Okinawan Analysis: Split Identity, Affinity with China --------------------------------------------- -------------- -----------------
¶17. (SBU) The above history still shapes Okinawans' world views, including their sense of identity. In December 2005 the University of the Ryukyus announced the results of a telephone survey of Okinawans, in which 40% of respondents, when asked how they identified themselves, said they were Okinawan. A smaller percentage said they were both Okinawan and Japanese (36%), and just over one in five identified themselves as Japanese (21%).
¶18. (SBU) This history also shapes how Okinawans view the GOJ and actions that are presented in the world press as provocations to China, most notably visits by the Prime Minister to Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine. While many mainland Japanese are reportedly uncomfortable with the visits, if push comes to shove between China and Japan, opinion polls show that most side with Japan's right to do as it pleases. We believe most Okinawans side with China. Typical of this attitude is Masaru Yamada, treasurer of Okinawa City, who recently criticized Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine. He told us he doubted China would ever accept Koizumi's explanations of the visits, any more than he himself did. Okinawans and Chinese held similar views of the visits, he explained, because they shared the experience of having been "prisoners of war" of the Japanese.
¶19. (U) Local newspaper editorials have also pointed to the Yasukuni visits as unnecessary barriers to bilateral and regional cooperation that the GOJ could, and should, remove. Although an exaggeration, a recent Ryukyu Shimpo article reporting on the study of Okinawan identity concluded with a warning that GOJ policies, particularly as they related to bases and transformation, could influence Okinawans' opinions on whether to remain part of Japan.
¶20. (SBU) Many Okinawans believe that China sees them differently, and more warmly, than it sees the rest of Japan. They point out that Taipei International Airport, when posting place names in Chinese characters, lists flights to/from "Ryukyu," not Okinawa. A May 2005 Ryukyu Shimpo report claimed that, because of Okinawa's history, it could become an NAHA 00000103 006.2 OF 008 intermediary peacefully linking China and Taiwan. By offering an independent, international contribution, Okinawa could renounce its title of "(strategic) keystone of the Pacific" and become a "keystone of goodwill." A June 2005 Ryukyu Shimpo opinion piece contrasted the hospitality the Chinese granted Okinawa Governor Inamine and his party when they visited Beijing with Beijing's snubbing of PM Koizumi. "The extreme attention provided Okinawa, with its deep historical connection to China, was conspicuous in its contrast. To look at it the other way around, it was an intense dig at the GOJ," commented the Shimpo.
¶21. (SBU) Chinese Ambassador to Japan Ki Ou (phonetic from Japanese pronunciation) visited Okinawa April 24, on a trip sponsored by the OPG, Okinawa Economic Association, and Okinawa Visitors and Convention Bureau. Ou masterfully played to Okinawans' sense of exceptionalism and desire for a new golden era of lucrative Sino-Okinawan relations. Ou cited the historical and cultural links between China and the Ryukyus and said he immediately felt comfortable on this first visit to Okinawa. Over the past 25 years China's economic expansion had far outpaced its military expansion, Ou claimed, and its defense capabilities were reasonable for a country of China's area and population. China alone, of the five original nuclear powers, had offered to eliminate all nuclear weapons if the others would only agree to do the same. Okinawa and China should again travel together the path of peaceful development, Ou stressed, and tens of thousands of Chinese tourists annually were sure to
