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Russians are generally considered to be obsessive chess players, and like good chess players they looked at the emerging teen series fighters during the seventies and drafted an appropriate strategy to counter. This strategy revolved about which design parameters would receive attention in the generation of aircraft built to succeed the mediocre MiG-21 Fishbed, MiG-23 Flogger and tactically dubious MiG-25 Foxbat. To fully understand the scale of change in Soviet thinking about air warfare we must look closely at the history of Soviet fighter development which reflects within itself much about Soviet military thinking.
The first tactically useful jet fighter which the Soviets produced was the Rolls-Royce Nene powered MiG-15 Fagot, which drew heavily upon WW II German research into swept wing aerodynamics. The MiG-15 was a simple and rugged airframe, with a respectable thrust to weight ratio and heavy gun armament of two 23 mm and one 37 mm cannon. It came as a rude surprise to Western air forces when the MiG-15 first challenged Western air forces in Korea, it easily outclassed the underpowered Meteor and F-84. Lighter than the leading US air superiority fighter, the F-86 Sabre, largely due to its rudimentary systems fit, the MiG-15 proved to be a tough adversary when well flown and the quoted 10:1 exchange rate in favour of the F-86 resulted largely from superior Western tactical airmanship.
The MiG-15 thus set the mold for the two subsequent generations of Soviet fighters, lightweight, simple and cheap to produce with good thrust to weight ratio and primarily gun armament, designed to fit into a closely controlled air defence environment tied to the local offensive land forces.
Arguably this approach did not stem so much from doctrine as from circumstances, the technologically unsophisticated industrial base of the USSR severely constrained what could be done in terms of powerplant performance, particularly specific fuel consumption, and avionic fit which determines radar and missile capability. Given that the USSR, as a continental power, placed most of its offensive warfare capabilities into the basket of massed tank and motorised infantry formations, there was hardly a perceived need to invest in the Douhet flavoured long range air war strategies espoused by the major Western powers. The Soviet military relied on the proven approach of overrunning its opponent with massive concentrations of armour, rather than bleeding its opponent to death by sustained air war against production facilities and infrastructure.
In this environment the role of the air forces, the tactical Frontovaya Aviatsia Voenno-Vozdushnykh Sil (FA VVS-Tactical Aviation/Military Air Forces) and home defence Istrebitelnaya Aviatsia Protivo Vozdushnoy Oborony Strany (IA PVOS - Interceptor Aviation/National Air Defences) was clear cut, the former would wrest control of the airspace above the battlefield, while the latter would defend the Soviet homeland from long range air attack. The specialisation would eventually lead to two unique streams of fighter development, the VVS tactical fighters and the PVO interceptor.
Initially this manifested itself in specialised variants of standard fighters, ie the VVS flew the MiG-17F (Fresco) and MiG-19S (Farmer), while the PVO flew the MiG-17PF, MiG-19PF and PM, the PVO types carrying rudimentary air intercept (AI) radar and gun in PF or air-air missile (ie AAM) in PM versions. Both the MiG-17 and MiG-19 were lightweight, short legged aircraft with good turn performance, thrust/weight ratio and short field performance.
The early sixties saw the first major split in fighter development, with the VVS adopting the MiG-21F Fishbed, essentially a VFR fighter armed with guns and cloned AIM-9B missiles designated K-13 (AA-2 Atoll), and the PVO adopting the Su-9 Fishpot family.The MiG-21 proved the more successful, spawning a string of variants with a wide range of capabilities (FA, PF, FL, PFS, PFM, PFMA, M, R, MF), spanning two decades in production, and achieving the distinction of being built in greater numbers than any other supersonic fighter. Exhaustive coverage of the genealogy of the MiG-21 is well beyond the scope of this discussion. The Fishpot in turn led to the larger Su-11 and Su-15/21 family of aircraft, all specialised interceptors locked via datalink into ground control air defence systems.
The PVO had opted out of the air combat game altogether, these aircraft being capable only against bombers. This philosophy culminated in the MiG-25 Foxbat family of Mach 3 interceptors, aircraft virtually useless in any task other than killing high flying high speed bombers and recce aircraft (the Foxbat is a major topic within itself, conceived to kill the B-70 Valkyrie and ultimately the means of a massive and successful strategic deception played against the USAF).
The VVS pursued its tactical role with vigour, adopting the Su-7 family of fighter bombers typified by the Su-7BM and creating a split within its own fighter force, between strike fighters and local air superiority aircraft. This in turn led to the next major Soviet fighter type, the swing wing MiG-23 Flogger family.
The late sixties saw the relative success, as perceived by the Soviets, of the surface-air missile (SAM) in Vietnam which saw the Red Army deemphasise the air superiority role in favour of strike. VVS aircraft would support land forces with air strikes against battlefield and theatre targets.
The Flogger drew heavily on the fad which created the F-111 family, the idea of the tactical strike aircraft which by virtue of AAMs could compete successfully in the air superiority role. Much like the F-111, the Flogger was cast into this mold at an early stage and thus proved to be an inferior air superiority fighter to the aircraft it was intended to defeat, the F-4 Phantom II.
The early seventies became a pivotal point in the global struggle for air superiority. The PVO was largely equipped with the ineffective Su-15 Flagon, supported by growing numbers of interceptor versions of the MiG-25 Foxbat and MiG-23M/MF Flogger, the latter entering massive series production. The VVS were still largely equipped with Fishbeds, but with substantial quantities of the Flogger becoming available, supported by growing numbers of swing wing Su-17 Fitter strike fighters. There was no capable air superiority aircraft in the class of the F-4E available, the Soviets having pushed the specialisation of their inventory to the point where fighter roles were subjugated to the respective services primary missions.
The Americans were at that time introducing the F-14A Tomcat and F-15A Eagle, both aircraft designed around the concept of energy manoeuvrability and the practical lessons gleaned from the many engagements flown between the USAF's F-4C/D/E, F-105D/F, the Navy's F-4B/N, F-8E and the MiG-17s, 19s and 21s of the North Vietnamese Air Force. Vietnam was a rude awakening for the Americans, who did not enjoy the absolute air superiority they sought over Hanoi and Haiphong. While they did decimate the NVAF and ultimately wipe out the NV air defence system, the exchange rate between the complex and expensive F-4 family and the cheap and nasty MiGs hardly reflected the technological advantage of the US. The new generation of fighters, dubbed the teen series, embodied a number of major departures from previous design strategies.
Air combat manoeuvring performance was a major priority, with both designs built for maximum thrust/weight ratio and minimum energy bleed, to provide the sustained turn performance required to get a guns or tail aspect heat seeking missile kill against a manoeuvrable and small target. The use of afterburning turbofan engines and substantial internal fuel capacity provided an effective combat radius well beyond 500 n.mi., to fight a strategic air war in the opponent's back yard. The cockpit saw major improvements in ergonomics and all round visibility, and look-down shoot-down pulse Doppler radars were fitted to allow beyond-visual-range (BVR) missile attacks on low flying targets. Both teen series fighters were thus formidable air combat fighters built for the long range air war strategy implicit within Western air war doctrine.
The strategic deception played by the Soviets with the Foxbat, seen by the Americans at the time as a highly manoeuvrable, 600 n.mi. radius Mach 3 air superiority fighter, had to some degree backfired, as the specifications for the F-14/15 performance and weapon system included the ability to defeat such an aircraft.
Many observers have commented, in the light of Belenko's defection to Japan, that both the F-14 and F-15 were clearly a case of overkill in capability against the mediocre Fishbeds and Floggers of the VVS. While that is true, the margin in performance has been of benefit in that these types are still serious players twenty years after their conception and are likely to remain such for the next decade.
Both the F-14 and F-15 were expensive and this quickly reflected in political pressure to adopt a 'Hi-Lo' mix of fighters, with cheaper aircraft supplementing these types. The USAF's Light Weight Fighter (LWF) flyoff between the YF-16 and YF-17 resulted in the adoption of the F-16, initially a clear weather dogfighter, to supplement the F-15. The YF-17 evolved into the Navy's F/A-18 multirole strike fighter, replacing A-4s, A-7s and F-4s in the fleet.
The teen series fighters had undisputed control of the skies since the late seventies and if there was any surprise, it was in the Soviets' apparent lack of response to this new generation of technology.
But the Soviets were not idle, and commenced work on a new generation of fighters during the early seventies, drawing heavily on the concepts adopted by the Americans in the teen series fighters. Clearly the new aircraft had to provide a worthwhile performance margin against the US aircraft as they would be at least half a decade later in deployment. Also they had to be manufactured within an industrial base much less sophisticated than that of the Western world, while also retaining the simplicity and ruggedness which the Soviet military uncompromisingly demanded.
Mikoyan MiG-29A Fulcrum A
Development of the Fulcrum progressed through the seventies and was first confirmed by Western reconnaissance when prototypes were seen at Ramenskoye test centre in 1977. These aircraft were provisionally allocated the reporting name of Ram-L, subsequent US intelligence reports stated that the aircraft entered production in 1982. It is certain that major toothing troubles were encountered because the aircraft did not achieve full operational capability until the mid eighties, a full decade after its Western adversaries. The principal user of the Fulcrum is the FA-VVS, the Soviet Army's tactical air arm, with aircraft deployed in Eastern Europe and within the USSR. An export drive seeking hard currency has resulted in export sales to India, Yugoslavia, Syria, Cuba, North Korea and other Third World nations, although it is not clear whether these aircraft retain the full systems capability of the Soviet aircraft.
Airframe and Propulsion
Without access to engineering documentation it is difficult to analyse the Fulcrum structurally, it is however known to employ conventional Al alloy construction in most areas. The forward fuselage will almost certainly be a separate shell, split into a radar/avionics bay, crew station and possibly a fuel tank area. The fuselage carapace will be another major assembly, absorbing the structural loads from the wings and mounting the tail booms which carry the vertical tails and horizontal tail surfaces. The fuselage tunnel between the nacelles is narrow and thus not useful for stores carriage, although a drop tank can be fitted with a major drag penalty.
What is unique to the Fulcrum is the FOD protection mechanism, which uses inlet blocking doors and dorsal louvres. On the ground at low speed the inlets are closed and air ingested from above the aircraft.
This arrangement is almost certainly an exercise in fudging an existing design which probably had far greater fuel capacity and lower empty weight, but had a FOD problem when operated under typical Soviet field conditions. As a result, most of the Fulcrum's 9,000 lb of fuel will be in fuselage/carapace fuel cells.
The aircraft's variable geometry intake almost certainly uses the FOD door as a single normal shock ramp, to provide acceptable inlet performance at Mach 2 speeds.
The undercarriage is of conventional design, with a dual nosewheel retracting aft and single mainwheels retracting forward, the mainwheels rotating flush into the wing roots.
The vertical tails are very large in area to ensure controllability at high AoA without the use of fly-by-wire control.
Roll control is via outboard ailerons and differential stabilator, with aileron control probably phased out at high speeds. Half span trailing edge flaps and full span leading edge flaps are used for landing and takeoff, there is no indication of their usage as manoeuvre flaps. The wing has three stations for pylons, typically carrying two BVR AAMs inboard and dogfight AAMs outboard. Up to four wing mount drop tanks may be carried, with quoted capacities of up to 800 lb of fuel.
The Fulcrum is powered by a pair of Isotov RD-33 low bypass ratio afterburning turbofans. The engine uses a twin shaft arrangement, with a conventional variable area exhaust nozzle. The engine is rated at 18,300 lb maximum afterburning thrust, with a specific fuel consumption of 0.77 lb/lb.hr and weighs in at 2,700 lb. The high thrust/weight ratio of the RD-33 has a penalty in poor durability, although this would not be seen as a problem in the Soviet logistical system which is structured about complete engine overhauls at several hundred hours.
Avionic Systems
The core of the Fulcrum's weapon system is the NO-93 Flash Dance coherent pulse Doppler look-down shoot-down radar, which is integrated with an Infra-Red Search and Track/Laser Rangefinder (IRST/LR) system. The radar has a quoted detection range of 54 n.mi. against fighter size targets, no information has been released on its target tracking capability. The IRST/LR and radar are slaved such that the inactive sensor tracks the boresight of the active sensor, this allows radar silent IR stalking of targets under VFR conditions with automatic switchover to radar if infrared lock is lost eg by cloud cover. Soviet engineers claim the IRST/LR is extremely accurate providing more precise gun solutions than the radar in visual engagements. What is not stated is that this arrangement can defeat jamming of the fire control radar, by switching to IRST/LR to complete the engagement.
Little has been published on the Fulcrum's defensive suite, it is known to carry a Sirena 3 (or possibly later generation design) Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) and upward firing flare/chaff dispensers in the vertical tail root extensions. It is not clear whether defensive trackbreaker ECM is carried, this is however likely given the presence of unexplained dielectric patches on the strakes and tailbooms. Other systems known to be carried are a radio altimeter and radio equipment for tie-in into the ground control intercept environment.
Cockpit
The cockpit of the Fulcrum more than anything illustrates the limitations of Soviet technological capability, as it is at the best comparable to late sixties Western technology. The layout is rather conventional, with a left hand console mounted throttles, centre control stick and a far left positioned switch bank. The AH, load factor, AoA, altimeter and DG are left of centre, the ASI, VSI and engine gauges to the right of centre. The upper right panel area is filled with a shrouded radar/IRST scope and a block of telltale warning indicators. A dual flat combiner Head Up Display (HUD) is fitted, the HUD camera optics are fed via optical fibre bundle. A Helmet Mounted Sight (HMS) can be carried, its output is fed together with IRST and radar parameters to the fire control computer which drives the HUD and missile seekers.
The canopy is relatively low and thus provides inferior rearward visibility in comparison with its Western counterparts. The pilot sits on a K-36D zero-zero seat which was inadvertently demonstrated to work well at last year's Paris air show.
With a cockpit much like sixties vintage Western fighters, the workload will be substantial where the pilot must rapidly switch weapons modes and manipulate systems, eg during a close-in engagement. While this would be considered a disadvantage in the West, it was another compromise accepted by the Soviets to keep the design as simple, maintainable and easy to produce as possible.
Performance and Weapons
With an combat weight of 30,200 lb and installed engine thrust of 36,600 lb, the Fulcrum is a very agile fighter. It has a wing loading and thrust/weight ratio which allow sustained 9G turning and excellent acceleration, including the ability to accelerate in a vertical climb at lower fuel states. The Fulcrum is redlined at 2.3M or 809 kt and has a sea level maximum RoC of 65,000 ft/min, which is respectable performance for the dash to intercept mission. In the fighter escort role the Fulcrum offers an unspectacular combat radius of over 300 n.mi. which is however acceptable for its primary role. Accepting this limitation, its acceleration and turning performance make up the principal elements of a successful air superiority fighter design. In terms of weapon load, the MiG-29 typically carries two large medium range R-23 (AA-7 Apex) missiles and four R-60 (AA-8 Aphid) heatseeking dogfight missiles. These are supplemented with a single barrel 30 mm cannon for close-in combat.
Soviet Fulcrums are also reported to carry the new AA-10 Alamo BVR missile and the AA-11 Archer dogfight missile. All missiles are carried on wing mounted pylons with the resulting drag penalties.
An unknown factor at this time is the performance of the new Fulcrum C which is reported to have a substantially higher internal fuel capacity as a result of a larger fuselage hump. Other upgrades reported involve a fly by wire control system and glass cockpit, which imply a mission computer and thus highly automated cockpit and weapon system.
Mission
The principal role of the Fulcrum is air superiority and air defence in support of Soviet land forces. While the aircraft is claimed to be capable of carrying up to 6,700 lb of air to ground stores, it does not appear to be fitted with the inertial navigation equipment or laser designator required for precision bomb delivery. Given the abundance of dedicated strike aircraft in the FA VVS inventory, mud bashing was obviously not a priority.
Deployed in the central European theatre, the Fulcrum would be used to engage NATO's F-15 and F-16 force thus allowing FA strike aircraft to penetrate NATO's air defence barrier. In the air defence role it would use its lookdown shootdown radar to engage NATO's low flying F-111 and Tornado aircraft, up to now almost impossible to stop.
The greatest tactical limitation of Fulcrum A is its limited radius which is rather low for its class of air superiority fighter (and almost certainly not what the designers intended), nevertheless it is a vast improvement over the earlier Fishbed, the later Flogger not being a serious contender for this role. Fulcrum C will almost certainly match its Western counterparts in combat radius. Deployment of the Fulcrum spells the end for older air superiority fighters such as the F-4E/F and the Mirage III/F.1 and will force the need for fighter escort for most NATO strike aircraft.
In Third World scenarios the Fulcrum balances the F-16A and defeats all earlier aircraft.
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