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Madmen With Nuclear Codes — A History of Unpredictable Foreign Policy

Naif al Hilali

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From War is Boring:

Madmen With Nuclear Codes — An History of Unpredictable Foreign Policy
Richard Nixon’s madman theory increased the risk of nuclear war — and now it has an imitator in Donald Trump
by SÉBASTIEN ROBLIN

Would being officially and strategically unpredictable make America safer? The question, once academic, is now deeply urgent — for one simple reason.

President-elect Donald Trump.

“We have to be unpredictable,” Trump said in April 2016. “We have to be unpredictable, starting now.”

That’s a terrible idea, and we have the data to prove it. Political scientists have actually studied the unpredictability question by modeling the so-called “prisoner’s dilemma.” They used computer algorithms to test the outcome of interactions between two parties that can choose to either cooperate … or betray each other.

One set of simulations found that the most successful strategy was to start out friendly, reciprocate cooperation — and promptly retaliate when betrayed… but without holding a long-term grudge.

In other words, reliability and consistent signaling amount to a safer and more rewarding strategy than inconsistency and aggression do.

Former U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger, however, championed a different school of thought known as “madman theory.” He even persuaded Pres. Richard Nixon to actually apply the theory in the early 1970s.

***

Nixon’s priority was a peace treaty with Hanoi that would allow him to withdraw U.S. troops from Vietnam. Internal memos reveal that Nixon and Kissinger were under no illusion that the South Vietnamese government would survive very long following a American withdrawal. Nixon and Kissinger just wanted a “decent interval” between the U.S. departure and South Vietnam’s collapse.

“Within Vietnam, we must worry the Soviets about the possibility that we are losing our patience and may get out of control,” Kissinger wrote in a March 22, 1969 memo.

“I call it the madman theory, Bob,” Nixon aide Bob Haldeman recalled Nixon saying in his memoir The Ends of Power. “I want the North Vietnamese to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We’ll just slip the word to them that, for God’s sake, you know, Nixon is obsessed about communism. We can’t restrain him when he’s angry — and he has his hand on the nuclear button.”

“Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace,” Nixon said, according to Haldeman.

Nixon wanted Soviet leaders to think he was irrational and volatile — and willing to embark upon a self-destructive course of action in single-minded pursuit of his goals. This, Nixon believed, would leave the Soviets no choice but to make concessions … or face mutual destruction.

In October 1969, Nixon placed U.S. forces around the world on alert, initiating a series of maneuvers he intended to scare the Soviet Union. This culminated in Operation Giant Lance on Oct. 27, when Nixon dispatched 18 U.S. Air Force B-52 bombers loaded with nuclear weapons to circle just outside of Soviet airspace for 36 hours in an attempt to rattle Moscow into pressuring Hanoi to join peace talks.

Nixon did succeed in convincing Soviet ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin that he was mad. “Nixon is unable to control himself even in a conversation with a foreign ambassador,” Dobrynin reported.

But the ploy failed to extract any concessions. So Nixon escalated, launching an illegal bombing campaign targeting Viet Cong positions in Cambodia.

1*vsjh6VRYQYWYnrquZB6_gA.jpeg

A U.S. Air Force B-52F bombing Vietnam. Photo via Wikipedia
When India and Pakistan went to war in 1971, Nixon again tried to demonstrate his “madness” — this time by sending an aircraft carrier group to the Bay of Bengal. He hoped to impress China and pressure the Soviet Union into making India back off.

Again, the Soviets called Nixon’s bluff.

The Vietnam War still raged in May 1972 when Nixon instructed Kissinger to convey to Dobrynin that Nixon was ready to “destroy the God-damn country [Vietnam], believe me — I mean destroy it, if necessary. And let me say, even [use] the nuclear weapon if necessary. It isn’t necessary, but you know, what I mean, that shows you the extent to which I’m willing to go.”

Kissinger agreed. “The more reckless we appear, the better,” he said, “because after all, Mr. President, what we’re trying to convince them of is that we are ready to go all the way.”

The United States and North Vietnam signed the Paris Peace Accords in December 1972, resulting in a ceasefire between North and South Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger considered their madman theory to be successful, although in fact there is little evidence that it affected Moscow’s decision-making.

Twenty-eight months later, North Vietnamese troops captured Saigon.

Today North Korea and Russia both pursue versions of Nixon and Kissiner’s madman strategy. Pyongyang oscillates wildly between peace overtures, nuclear threats and acts of overt conventional military aggression such as its artillery bombardment of Yeongpyeong Island in 2010.

In a speech on Jan. 11, 2016, Trump expressed his grudging admiration for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. “If you look at North Korea — this guy, he’s like a maniac, okay?” Trump said. “And you have to give him credit. How many young guys — he was like 26 or 25 when his father died — take over these tough generals, and all of a sudden — you know, it’s pretty amazing when you think of it.”

“How does he do that?” Trump continued. “Even though it is a culture and it’s a cultural thing, he goes in, he takes over, and he’s the boss. It’s incredible. He wiped out the uncle. He wiped out this one, that one. I mean, this guy doesn’t play games. And we can’t play games with him. Because he really does have missiles. And he really does have nukes.”

Russian president Vladimir Putin is also known for his doctrine of strategic ambiguity. Under Putin, Russian troops seized Ukraine’s Crimea region and intervened in the civil war in Syria with little forewarning. Putin has also deployed intermediate-range nuclear-capable missiles near Poland, promulgated a doctrine of using nuclear weapons as a “de-escalatory” move and has threatened the vulnerable Baltic states.

Putin’s boldness has drawn Trump’s praise. “He’s running his country, and at least he’s a leader, unlike what we have in this country,” Trump said when the hosts of Morning Joe asked him about the killing of journalists in Russia.

But the madman theory is problematic. First, if a country’s leader is inconsistent or exaggerates, adversaries and allies won’t be able to tell when a genuine crisis is at hand.

Consider North Korea, which trafficks in hyperbolic threats, troop-mobilizations and nuclear and ballistic missile tests. These do increase tensions and sometimes provoke military responses from Seoul and Washington, but North Korea has yet to extract any major concessions as a result of its strategy.

Pyongyang’s provocations have become so routine that outside observers might have a hard time telling if the North Korean regime really were ready to go to war.

The reverse reaction could be even worse. An adversary may misinterpret aggressive, erratic moves as indications of an imminent attack — and launch a preemptive strike.

In his first term in office, Pres. Ronald Reagan’s significantly heightened tensions with the Soviet Union. In 1983, NATO held one of its most ambitious military exercises ever. Able Archer involved simulated nuclear attacks that, from the Soviet perspective, were hard to distinguish from the real thing.

Alarmed by the coded signals traffic, the Soviets wondered if the war game might in fact be cover for a NATO attack. Moscow mobilized its own nuclear forces in response, bringing the powers the closest they’d been to nuclear war since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

1*E3wqSWtYLVeE2WMRLs6z5g.png

Soviet submarine ‘B-59’ after being forced to the surface by U.S. warships on Oct. 28, 1962. National Archives photo
In 1967, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser troops deployed forces along the Israeli border and closed the straits of Tiran. Anticipating an Egyptian attack, Israel launched the devastating preemptive attack, seizing the remainder of the Sinai Peninsula and the West Bank — the so-called Six-Day War.

Decades later, there’s still no consensus on whether either side had initially intended for tensions to escalate into a full-scale war. Some sources, including the memoirs of Israeli leaders, suggest that Nasser ordered the mobilization simply to drum up domestic political support. A miscalculated provocation may have radically redrawn the map of the Middle East.

Acting recklessly to achieve short-term objectives can jeopardize a country’s long-term interests by convincing adversaries and allies alike of its unreliability.

North Korea’s erratic politics has left it economically isolated and impoverished, locked in perpetual conflict with South Korea and increasingly at odds with its long-time ally China. Putin’s incursions into Ukraine have triggered crippling sanctions that have forced the Russian economy into recession.

Bold moves without regard for consequences can result in short-term victories that incur terrible long-term costs. Clear communication, consistency and cool-headed leadership are particularly important when it comes to nuclear arms.

Many people assume that the political and technical safeguards against nuclear war are ironclad — simply because no one has actually used atomic weaponry since World War II. In fact, history is punctuated by frequent nuclear close-calls. Devastating atomic warfare remains chillingly possible.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, U.S. military leaders urged Kennedy to authorize air strikes on Soviet ballistic missile sites in Cuba. It was later discovered that Soviet troops in Cuba had more than a hundred tactical nuclear weapons at their disposal — and which they were authorized to fire in response to an American attack.

Had Kennedy simply followed the unanimous advice of his generals, Florida might be an irradiated wasteland today.

***

Meanwhile, Cuban leader Fidel Castro had grown so convinced a U.S. invasion was inevitable that he asked the Soviets to launch a preemptive nuclear strike on the United States. Fortunately, Khrushchev saw things differently.

As the crisis ground on, Soviet submarine B-59 lost communication with Moscow. U.S. ships surrounded her and dropped a signaling depth charge. Assuming war had broken out, the captain and political officer of the sub authorized the launch of a nuclear torpedo at the American ships.

Only the veto of a higher-ranking of officer who wasn’t a regular member of the crew prevented World War III from erupting in the Caribbean.

On Sept. 26, 1983 — shortly before the Able Archer exercises — Soviet early-warning satellites reported the launch of five ballistic missiles from the United States. In fact, the “missiles” were merely sunlight reflecting off of high-altitude clouds. The only thing that prevented a retaliatory strike by the Soviets was the cool-headed assessment of a colonel named Stanislav Petrov.

In 1979 and 1980, the North American air-defense system also malfunctioned, causing it to falsely report nuclear attacks. In 1995, a missile arcing toward Moscow compelled Russian president Boris Yeltsin to open the briefcase with the nuclear codes — and ready his submarines to launch a retaliatory strike on the United States. The missile turned out to be a Norwegian scientific rocket.

Only the level-headed judgment of soldiers and national leaders prevented these incidents from triggering apocalypse. Does Trump seem level-headed? Consider his Twitter wars with Fox News host Megan Kelly, Gold Star parents Khizr and Ghazala Khan and former Miss Universe Alicia Machado.

Rather than letting go of their justified criticisms of him, Trump escalated the spats with insults on social media.

Trump’s impulsiveness didn’t cost him electoral votes on election day. However, the United States could pay a price — an existential one — if the president-elect responds to some international crisis the same way he responds to minor irritations in the media.

A madman might make for entertaining tweets. But we cannot trust such a person with America’s foreign policy. Or its nukes.
 
From War is Boring:

Madmen With Nuclear Codes — An History of Unpredictable Foreign Policy
Richard Nixon’s madman theory increased the risk of nuclear war — and now it has an imitator in Donald Trump
by SÉBASTIEN ROBLIN

Would being officially and strategically unpredictable make America safer? The question, once academic, is now deeply urgent — for one simple reason.

President-elect Donald Trump.

“We have to be unpredictable,” Trump said in April 2016. “We have to be unpredictable, starting now.”

That’s a terrible idea, and we have the data to prove it. Political scientists have actually studied the unpredictability question by modeling the so-called “prisoner’s dilemma.” They used computer algorithms to test the outcome of interactions between two parties that can choose to either cooperate … or betray each other.

One set of simulations found that the most successful strategy was to start out friendly, reciprocate cooperation — and promptly retaliate when betrayed… but without holding a long-term grudge.

In other words, reliability and consistent signaling amount to a safer and more rewarding strategy than inconsistency and aggression do.

Former U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger, however, championed a different school of thought known as “madman theory.” He even persuaded Pres. Richard Nixon to actually apply the theory in the early 1970s.

***

Nixon’s priority was a peace treaty with Hanoi that would allow him to withdraw U.S. troops from Vietnam. Internal memos reveal that Nixon and Kissinger were under no illusion that the South Vietnamese government would survive very long following a American withdrawal. Nixon and Kissinger just wanted a “decent interval” between the U.S. departure and South Vietnam’s collapse.

“Within Vietnam, we must worry the Soviets about the possibility that we are losing our patience and may get out of control,” Kissinger wrote in a March 22, 1969 memo.

“I call it the madman theory, Bob,” Nixon aide Bob Haldeman recalled Nixon saying in his memoir The Ends of Power. “I want the North Vietnamese to believe I’ve reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We’ll just slip the word to them that, for God’s sake, you know, Nixon is obsessed about communism. We can’t restrain him when he’s angry — and he has his hand on the nuclear button.”

“Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace,” Nixon said, according to Haldeman.

Nixon wanted Soviet leaders to think he was irrational and volatile — and willing to embark upon a self-destructive course of action in single-minded pursuit of his goals. This, Nixon believed, would leave the Soviets no choice but to make concessions … or face mutual destruction.

In October 1969, Nixon placed U.S. forces around the world on alert, initiating a series of maneuvers he intended to scare the Soviet Union. This culminated in Operation Giant Lance on Oct. 27, when Nixon dispatched 18 U.S. Air Force B-52 bombers loaded with nuclear weapons to circle just outside of Soviet airspace for 36 hours in an attempt to rattle Moscow into pressuring Hanoi to join peace talks.

Nixon did succeed in convincing Soviet ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin that he was mad. “Nixon is unable to control himself even in a conversation with a foreign ambassador,” Dobrynin reported.

But the ploy failed to extract any concessions. So Nixon escalated, launching an illegal bombing campaign targeting Viet Cong positions in Cambodia.

1*vsjh6VRYQYWYnrquZB6_gA.jpeg

A U.S. Air Force B-52F bombing Vietnam. Photo via Wikipedia
When India and Pakistan went to war in 1971, Nixon again tried to demonstrate his “madness” — this time by sending an aircraft carrier group to the Bay of Bengal. He hoped to impress China and pressure the Soviet Union into making India back off.

Again, the Soviets called Nixon’s bluff.

The Vietnam War still raged in May 1972 when Nixon instructed Kissinger to convey to Dobrynin that Nixon was ready to “destroy the God-damn country [Vietnam], believe me — I mean destroy it, if necessary. And let me say, even [use] the nuclear weapon if necessary. It isn’t necessary, but you know, what I mean, that shows you the extent to which I’m willing to go.”

Kissinger agreed. “The more reckless we appear, the better,” he said, “because after all, Mr. President, what we’re trying to convince them of is that we are ready to go all the way.”

The United States and North Vietnam signed the Paris Peace Accords in December 1972, resulting in a ceasefire between North and South Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger considered their madman theory to be successful, although in fact there is little evidence that it affected Moscow’s decision-making.

Twenty-eight months later, North Vietnamese troops captured Saigon.

Today North Korea and Russia both pursue versions of Nixon and Kissiner’s madman strategy. Pyongyang oscillates wildly between peace overtures, nuclear threats and acts of overt conventional military aggression such as its artillery bombardment of Yeongpyeong Island in 2010.

In a speech on Jan. 11, 2016, Trump expressed his grudging admiration for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. “If you look at North Korea — this guy, he’s like a maniac, okay?” Trump said. “And you have to give him credit. How many young guys — he was like 26 or 25 when his father died — take over these tough generals, and all of a sudden — you know, it’s pretty amazing when you think of it.”

“How does he do that?” Trump continued. “Even though it is a culture and it’s a cultural thing, he goes in, he takes over, and he’s the boss. It’s incredible. He wiped out the uncle. He wiped out this one, that one. I mean, this guy doesn’t play games. And we can’t play games with him. Because he really does have missiles. And he really does have nukes.”

Russian president Vladimir Putin is also known for his doctrine of strategic ambiguity. Under Putin, Russian troops seized Ukraine’s Crimea region and intervened in the civil war in Syria with little forewarning. Putin has also deployed intermediate-range nuclear-capable missiles near Poland, promulgated a doctrine of using nuclear weapons as a “de-escalatory” move and has threatened the vulnerable Baltic states.

Putin’s boldness has drawn Trump’s praise. “He’s running his country, and at least he’s a leader, unlike what we have in this country,” Trump said when the hosts of Morning Joe asked him about the killing of journalists in Russia.

But the madman theory is problematic. First, if a country’s leader is inconsistent or exaggerates, adversaries and allies won’t be able to tell when a genuine crisis is at hand.

Consider North Korea, which trafficks in hyperbolic threats, troop-mobilizations and nuclear and ballistic missile tests. These do increase tensions and sometimes provoke military responses from Seoul and Washington, but North Korea has yet to extract any major concessions as a result of its strategy.

Pyongyang’s provocations have become so routine that outside observers might have a hard time telling if the North Korean regime really were ready to go to war.

The reverse reaction could be even worse. An adversary may misinterpret aggressive, erratic moves as indications of an imminent attack — and launch a preemptive strike.

In his first term in office, Pres. Ronald Reagan’s significantly heightened tensions with the Soviet Union. In 1983, NATO held one of its most ambitious military exercises ever. Able Archer involved simulated nuclear attacks that, from the Soviet perspective, were hard to distinguish from the real thing.

Alarmed by the coded signals traffic, the Soviets wondered if the war game might in fact be cover for a NATO attack. Moscow mobilized its own nuclear forces in response, bringing the powers the closest they’d been to nuclear war since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

1*E3wqSWtYLVeE2WMRLs6z5g.png

Soviet submarine ‘B-59’ after being forced to the surface by U.S. warships on Oct. 28, 1962. National Archives photo
In 1967, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser troops deployed forces along the Israeli border and closed the straits of Tiran. Anticipating an Egyptian attack, Israel launched the devastating preemptive attack, seizing the remainder of the Sinai Peninsula and the West Bank — the so-called Six-Day War.

Decades later, there’s still no consensus on whether either side had initially intended for tensions to escalate into a full-scale war. Some sources, including the memoirs of Israeli leaders, suggest that Nasser ordered the mobilization simply to drum up domestic political support. A miscalculated provocation may have radically redrawn the map of the Middle East.

Acting recklessly to achieve short-term objectives can jeopardize a country’s long-term interests by convincing adversaries and allies alike of its unreliability.

North Korea’s erratic politics has left it economically isolated and impoverished, locked in perpetual conflict with South Korea and increasingly at odds with its long-time ally China. Putin’s incursions into Ukraine have triggered crippling sanctions that have forced the Russian economy into recession.

Bold moves without regard for consequences can result in short-term victories that incur terrible long-term costs. Clear communication, consistency and cool-headed leadership are particularly important when it comes to nuclear arms.

Many people assume that the political and technical safeguards against nuclear war are ironclad — simply because no one has actually used atomic weaponry since World War II. In fact, history is punctuated by frequent nuclear close-calls. Devastating atomic warfare remains chillingly possible.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, U.S. military leaders urged Kennedy to authorize air strikes on Soviet ballistic missile sites in Cuba. It was later discovered that Soviet troops in Cuba had more than a hundred tactical nuclear weapons at their disposal — and which they were authorized to fire in response to an American attack.

Had Kennedy simply followed the unanimous advice of his generals, Florida might be an irradiated wasteland today.

***

Meanwhile, Cuban leader Fidel Castro had grown so convinced a U.S. invasion was inevitable that he asked the Soviets to launch a preemptive nuclear strike on the United States. Fortunately, Khrushchev saw things differently.

As the crisis ground on, Soviet submarine B-59 lost communication with Moscow. U.S. ships surrounded her and dropped a signaling depth charge. Assuming war had broken out, the captain and political officer of the sub authorized the launch of a nuclear torpedo at the American ships.

Only the veto of a higher-ranking of officer who wasn’t a regular member of the crew prevented World War III from erupting in the Caribbean.

On Sept. 26, 1983 — shortly before the Able Archer exercises — Soviet early-warning satellites reported the launch of five ballistic missiles from the United States. In fact, the “missiles” were merely sunlight reflecting off of high-altitude clouds. The only thing that prevented a retaliatory strike by the Soviets was the cool-headed assessment of a colonel named Stanislav Petrov.

In 1979 and 1980, the North American air-defense system also malfunctioned, causing it to falsely report nuclear attacks. In 1995, a missile arcing toward Moscow compelled Russian president Boris Yeltsin to open the briefcase with the nuclear codes — and ready his submarines to launch a retaliatory strike on the United States. The missile turned out to be a Norwegian scientific rocket.

Only the level-headed judgment of soldiers and national leaders prevented these incidents from triggering apocalypse. Does Trump seem level-headed? Consider his Twitter wars with Fox News host Megan Kelly, Gold Star parents Khizr and Ghazala Khan and former Miss Universe Alicia Machado.

Rather than letting go of their justified criticisms of him, Trump escalated the spats with insults on social media.

Trump’s impulsiveness didn’t cost him electoral votes on election day. However, the United States could pay a price — an existential one — if the president-elect responds to some international crisis the same way he responds to minor irritations in the media.

A madman might make for entertaining tweets. But we cannot trust such a person with America’s foreign policy. Or its nukes.
Not only mademan but also the revenger,win drunker,religious,carporate are dangerous with Nuke codes, such as Modi,Trump,Nethon yaho,Taliban,etc.
 
From The Atlantic:

The U.S.S.R. and U.S. Came Closer to Nuclear War Than We Thought

A series of war games held in 1983 triggered "the moment of maximum danger of the late Cold War."


An ailing, 69-year-old Yuri Andropov was running the Soviet Union from his Moscow hospital bed in 1983 as the United States and its NATO allies conducted a massive series of war games that seemed to confirm some of his darkest fears.

Two years earlier Andropov had ordered KGB officers around the globe to gather evidence for what he was nearly certain was coming: A surprise nuclear strike by the U.S. that would decapitate the Soviet leadership. While many didn't believe that the U.S. had such plans, they dutifully supplied the Kremlin with whatever suspicious evidence they could find, feeding official paranoia.

For two years, KGB agents had been scouring the world for evidence of what the Soviet leadership believed were U.S. preparations for all-out nuclear war against the U.S.S.R.

The Western maneuvers that autumn, called Autumn Forge, were depicted by the Pentagon as simply a large military exercise. But its scope was hardly routine, as Americans learned in detail this week, for the first time, from declassified documents published by the National Security Archive, a Washington-based nonprofit research organization.

To the Russians, it could easily have looked like a genuine preparation for a nuclear strike, the documents revealed: A total of 40,000 U.S. and NATO troops were moved across Western Europe, including 16,044 U.S. troops airlifted overseas in 170 missions conducted in radio silence.

More ominously, U.S. and NATO officers practiced the procedures they would have to follow to authorize and conduct nuclear strikes in an unpublicized exercise called Able Archer 83, shifting their headquarters as the game escalated toward chemical and nuclear warfare. In communications, they several times referred to non-nuclear B-52 sorties as nuclear "strikes" -- slips of the tongue that could have been intercepted by Soviet eavesdroppers.

While historians have previously noted the high risk of an accidental nuclear war during this period, the new documents make even clearer how the world's rival superpowers found themselves blindly edging toward the brink of nuclear war through suspicion, belligerent posturing and blind miscalculation.

In a coincidence that could have proved catastrophic, the script for the maneuvers dovetailed snugly and perilously with the Soviets' fears that they were under threat, coupled with nagging doubts about their ability to protect themselves from U.S. military might.

The problem with this brinksmanship was that it increased the risk of a nuclear exchange due to miscalculation, according to Nate Jones, a Cold War historian with the National Security Archive who edited and published the collection of more than 50 documents, totaling more than 1,000 pages, in three installments beginning May 16 and ending Thursday.

Ranging from presidential note cards to previously secret CIA reports, the documents describing Able Archer 83 offer fresh insight into a much studied but incompletely understood episode in the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. "This episode should be studied more because it shows that U.S. leaders might not have learned as much from the Cuban missile crisis [about avoiding accidental conflict] as they should have," Jones said.

In the current edition of the Journal of Strategic Studies, Israeli historian Dmitry Adamsky calls the 1983 war games "the moment of maximum danger of the late Cold War." Able Archer, he wrote "almost became a prelude to a preventative nuclear strike."

The March 1984 edition of Air Man Magazine , a rare detailed public account, called Autumn Forge "the biggest North Atlantic Treaty Alliance show of force of the year -- a test of military readiness in the context of NATO's deterrent mission." But the article emphasized the air lift, never mentioning rehearsal for nuclear war.

Even the troops on maneuver tried not to draw too much attention to themselves. At Dusseldorf Airport, the 45th Tactical Air Wing commander had his planes park away from the passenger terminal to keep a low profile. Most travelers, he was sure, were not even aware of troop activity at the airport.

But the Pentagon knew that the Soviets were monitoring his troops' every move. "The series of exercises are watched very carefully by the Eastern Bloc nations, just as we try to watch their exercises as closely as we can, to learn tactics and procedures," Air Force Maj. Gen. William E. Overacker told Air Man.

The impetus for the exercise came from the White House, "where they wanted to stare down the Soviet bear," said Jones.

Tensions had heated up that September, after the Soviet shoot-down of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, which had strayed into Soviet air space. The administration responded with stepped-up surveillance, and provocative naval maneuvers, and pressed for the deployment of new Pershing II missiles in Europe capable of reaching Moscow in less than ten minutes.

Considered in a vacuum, Able Archer 83, in which officer's at NATO's Belgium headquarters practiced their response to hypothetical chemical and nuclear conflict with a thinly-disguised Soviet Union, might not have seemed particularly threatening.

But for two years prior to Able Archer 83, KGB agents had been scouring the world for evidence of what the Soviet leadership in general -- and Andropov in particular -- believed were U.S. preparations for all-out nuclear war against the U.S.S.R.

The massive intelligence-gathering effort, called "Operation RYAN," pressured the KGB to find proof that the U.S. was planning a "decapitating" strike against Moscow with its nuclear forces. (The Russian acronym derives from Raketno-Yadernoye Napadeniye, or nuclear missile strike.)

According to an unclassified summary of the nuclear exercise scenario, prepared for the National Security Archive by a NATO historian, the war game began with briefings on an imaginary East-West conflict in the Middle East, including "Orange" -- that is, Soviet -- arms deliveries to Syria, coupled with unrest in Eastern Europe.

Rising tensions and a change in the Soviet leadership triggered an invasion by the Red Army of Yugoslavia, Finland, Norway and Greece, according to the exercise scenario. After the "Orange" Soviets finally attacked "Blue" -- U.S. and NATO forces -- with chemical weapons, NATO decided to respond with two series of nuclear strikes.

"Until the President's Intelligence Advisory Board report is declassified, we won't know how close the U.S. came" to nuclear war.

The Soviets certainly made no secret of their fears at the time. One key document, released by the Library of Congress, describes how Andropov repeatedly warned that the U.S. was approaching the "red line" leading to nuclear war when he met with veteran U.S. diplomat Averell Harriman in June 1983.

But President Reagan was unsure if the Soviets were really convinced that the U.S. was preparing a sneak attack on them, or were merely " huffing and puffing," as Reagan asked his ambassador to the U.S.S.R. in 1984.

There was skepticism in Washington about Andropov's sincerity. Three days after the end of Able Archer 83, the CIA issued a Top Secret Joint Net Assessment of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces that assured senior administration officials that the balance of forces "is probably adequate to deter a direct nuclear attack on the United States." It did not acknowledge the possibility of nuclear war through miscalculation.

Another Top Secret CIA analysis, written six months after Able Archer 83, shows how profoundly the spy agency may have misread the Kremlin's thinking. "We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States," its authors wrote.

It acknowledged, however, that since the Able Archer exercise, the Soviet military had stepped up its activity and deployed new weapons and forces.

Even if his intelligence advisers were sanguine, Reagan himself was worried after the exercise that the Soviets genuinely feared the U.S. was preparing to commit nuclear aggression, writing at one point in his diaries that "I feel the Soviets are so defense minded, so paranoid about being attacked that without being in any way soft on them we ought to tell them that no one here has any intention of doing anything like that. What the h--l have they got that anyone would want."

Moscow's reaction to the November 1983 war games is not well documented, partly because obtaining material from Russian government archives has become increasingly difficult since the 1990s. "I wouldn't say it has stopped, but it's proceeding at a glacial pace," Jones says.

But Russia isn't the only country hanging onto some of the secrets surrounding the 1983 war scare.

The papers of former Washington Post reporter Don Oberdorfer include a summary of what Jones says may be the most comprehensive account of the Able Archer 83 ever written, a classified 110-page report completed in 1990 by the President's Intelligence Advisory Board.

The report has never been released, but Oberdorfer's notes, based on an interview with a confidential source, say it concluded that the 1983 "war scare was an expression of genuine belief on the part of Soviet leaders that US was planning a nuclear first strike, causing Sov(iet) military to prepare for this eventuality, for example by readying forces for a Sov(iet) preemptive strike."

The note concludes in telegraphic style: "If so, war scare a cause for concern."

Jones says the 1990 report to President George H. W. Bush may be the most comprehensive account ever written on what happened during those five days in November of 1983, but he's been fighting to get it declassified without success since 2004. "Until the President's Intelligence Advisory Board report is declassified, we won't know how close the U.S. came" to nuclear war, Jones said.
 

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