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INSIGHT: New technologies, COIN and Afghanistan Ejaz Haider
Opposition in Pakistan to US drone strikes has failed entirely to assess their effectiveness in COIN operations for the US. This failure has translated into the inability of countless defence experts who appear on TV channels to formulate either the parameters of the debate properly or lay down a policy for the government of Pakistan
The Obama administration seriously thinks it can win in Afghanistan through a combination of effective use of force, sound diplomacy and humanitarian concerns. This package is supposed to work where the previous approach failed. Lets examine it.
Effective counterinsurgency, while relying on the new COIN FM 3-24, is also pegged on new technologies, both ground-based UGVs (unmanned ground vehicles) and air-based UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles). For the most part, these technologies have proved their operational effectiveness in Iraq and Afghanistan.
UGVs are a range of robots or war-bots that are being used in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, in Afghanistan in support of COIN operations. The US militarys interest in UGVs, also sometimes referred to as ground-bots, has increased tremendously given the success of these bots in reconnaissance, mine- and IED-sweeping operations, field stalking as vanguards, and even urban combat.
US experts like Peter Singer, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC who has done much work on the rise of UGVs, say these bots have helped save the lives of hundreds of US soldiers and technological innovations are making them increasingly effective in and relevant to COIN operations, which require highly effective intelligence and accurate and timely execution because of high risk of collateral damage. (For more details see Singer, Robot at War: The New Battlefield; Robots at War: The New Battlefield)
In theory, if innovations can make these ground-bots more effective and lethal and one doesnt have to doubt that then their employment in combat, through a combination of techniques, could not just help save US lives but also add another dimension to combat where a determined man with an assault rifle and sundry other advantages had come to dominate the battlefield and, by extension, undermined the confidence of the planners in RMA (revolution in military affairs).
At the minimum future deployment of these bots in the thousands in support of a flexible and highly trained force could create a deadly buffer between the insurgent and his opponents with the insurgent having to first take out the bots before reaching his adversary. That, inevitably, gives COIN forces a massive advantage at multiple levels, commensurate with the various roles in which the bots can be employed and, in most cases, are being employed.
It is the same with UAVs. Opposition in Pakistan to US drone strikes has failed entirely to assess their effectiveness in COIN operations for the US. This failure has translated into the inability of countless defence experts who appear on TV channels to formulate either the parameters of the debate properly or lay down a policy for the government of Pakistan.
Before 9/11, American UAVs, while effective in the reconnaissance role because of tremendous improvements through the 90s in sensor and computer processors, were not armed with missiles. That is not the case now. The now-famous MQ-1 Predator has the laser-guided Hellfire missiles mounted on its wings. At about USD4.5 million, the 27-foot long plane which can stay in air for nearly 24 hours and fly up to heights of 26,000 feet, is a fraction of the cost of a fighter jet.
The platform has what is termed a ball, a round mounting under its nose that carries two variable-aperture TV cameras, one for seeing during the day and an infrared one for night, as well as a synthetic-aperture radar that allows the Predator to peer through clouds, smoke, or dust. The exact capabilities of the system are classified, but soldiers say they can read a license plate from two miles up.
Together with MQ-9 Reaper and Global Hawk, the Predator is a deadly accurate aerial platform. According to Singer, From June 2005 to June 2006, Predators carried out 2,073 missions, flew 33,833 hours, surveyed 18,490 targets, and participated in 242 separate raids. Such is the requirement that the Predator fleet has grown from less than 10 in 2001 to some 180 in 2007, with plans to add another 150 over the next few years.
Add to this the accuracy (CEP at times of 10-13 meters) through the JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition) kit fitted to turn gravity or dumb bombs into all-weather smart munitions and COIN forces have the ability to put a bomb where it is required. JDAM munitions become lethally accurate through their inertial guidance system and the global positioning system.
Predators combine the ability as long-loiter aerial platforms, reconnoitring, sensing, and identifying targets for up to 24 hours with the ability to kill. This is why it is useless to think that the US would stop the practice of using them against targets identified by intelligence as hostile elements. These aerial strikes are meant to support the ground components, and if they were not effective the US would have found the policy cost-prohibitive in terms of how they are viewed by the public in Pakistan.
But they have been effective to a point where even the Obama administration thinks that the benefit outweighs the cost, if any.
Yet, the question remains. Even if the US military begins to turn the tide on the insurgency, would that, in and of itself, become the basis for peace and good governance in Afghanistan? Let us just say that while reduced violence may be a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient condition to transform Afghanistan into a modern, viable state.
There is yet another aspect of the use of technology, especially ground-bots. What laws will govern their use and how will questions of accountability be addressed if and when things go wrong? Peter Singer, who has written an excellent book, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century, published by Penguin, has raised some of these very pertinent questions. (An essay adapted from his book can be found on the New Atlantis website.) Additionally, there is always the danger of the technology being utilised by non-state actors. One of the problems with technology, regardless of how long it takes for its lateral diffusion, is that it does spread out. Hence the need to devise laws and look into ethical questions regarding the use of new technologies.
There are two other aspects, diplomacy and humanitarian concerns which the Obama administration wants to combine with the use of force. They are also the most difficult to achieve. What can be done there and what they envisage remains to be seen.
Ejaz Haider is Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times and Consulting Editor of The Friday Times. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk. This is the concluding article in a two-part series. The first article appeared yesterday
Opposition in Pakistan to US drone strikes has failed entirely to assess their effectiveness in COIN operations for the US. This failure has translated into the inability of countless defence experts who appear on TV channels to formulate either the parameters of the debate properly or lay down a policy for the government of Pakistan
The Obama administration seriously thinks it can win in Afghanistan through a combination of effective use of force, sound diplomacy and humanitarian concerns. This package is supposed to work where the previous approach failed. Lets examine it.
Effective counterinsurgency, while relying on the new COIN FM 3-24, is also pegged on new technologies, both ground-based UGVs (unmanned ground vehicles) and air-based UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles). For the most part, these technologies have proved their operational effectiveness in Iraq and Afghanistan.
UGVs are a range of robots or war-bots that are being used in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, in Afghanistan in support of COIN operations. The US militarys interest in UGVs, also sometimes referred to as ground-bots, has increased tremendously given the success of these bots in reconnaissance, mine- and IED-sweeping operations, field stalking as vanguards, and even urban combat.
US experts like Peter Singer, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC who has done much work on the rise of UGVs, say these bots have helped save the lives of hundreds of US soldiers and technological innovations are making them increasingly effective in and relevant to COIN operations, which require highly effective intelligence and accurate and timely execution because of high risk of collateral damage. (For more details see Singer, Robot at War: The New Battlefield; Robots at War: The New Battlefield)
In theory, if innovations can make these ground-bots more effective and lethal and one doesnt have to doubt that then their employment in combat, through a combination of techniques, could not just help save US lives but also add another dimension to combat where a determined man with an assault rifle and sundry other advantages had come to dominate the battlefield and, by extension, undermined the confidence of the planners in RMA (revolution in military affairs).
At the minimum future deployment of these bots in the thousands in support of a flexible and highly trained force could create a deadly buffer between the insurgent and his opponents with the insurgent having to first take out the bots before reaching his adversary. That, inevitably, gives COIN forces a massive advantage at multiple levels, commensurate with the various roles in which the bots can be employed and, in most cases, are being employed.
It is the same with UAVs. Opposition in Pakistan to US drone strikes has failed entirely to assess their effectiveness in COIN operations for the US. This failure has translated into the inability of countless defence experts who appear on TV channels to formulate either the parameters of the debate properly or lay down a policy for the government of Pakistan.
Before 9/11, American UAVs, while effective in the reconnaissance role because of tremendous improvements through the 90s in sensor and computer processors, were not armed with missiles. That is not the case now. The now-famous MQ-1 Predator has the laser-guided Hellfire missiles mounted on its wings. At about USD4.5 million, the 27-foot long plane which can stay in air for nearly 24 hours and fly up to heights of 26,000 feet, is a fraction of the cost of a fighter jet.
The platform has what is termed a ball, a round mounting under its nose that carries two variable-aperture TV cameras, one for seeing during the day and an infrared one for night, as well as a synthetic-aperture radar that allows the Predator to peer through clouds, smoke, or dust. The exact capabilities of the system are classified, but soldiers say they can read a license plate from two miles up.
Together with MQ-9 Reaper and Global Hawk, the Predator is a deadly accurate aerial platform. According to Singer, From June 2005 to June 2006, Predators carried out 2,073 missions, flew 33,833 hours, surveyed 18,490 targets, and participated in 242 separate raids. Such is the requirement that the Predator fleet has grown from less than 10 in 2001 to some 180 in 2007, with plans to add another 150 over the next few years.
Add to this the accuracy (CEP at times of 10-13 meters) through the JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition) kit fitted to turn gravity or dumb bombs into all-weather smart munitions and COIN forces have the ability to put a bomb where it is required. JDAM munitions become lethally accurate through their inertial guidance system and the global positioning system.
Predators combine the ability as long-loiter aerial platforms, reconnoitring, sensing, and identifying targets for up to 24 hours with the ability to kill. This is why it is useless to think that the US would stop the practice of using them against targets identified by intelligence as hostile elements. These aerial strikes are meant to support the ground components, and if they were not effective the US would have found the policy cost-prohibitive in terms of how they are viewed by the public in Pakistan.
But they have been effective to a point where even the Obama administration thinks that the benefit outweighs the cost, if any.
Yet, the question remains. Even if the US military begins to turn the tide on the insurgency, would that, in and of itself, become the basis for peace and good governance in Afghanistan? Let us just say that while reduced violence may be a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient condition to transform Afghanistan into a modern, viable state.
There is yet another aspect of the use of technology, especially ground-bots. What laws will govern their use and how will questions of accountability be addressed if and when things go wrong? Peter Singer, who has written an excellent book, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century, published by Penguin, has raised some of these very pertinent questions. (An essay adapted from his book can be found on the New Atlantis website.) Additionally, there is always the danger of the technology being utilised by non-state actors. One of the problems with technology, regardless of how long it takes for its lateral diffusion, is that it does spread out. Hence the need to devise laws and look into ethical questions regarding the use of new technologies.
There are two other aspects, diplomacy and humanitarian concerns which the Obama administration wants to combine with the use of force. They are also the most difficult to achieve. What can be done there and what they envisage remains to be seen.
Ejaz Haider is Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times and Consulting Editor of The Friday Times. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk. This is the concluding article in a two-part series. The first article appeared yesterday
