way out, Manmohan gave PM Modi file on hush-hush Kashmir talks with Pakistan | The Indian Express

 

[Styx]

interesting, though that's probably all in the past and dead and buried by now.

or, could Modi and Noora be in a secret dialogue again ?

 

[ice_man]

Files recording unsigned documents exchanged by the two sides were personally handed over to PM Modi by his predecessor at a May 27, 2014 meeting
Written by Praveen Swami | New Delhi | Updated: October 8, 2015 7:21 am
Manmohan Singh and L K Advani at the book launch of Khurshid Kasuri in New Delhi Wednesday. (Express Photi by: Anil Sharma)

Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistani military ruler General Pervez Musharraf had hammered out a draft framework agreement on Jammu and Kashmir in secret talks, a senior Indian diplomat familiar with the negotiations has told The Indian Express.

Files recording unsigned documents exchanged by the two sides were personally handed over to Prime Minister Narendra Modi by his predecessor at a May 27, 2014 meeting, the diplomat said.

The official spoke even as former Pakistan Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri is in New Delhi to release the Indian edition of his book, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove — the first insider account of India-Pakistan secret diplomacy on Kashmir.

Kasuri’s book quotes General Musharraf as stating that the secret Kashmir agreement envisaged joint management of the state by India and Pakistan, as well as demilitarisation of the territory.

The Indian negotiator said the final draft of the framework agreement in fact spoke of a “consultative mechanism”, made up of elected representatives of the governments of Jammu and Kashmir and Azad Kashmir, as well as officials of the two national governments. The consultative mechanism, he said, was mandated to address regional “social and economic issues”, like tourism, religious pilgrimages, culture and trade.

New Delhi, the official said, had rejected General Musharraf’s push for institutions for joint management of Kashmir by the two states, arguing it would erode Indian sovereignty.

Prime Minister Singh’s hand-picked envoy, Ambassador Satinder Lambah, and General Musharraf’s interlocutors, Riaz Muhammad Khan and Tariq Aziz, held over 200 hours of discussions on the draft agreement, during 30 meetings held in Dubai and Kathmandu.

Lambah, a former intelligence official recalled, was also flown to Rawalpindi on a Research and Analysis Wing jet as negotiations reached an advanced stage, travelling without a passport or visa to ensure the meetings remained secret.

“In early talks,” the Indian diplomat said, “Pakistan reiterated its public positions, calling for international monitoring of the Line of Control, and so on. However, it became clear that both General Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh were keen on arriving at an agreement that would allow them to focus on their respective agendas, without conflict over Kashmir sapping their energies.”

“Each paper exchanged between the two sides,” the diplomat said, “was read by him personally, and his instructions were then given to Lambah. There were just two people in the Cabinet, and perhaps three more in the bureaucracy, who were privy to what was going on.”

Later, Prime Minister Singh’s interlocutor on Kashmir, now Governor N N Vohra, was also tasked with briefing secessionist leaders in the state on the looming deal. “I think the agenda is pretty much set,” Kashmir leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq said in an April 2007 interview. “It is September 2007,” he went on, “that India and Pakistan are looking at, in terms of announcing something on Kashmir.”

Prime Minister Singh, a former aide involved in the talks said, was scheduled to begin consultations with his Cabinet and opposition leaders on the deal, when a tide of protest unleashed by Pakistani lawyers pushed General Musharraf into a corner in March, 2007. “He seemed confident the talks would soon be able to revive,” the aide said, “but ended up being swept out of office”.

Former Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari had sought to revive the talks when he took power in 2008, but was prevented from doing so by Musharraf’s successor as army chief, General Pervez Ashfaq Kayani.

“At one time,” Singh admitted at a press conference in 2014, “it appeared that an important breakthrough was in sight. Events in Pakistan — for example, the fact that General Musharraf had to make way for a different setup — I think that led to the process not moving further.”

Key to the agreement, the Indian negotiator said, was an understanding that it would not require ratification by Parliament, or a Constitutional amendment. Thus, the two sides agreed to treat the Line of Control “like an international border”, with agreements to allow for the free movement of goods and people.

Following cessation of “violence and terrorism”, the two sides were to draw down military forces on both sides of the Line of Control to a minimum though India was permitted to maintain full-scale defensive positions

Lambah declined to be interviewed for this article, but the official said the language of speech he delivered at Kashmir University in 2014 “was near-identical to that used in the final draft”.

Earlier notes exchanged by the negotiators, seen by The Indian Express, also agreed on self-governance for both sides of Kashmir, a proposal first moved by the PDP which now rules the state in alliance with the BJP.

On way out, Manmohan gave PM Modi file on hush-hush Kashmir talks with Pakistan | The Indian Express

well we had 3 opportunities that got botched:

1) 1998 Lahore agreement between Vajpayee and Nawaz

2) Agra summit

3) initial rule of Manmohan Singh

The truth about Agra

have a read great opportunities lost and now atleast another decade of proxy war would continue.

specially during MODI tenure.

infact i would go as far as saying South Asia would be lucky to avoid a war during Modi's tenure in power.

vajpayee & manmohan were a different breed compared to Modi.

 

[BDforever]

Files recording unsigned documents exchanged by the two sides were personally handed over to PM Modi by his predecessor at a May 27, 2014 meeting
Written by Praveen Swami | New Delhi | Updated: October 8, 2015 7:21 am
Manmohan Singh and L K Advani at the book launch of Khurshid Kasuri in New Delhi Wednesday. (Express Photi by: Anil Sharma)

Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistani military ruler General Pervez Musharraf had hammered out a draft framework agreement on Jammu and Kashmir in secret talks, a senior Indian diplomat familiar with the negotiations has told The Indian Express.

Files recording unsigned documents exchanged by the two sides were personally handed over to Prime Minister Narendra Modi by his predecessor at a May 27, 2014 meeting, the diplomat said.

The official spoke even as former Pakistan Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri is in New Delhi to release the Indian edition of his book, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove — the first insider account of India-Pakistan secret diplomacy on Kashmir.

Kasuri’s book quotes General Musharraf as stating that the secret Kashmir agreement envisaged joint management of the state by India and Pakistan, as well as demilitarisation of the territory.

The Indian negotiator said the final draft of the framework agreement in fact spoke of a “consultative mechanism”, made up of elected representatives of the governments of Jammu and Kashmir and Azad Kashmir, as well as officials of the two national governments. The consultative mechanism, he said, was mandated to address regional “social and economic issues”, like tourism, religious pilgrimages, culture and trade.

New Delhi, the official said, had rejected General Musharraf’s push for institutions for joint management of Kashmir by the two states, arguing it would erode Indian sovereignty.

Prime Minister Singh’s hand-picked envoy, Ambassador Satinder Lambah, and General Musharraf’s interlocutors, Riaz Muhammad Khan and Tariq Aziz, held over 200 hours of discussions on the draft agreement, during 30 meetings held in Dubai and Kathmandu.

Lambah, a former intelligence official recalled, was also flown to Rawalpindi on a Research and Analysis Wing jet as negotiations reached an advanced stage, travelling without a passport or visa to ensure the meetings remained secret.

“In early talks,” the Indian diplomat said, “Pakistan reiterated its public positions, calling for international monitoring of the Line of Control, and so on. However, it became clear that both General Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh were keen on arriving at an agreement that would allow them to focus on their respective agendas, without conflict over Kashmir sapping their energies.”

“Each paper exchanged between the two sides,” the diplomat said, “was read by him personally, and his instructions were then given to Lambah. There were just two people in the Cabinet, and perhaps three more in the bureaucracy, who were privy to what was going on.”

Later, Prime Minister Singh’s interlocutor on Kashmir, now Governor N N Vohra, was also tasked with briefing secessionist leaders in the state on the looming deal. “I think the agenda is pretty much set,” Kashmir leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq said in an April 2007 interview. “It is September 2007,” he went on, “that India and Pakistan are looking at, in terms of announcing something on Kashmir.”

Prime Minister Singh, a former aide involved in the talks said, was scheduled to begin consultations with his Cabinet and opposition leaders on the deal, when a tide of protest unleashed by Pakistani lawyers pushed General Musharraf into a corner in March, 2007. “He seemed confident the talks would soon be able to revive,” the aide said, “but ended up being swept out of office”.

Former Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari had sought to revive the talks when he took power in 2008, but was prevented from doing so by Musharraf’s successor as army chief, General Pervez Ashfaq Kayani.

“At one time,” Singh admitted at a press conference in 2014, “it appeared that an important breakthrough was in sight. Events in Pakistan — for example, the fact that General Musharraf had to make way for a different setup — I think that led to the process not moving further.”

Key to the agreement, the Indian negotiator said, was an understanding that it would not require ratification by Parliament, or a Constitutional amendment. Thus, the two sides agreed to treat the Line of Control “like an international border”, with agreements to allow for the free movement of goods and people.

Following cessation of “violence and terrorism”, the two sides were to draw down military forces on both sides of the Line of Control to a minimum though India was permitted to maintain full-scale defensive positions

Lambah declined to be interviewed for this article, but the official said the language of speech he delivered at Kashmir University in 2014 “was near-identical to that used in the final draft”.

Earlier notes exchanged by the negotiators, seen by The Indian Express, also agreed on self-governance for both sides of Kashmir, a proposal first moved by the PDP which now rules the state in alliance with the BJP.

On way out, Manmohan gave PM Modi file on hush-hush Kashmir talks with Pakistan | The Indian Express

hush... hush... hush

 

[Bang Galore]

"Lambah declined to be interviewed for this article, but the official said the language of speech he delivered at Kashmir University in 2014 “was near-identical to that used in the final draft”.

‘A settlement will give the people of J&K an opportunity to seek a future’
Excerpts from a speech by Satinder K. Lambah, special envoy of the prime minister, at the University of Kashmir in Srinagar on May 13

The settlement will relieve Pakistan from a debilitating military competition with a much larger neighbour that has drained its economy.

By: Satinder K. Lambah

India’s position on Jammu & Kashmir is legally, politically and historically correct. Yet, it has remained one of our major post-independence problems, contributing to three wars between India and Pakistan, decades of cross-border terrorism and violence, and incalculable sufferings for the ordinary people of Jammu and Kashmir.

Therefore, successive prime ministers of India have made resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir issue a priority. Prime Minister Nehru’s initiatives culminated in the inconclusive Swaran Singh-Bhutto Talks in the early 1960s. Indira Gandhi’s efforts to seek a settlement through the Simla Agreement reflected recognition, even in the moment of decisive victory in the 1971 war, that a solution to the Kashmir issue was important for lasting peace and security. In a generational shift, Rajiv Gandhi tried to chart a new course with Benazir Bhutto. Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s bold attempt to reset the relations in 1999 took place months after the nuclear tests by both the countries; his bus journey to Lahore highlighted the proximity between our two countries and the centrality of people to this relationship. Kargil did not dissuade him to engage its perpetrator in Agra, nor did the Parliament attack of December 2001 stop him from making another journey to Pakistan in January 2004 in search of peace and settlement.

Manmohan Singh picked up the baton and turned it into one of his foreign policy priorities. His vision is rooted in India’s security, economic development and global aspirations, and in the transformation of a region that is central to India’s destiny.

At the highest level of the government, there has always been interest, readiness and resolve. Let me venture to make some suggestions of a possible outline of a solution in my personal capacity.

…it is essential that any agreement must ensure that the Line of Control is like a border between any two normal states. There can be no redrawal of borders;

Alongside, in accordance with the normal acceptable behaviour between nations, it is imperative that the people of Jammu & Kashmir on either side of the Line of Control should be able to move freely from one side to the other.

The process of progressive removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers in specified locally produced goods already underway has to be expedited to ensure meaningful trade between the two sides of the LoC;

The essential prerequisite is that there has to be an end to hostility, violence and terrorism; once this happens, it would be important that military forces on both sides of the LoC are kept to the minimum, particularly in populated areas;

It would be important to ensure self-governance for internal management in all areas on the same basis on both sides of the LoC;

There has to be respect for human rights on both sides of the LoC and efforts need to be made to reintegrate into society those sections who had been involved in violent militant activities; and

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in his speech in Amritsar on March 24, 2006 has stated that he “envisaged a situation where the two parts of Jammu and Kashmir can…work out a cooperative, consultative mechanism so as to maximise the gains of cooperation in solving problems of social and economic development of the region.” It should be possible to do so to enable it to look into socio-economic issues like tourism, travel, pilgrimages to shrines, trade, health, education, and culture.

A settlement will give the people of J&K an opportunity to seek a future defined by the bright light of hope, not darkened by the shadow of the gun… a solution of the Kashmir issue will substantially enhance India’s security, strengthen the prospects for durable peace and stability in the region and enable India to focus more on the rapidly emerging long term geopolitical challenges.

It will relieve Pakistan from a debilitating military competition with a much larger neighbour that has drained its economy. It will hopefully strengthen its ability to turn the tide on terrorism and radical militancy. Needless to say, a stable Pakistan is also in India’s interest.

We are undergoing enormous transformation in a world witnessing change and transition on an unprecedented scale. A stable, peaceful, cooperative and connected neighbourhood is essential for us to realise our destiny. Solution of the Kashmir issue will help us on that path.

- See more at: ‘A settlement will give the people of J&K an opportunity to seek a future’ | The Indian Express

well we had 3 opportunities that got botched:

1) 1998 Lahore agreement between Vajpayee and Nawaz

2) Agra summit

3) initial rule of Manmohan Singh

The truth about Agra

have a read great opportunities lost and now atleast another decade of proxy war would continue.

specially during MODI tenure.

infact i would go as far as saying South Asia would be lucky to avoid a war during Modi's tenure in power.

vajpayee & manmohan were a different breed compared to Modi.

The problem with that is that you forgot this:


"Former Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari had sought to revive the talks when he took power in 2008, but was prevented from doing so by Musharraf’s successor as army chief, General Pervez Ashfaq Kayani."

Always easy to look for a convenient bogeyman.

Lahore & Agra were just starting points, what we are discussing here is the "solution". Not in the same plane. It was not Manmohan Singh who reneged, it was the PA under Kayani that withdrew support for Musharraf's plan.


Full text of speech:

'A Possible Outline Of A Solution' | Satinder K. Lambah | May 14,2014

 

[ice_man]

‘A settlement will give the people of J&K an opportunity to seek a future’
Excerpts from a speech by Satinder K. Lambah, special envoy of the prime minister, at the University of Kashmir in Srinagar on May 13

The settlement will relieve Pakistan from a debilitating military competition with a much larger neighbour that has drained its economy.

By: Satinder K. Lambah

India’s position on Jammu & Kashmir is legally, politically and historically correct. Yet, it has remained one of our major post-independence problems, contributing to three wars between India and Pakistan, decades of cross-border terrorism and violence, and incalculable sufferings for the ordinary people of Jammu and Kashmir.

Therefore, successive prime ministers of India have made resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir issue a priority. Prime Minister Nehru’s initiatives culminated in the inconclusive Swaran Singh-Bhutto Talks in the early 1960s. Indira Gandhi’s efforts to seek a settlement through the Simla Agreement reflected recognition, even in the moment of decisive victory in the 1971 war, that a solution to the Kashmir issue was important for lasting peace and security. In a generational shift, Rajiv Gandhi tried to chart a new course with Benazir Bhutto. Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s bold attempt to reset the relations in 1999 took place months after the nuclear tests by both the countries; his bus journey to Lahore highlighted the proximity between our two countries and the centrality of people to this relationship. Kargil did not dissuade him to engage its perpetrator in Agra, nor did the Parliament attack of December 2001 stop him from making another journey to Pakistan in January 2004 in search of peace and settlement.

Manmohan Singh picked up the baton and turned it into one of his foreign policy priorities. His vision is rooted in India’s security, economic development and global aspirations, and in the transformation of a region that is central to India’s destiny.

At the highest level of the government, there has always been interest, readiness and resolve. Let me venture to make some suggestions of a possible outline of a solution in my personal capacity.

…it is essential that any agreement must ensure that the Line of Control is like a border between any two normal states. There can be no redrawal of borders;

Alongside, in accordance with the normal acceptable behaviour between nations, it is imperative that the people of Jammu & Kashmir on either side of the Line of Control should be able to move freely from one side to the other.

The process of progressive removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers in specified locally produced goods already underway has to be expedited to ensure meaningful trade between the two sides of the LoC;

The essential prerequisite is that there has to be an end to hostility, violence and terrorism; once this happens, it would be important that military forces on both sides of the LoC are kept to the minimum, particularly in populated areas;

It would be important to ensure self-governance for internal management in all areas on the same basis on both sides of the LoC;

There has to be respect for human rights on both sides of the LoC and efforts need to be made to reintegrate into society those sections who had been involved in violent militant activities; and

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in his speech in Amritsar on March 24, 2006 has stated that he “envisaged a situation where the two parts of Jammu and Kashmir can…work out a cooperative, consultative mechanism so as to maximise the gains of cooperation in solving problems of social and economic development of the region.” It should be possible to do so to enable it to look into socio-economic issues like tourism, travel, pilgrimages to shrines, trade, health, education, and culture.

A settlement will give the people of J&K an opportunity to seek a future defined by the bright light of hope, not darkened by the shadow of the gun… a solution of the Kashmir issue will substantially enhance India’s security, strengthen the prospects for durable peace and stability in the region and enable India to focus more on the rapidly emerging long term geopolitical challenges.

It will relieve Pakistan from a debilitating military competition with a much larger neighbour that has drained its economy. It will hopefully strengthen its ability to turn the tide on terrorism and radical militancy. Needless to say, a stable Pakistan is also in India’s interest.

We are undergoing enormous transformation in a world witnessing change and transition on an unprecedented scale. A stable, peaceful, cooperative and connected neighbourhood is essential for us to realise our destiny. Solution of the Kashmir issue will help us on that path.

- See more at: ‘A settlement will give the people of J&K an opportunity to seek a future’ | The Indian Express



The problem with that is that you forgot this:


"Former Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari had sought to revive the talks when he took power in 2008, but was prevented from doing so by Musharraf’s successor as army chief, General Pervez Ashfaq Kayani."

Always easy to look for a convenient bogeyman.

Lahore & Agra were just starting points, what we are discussing here is the "solution". Not in the same plane. It was not Manmohan Singh who reneged, it was the PA under Kayani that withdrew support for Musharraf's plan.

it is an indian website so you would have to take it with a pinch of salt.

Kiyani was hand picked by Musharraf and i doubt he would curtail the plan set in motion by his senior.

However, doread the link i posted :

The Declaration would have raised Vajpayee's standing internationally and at home. Advani was seen agitatedly pacing up and down when the drafting was in process. Vajpayee revealed in the Lok Sabha on August 16 that Advani "had got worried when his one-to-one meeting with Musharraf went on for an unusually long time". The Prime Minister disclosed how Advani sent a man insideto "find out" what was afoot (Indian Express; August 17, 2001). This is utterly unheard of. Jaswant Singh was treated as badly with intrusions and phone calls to his officials over his head. The Advani who behaved thus was an Advani out to abort the Agra Declaration.

A diminished Vajpayee emerged from the debris at Agra. Advani overruled him twice thereafter within the next six months.

The truth about Agra


So before you point fingers at PA which has usually been the norm sometimes it is an inside job. In AGRA it was Advani.

and then i am sure it was clearly a case of making sure that Manmohan didn't become the all dominating figure in congress. hence his arms were not strengthened to get a final deceleration.

 

[Styx]

vajpayee & manmohan were a different breed compared to Modi.

there will be no repeats of Kargil and 26/11, not without very serious consequences anyway.

 

[Bang Galore]

it is an indian website so you would have to take it with a pinch of salt.

Kiyani was hand picked by Musharraf and i doubt he would curtail the plan set in motion by his senior.

However, doread the link i posted :

The Declaration would have raised Vajpayee's standing internationally and at home. Advani was seen agitatedly pacing up and down when the drafting was in process. Vajpayee revealed in the Lok Sabha on August 16 that Advani "had got worried when his one-to-one meeting with Musharraf went on for an unusually long time". The Prime Minister disclosed how Advani sent a man insideto "find out" what was afoot (Indian Express; August 17, 2001). This is utterly unheard of. Jaswant Singh was treated as badly with intrusions and phone calls to his officials over his head. The Advani who behaved thus was an Advani out to abort the Agra Declaration.

A diminished Vajpayee emerged from the debris at Agra. Advani overruled him twice thereafter within the next six months.

The truth about Agra


So before you point fingers at PA which has usually been the norm sometimes it is an inside job. In AGRA it was Advani.

and then i am sure it was clearly a case of making sure that Manmohan didn't become the all dominating figure in congress. hence his arms were not strengthened to get a final deceleration.

Again Agra was not a solution, just the basic route for a plan. Any blocking that happens during negotiations is par for the course. This was a solution hammered by & agreed to by the PM of India & the then President of Pakistan. Not the same. There was no solution agreed to in Agra, it was just the framework that was sought to be established.

The role of Kayani is well known and there are innumerable references even by Pakistani sources. In any case, the joke is to blame a man who came into the picture in 2014. That's a bit like arguing that 26/11 & behavior by the Pakistani state afterwards made no impact but somehow Modi does.

From a much earlier thread here:

Kayani last obstacle to Kashmir deal : US cable

Kayani opposed Aziz as interlocutor for India: WikiLeaks

http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2011/04/04/national/uk-saw-kayani-as-obstacle-to-a-deal-on-kashmir/

Zardari-Singh Kashmir deal not cleared by Kayani: cables - Pakistan - DAWN.COM

Pak-India were close on Kashmir - thenews.com.pk

and then i am sure it was clearly a case of making sure that Manmohan didn't become the all dominating figure in congress. hence his arms were not strengthened to get a final deceleration.

How does that square with almost everyone, including Musharraf pointing to his exit as the turning factor?

 

[ice_man]

Again Agra was not a solution, just the basic route for a plan. Any blocking that happens during negotiations is par for the course. This was a solution hammered by & agreed to by the PM of India & the then President of Pakistan. Not the same. There was no solution agreed to in Agra, it was just the framework that was sought to be established.

The role of Kayani is well known and there are innumerable references even by Pakistani sources. In any case, the joke is to blame a man who came into the picture in 2014. That's a bit like arguing that 26/11 & behavior by the Pakistani state afterwards made no impact but somehow Modi does.

From a much earlier thread here:

Kayani last obstacle to Kashmir deal : US cable

Kayani opposed Aziz as interlocutor for India: WikiLeaks

http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2011/04/04/national/uk-saw-kayani-as-obstacle-to-a-deal-on-kashmir/

Zardari-Singh Kashmir deal not cleared by Kayani: cables - Pakistan - DAWN.COM
Pak-India were close on Kashmir - thenews.com.pk




How does that square with almost everyone, including Musharraf pointing to his exit as the turning factor?

both the links you posted do not high light what deal was being agreed by zardari. or the framework.

however, in agra a declaration was ready if the framework as you wished to call it was established. maybe in a year or couple of years Musharraf and Manmohan could have worked out a deal .

But

due to the failure of the "route of the plan" as you called it. we were set back a couple of years and things changed in between.

NOW

nawaz has tried to revive his stance of 1998 BUT modi government cannot be seen as "appeasing" pakistan as BJP government is still in infancy. hence hope of any progress is unrealistic.

India's response to four-point agenda set by Nawaz Sharif not encouraging: Pakistan | Latest News & Updates at Daily News & Analysis

UNGA speech: Nawaz proposes 4-point peace initiative with India - The Express Tribune


MODI if he has a strong spine for it could show his statesmanship and get to an agreement.

let's leave what has been a history of botched attempts of negotiations and get the issue resolved once and for all.

political will is shown on ourside..... on the indian side not so much.

 

[Bang Galore]

both the links you posted do not high light what deal was being agreed by zardari. or the framework.

Not Zardari, he would have signed what Musharraf had negotiated. Musharraf had invited MMS to come to Pakistan in the year that things unraveled for him. That was to sign the the Sir Creek deal & Musharraf was even pushing for the Siachen deal. It was to be the first step to a public statement on the deal, highlights of which are given below.

…it is essential that any agreement must ensure that the Line of Control is like a border between any two normal states. There can be no redrawal of borders;

Alongside, in accordance with the normal acceptable behaviour between nations, it is imperative that the people of Jammu & Kashmir on either side of the Line of Control should be able to move freely from one side to the other.

The process of progressive removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers in specified locally produced goods already underway has to be expedited to ensure meaningful trade between the two sides of the LoC;

The essential prerequisite is that there has to be an end to hostility, violence and terrorism; once this happens, it would be important that military forces on both sides of the LoC are kept to the minimum, particularly in populated areas;

It would be important to ensure self-governance for internal management in all areas on the same basis on both sides of the LoC;

There has to be respect for human rights on both sides of the LoC and efforts need to be made to reintegrate into society those sections who had been involved in violent militant activities

however, in agra a declaration was ready if the framework as you wished to call it was established. maybe in a year or couple of years Musharraf and Manmohan could have worked out a deal .

A declaration for a framework is agreed to when actually agreed to. Differences inside governments are common. Manmohan was not in the picture (Vajpayee was PM) and he (Vajpayee) did make progress with Musharraf throughout 2003 & 2004. The Musharraf-MMS plans were a continuation of the the Vajpayee-Musharraf talks on the matter.

NOW

nawaz has tried to revive his stance of 1998 BUT modi government cannot be seen as "appeasing" pakistan as BJP government is still in infancy. hence hope of any progress is unrealistic.

India's response to four-point agenda set by Nawaz Sharif not encouraging: Pakistan | Latest News & Updates at Daily News & Analysis

UNGA speech: Nawaz proposes 4-point peace initiative with India - The Express Tribune



MODI if he has a strong spine for it could show his statesmanship and get to an agreement.

It has nothing to do with having a strong spine. The proposals as framed will have no acceptance & does not constitute a serious offer which would have been worked out by both parties before any announcement. Bringing in expanded UN monitoring or demilitarisation in Kashmir without connecting it to terrorist violence was never going to be taken seriously, the one on Siachen, even less seriously.

let's leave what has been a history of botched attempts of negotiations and get the issue resolved once and for all.

political will is shown on ourside..... on the indian side not so much.

There was political will shown by Modi in moving forward, there is very little appreciation of this in Pakistan but I would expect that someone like you may want to look at the events as happened.

Much is made of Nawaz Sharif's bravery in visiting India but not enough credit given to Modi for inviting him which was against his known positions on Pakistan. He continued to hold up that invitation even when a LeT attack on the Indian consulate in Herat happened 3 days before his swearing in where the plan was to execute Indian diplomats at the time of Modi's swearing in.

Post the Modi-NS meeting, Modi agreed to FS talks which it should be remembered had not taken place since 2011.
Again Modi cops the blame for cancellation of those talks but look at what happened - NS came under pressure for not raising Kashmir or meeting the Hurriyat & that pressure was increased politically with the marches & container politics pushing him into a corner. He then started to raise Kashmir more forcefully & Pakistani diplomats started voicing the old speeches and taking rigid positions. All this while the border starts heating up and there is sustained firing coming in from Pakistani forces. The last straw that convinced Modi that the FS talks were going nowhere was the invitation given to the Hurriyat by the Pakistani HC to "discuss" the FS talks. The lie to that was given by the fact that Kashmir was not even on the discussion issues, since these were talks about talks & how to proceed with a format. Clearly NS had come under pressure & decided to do some grandstanding. There was little to do but cancel the FS talks given the situation inside of Pakistan in the month of July & how compromised Sharif was. Nor was it the only cancellation, even the Chinese cancelled the visit of their leader because of the situation.

Modi moved again in December following the awful attack in Peshawar when a 2 minute silence was observed in the Indian parliament & across schools in the country. What happens? In a sudden intriguing twist to the tale, Lakhvi suddenly gets bailed out putting the whole situation off the rails.

Ufa, the same thing happens. Sharif over-promises, realises he cannot deliver when he gets back & attempts to wriggle out by trying desperate stunts including falling back on the Hurriyat option. (Modi had made concessions that Pakistani officials could meet Hurriyat during national occasions but not during the period of any meetings). Do you really think that anyone takes proposals coming from NS in such a situation as a serious outreach?

 

[ice_man]

Not Zardari, he would have signed what Musharraf had negotiated. Musharraf had invited MMS to come to Pakistan in the year that things unraveled for him. That was to sign the the Sir Creek deal & Musharraf was even pushing for the Siachen deal. It was to be the first step to a public statement on the deal, highlights of which are given below.

…it is essential that any agreement must ensure that the Line of Control is like a border between any two normal states. There can be no redrawal of borders;

Alongside, in accordance with the normal acceptable behaviour between nations, it is imperative that the people of Jammu & Kashmir on either side of the Line of Control should be able to move freely from one side to the other.

The process of progressive removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers in specified locally produced goods already underway has to be expedited to ensure meaningful trade between the two sides of the LoC;

The essential prerequisite is that there has to be an end to hostility, violence and terrorism; once this happens, it would be important that military forces on both sides of the LoC are kept to the minimum, particularly in populated areas;

It would be important to ensure self-governance for internal management in all areas on the same basis on both sides of the LoC;

There has to be respect for human rights on both sides of the LoC and efforts need to be made to reintegrate into society those sections who had been involved in violent militant activities




A declaration for a framework is agreed to when actually agreed to. Differences inside governments are common. Manmohan was not in the picture (Vajpayee was PM) and he (Vajpayee) did make progress with Musharraf throughout 2003 & 2004. The Musharraf-MMS plans were a continuation of the the Vajpayee-Musharraf talks on the matter.






It has nothing to do with having a strong spine. The proposals as framed will have no acceptance & does not constitute a serious offer which would have been worked out by both parties before any announcement. Bringing in expanded UN monitoring or demilitarisation in Kashmir without connecting it to terrorist violence was never going to be taken seriously, the one on Siachen, even less seriously.




There was political will shown by Modi in moving forward, there is very little appreciation of this in Pakistan but I would expect that someone like you may want to look at the events as happened.

Much is made of Nawaz Sharif's bravery in visiting India but not enough credit given to Modi for inviting him which was against his known positions on Pakistan. He continued to hold up that invitation even when a LeT attack on the Indian consulate in Herat happened 3 days before his swearing in where the plan was to execute Indian diplomats at the time of Modi's swearing in.

Post the Modi-NS meeting, Modi agreed to FS talks which it should be remembered had not taken place since 2011.
Again Modi cops the blame for cancellation of those talks but look at what happened - NS came under pressure for not raising Kashmir or meeting the Hurriyat & that pressure was increased with the marches & container politics pushing him into a corner. He then starts to raise Kashmir more forcefully & Pakistani diplomats start voicing the old speeches. All this while the border starts heating up and there is sustained firing coming in from Pakistani forces. The last straw that convinced Modi that the FS talks were going nowhere was the invitation given to the Hurriyat by the Pakistani HC to "discuss" the FS talks. The lie to that was given by the fact that Kashmir was not even on the discussion issues, sice these were talks about talks & how to proceed with a format. Clearly NS had come under pressure & decided to do some grandstanding. There was little to do but cancel the FS talks given the situation inside of Pakistan in the month of July & how compromised Sharif was. Nor was it the only cancellation, even the Chinese cancelled the visit of their leader because of the situation.

Modi moved again in December following the awful attack in Peshawar when a 2 minute silence was observed in the Indian parliament & across schools in the country. What happens? In a sudden intriguing twist to the tale, Lakhvi suddenly gets bailed out putting the whole situation off the rails.

Ufa, the same thing happens. Sharif over-promises, realises he cannot deliver when he gets back & attempts to wriggle out by trying desperate stunts including falling back on the Hurriyat option. (Modi had made concessions that Pakistani officials could meet Hurriyat during national occasions but not during the period of any meetings). Do you really think that anyone takes proposals coming from NS in such a situation as a serious outreach?

what had musharraf agreed upon? I am sure Kiyani would have known. Hence the myth that zardari was willing to sign but Kiyani was reluctant cannot be known for sure. unless we remove the smoke screen from what was actually agreed upon between Musharraf and Manmohan. so i would believe that kiyani was reluctant maybe due to changes from the indian side.

However, we will never find out hence to speculate on it would be illogical.

from your link :
The essential prerequisite is that there has to be an end to hostility, violence and terrorism;

now this is our problem India wishes to make terrorism the core issue NOW. for us it is more of let's discuss all issues INCLUDING TERRORISM. as it states prerequisite 1) end hostilities 2) end violence 3) end terrorism

IN THAT SPECIFIC ORDER.


as we have discussed before I and i would like to go out on a limb here WE Pakistanis feel that for the very first time Nawaz is actually doing a fine job as the foreign minister. and UFA failure was due to misunderstanding that "all issues" by default included Kashmir. even though hurriyat meeting with the NSA would have been on the side lines of the actual talks and would be off the record and would not impact the talks directly.

Nawaz is trying to carry on from where mushrraf left off. However, the onus rests on india to say fine we accept the discussion on four points but we would like to add a fifth terrorism. time to move forward and not keep looking in the rear view mirror.

UFA failure was due to india setting preconditions to NSA level talks.


but, if we insist on looking over our shoulders then we must not ignore Agra where it was BJP in house fighting that resulted in failure to set forth a road map. which would have expedited the process and probably and lead to a resolution. as musharraf by default had the backing of the nation and its armed forces behind him. and was the absolute authority.

have a read:

India's response to four-point agenda set by Nawaz Sharif not encouraging: Pakistan | Latest News & Updates at Daily News & Analysis


lastly as for Modi potential positive moves , that is your personal opinon and we should not push our personal opinions and be subjective on this issue.

and IF modi like you pointed out was keen on resolving the issue he could have responded positively after Nawaz speech in UN.

but instead he chose to troll

 

[Bang Galore]

what had musharraf agreed upon? I am sure Kiyani would have known. Hence the myth that zardari was willing to sign but Kiyani was reluctant cannot be known for sure. unless we remove the smoke screen from what was actually agreed upon between Musharraf and Manmohan. so i would believe that kiyani was reluctant maybe due to changes from the indian side.

Believe what you will, I have posted enough references on that issue.

However, we will never find out hence to speculate on it would be illogical.

We did find out, you seem not to.

from your link :

The essential prerequisite is that there has to be an end to hostility, violence and terrorism;

now this is our problem India wishes to make terrorism the core issue NOW. for us it is more of let's discuss all issues INCLUDING TERRORISM. as it states prerequisite 1) end hostilities 2) end violence 3) end terrorism

IN THAT SPECIFIC ORDER.

All of them are inter-connected & have to be in place for any agreed deal to be agreed on. There is no agreed deal & post 26/11, India is clear that terrorism has to be front & centre.

as we have discussed before I and i would like to go out on a limb here WE Pakistanis feel that for the very first time Nawaz is actually doing a fine job as the foreign minister.

Modi has a quoted approval rating of 87%. Tells you what Indians think.

and UFA failure was due to misunderstanding that "all issues" by default included Kashmir. even though hurriyat meeting with the NSA would have been on the side lines of the actual talks and would be off the record and would not impact the talks directly.

No misunderstanding. The Indian NSA could not have talked Kashmir, nor could the DG BSF or the Indian DGMO. That would have to wait the outcome of those talks, something Pakistan didn't wait for.

Nawaz is trying to carry on from where mushrraf left off. However, the onus rests on india to say fine we accept the discussion on four points but we would like to add a fifth terrorism. time to move forward and not keep looking in the rear view mirror.

Nope, he isn't. His ministers are on record criticising Musharraf's proposals.

UFA failure was due to india setting preconditions to NSA level talks.

Hardly. It was because Pakistan suddenly decided that they were not getting support back home. The criticism of Ufa came from Pakistanis, not Indians.

but, if we insist on looking over our shoulders then we must not ignore Agra where it was BJP in house fighting that resulted in failure to set forth a road map. which would have expedited the process and probably and lead to a resolution. as musharraf by default had the backing of the nation and its armed forces behind him. and was the absolute authority.

Why stop at Agra? Why not go back to Kargil ? No agreement was signed in Agra. The government is well within its rights to hold different opinions till the time a deal is reached following which the disagreements have no basis. Pakistan is fully entitled to go back on Musharraf's proposals but for anybody to think they will be offered a better deal than that is not looking at the situation realistically.

have a read:

India's response to four-point agenda set by Nawaz Sharif not encouraging: Pakistan | Latest News & Updates at Daily News & Analysis

As I have said, nothing of interest there to India.

lastly as for Modi potential positive moves , that is your personal opinon and we should not push our personal opinions and be subjective on this issue.

Where was the personal opinion? I stated facts. I did not give you any statement that are not in public domain or may constitute a personal opinion. A pity that you saw it as a personal opinion favouring Modi. Shows you the inherent bias & lack of reason among many Pakistanis when Modi is mentioned. Any place where Modi isn't portrayed as evil has to be biased & someone's personal opinion.

and IF modi like you pointed out was keen on resolving the issue he could have responded positively after Nawaz speech in UN.

but instead he chose to troll

Make no mistake, whether Modi now thinks there is a possibility of a solution or not, no one is about to give Pakistan whatever it wishes. The solution will be either the same or lesser than what was on the table with Musharraf. NS could equally be held guilty of trolling for his post Ufa performance, Modi has made no comment after the UNGA meeting.

I have been pretty clear here, I think that Nawaz Sharif & Gen. Raheel Sharif will also want a solution but what kind of a solution they might be aiming at is quite different from what India will agree to.

 

[ice_man]

Believe what you will, I have posted enough references on that issue.



We did find out, you seem not to.


All of them are inter-connected & have to be in place for any agreed deal to be agreed on. There is no agreed deal & post 26/11, India is clear that terrorism has to be front & centre.





Modi has a quoted approval rating of 87%. Tells you what Indians think.




No misunderstanding. The Indian NSA could not have talked Kashmir, nor could the DG BSF or the Indian DGMO. That would have to wait the outcome of those talks, something Pakistan didn't wait for.



Nope, he isn't. His ministers are on record criticising Musharraf's proposals.



Hardly. It was because Pakistan suddenly decided that they were not getting support back home. The criticism of Ufa came from Pakistanis, not Indians.




Why stop at Agra? Why not go back to Kargil ? No agreement was signed in Agra. The government is well within its rights to hold different opinions till the time a deal is reached following which the disagreements have no basis. Pakistan is fully entitled to go back on Musharraf's proposals but for anybody to think they will be offered a better deal than that is not looking at the situation realistically.



As I have said, nothing of interest there to India.



Where was the personal opinion? I stated facts. I did not give you any statement that are not in public domain or may constitute a personal opinion. A pity that you saw it as a personal opinion favouring Modi. Shows you the inherent bias & lack of reason among many Pakistanis when Modi is mentioned. Any place where Modi isn't portrayed as evil has to be biased & someone's personal opinion.



Make no mistake, whether Modi now thinks there is a possibility of a solution or not, no one is about to give Pakistan whatever it wishes. The solution will be either the same or lesser than what was on the table with Musharraf. NS could equally be held guilty of trolling for his post Ufa performance, Modi has made no comment after the UNGA meeting.

I have been pretty clear here, I think that Nawaz Sharif & Gen. Raheel Sharif will also want a solution but what kind of a solution they might be aiming at is quite different from what India will agree to.

we still maintain that all issues would be discussed BUT discussions should have no preconditions. we cannot and will not take dictation.

we have never rejected discussing terrorism. neither has our NSA nor our PM said we will not discuss so called terrorism.

However, seems like india wishes to hide behind the mantle of terrorism in order to avoid talks.

clearly indian PM recently asked the UN to define terrorism

PM Modi asks UN to differentiate between terrorist, humanity supporters | Business Standard News

so yes india can try and wriggle all it wants eventually it would have to come and discuss all issues. it can try and do all the saber rattling & sulking it wants but talks cannot be specific to what india wishes to discuss.

we are currently in no hurry as we have made our stance crystal clear in the UN and have shown our willingness to sit down. it seems like india is the one resisting and like our PM rightly said:

Four-point peace plan only way forward: PM - The Express Tribune

India rebuffing his peace roadmap with a ‘one-point’ peace proposal of its own, the premier said, “India will have to follow the peace plan sooner or later and the sooner they do the better it will be.”


so yes take your time. but you would have to come and talk peace eventually and without preconditions. our PM tried to extend an olive branch which indian PM rejected. not smart statesmanship i would say but then again it would be considered an"inherent bias" by you.

Just like the indian inherent bias that everything is decided by the Army Chief Raheel Sharif.

 

[Prajapati]

This discussing is unwarranted.

Current Modi govt. policy is to Ignore pakistan and focus on Economic and social development. Internationally the agenda is to isolate pakistan and turn it into a pariah state.

This strategy will take time to be implemented and build up the pressure so great on pakistan that it will come begging for talks.

Its better these "files" be discussed when that happens. Otherwise its a waste of bandwidth.

 

[ice_man]

This discussing is unwarranted.

Current Modi govt. policy is to Ignore pakistan and focus on Economic and social development. Internationally the agenda is to isolate pakistan and turn it into a pariah state.

This strategy will take time to be implemented and build up the pressure so great on pakistan that it will come begging for talks.

Its better these "files" be discussed when that happens. Otherwise its a waste of bandwidth.

however, currently the opposite seems to be happening

Pakistan likely to secure civil nuclear deal with US: report - The Express Tribune

Obama invites Pakistan's PM to White House as Susan Rice visits Islamabad | World news | The Guardian


Russia, China and Pakistan: An Emerging New Axis? | The Diplomat

Russia agrees to sell Pakistan four MI-35 attack helicopters - The Express Tribune

Pakistan’s military is true to its word, says General Campbell - The Express Tribune


sorry to burst your bubble.