M1 Abrams vs. T-90: Top US General Admits Russia Has Achieved Tank Parity

[خره مينه لګته وي]

US Army Deputy Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Mike Murray has told a Senate Armed Services subcommittee that the US faces falling behind other countries in the area of tank technology, saying that other nations, including Israel, the UK and particularly Russia are close to catching up. Russian observers ponder the significance of the general's remarks.

In a speech before Senate defense subcommittee members last week that went largely unreported, Lt. Gen. Murray warned that the US no longer has the edge in tank technology it used to, saying that he could "not say that we have the world class tank that we had for many, many years."

"I'll be the optimist and say that we're at parity with a lot of different nations," Murray noted. Still, the officer stressed that "our most capable enemies are closing quickly."

"I think the Abrams is still towards the top of its class in terms of combat systems, in terms of tanks," Murray said. "I think we have parity, I think there is parity out there." Still, he warned that Russia has closed the gap it had with the US since the end of the Cold War. "I think the T-90 is probably pretty close," he told one senator.

As for Russia's newest generation tank, the Armata, the officer said that he couldn't comment on that, since the tank has not yet been widely fielded.

Murray emphasized that the M1 Abrams platform, introduced in the 1980s, is reaching the end of its upgrade potential, and suggested that it's time for the US to start development of a new generation tank. "We're just about reaching the limits of what we can do with the Abrams," he said.

At the same time, the officer said that he was concerned that designers have not offered any fundamental breakthroughs in technology which can be used to build this next generation tank: "What I worry about is, there is nothing on the near-horizon that indicates a fundamental breakthrough in technology where we can come up with a lighter tank. I think we would be mistaken to build another 75-ton tank as long as protection requirements are where they are," Murray stressed.

Commenting on the unusual frankness of the top US Army official's remarks, RT Russian contributor Nadezhda Alekseeva suggested that "the recognition of its own technological lag in the area of tank building is something new for the US military. For decades, the US had presented the M1 as the best piece of equipment in its class, one no rival could match."

Today, the journalist writes, "the technological gap has become so obvious that it is impossible to keep silent about it."

U.S. soldiers stand next to the M1 Abrams tanks that will be deployed in Latvia for NATO's Operation Atlantic Resolve in Garkalne, Latvia February 8, 2017 @Reuters

After all, the journalist recalled, in Russia, the idea that the US and its allies are lagging behind Russia's tank industry is nothing new. Two years ago, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin reacted to news that Germany and France were planning to build a new generation of tanks to match the T-14 Armata by pointing out that he estimates other countries to have fallen behind Russia by 15-20 years in this area. Rogozin stressed that playing catchup would be difficult, too, since obviously Russia's tank designers wouldn't just sit idle over the next two decades.


For his part, independent military analyst Vladimir Tuchkov suggested that frank or not, the purpose of Murray's speech was pretty obvious: to squeeze more money out of the government to develop new heavy armor.


The problem, he wrote, was that the general did not provide a very convincing argument to Congress about the need to allocate new billions for a new tank, when he himself admitted that US engineers do not have any fresh ideas. "A further increase in the size and weight of the tank would only turn an already unwieldy tank into a slow-moving dinosaur," the journalist noted, driving Murray's point home.

Looking back on the Abrams' proud history, Alekseeva suggested that in its own time, the M1 truly was a crowning achievement in technical terms, having been released over a decade before the appearance of its Soviet/Russian competitor, the T-90, which entered service only in 1993.

Troops from the Army’s 1st Infantry Division lean on an M1A1 Abrams main battle tank as a convoy passes in the background at an assembly point in afternoon on Sunday, Jan. 21, 1991 in Saudi Arabia. Troops from the 1st Infantry Division have taken up positions close to the border with Kuwait @AP Photo/Peter Dejong

Chrysler developed the Abrams in 1979, and the formidable machine began to enter service in the US Army in 1980, replacing the aging M60. The tank was considered to have had a successful 'baptism by fire' in the first Gulf War in 1991, easily defeating the tank forces of the Iraqi army, equipped with Soviet monkey model T-55s, T-62s and T-72s, cutting into them like Swiss cheese and suffering almost no casualties from enemy tank fire.

However, since then, beginning with the second Iraq war and continuing with the Iraqi army's war against Daesh (ISIL/ISIS) terrorists in 2014, the tank began showing a growing number of weak points.

With this in mind, Tuchkov suggested that the "powerful advertising by General Dynamics Land Systems [the Abrams' current builder] notwithstanding, the number of lost Abrams tanks completely negates the assertion that it is one of the best tanks in the world." In fact, the military writer boldly suggested that the Abrams is no longer even in the top 5, with Israel, Germany, the UK, South Korea and Russia all producing tanks with far superior technical and combat characteristics.


He recalled, for instance, that the US lost 80 Abrams in Iraq during the 2003 invasion, out of a total of 1,135 machines deployed. "As for tanks disabled by enemy fire and due to serious damage suffered by major components and systems, the picture is just depressing," Tuchkov wrote. In 2006, "the army had to ship 530 tanks –i.e. almost half of those deployed, off for repair in the US."

"Taking account of the negative experience, designers upgraded the Abrams – strengthening its armor protection, fitting the tanks' rear and sides with dynamic armored plating."

"But that too didn't help much," the journalist wrote. "According to various sources, between 30 and 47 Abrams have been lost from last autumn to the present in northern Iraq" in the ongoing campaign against Daesh.

As for Russia and its T-90, it has a lower profile, a higher top speed, a longer operational range, and at 46.5 tons, weighs a full 16.5 tons less than the 63 ton US behemoth. It has partial dynamic protection by default, with no additional skirt installations required, and according to Tuchkov, has demonstrated its prowess in the Syrian conflict.

T-90 during a military exercise

The Syrian Army, Tuchkov recalled, has an undisclosed number of T-90As, the first version of the tank which saw mass production. "Since 2014, the Syrian Army has lost only one T-90 to an American TOW missile."

Just as significant, the observer suggested, was the fact that the loss occurred "not due to the tank's weakness, but due to poor crew training, and their failure to follow safety instructions." Specifically, the onboard Shtora-1 infrared ATGM jamming system was switched off at the time of the militants' attack; the tank's hatches were also open. Abandoned by the Syrian Army, the T-90A has since been captured and used by the militants.

The one lost tank excepted, Syrian T-90s have been successfully used by the Syrian Army's 4th Mechanized Division, usually on the front lines of the Army's key offensives, including the recent offensive to liberate Aleppo.

Ultimately, Alekseeva stressed that while military publications in the US and Russia have made comparisons of the T-90 and the M1 ad nauseam, the truth is that "it's probably impossible to speak of either tank's unquestionable superiority over the other: both tanks belong to roughly the same generation, and both have implemented the best technologies available in their time…Rather, the real cause for concern for the US military is the T-14 Armata, Russia's latest main battle tank."

That tank, developed in the late 2000s by Uralvagonzavod, and starting mass production beginning in 2015, is the real concern for Lt. Gen. Murray and the US Army, the journalist noted.

 

[Hassan Guy]

Is the T-90 better than the Type 90-II and T-84 Oplot-M?

 

[Talwar e Pakistan]

They use this fear-mongering technique all the time to get the Government to further increase the defence budget.

 

[cerberus]

Is the T-90 better than the Type 90-II and T-84 Oplot-M?

If you questioning T-90 as system then Yes with its evolving versions its better and affordable system than both tanks With 3UBK-14F "Invar" Atgms Its Beast to reckon With in Modern day tanks battles

 

[LeGenD]

Is the T-90 better than the Type 90-II and T-84 Oplot-M?

Possible! T-90 platform is continuously evolving.

T-90SM is the latest and most powerful variant of this platform; a major leap from the original model. American general was most likely citing this variant in his assessment.

 

[Penguin]

MISLEADING THREAD TITLE
"close to catching up " is not "Achieved Tank Parity"
"no longer has the edge in tank technology it used to"does not mean no edge no more.

"the US lost 80 Abrams in Iraq during the 2003 invasion, out of a total of 1,135 machines deployed. "As for tanks disabled by enemy fire and due to serious damage suffered by major components and systems, the picture is just depressing," Tuchkov wrote. In 2006, "the army had to ship 530 tanks –i.e. almost half of those deployed, off for repair in the US."
Are these COMBAT losses, or simply mechanical failures?

 

[Hamartia Antidote]

Tuchkov wrote. In 2006, "the army had to ship 530 tanks –i.e. almost half of those deployed, off for repair in the US."

This is the article he gets the 530 from:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/04/AR2006120401347.html

It talks about various reasons. Vehicles with too many miles, damage from mines, engine parts worn from sand abuse, etc.

 

[The SC]

MISLEADING THREAD TITLE
"close to catching up " is not "Achieved Tank Parity"
"no longer has the edge in tank technology it used to"does not mean no edge no more.

"the US lost 80 Abrams in Iraq during the 2003 invasion, out of a total of 1,135 machines deployed. "As for tanks disabled by enemy fire and due to serious damage suffered by major components and systems, the picture is just depressing," Tuchkov wrote. In 2006, "the army had to ship 530 tanks –i.e. almost half of those deployed, off for repair in the US."
Are these COMBAT losses, or simply mechanical failures?

"due to serious damage suffered by major components and systems" means clearly that they are not useful anymore on the battle field, they are not combat losses by definition by they are the closest losses to the meaning, because they were apparently recoverable and recovered, although out of service and with no use and a negative impact on the following battles..

Is the T-90 better than the Type 90-II and T-84 Oplot-M?

Apparently the T-90MS is much better, since it is a new platform using new technologies in armour and much more..

 

[Penguin]

"due to serious damage suffered by major components and systems" means clearly that they are not useful anymore on the battle field, they are not combat losses by definition by they are the closest losses to the meaning, because they were apparently recoverable and recovered, although out of service and with no use and a negative impact on the following battles..

Anything you use very intensively will eventual suffer wear and tear, esp. if specific issues can't be resolved with field maintenance. If you also consider the equipment numbers used, then guess what, it should be no surprise you have to go fix many vehicles eventually.

Combat damage:

• damage from mines

Wear and Tear / operational issues (e.g. intensive use, low rate of equipment rotation/replacement):

• Vehicles with too many miles
• Engine parts worn from sand abuse, etc.

"An estimated $17 billion-plus worth of military equipment is destroyed or worn out each year, blasted by bombs, ground down by desert sand and used up to nine times the rate in times of peace."
Lt. Col. Mike Johnson, a senior Army planner, said: "Before, if a unit was less than C-1," or fully ready, "someone would get fired." Now, he said, that is accepted as combat-zone rotations are sapping all units of gear and manpower. "It's a cost of continuous operations. You can't be ready all the time," he said.
The Army alone has 280,000 major pieces of equipment in combat zones that will eventually have to be fixed or replaced.
As the war has continued, Army leaders have recognized that they cannot afford to wait for a drawdown of troops before they begin overhauling equipment -- some of it 20 years old.
Tank crews are driving more than 4,000 miles a year -- five times the normal rate. Truck fleets that convoy supplies down Iraq's bomb-laden roads are running at six times the planned mileage, according to Army data.
Despite the work piling up, the Army's depots have been operating at about half their capacity because of a lack of funding for repairs.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/04/AR2006120401347.html

Clearly, this is an issue that is the result from policy decision (heavy equipment use, lacking maintenance funding, driven by a tight overall budget), not the result from anything inherently wrong with the design or built of the equipment. Waging war isn't cheap. In many ways, it is very wastefull.

Show me data on similarly (mis)treated Russian equipment for a fair comparision.

 

[The SC]

Anything you use very intensively will eventual suffer wear and tear, esp. if specific issue can't be resolved with field maintenance. If you also consider the equipment numbers used, the guess what, it should be no surprise you have to go fix many vehicles eventually.

Combat damage:

• damage from mines

Wear and Tear / operational issues (e.g. intensive use, low rate of equipment rotation/replacement):

• Vehicles with too many miles
• Engine parts worn from sand abuse, etc.

"An estimated $17 billion-plus worth of military equipment is destroyed or worn out each year, blasted by bombs, ground down by desert sand and used up to nine times the rate in times of peace."
Lt. Col. Mike Johnson, a senior Army planner, said: "Before, if a unit was less than C-1," or fully ready, "someone would get fired." Now, he said, that is accepted as combat-zone rotations are sapping all units of gear and manpower. "It's a cost of continuous operations. You can't be ready all the time," he said.
The Army alone has 280,000 major pieces of equipment in combat zones that will eventually have to be fixed or replaced.
As the war has continued, Army leaders have recognized that they cannot afford to wait for a drawdown of troops before they begin overhauling equipment -- some of it 20 years old.
Tank crews are driving more than 4,000 miles a year -- five times the normal rate. Truck fleets that convoy supplies down Iraq's bomb-laden roads are running at six times the planned mileage, according to Army data.
Despite the work piling up, the Army's depots have been operating at about half their capacity because of a lack of funding for repairs.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/04/AR2006120401347.html

Clearly, this is an issue that is the result from policy decision (heavy equipment use, lacking maintenance funding, driven by a tight overall budget), not the result from anything inherently wrong with the design or built of the equipment. Waging war isn't cheap. In many ways, it is very wastefull.

Show me data on similarly (mis)treated Russian equipment for a fair comparision.

Well, we can take the example of the Kalashnikov, if you want!

 

[truthseeker2010]

MISLEADING THREAD TITLE
"close to catching up " is not "Achieved Tank Parity"
"no longer has the edge in tank technology it used to"does not mean no edge no more.

"the US lost 80 Abrams in Iraq during the 2003 invasion, out of a total of 1,135 machines deployed. "As for tanks disabled by enemy fire and due to serious damage suffered by major components and systems, the picture is just depressing," Tuchkov wrote. In 2006, "the army had to ship 530 tanks –i.e. almost half of those deployed, off for repair in the US."
Are these COMBAT losses, or simply mechanical failures?

iraqi invasion, the same iraqi that lost to isis with abrams............. good to satisfy ego

 

[Penguin]

Well, we can take the example of the Kalashnikov, if you want!

What about the Kalashnikov? The Kalashnikov is not a complex piece of equipment like a tank or artillerey piece or mobile SAM. And not necessarily the best rifle (depending on what you need i.e. which critiria):
AR-15 – versatility and speed
AK47 – durability and affordability

iraqi invasion, the same iraqi that lost to isis with abrams............. good to satisfy ego

But not all 580, obviously. In general, if you put a bunch of monkeys in a tank, you don't expect the same results as when you put in a highly trained human crew, given that the tank is identical (which may not be the case when comparing US units with M1 and non-US units).

If you read the WP article, it is clear that the issue is OVERUSED and UNDERMAINTAINED equipment, not the design of equipment. It is what is happening in all militaries that I know that send troops on missions abroad while operating on a tight defence budget. Equipment is worn out, but because funding is low, spare parts stores get depleted and maintenance postponed, with the end result that at some point a good bit of units cease to be combat effective.

 

[AUz]

Lol...

 

[The SC]

What about the Kalashnikov? The Kalashnikov is not a complex piece of equipment like a tank or artillerey piece or mobile SAM. And not necessarily the best rifle (depending on what you need i.e. which critiria):
AR-15 – versatility and speed
AK47 – durability and affordability



But not all 580, obviously. In general, if you put a bunch of monkeys in a tank, you don't expect the same results as when you put in a highly trained human crew, given that the tank is identical (which may not be the case when comparing US units with M1 and non-US units).

If you read the WP article, it is clear that the issue is OVERUSED and UNDERMAINTAINED equipment, not the design of equipment. It is what is happening in all militaries that I know that send troops on missions abroad while operating on a tight defence budget. Equipment is worn out, but because funding is low, spare parts stores get depleted and maintenance postponed, with the end result that at some point a good bit of units cease to be combat effective.

AR-15 became much better, but only after some very bad experiences with it by US troops who have complained a lot.. The AK-47 never had any issues in any condition of a battlefield..
Russian tanks and artillery pieces proved to be reliable too, not the best in protection like the American tanks, but much lighter, more manoeuvrable and also more affordable.. So it is still going with the philosophy and tactics of WW2, where Germans had much higher quality and the Russians much higher quantity..

 

[Penguin]

AR-15 became much better, but only after some very bad experiences with it by US troops who have complained a lot.. The AK-47 never had any issues in any condition of a battlefield..

Chewed around too much already. Counter example could be the Willies jeep. Incidentally, we'ld specifically need to talk AK-47 then, not any and all AK-###. Point here is that the AK is not a representative piece of equipment: it is not a complex item like today's tank, IFV etc. Rifles are serviced by individual service men, if they take good care of their weapon on a day to day basis there shouldn't be any issue like the ones being discussed here.

Russian tanks and artillery pieces proved to be reliable too, not the best in protection like the American tanks, but much lighter, more manoeuvrable and also more affordable.. So it is still going with the philosophy and tactics of WW2, where Germans had much higher quality and the Russians much higher quantity..

PzKw IV production started 1936. It weighed 25 tons initially. Armor varied from 20mm to 80mm. Unit cost was approx. 103,462 Reichsmark (about US$41,385) 8,553 Panzer IVs of all versions were built during World War II

The Panzer IV saw service in all combat theaters involving Germany and was the only German tank to remain in continuous production throughout the war. Upgrades and design modifications, intended to counter new threats, extended its service life. Generally, these involved increasing the Panzer IV's armor protection or upgrading its weapons, although during the last months of the war, with Germany's pressing need for rapid replacement of losses, design changes also included simplifications to speed up the manufacturing process.

T-34 production started 1940, it weighed 26 metric tons then (as compared to 45 tons of the KV-1) but later models weighed up to 30.9 metric tons (T-34/85: 32 t), armor varied from 15mm to 60mm (KV-1: max 90mm. T-34/85: 90mm). The unit production cost of the T-34 was reduced from 269,500 rubles in 1941, to 193,000 and then to 135,000. T-34/85 unit cost was 164,000 rubles. Production: 35,120 T-34 plus 48,950 T-34-85.

The T-34 was one of the best-protected tanks in the world in 1941. The heavily sloped armour design made the tank better protected than the armour thickness alone would indicate. The shape also saved weight by reducing the surface area. Over time, the manufacturing fit-and-finish standard dropped some. Later T-34 were more roughly finished, but quality and reliability was not compromised in the process.

M4 production began in February 1942, it weighed 30.3–38.1 metric tons depending upon variant, armor varied from 12.7mm to 178mm in the best armored variants (e.g. Jumbo), 76mm in most common variants. Unit cost $44,556–64,455 in 1945 dollars, depending upon variant. Production: 49,234

The armor of the M4 was effective against most early war anti-tank weapons. Standard production versions of the Sherman, the welded hull M4, M4A2 and early production M4A3, had protruding armored "hatchways" located just in front of the driver and assistant driver that compromised the 56 degree-angled glacis plate, making them weak points where the effect of the glacis plate's slope was greatly reduced. M4 was "moderately superior" to the relatively small but older Panzer IV.

Assuming a single greenback actually sold for 30-33 rubles, this translates to approx USD values of 80,850-88,935, then 57,900-63,690 and then 40,500-44,550, with the T-34/85 at 49,200-54,120. (See https://www.rt.com/business/217003-russian-ruble-tumultuous-history/ ). This compares well with e.g. "When it comes to price, it’s estimated that the T-34 would cost around $45,000 to $50,000 for each tank built ... compared to the Sherman that costed $45,000 to build and the Panzer IV with a production cost of $45,500" (see https://thearmoredpatrol.com/2016/02/28/tank-myths-russian-t-34/ )

When built, the T-34 had a planned service life of about 6 months. This means that the average T-34, outside of combat, was only expected to last 6 months before suffering major mechanical failures necessitating a complete overhaul. Very few T-34 ever lasted long enough to enjoy the luxury of “mechanical failure” : most were destroyed long before that. During normal operations, it could last a few months. During heavy combat operations (Kursk, Kharkov, Stalingrad, etc), a T-34 would usually last less than two weeks. During some particularly pitched battles, T-34s sometimes lasted as little as about 8 hours on average.... Over the course of the war, the Soviets manufactured 57,000 T-34s (both 76mm and 85mm variants). Of these, around 45,000 were destroyed in battle – a loss rate of almost 80 percent.

Relative cheapness compared to e.g. newer tanks like Panther (not PzKwIV) meant economies of scale payed off in the field: Between the beginning of Panther production in spring 1943 and the defeat of Nazi Germany two years later, 6,000 Panther tanks were built. During the same period 29,400 T-34-85s rolled off Russian assembly lines. This disparity was increased by the low proportion of Panthers that were operational at any one time due to their poor mechanical reliability. Consequently, an engagement in which a Panther destroyed four or five T-34-85s before being disabled could still be considered, from a strategic point of view, a Soviet victory.
http://militaryhistorynow.com/2015/03/20/tank-clash-the-german-panther-vs-the-soviet-t-34-85/

Nonetheless, reliability was poor:
The T-34 was supposed to be a simple and rugged vehicle that seldom broke down. Authors like to compare it to the more complex German tanks that supposedly broke down often. The concept of the T-34 as a reliable tank is another myth of WWII. The majority of vehicles in 1941 were lost due to equipment malfunction. The same reliability problems continued during the period 1942-44. The evacuation and relocation of industrial facilities combined with the loss of skilled workers could only lead to the fall of reliability.
http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.nl/2012/07/wwii-myths-t-34-best-tank-of-war.html

BUT, to their credit, the Russians soldiers in the field were very good at piecing together working copies from components stripped from damaged or destroyed vehicles (and the design was simple enough to alow this to be done in the field), thus helping to keep up operational numbers.