Actually, No. I am neither pro US nor pro China, but am pro Japan. A Japan that is independent of foreign interventionalism, secondly, I am (and have always been) a pro East Asian Unificationist. In fact , I have in my many posts in this forum, have identified that the barrier to Japanese Rise has always been the United States. Ultimately, we Japanese patriots understand the insidious apperture of American (Washington) State Actors have had in Tokyo throughout the years , first it was the guise of Soviet Threat, now, recently the threat of China to bolster and legitimize continued US presence in the Japanese Fatherland. On a much inferior significance, North Korea is sometimes labeled as the threat (and thus is argued as the reason why the US is to remain in Japan and Korea), we all know the reality , my friend. The problem, in the end, is not just the United States ' strategic and research wings that operate malevolently in Japan in the guise of regional security, but also the collaboration of Japanese lawmakers that have been under the influence of America.
My friend, I have deep respect for the United States , its contribution to democracy, and , i suppose in other regards, to the principles of representative government. Despite these ideological notions as well as some valuable social norms in American society, what I don't particular am fond of is the American foreign policy mandate of intervention, either openly or conspiratorially. This , ultimately, if you have ever reviewed political science and nation state systematization , is actually inhibitive of the natural or historical aspect.
The Need of Sino-Japanese Correspondence in the 21st Century: Is there an Empirical Validation ?
By: @Nihonjin1051, Ph.D.
I. The Historical Link between Japan and China
The history of Japan and China has is long as well as it is being intertwined through the economic trade, cultural transmission, political and philosophical influence. China has had a direct pivotal role in helping mold and form the early Japanese identity which stems back to the Chinese ancient text known as the Book of Later Han. In this text, Emperor Guangwu of the Han Dynasty provided a golden seal to the early Yamato Clan. In fact this golden seal is referred to In Japan as the King of Na gold seal, and is held in a museum in the Japanese island of Kyushu in commemoration of this ancient political link between both civilizations. During the 7th century AD, the Imperial Japanese Court had initiated what is known as the Taika Reform.
The Taika reform encouraged Japan to build embassies in China as a way to establish proper diplomatic and political rapprochement between the said two entities, and this allowed Japanese students to go study in China. These students that had spent time in China’s Imperial Court and Chinese schools of philosophies allowed them to absorb new information back to Japan. It was through the Taika Reform that Japan brought back teachings of Buddhism, bureaucratic reforms, architectural traits, urban planning traits as well as Imperial court customs – which were then integrated into Japanese culture. One important and lingering Chinese imprint into Japanese society and culture is in the written language; the Japanese Kanji system is based on the Chinese classical characters known as Hanzi. There is , indeed, a cultural and historical commonality.
II. The Dynamic of Japan’s Interaction with East Asia
“Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the present controls the past.”
-George Orwell
The above aforementioned quote by Orwell takes into consideration how the future is influenced by the past events, and this is a poignant quotation in context of the Japanese and Chinese Equation. The history between Japan and China stretches back over 2 millennia, with formal representation taking place during the beginning of the 8th Century A.D. when Japanese Embassies were created throughout China as well as vice versa.
The marked cross straits interaction between Japan and China was positive with only four militant events; the 12th century war with the Yuan Dynasty and the subsequent attempts of the Mongols to invade Japan, the second was the 16th century Imjin War wherein the forces of Japan under the leadership of Hideyoshi Toyotomi, who was appointed as Kampaku or the Imperial Chancellor and thus the personal hand of the Emperor of Japan. Hideyoshi, who was named Daijo-daijin (Chief Minister) , initiated the unification of Japan and then subsequent mandate to conquer Korea with the goal to acquire the prize of China. The demise of Hideyoshi had led to the collapse of the struggle to conquer Korea , forcing a general retreat of Japanese forces from the Korean peninsula back into Japan proper , and thus would begin a dormant and introverted closed door policy. The 19th century ended with a brutal war between Imperial Japan and Qing Dynasty China known as the 1st Sino-Japanese War, which lasted from 1894 to 1895. The last conflict between China and Japan was the 2nd Sino-Japanese War, which ended in 1945.
The war left deep scars in both China and Japan. The sensitivities of domestic politics in China regarding Japan’s 2014 Collective Defense Principle and re-militarization is historically driven. Japanese should be more considerate of these reactions by the Chinese and approach the issue with an attempt to understand the psychology of the Chinese side and refrain from a defensive posture when reading Chinese media reaction.
III. Approaching China from a Cooperative Position
It is important to focus on the positive developments, particularly when contrasting them with the tensions and the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China during the five years of the Koizumi era and also recently during the beginning of the Administration of Prime Minister Abe. In Japan there is a conviction that China very much needs Japan; be it to protect its foreign image as a peacefully developing country, to maintain its export and FDI-dependent economy, to reduce its energy consumption, to help cope with its environmental problems and that China is open to seeking compromise. Whether or not this is true or not, one thing that Chinese leaders and strategic planners should take into consideration is that Japan has a positive outlook towards China and maintains a policy of cooperation, eager almost, with China.
There are themes that Japan and China can both work on , ranging from Cross Straits Cooperation on Taiwan, addressing the claims in the East China Sea, as well as understanding and working with each other on China’s Ascendancy.
The disputes in the East China Sea are about the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands (which is known by the Chinese as the Diayutai Islands) and the Exclusive Economic Zone between China and Japan, and the rivaling Air Defense Identification Zones of Japan and China. The solution of the EEZ issue between both countries is closely related to the sovereignty dispute as well as to an EEZ agreement between China and Kore and the ones with Japan and Korea, where there is rivaling claims in the norther part of the East China Sea. According to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continent Shelf, there must be cooperation between the Governments of South Korea, Japan and China to declare the EEZ limits. In regards to the Senkaku Islands, Japan claims that there is no sovereignty dispute because it is in the comfortable position of having de facto control over them, which is refuted by China. Both countries also apply different principles to determine EEZ border between them. It is apparent that these issues are within the forefront of political contention between Tokyo and Beijing.
These issues just discussed have to be put in the context of the growing economic competition and political rivalry of the two countries. The phenomenal growth of China’s economy, which also owes a lot to Japan, had led to increased competition. While trade between the two countries in the 1980s was dominated by China selling natural resources and semi-finished products to Japan, trade is increasingly becoming an exchange of processed and manufactured goods, at an ever-increasing level of sophistication. Although Japan is still an important foreign direct investor in China, since the beginning of the new century, China had started, on a very modest scale, to invest in Japan. This is in order to acquire technology, brands, market access and marketing skills and includes the acquisition of distressed medium-sized Japanese companies. Both Japan and China have cross-straits vested interests within each other, ranging from domestic investment, which is now over $320 Billion.
China’s rise has undoubtedly presented new challenges to Japan and these have been articulated as part of the so called ‘China Threat’ discourse. That China threat debate is a broad term that generally refers to the popular academic discussions of the ways in which China posed potential risks to Japanese economic, security, and political interests. However, the discussion went beyond traditional military threat perceptions based on measurement of intentions and capabilities and encapsulated concerns about new uncertainties posed by China’s rapid development and modernization and how to respond to them.
To address these issues, Japanese leaders are now espousing Sino-Japanese policy consultation and coordination as a way to preserve regional peace and stability, such as in the Korean Peninsula, and as a way to abate any tensions between both countries’ EEZ claims and ADIZ claims. The contention is surmountable. We have to remember that in October 1992, Emperor Akihito of Japan had visited China, suggesting that the mistrust between China and Japan is surmountable and that the legacy of the past can be transcended by the two countries’ common interests. It is also important to recognize the special importance that Japan has attached to its relationship with China, despite the vagaries of politics. This said, development of greater rapprochements between Japan and China in the Taiwan issue, and economic commonalities will benefit both sides. The expected communication between China’s Xi Jinping and Japan’s Shinzo Abe will present opportunities for both sides to address common interests, as well as initiate mechanisms that will allow both Japan and China to find solutions to areas of disagreement.
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I have relatives that live in Guangzhou, and also have family members who have married Chinese , so I know full well Sino-Japanese relations on the personal grass-roots level, as well as i the unique national level aspect. The point is that I don't buy western-articulated poisonous generalizations of how Japanese and Chinese can't get along. I think we have gotten along quite well (given, our relationship is not without bumps and wars) throughout our 3 millenial inseparable relationship. Even before the birth of the Roman Empire, relations between China and Japan have already been.
you can see all his post are now pro-China 
