Legitimacy and Counter Terrorism

[muse]

Fair does not mean NEUTRAL, it is however a reflection of the principles that guide, principles that can garner support - How are these relevant to terrorism and efforts to counter it?



Terrorism and Counter-terrorism
Richard Barrett

11 September 2008

A week ago the European Court of Justice annulled the implementation within the European Community of the United Nations sanctions regime against Al Qaeda, the Taleban and their associates. Although the court’s judgment affects only a Saudi businessman, Yassin Abdullah Kadi, and the Al Barakaat International Foundation, which brought their cases to its attention, the Sept 3 ruling is likely to have far-reaching consequences, well beyond the jurisdiction of the court itself.

The main finding of the court was that the implementation of the sanctions had inadequately respected the rights of the parties concerned, in particular their right to be heard and their right to effective judicial review. It also found that the individual’s right to property had been unreasonably restricted.

This is hardly the first time that national or international counterterrorist action has been questioned in the courts. There is an inevitable tension between protecting the rights of the individual terrorist, or suspected supporter of terrorism, and protecting the security of the community at large. But as is widely recognised, if counterterrorism action causes the erosion of individual rights, it is likely to give more fuel to terrorism than to the efforts to prevent it.

In June this year the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1822, which specifically addressed concerns that its sanctions against Al Qaeda and the Taleban paid insufficient regard to the rights of the people it affected. The Council decided to review the approximately 500 names on its list within two years; it decided to provide a narrative summary of the reasons behind the listings, and it strengthened its demand that UN member states notify newly- listed parties of their listing in a timely manner.

Certainly these changes will satisfy some critics, though undoubtedly not all. But the new resolution is not just procedural tinkering: It is a reflection by the Security Council of the fact that effective measures to counter terrorism must be fair, transparent and supported by the public at large.

It will now be up to the European Council to try to devise a new regulation for implementing the sanctions within the three-month grace period allowed by the court.

The issue of legitimacy is of concern not only to counterterrorists. Terrorists, too, must convince themselves, their sympathisers and prospective recruits that their acts are legitimate and justifiable.While debates on the meaning of defensive jihad, or the circumstances in which the killing of women and children can be considered forgivable, may seem ridiculous to the nonterrorist and irrelevant to those who just seek violence, Al Qaeda leaders have always tried to explain and justify their acts. If they cannot convince their supporters that their fight is legitimate according to the religion they claim to defend, they have no defence against the accusation that they are merely a group of violent criminals.

Al Qaeda leaders are not religious scholars and they are sensitive to criticism from others whose religious knowledge is better respected. Criticism of Al Qaeda from these quarters has been considerable over the last 12 months, and despite Al Qaeda’s attempts at rebuttal, its spurious claims of legitimacy have been widely exposed. Although the short-term consequences may not be great, Al Qaeda’s standing, particularly among the tribes on the Afghan-Pakistan border, depends in large part on respect for its finer understanding and practice of religion. In due course, the disdain of the rest of the Muslim world may seep through to affect these areas as well.

The battle for legitimacy is essential to Al Qaeda’s future. Without it, there is even less likelihood that the leadership will find the secure base that it so desperately needs.At present its main hope lies in forging a lasting alliance with the Taleban in Pakistan, and maintaining a relationship with the Afghan Taleban under Mullah Omar, in the expectation that sooner or later one group or another will gain control of enough territory to allow it to rebuild an international network of foreign fighters under its direct control and plan new attacks across the world.

The battle for legitimacy between terrorists and those who seek to defeat them is not as one-sided as it should be. The international community must continue to undermine the specious claims of Al Qaeda, while strengthening the legitimacy of its counterterrorist actions.The ruling of the European Court will force further action towards this end, but the Security Council has already taken steps along the road.

Richard Barrett is the UN’s highest-ranking official responsible for monitoring the activities of Al Qaeda and the Taleban

 

[muse]

Living to bomb another day
By Ronen Bergman

Thursday, September 11, 2008
TEL AVIV:

'Among all the bombs, explosives and guns, the number of martyred dead is rising. Though this is the will of Allah, it is nevertheless possible to cause the enemy greater damage without exposing the Muslims to danger. How is it to be done?"

This question, which appeared as a post in May on the Web site al7orya, one of the most important of Al Qaeda's closed Internet forums, is only one example of the evidence that has been accumulated by American and Israeli intelligence in recent months of a significant ideological change under way within Osama bin Laden's organization.

Seven years after 9/11, it may well be that we are witnessing the beginning of the end of suicide terrorism and a shift toward advanced technologies that will enable jihadist bombers to carry out attacks and live to fight another day.

Although Islamic suicide terrorism dates back to the anti-Crusader "assassins" of the 11th century, its modern history begins with statements made by Sheik Mohamed Hussein Fadlallah, the spiritual compass of Hezbollah, in an interview published in 1983. "We believe that the future has surprises in store," he said. "The jihad is bitter and harsh, it will spring from inside, through effort, patience and sacrifice, and the spirit of readiness for martyrdom."

A short time later, Sheik Fadlallah's bodyguard, Imad Mughniyah, organized a series of murderous suicide attacks - first against Israeli military targets, then against the U.S. Embassy in Beirut and finally, of course, against the barracks of the American-led multinational force in Lebanon, causing nearly 300 deaths. From there, it was a short march to 9/11.

Despite countless attempts by Western intelligence agencies, and the many projects by psychologists trying to draw the profile of the average suicide terrorist, we have failed miserably in finding a solution to the "poor man's smart bomb." Now, however, attrition may achieve what the experts have not: After years of battle in two main arenas - Iraq and Afghanistan - Al Qaeda's suicide-recruitment mechanisms are beginning to wear out.

While the terrorist group has been careful not to mention it in its official statements, it is no longer uncommon to find jihadists in their chat rooms and, according to Western intelligence sources, in interrogations, stating that young men are reluctant or simply too scared to take part in suicide attacks. At the same time, military blows against Al Qaeda's training structure since 2001 have meant that the number of extremists with combat experience is decreasing, and that new recruits are harder to train.

The startling cost in lives of its operatives in Iraq and Afghanistan has motivated Al Qaeda's technical experts to start seeking technical solutions, primarily on the Internet, that would render suicide unnecessary. These solutions mostly revolve around remote controls - vehicles, robots and model airplanes loaded with explosives and directed toward their targets from a safe distance.

This turn to technology, however, is not devoid of religious aspects: Although dying in battle is undisputedly holy, many scholars claim that any intentional taking of one's own life is forbidden, thus outlawing suicide attacks altogether. Even religious rulers who endorse suicide attacks consider them to be a last resort, to be used only when all other means are exhausted.

"Martyrdom operations are legitimate, and they are among the greatest acts of combat for Allah's cause," said Bashir bin Fahd al-Bashir, a Saudi preacher and one of Al Qaeda's most popular religious authorities, in a recent sermon. "But they should not be allowed excessively. They should be allowed strictly on two conditions: 1. The commander is convinced they can definitely inflict serious losses on the enemy. 2. This cannot be achieved otherwise."

The meaning of such dictates is clear: Carrying out suicide attacks when alternatives could allow the bomber to survive should be considered "intihar," the ultimate sin of taking one's own life without religious justification.

Avoiding suicide has become the major topic on Al Qaeda's two main Web platforms for discussing the technological aspects of jihad, the forums Ekhlaas and Firdaws. "Those overpowering Satan's seduction are few, and we sacrifice those few since they may win us Paradise," read a posting on both sites this summer on the subject of "vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices." It continued: "Yet, keeping them alive is beneficial for us, since every one of them is tantamount to an entire people. So we must find a way to save those lives and harness that zeal."

The post led to a vast and heated online discussion among extremists, illustrating the new complexity of the topic. As the jihadists on these sites move from discussing ideology to the practical aspects, it becomes clear that their biggest technological challenge will be moving on from the radio-wave technology that has proved highly successful in remotely setting off homemade bombs against military convoys in Iraq to the more delicate task of getting the explosive to its target and then detonating it without being exposed.

Unfortunately, Al Qaeda seems well on its way to gaining such an ability. Chatter on these sites has tended toward discussions of the various types of remote-piloted aircraft able to carry the necessary weights, as well as specific robot designs, including models that police forces use to dispose of explosive devices. One extremist pointed out the ease with which such robots can be acquired commercially.

Also, in a document posted last month at Maarek, the most sophisticated jihadist forum for discussing explosives manufacturing, a prolific technical expert calling himself Abu Abdullah al-Qurashi suggested training dogs to recognize American troops' uniforms, then releasing other dogs carrying improvised explosive devices toward American soldiers so the bombs can be detonated from a safe distance.

To get a feeling for how Western militaries and security services plan to counter this next wave of terrorism, I talked to Gadi Aviran, the founder of Terrogence, a company made up of former members of Israel's intelligence community and special military units that gathers information on global jihad as a subcontractor for intelligence agencies in Israel, the United States and Europe. "All of these secretive discourses in the password-protected cyber forums are of the same spirit," he told me. "Mujahidin's lives are fast becoming too valuable to waste and although this seems like good news, the alternatives may prove to be just as difficult to deal with."

So, while an end of suicide terrorism might seem like a good thing for the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, the bad news is that the extremists seem to be well on their way to mastering all sorts of new technology, much of which, such as using dogs and remote detonators, is simple and cheap.

Most counterterrorism experts estimate that for military forces to devise and deploy measures to counter a new insurgent strategy usually takes two to five years. And a new emphasis on remote execution would significantly change the profiles of the terrorists. The uneducated, enthusiastic youths from weak economic backgrounds who have formed the bulk of Al Qaeda's followers will give way to electricians and robotics experts joining the chemists who make the explosives in order to carry out nonsuicide attacks.

The good news is that suicide bombing seems to be on the wane. The bad news is that Western forces will almost certainly face a new breed of highly educated Qaeda terrorists.

Ronen Bergman, a correspondent for Yedioth Ahronoth, an Israeli daily, is the author of "The Secret War With Iran."

 

[Nasha]

So threre's gona be like, terorist/extremist devices and chemicals making course in universities now? I hear Uni's like to go with the most profitable trend.

 

[muse]

Suicide bombing demystified




By Razi Ahmed


SUICIDE bombing, mapped out by the non-state actor, a renegade faction, secessionists or even nation-states, is sometimes written off as futile and incomprehensible.

Debunking the oft-stated myth of the irrationality of suicide bombing, University of Chicago’s political scientist Robert Pape has argued suicide bombing contains a strategic logic wherein the perpetrators inflict sustained, brutal costs upon the state so as to compel the state to re-consider its policy.

In his insightful work, Dying to Win, Pape shows — based on a universal database of attacks from 1980-2003 — suicide bombings are motivated more by limited geo-strategic objectives than exclusively religious ones. Religious doctrine is mangled to sanctify the purely political objectives of the planners and to promise salvation for their pawn.

It is a given that when states begin to negotiate with terrorists — giving them the legitimacy and acknowledgment they crave — to prevent further panic and disaster from the seeming randomness of suicide attacks, it emboldens these non-state actors inevitably at the cost of the state.

The present pattern of suicide bombings in Pakistan suggests a coordinated, coherent policy galvanising choppy forces to achieve certain, as is conveyed in Pape’s narrative, strategic objectives. The overarching one is to enable the periodic regrouping of Taliban remnants on the run from Nato forces in Afghanistan or under attack from them in our medieval badlands. An accommodating western border and misguided neocon policies having hardened tribal pride, honour and sub-nationalism have forced, as a rule, the locals to rally behind their renegade Pakhtun kin and their foreign financiers.

From the earlier stage of official denial during the first few years of Pervez Musharraf’s government, sporadic suicide missions have driven home the point that the threat to Pakistan’s federation, law-enforcement agencies and citizens is alive and kicking — and to this day, despite the enthronement of democratic forces. Pape, in fact, contends that democracies are particularly vulnerable to suicide attacks as evidenced in the UK, Turkey, Israel, India and Sri Lanka. In Pakistan’s case, however, the pattern, thus far, demonstrates an even record of vulnerability across the Feb 18 threshold between military and civilian governments.

No political party can be as unambiguous to the swords crossed over our frontier towns, critical infrastructure projects and our metropolises as the PPP. With its vote bank representing a third of the electorate; PPP has the electoral strength, grit in its mission as we saw in its successful operation in Karachi in 1995, and the legacy of an outstandingly courageous leader, Benazir Bhutto, to mount a concerted and ferocious operation against the patrons and planners of suicide missions.

After all, the attacks of Oct 18 and Dec 27 were attempts to pre-empt Bhutto and her party from challenging the proliferating potency of foreign fighters on our soil and their local sympathisers. Her unequivocal, passionate pleas to counter and contain the Talibanisation of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the growth of extremism in the Frontier, whether in Washington or Peshawar, won her rebuke from the rightwing media and parochial politicians who failed to understand the strategic logic of terrorism. They chose instead to accept the false religiosity claimed in the cloak of horrors and the inhumanity of suicide bombings.

In 1991, Rajiv Gandhi, like Bhutto, fell victim to terrorism. Dhannu, a female suicide bomber, detonated herself at his election rally to avenge the Indian leader’s support to Sri Lanka against the Tamil Tigers. Triumphalism pervaded the Tamil terrorist network as their articulate nemesis along with his resolve to return Indian Peacekeeping Forces to Sri Lanka were dispatched. The clarity of zero tolerance on terrorism, their coherence of this purpose and their courage cost both Gandhi and Bhutto their lives.

While Sri Lanka flushes out its insurgents, our country is increasingly at the mercy of ours. The first prominent suicide attack post-9/11 occurred outside a Karachi hotel killing 14 foreign and local persons on May 14, 2002. The second one followed on June 16 outside the US consulate in Karachi killing 12. Both incidents employed cars filled with explosives.Attempts on Pervez Musharraf’s life in 2003 and again in 2004 ratcheted the stakes of state actors, exposing them to the ostensible vagaries of suicide missions. Shaukat Aziz, Aftab Sherpao (at an Eid prayer congregation in a mosque no less), Bhutto and the PPP, and the country’s law-enforcement symbols have been the most conspicuous, high-value targets. And the latest is the warning attack on Prime Minister Yousuf Gilani’s motorcade on an Islamabad artery. There is a menacing continuity in these attacks.

The inescapable fact is that the ‘war’ is on our soil. Its origins might be somewhere else — the netherworld, perhaps — but its effects have taken a very heavy and real toll on our people. Our federal emblems — the Pakistani flag, anthem, security check posts, infrastructure, parliamentary writ and resources — are being repudiated and ravaged.

Patriotic leaders, parties, soldiers, students and ordinary citizens cannot wish this away or do nothing while the extremists challenge our constitution, civilisation and way of life. It is instructive to heed Pape’s advice to decipher the logic of suicide terrorist campaigns. The likelihood of rescuing our country from the benighted clutches of, yes, ‘rational’ suicide terrorists will increase the sooner we do so. The present piecemeal approach to the twin menaces of terrorism and extremism will backfire, as Pape warns, “incremental compromises … provide time for spoilers — the terrorists — to commit more violence” as happened to the “Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords, leading to the Second Intifada”.

The Ramazan lull in military operations in the Frontier carries the foreboding of inevitable resurgence. Counter-terrorism experience demands that the operations continue, Ramazan or no Ramazan. The terrorists cannot be allowed to regroup. Alongside tighter border controls — and we must fence the western border — as well as, ultimately, setting up planned reconstruction opportunity zones in the troubled areas will go a long way in systemically expunging the Taliban’s influence.

razi.razi@gmail.com