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JF 17 is The Wrong Omnirole Aircraft For PAKISTAN

By the way if you do not comprehend a concept, it does not mean it is stupid unless you have been declared and accepted equivalent to Gold standard.

I can't understand why you responded to this post today AGAIN, when you had responded to it the day I posted it and I had answered you?????

No one is God here. We write our point of view and facts, the readers get to read it. The best we could do, is to write our points effectively and the readers will determine what makes sense. Doesn't mean your argument is invalid and mine is, some will prefer yours, and some will mine. Life moves on to the next thread :tup:
 
Hi,

With aesa radar----JFT is a match with any other aircraft with aesa at BVR range other than the 5th gen aircraft. The kill range and the potency of your BVR missile will make the distance.

Without aesa---it is again at match at BVR with any other aircraft in the enemy's arsenal. The thing is what kind of 'Growler' capabilities you have---.

There is nothing wrong with the engine of the JF 17----.
what do u mean by 'Growler' capabilities
 
US hands over 14 combat aircraft, 59 military trainer jets to Pakistan: report with this now Pakistan have 99 F-16's

The United States handed over Pakistan on Wednesday 14 combat aircraft, 59 military trainer jets and 374 armoured personnel carriers which were earlier used in Afghanistan and Iran.

“As the US withdraws its forces from neighbouring Afghanistan, the major defence articles have been transferred to Pakistan under its ‘Excessive Defence Article’ category, an internal Congressional report said, according to the

India in the past has opposed to the transfer of such arms to Pakistan as it believes Islamabad would eventually use the fighter jets against it.

Pakistan has either made full payment or will make payments from its national funds towards the purchase of 18 new F-16C/D Block 52 Fighting FalconBSE -4.69 % combat aircraft worth $1.43 billion, according to the internal report prepared by Congressional Research Service (CRS), an independent research wing of the Congress.

This includes F-16 armaments including 500 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles, 1,450 2,000-pound bombs, 500 JDAM Tail Kits for gravity bombs and 1,600 Enhanced Paveway laser-guided kits. These have cost Pakistan $629 million.

Pakistan has also paid $298 million for 100 harpoon anti-ship missiles, 500 sidewinder air-to-air missiles ($ 95 million) and seven Phalanx Close-In Weapons System naval guns ($80 million).

Pakistan received 26 Bell 412EP utility helicopters along with related parts and maintenance, val valued at $235 million under the Coalition Support.

Pakistan is also receiving military equipment with a mix of its national funds and America’s foreign military funding.

These include 60 Mid-Life Update kits for F-16A/B combat aircraft.

Pakistan has purchased 45 such kits, with all upgrades completed to date. This include 115 M-109 self-propelled howitzers.

Under Frontier Corps and Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund authorities, US has provided four Mi-17 multirole helicopters (another six were provided temporarily at no cost), four King Air 350 surveillance aircraft, and 450 vehicles.
Source please.I think this is rehashing of what has happened already. The 14 fighters may well be the ADF fighters which we received through Jordan AF.
Araz
 
what do u mean by 'Growler' capabilities

A dedicated aircraft for electronic warfare, like Jamming, detection etc.

Basically, it is based on the same fighter aircraft and instead of carrying only weapons, it will carry dedicated electronic weapons.

Growler is the electronic warfare version of the USN F-18 aircraft.
 
A dedicated aircraft for electronic warfare, like Jamming, detection etc.

Basically, it is based on the same fighter aircraft and instead of carrying only weapons, it will carry dedicated electronic weapons.

Growler is the electronic warfare version of the USN F-18 aircraft.
but it is also carry ARM and SEAD weapons not just electronic weapons:p:
 
The PAF is the DEFENSIVE air force. Its primary objective as outlined both within its psyche and the ever constant budgetary gloom that is Pakistan's economy is to ensure that Pakistan's airspace in kept secure in peacetime and that in wartime the enemy is not able to inflict the sort of damage that it wishes from the air on the Pakistan Army as it hold them off. In addition, it is required to provide support to the Army first and foremost in defensive operations in holding off a much larger force; and (as an extension) provide support to its offensive operations.[1]


After 71 it was also tasked with providing the Pakistan Navy the ability to attack the enemy and at the least harass them enough that they are not able to approach the coast of Pakistan to that distance until the PN fully deploys its assets which includes its submarines and its coastal missile boats for further harassing attacks and to provide cover and support for its main surface fleet force as it strives to protect the supply lines for Pakistan as they shift(and/or fallback) from Karachi towards the ancillary ports along the Balochistan coast.

As a tertiary role, the PAF is required( in the event that it needs to) to carry and delivery with a high degree of success Pakistan's nuclear weapons systems onto preselected and well-rehearsed targets within the enemy territory.(although most of Pakistan's missile systems and their deployment have made this role near redundant).


Now that we have established that the primary role of the PAF is to provide defensive support, we can focus on the term defensive when it comes to Pakistan's unique geographical needs and the size and proximity (along with much larger budget) of its primary threat in terms of what it will face from them in the near and later future. This requires us to go a little into history both from objectives and a little dabble into shaping events and international politics to see how the Indian psyche for warfare developed and then think of some possible implementations based on public knowhow and some assumptions.


The most important and most intelligent of these assumptions is:


The IAF and its planners and pilots are every bit as intelligent and well trained as those of the PAF


Whether that is true or not and to whatever it is skewed towards is irrelevant. What this allows us to do is to focus in on objective manner on what a nation such as Pakistan in its defensive mode can best utilize its resources against a nation such as India, which is in offensive mode.

Let’s assume as well for an instant, that India’s forced structure and growth are as they are today and will happen as they are planned to be regardless of how they came to be today and how they are influenced to become later on.


Facing such an adversary, there are certain clear expectations (or rather putting ourselves in the Indian military forces shoes) as to what their objectives are likely to be when facing a nuclear weapon state that they outnumber and certainly out territory. Knowing that their objectives that given the historical context and current context require them to demonstrate an ability to dismantle or at the very least devastate structures that support in their view terrorist activities in their country, along with preventing any interference in the accomplishment of these objectives while during the time of that current scenario and for the foreseeable future.


What this euphemistic expression of objective means is that the Indian military forces will be tasked to initially attack and destroy what they in their view terrorist training camps and springboards into India via air. This they anticipate and as a certainty know will result in interference and retaliation by the Pakistan military whose sphere of influence they will penetrate to achieve these objectives. This then means that the Indian forces will have to initially attack and destroy any aerial hindrance to their strike forces going after the terrorist infrastructure, and then as a secondary objective closing the gaps that allow infiltration to happen in India.


As an automatic requirement, this also entails causing enough damage to the Pakistani military that it forces them to capitulate and allow the Indian forces freedom of movement within the Pakistani territory in achieving their objectives against their designated terrorist threat. In a nutshell, the object is in India wishes to achieve are no different than what it has achieved in Bangladesh; neutralize the threat to India. The first expression of that desire was the removal of the threat India faced on the east, both in terms of military and economics via the exploitation of ethnic and religious lines (not different from our erstwhile masters the British) although by a guaranteed sucker punch to an already an ill-equipped, demoralized and badly led foe(which, in all fairness was just a bonus as initial Indian estimates of their Eastern offensive picture in a much more grueling battle to defeat the Pakistan Army had they followed better strategy and tactics as was assumed at the start) . General Manekshaw was not wrong when he said that he only undertook the offensive once he was sure that victory was certain.


Attempts to replicate the same success on the Western front were generally not planned, even if certain ambitious area commanders within the Indian military made the initial overtures that seem to belie that. The simple reason was that when it came to the western front the Indian military did not have the overwhelming numerical and strategic superiority that it possessed in the Eastern offensive in terms of its ground forces. However, its Air Force clearly outnumbered and out-equipped the Pakistan Air Force despite dishonest attempts by many Indian historians to paint it so in their attempt to out-boast the Pakistani authors. In addition, the Pakistani Air Force was tied down to absolute self-defense for operations in lieu of its restrictive role to support a counter offensive that never came.


At the end of the day however, despite its massive numerical superiority along with generally much improved training and tactics as compared to the last conflict; the Indian military learnt many important lessons:-


The first of which regarding its airforce was that its numerical and technological superiority notwithstanding; when it comes to offensive operations over Pakistani territory anything less than round the clock operations day and night will not succeed in bringing the Pakistani war machine in the west to a capitulating halt every time due to weak leadership. In addition, it has to prevent success of Pakistani counter air operations over its own territory both from a disruptive and morale point of view.


The second was that its support role to the Indian Army also had to be nothing less than a Blitzkrieg when it came to operations in the North and South. Both its failure and success in the Monabao-Tharparker offensive and at Longewalla respectively outlined the critical vulnerability that the Indian Army faced to air attacks (this also led to the serious attempts to procure Army air defense assets as a backup to the IAF). The IN ironically had very little change in its role to blockade Pakistan and metaphorically it is still focused to essentially choke Pakistan while it is pounded to a pulp as a knife was driven through it.


It was this deterrent of force(remember, the Kashmir insurgency and militant training and support into Indian Kashmir had resumed soon after 71) in this concept of a blitzkrieg that would cut through Pakistan regardless of NBC conditions whilst keeping its own civilian population relatively safe that was to serve as a warning to back down on Kashmir. The introduction of the nuclear spectrum only enforced this idea of how only a total destruction of Pakistan’s military capability was to ensure security for India’s western border despite the heavy cost (at that time India assumed Pakistan only had at maximum ten or so scientific warheads that could be brought to bear against its forces and the idea of them being used against civilian centers was considered a moral boundary that Pakistan may not cross to ensure the survival of its state and deterrent) and was eventually demonstrated in Brasstacks which had the Pakistani Army nearly browning its pants and Zia’s Cricket match antics. How this policy was essentially created to force an atmosphere for more compromise from Pakistan on Kashmir is a different discussion and not for this thread (technically a lot of it is not but will lead to be). How this doctrine and force structure stayed relatively constant and what caused it to change is important as follows:


This policy proved somewhat successful except for a brief period in the early to mid-90s when both states faced embargoes which for India also meant a dissolving primary supplier in the Soviet Union and ipso facto reliable upkeep of its equipment whilst Pakistan was still able to get good support out of its emerging giant China. This meant that whilst on paper India still held certain numerical and technological superiority over Pakistan, the lack of upkeep in this transformational period along with loss of a large cadre of its military officers to a growth spurt in the Indian Airline Industry and other economic prospects had its actual offensive capability somewhat uncertain especially in the shadow of the unsaid but well known nuclear overhang on Indian offensive operations. This also led to increased Pakistani confidence in supporting militancy in Kashmir that eventually had India resorting to responding in kind with sponsoring ethnic and sectarian strife and bombings in Pakistan in the early to mid-90s with support from Iran [2]


This continued perceived lack of potency along with fear of China ended up with India ( in my view) making the biggest blunder in terms of its moral upper hand in an all-out conflict with Pakistan by conducting the nuclear tests (assumed effect on Pakistani support for militancy in Kashmir). That allowed Pakistan to comfortably reveal its capability and take the moral barrier off in hitting Indian population centers and also gave Pakistan the ability to somewhat have a landmine strapped to its chest whilst it could go ahead and stab India without the danger of being shot. Kargil was the result of this false bravado (although there were other factors involved) and the result of it notwithstanding was at one point very shocking and damaging to the Indian position in Siachen and Kashmir but more so in the idea that regardless of how successful it was in beating Pakistanis in the long run, it was unable to prevent future Kargils as long as the nuclear overhang was there.

The quicker solution to the policy was the implementation of the Sunderji Doctrine under the moral high ground of no first strike and complete retaliation if so. The hope being that the effect of a blitzkrieg and the fear of nuclear weapons might force another Tashkent with much more favorable conditions to India. However, as Operation Parakaram showed; the time it took for such a large force to mobilize versus the capability of the Pakistani military to mobilize its defensive capabilities made the idea of the blitzkrieg look more like a meat grinder for both forces. In addition, the ability of international powers (namely the US and China) to warn Pakistan of critical flanking or surprise strikes due to the time it took to mobilize them made any tenable gains costly and impractical. In other words, India could and would achieve its objectives but its military would come out in such shape that an attack or offensive (as unlikely as it were) by another force such as China would lead to its certain defeat.

Hence, the objectives were revised and that is where the cold start/quick mobilization in which the Indian military is looking to be able to launch offensive operations in a very short notice along with a focus on network centric modernized military force capable of rapid changes in offensive and defensive roles and objectives came about. Since that has been fairly discussed to death, what is pertinent is how the effect of the policy created another change within this new doctrine which led to a much greater focus on rapid punishment attacks on a limited scale against known terrorist launch pads before any coordinated large scale attack on the purported supporting structure as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this post; this allows a certain diplomatic moral ground to offensive operations against the Pakistani military whilst restraining Pakistan from resorting to nuclear weapons that quickly.


So, what do these objectives entail in terms of equipment?

1. Air: The Aerial element of the Indian military should have capabilities to provide concrete offensive strike capabilities with guaranteed success against targets designated as terrorist infrastructure on day-1 as the very success of these strikes would set the mood for the rest of the conflict or even lead to an early favorable result such as a white flag at the UN or serious capitulation otherwise. This means that the strike groups must reach their targets at the required ToT and achieve an above 80% damage rate to their targets with VISUAL proof( as FLIR video or otherwise) which can be translated to diplomatic points abroad and political points at home. Any threats to the strike group must be neutralized before it gets to them and any losses must be minimized both during ingress and egress. This requires equipment that can both provide air to air firepower to sufficiently keep the air clear during a protracted time on station for strike aircraft (which in turn need to survive air defenses to deliver their payload with effective results)- OR – a strike group that can bypass the traditional guarded approaches and circumvent them to strike at targets and then fight their way out with minimal losses. In addition, the Indian Air Force also wanted the capability to be able to conduct longer range operations in the north where its targets are in many cases located deep inside China.

This is where the logical choice for this key puncher equipment came down to either the F-15 or a Su-27 derivative. With the former prone to embargoes and the long term relationship with Russia; the MKI emerged. With its payload and loitering capacity, the MKI could carry out both options for the IAF’s strike force built around Mirage-2000s or in itself provide the strike capability.


2. In case the strikes on day-1 are less than successful in their objectives of deterring Pakistan, provide follow up military softening strikes along with attacking other support structures deemed connected to terrorism which may entail ISI targets. [3] These operations will be centered around attacking PA defenses along the lines of incursion and stopping any PA regrouping/counterattacks along with keeping any PAF support irrelevant by ensuring air superiority over the area of operations and over all key centers of Pakistan Army logistic operations in support of their defenses whilst still carrying out strikes against both designated terrorist targets along with “hindrance” targets.

3. Ensure that the ground forces are able to hold enough ground in a very short set time allotted from Day-1 that they are close enough to Pakistani population and industrial centers that a tactical nuclear strike will also have the chance of threatening Pakistani civilian population to a large degree and creating less and less moral and cost incentive for Pakistan to use that gambit in the hope that it does not escalate to total war. Thereby delaying the timeframe when this decision can be brought to bear by Pakistani decision makers whilst creating bargaining chips on the negotiation table after the impending ceasefire that the international community will soon force along with giving Indian decision makers more room to not having to debate between escalation or total retaliation in case a tactical nuclear weapon is used on the Indian forces in Pakistani territory.


4. Helping the IN force a blockade of Pakistan within a timeframe that matches the week or ten days they hope to achieve their land based objectives by destroying or suppressing the effectiveness of Pakistan Navy’s surface and subsurface assets including the coastal defenses and harassing missile boats whilst making shipping impossible to anywhere except the farthest areas along the Baluchistan coast and hence irrelevant. This may also include supporting amphibious operations to secure flanking positions along the coast.


To achieve its first task the IAF has its MKIs, M2Ks and Rafale’s supported by its Tanker assets. The second and third involve all of the IAF’s assets and the fourth both IAF and IN assets whose ORBAT is not needed to be reproduced as it is well known.


Now that we have made some assumption as to what India may be looking to achieve, lets see what Pakistan then has to work with and what it needs to do. The first thing is looking at the constraints that Pakistan has and namely its airforce has vis-à-vis those laid down for the Indian military.


I. Ensuring that during both peacetime operations where there is no war but the threat of sudden war breaking out exists, there exists a capability to provide round the clock aerial defense and deterrence capability that preempts any sudden pre-emptive strikes on purported terrorist camps or otherwise.

II. Ensuring that its own infrastructure and capabilities along with those of the Army survive what is going to be a relentless onslaught with enough force capacity to last beyond a week-ten days of attack and hence prevent enemy objectives in being accomplished. This entails being aware of enemy aerial operations and being able to bring to bear the most shooters (and not the most weapons) to bear in the shortest amount to time so that it stresses their SA and overwhelms them and their strike forces from multiple angles which at the very least will cause them to abandon their strike objectives especially during the early hours of the conflict. To allow greater number of shooters means having assets that are able to be kept at such a high state of readiness for prolonged periods, able to generate a large number of sorties and be able to absorb losses affordably whilst still being effective at their defense mission.

III. Both the second and third also require close air support operations with a good degree of survivability via electronic protection against surface threats and using standoff systems to harass and slow down enemy ground forces.

IV. The ability to provide effective naval support both via aerial protection of key installations and assets along with the capability to successfully penetrate the defensive cover of the enemy surface fleet to carry out harassing strikes that make the enemy waste resources in extending its defensive circle and carry out more cautious movement in the sea.


Constraints & Considerations:

A. Unlike its adversary, Pakistan’s economy is generally in shambles and plagued by corruption at all levels of government and military. Which means that it not only does not have enough resources to procure the best equipment, it also struggles to provide the required training and flight hours needed to maintain the high standards it sets for itself otherwise.

B. The lack of depth for assets to retreat means that many of them have to have dispersal capabilities along with easy maintenance and support for quick turnaround times to ensure a high number of sorties. This means that in addition to having well trained pilots; the PAF needs to have MORE well trained pilots i.e. its pilot to aircraft ratio has to be high so that sortie rates are kept high along with keeping pilot fatigue low.[4]

C. The proximity of Pakistan’s primary airbases to its border and these key targets means that it needs assets that are all network centric along the lines of the Swedish defense setup so that defensive capabilities can be coordinated and prioritized keeping the first point in mind. Assets must be able to respond quickly and effectively in the most cost effective manner whilst maintaining a degree of survivability and repeated operations throughout the day.

D. Assets should be able to keep flying regardless of international relations and diplomatic constraints both in peacetime and wartime to ensure minimum levels of deterrence from air defense response and capability.

E. Losses in men may be difficult, but those in material should be capable of being replaced with some effectiveness from reliable supply lines.


Now that we have listed what drives the planning within the Pakistan Air Force, let’s come back to Pakistan and start looking at the basic misconceptions and delusions that make up the usual dramatic 9 o clock news type argument that the JF-17 was a mistake:


a) The JF-17 is the main force of the PAF:

Yes, the JF-17 is the most numerous fighter in the PAF and so had a lot of roles to play. BUT, it is NOT the main offensive punch of the PAF. There is another fighter, and it’s called the F-16(and a follow up later in a fifth gen aircraft as the need develops and budget becomes available) So then, the PAF wanted to acquire a light fighter to replace all its Air Defense fighters and it’s Strike Mirages (which in reality, are actually getting replaced by some F-16s and the JF-17 Block-III). The JF-17 first and foremost fulfills the requirements of A, B & C along with D and even E that the F-16 or any other western asset cannot provide. It does so whilst providing minimum capabilities to fulfill all or some tasks outlined in I, II, III and IV while the remaining gaps are fulfilled by the F-16.


b) "Yes, but if you survive after firing two BVRs and score a kill, you can re-engage in a different zone with the other two BVRs.Plus it(a heavier aircraft) can carry more 'heavy bombs' than JF-17, along with being able to carry pods on separate chin hardpoints and thus not wasting a weapon hardpoint. Ideal if you are going on a ground strike or anti-ship role."

No you won’t, because the chances that you will survive two BVRs with their associated evasive maneuvering and still score a kill means that you have already exhausted your time on station and/or that you are already exhausted from the ordeal. Aerial combat is sometime considered inglorious or rather disconnected by the grunts on the ground but if you ever get to meet a pilot after ACT his condition will make you think he ran a marathon. It is both physically and mentally draining. In WWII, Korean War, Vietnam there were pilots who were shot down in their second engagement because they were physically and mentally harangued after their first that their ability to make the right decisions were impacted. Even in GW-1. F-15Cs had all that capacity but after most engagements with the IQaF where they fired their BVRs and survived to tell the tale, the pilots were RTB namely because there were other fresher assets on station to take over.

Aircraft like the F-15 carry a lot of missiles so that they are able to fire enough to get a kill. and (that philosophy died out after more effective systems like the AMRAAM came online) be able to fight going into enemy territory and fight out of it. It was designed to be effective at air domination and not just air defense. The ultimate air fighting machine which is also why it costs $127 million dollars in today's terms. Yet, these same F-15s were STILL bounced by IqAF Mig-21s in WVR combat. Which only demonstrates the absolute vulnerability aircraft are in regardless of their BVR or weapons carrying capacity when over enemy territory which is something the IAF also has faced before and something they strived to overcome in their Cope India tactics.


Now, coming to bombs and close air support. The modern air defense environment that exists around today’s Indian battlegroup means that there is limited or no space to redo the feats of “8-Pass Charlie”. Between the ingress to target and egress the PAF CAS and interdiction mission has to deal with aerial and surface threats which it must defeat through a combination of electronic warfare and long range hip shots; this if successful will lead to the opportunity to drop a single weapons load which for the most part is irrelevant if of 2x1000 pound bombs or 10 x 500 pound bombs unless all of them are guided. This holds true for the F-16 as well for the JF-17 and any other platform. What the PAF needs is more AGM-65 and SDB type weapons to ensure multiple targets are attacked in a single pass or chances are that its asset will be shot down. Getting a bomb truck will not solve the problem as it can drop 10x 1000 pound bombs and they will have the same effect on a T-90 or Sarab as a 150 pound guided bomb will have. Which is why the focus all over the world is moving towards smaller weapons of which more can be carried rather than larger aircraft with greater carrying capacity.

c) The PAF can purchase a smaller number of larger assets to provide a high threat capability instead of the JF-17.

This is the most popular argument that seems to base all its pros on the idea that a larger aircraft that can carry more weapons is somehow more survivable. Let’s assume that we simply take size as the only cost factor and discard all real world costs that tend to multiply. The JF-17 is roughly 1/3rd of the Shenyang J-11s in size and so by this inference we will assume that the PAF could have bought at maximum 2/3rd of the JF-17 fleet size or 100 J-11s based on savings from not setting up a production line in Pakistan. This would mean that the total force size of the PAF would be 200 aircraft roughly with still the same area left to cover. Considering the disparity in number of aircraft versus the number of shooters needed to put up a defence vis-à-vis type availability (the MKI barely manages 65%) there will simply never be enough to put up an effective defense in all the areas required. Additionally, the inevitable losses that these heavier aircraft will take will be much more costly and time consuming to replace; in plain words, the PAF will be much less effective in terms of its objectives in providing effective support for its airspace whilst ending with a force that will dwindle much faster due to losses in the air and on the ground at times of conflict.



The JF-17 was designed to fulfill the EXACT needs of the PAF in the most cost effective manner possible vis-à-vis the threat environment it faced keeping in mind the constrains mentioned. Each air-force has a requirement to perform specific tasks within its force structure. The F-16 for e.g. was borne out of a need for a cheaper fighter to engage both the low end Migs and the high end migs in WVR and defeat them in the USAFE threat spectrum whilst DEFENDING Europe. The Gripen(whose early air defense loadout was no different than the JF-17) was designed to use better situational awareness and high maneuverability to offset numbers whilst still being cost effective for the Swedish budget. The swedes could have gone for a high end air superiority fighter much like the F-15.but their situation and requirements were different. Their air force was tasked to primarily DEFEND Sweden which is a small country with small strategic depth when compared to the threat she faced whilst her troops held off the enemy the best they could.


Considering that this doctrine only extended for Sweden whose enemy was perhaps pretty much en equivalent in terms of force disparity and (in the late 80s when the Gripen was being taken through its paces and conceived) facing an enemy with increasing numbers of Su-27s, Su-24s and Mig-29s which were fairly well equipped and potent for their relative time period; shall we consider that the swedes were making a mistake? (Considering they faced no sanctions and had a fairly respectable GDP). That all had to do with the need for a Defensive mentality; to stop the Soviet advance.





[1] which regardless of the many Jihadi nutjobs that roam this forum does not involve invading Dehli but capturing small but significant portions of Indian Punjab and critical flanking positions that make continued war very expensive for the enemy even if they eventually do win it

[2] Who were hitting back on the idea that the Saudis would get a bomb from Pakistan until AQ Khan was sent to assure them of our brotherly relations with all Muslim countries –aka the Ummah Chummah which in reality was giving Iran the oldest design of centrifuge that would have kept their program going and them happy whilst delaying it long enough so that the west could step in and keep them from actually getting a bomb

[3] However, as was found during the early days of Su-30MK operations; the engines and equipment were far from completely reliable and the operating costs prohibited using the asset for mundane missions such as point air defence and light close air support to any offensives that the IA might undertake as part of theatre battlegroup operations and therefore replacing everything with the MKI was found impractical and cost prohibitive.

[4] Pakistan has one of the highest aircraft to pilot ratio’s (1:2.5). By contrast the IAF has (1:0.8) which may also be a contributing factor in preventing conflict

This is why I keep coming back here.

Deepest Respect Sir.



India will not send that 200 jets all together at one place it will b coming from places where we dont have SAMs they can't enter from lahore as Lahore is heavily armed with SAMs and other parts also have SAMs they will enter from desert parts like thar or may b the part between Lahore and multan these are two little week parts they don't have guts to go in a place which is fully loaded with SAMs now what if they enter from Thar or the part b/w multan and Lahore .... Base minhas will initially deploy it's F-7 P interceptors + Mirage to counter them and for more support Thunder can b deployed to and these parts there r air defense units hiding they will also take part F-7 Mirage and Thunder will b enough as F-7 can intercept few as in interception you don't need maneuverability u need the best head-on shooting capability and our skybolt has it our mirage has a week head-on capability but they are good at tackling enemy and they can reach the area quickly as they are the fastest jet in PAF and our thunder can do the rest of close combat then later on F-16s will b deployed but only from no-9 sqn from sargodha there are F-16 block 15 in sargodha but after MLU upgrade they have reached block-52 standard as in anatolian eagle 2008 PAF's F-16 were able to shot EFT's one of the world's known maneuverable jets ....!!!!!! this will b the first thing gona happen then ....??? THE REST OF WAR ...!!!! the counter attacks then if a full scale war brokes out BVR combat capabilities are useless ...!!!!!! you know why ?????? both countries have AESA AWACS both will jam each other's long range radars as both have radar jaming pods and bohat have A level radar jaming capabilities so what ????? both countries get their radar's jamed ...!!!! it will again come to the dog fights that prity hard turn those battle tactics , bearing extra Gs and u know ...?? u know the history we r best in dog fights no matter they have more advanced more maneuverable jets v won ..... but now we also have 8 G thunder and 9 G viper and our Jf-17 block 3 will also b 9 G fighter .............................. wait one thing i showed the use of mirage ..... mirage still can play an important role and also is very good in deep strikes and night missions so after countering them we will attack back on Endia with use of Mirage 3 rose 1 and mirage 5 E and with mighty F-16 block 52 wich will use CFT's for longer range and sniper targeting pods ................!!

This however is what keeps me away :-/
 
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Source please.I think this is rehashing of what has happened already. The 14 fighters may well be the ADF fighters which we received through Jordan AF.
Araz

no US giving used F-16's to Pakistan.In 2015 14 are deliver yet and 4 left

USA F-16 Fighting Falcon
F-16A/B Block 15
F-16A/B Block 15 OCU
F-16C/D Block 50/52+
F-16A/B Block 15 ADF
F-16C/D Block 52

1983 40
2005 14
2010 18
2014 13
2015 14

Jordan Air force 13 f-16 have been upgraded in 2014 by Turkish Aerospace Industries in Ankara and are use in Pakistan air force these 14 planes are newly added in Pakistan air force

i am new in this forum so they are not allowing me to put a web link a here but u can search on google or on
the express tribune
 
So here we are again, banging our heads for which aircraft should have been procured and which shouldn’t. Well everyone is stuck to his point of view either of being in love with a particular fighter aircraft while dreaming it in PAF colors or being in his own analytical believes and judgment whether they are right or wrong.

So many heads, so many views and every head pushing his own agenda which he or she believes is right in their own minds and wants other to believe the same.

“JF 17 is The Wrong Omnirole Aircraft For PAKISTAN”,

Some members however believe the otherwise.

So is it really?

JF 17 project evolved into something potent, a real bargain warplane for an air force that lacked technological advancement such as BVR and look shoot down capabilities in past. The ‘Thunder Program’ brought what was sheerly needed to counter the enemy stationed as a next door neighbor, who not only was strong in numbers but also the technology as well. Since the project is a home grown one with the help of Chinese, it opened up many other doors from Westerns as well as Russians suppliers for the supply of sensitive technology and war equipment which was sanctioned before. Not to forget factors involved such as help in WOT, political and diplomatic influences etc.
JF-17 has indeed pulled many of those strings that went loose during 1990’s era and it will definitely strengthen the ties attached to those strings too, when the aircraft will be inducted in numbers and will further mature with future upgrades.

But the real question is, will this really suffice the purpose “completely” tomorrow and in coming future?

Which by the way the real purpose of this thread was.

Definitely no. Talking about air force, ever wonder why Americans are still not satisfied with what they have now? F16’s, F15’s, F18’s F22’s and so on are the most advance aircrafts in the world yet they are going for F35’s let alone other secret projects which are already underway.

Even in today’s air warfare PAF is inferior to quality and quantity to IAF in big numbers and a lot many of us agree to the fact and many other who don’t are perhaps obsessed by patriotism which I will not discourage because I feel as I am among those.

Anything stopping India right now from any misadventure is not the PAF or the other armed forces of the nation, but the only the possession of nuclear weapons.

It’s not that, we all as a nation don’t want other lucrative birds in PAF colors but we all tend to believe that this will not happen or this cannot happen or this will not be feasible, keeping in view of budget constraints, economic conditions, geopolitical issues and external politics etc.

Well to tell you all that, all these factors are with our nation since its inception and they have rather gone worst with number of years rather any improvement. Corruption, consistent political turmoil and injustice in our society are mumbling around our nation like its written in Pakistan’s constitution and there is no cure of it yet. Either the funds will be spread among political leaders and their co workers or will be laundered abroad rather for nation’s good cause. There is a history of it. So why not put them in use to enhance something somewhere, why not PAF or Navy instead, rather falling in corrupt hands or their bank accounts. So why not SU-35, JH-7 or anything else right away?
 
no US giving used F-16's to Pakistan.In 2015 14 are deliver yet and 4 left

USA F-16 Fighting Falcon
F-16A/B Block 15
F-16A/B Block 15 OCU
F-16C/D Block 50/52+
F-16A/B Block 15 ADF
F-16C/D Block 52

1983 40
2005 14
2010 18
2014 13
2015 14

Jordan Air force 13 f-16 have been upgraded in 2014 by Turkish Aerospace Industries in Ankara and are use in Pakistan air force these 14 planes are newly added in Pakistan air force

i am new in this forum so they are not allowing me to put a web link a here but u can search on google or on
the express tribune
U r saying that PAF has 99 F-16s right now.
 
I think the title should be changed to:

JF-17 is not an omni role aircraft.

Right or wrong is a separate debate, it is not meant to be an omnirole fighter to start with. JF-17 will be a multi-role fighter jet and is good at that. Specially considering the potential Blk-II and Blk-III upgrades, the plane will meet our requirements nicely.
 
can u elaborate ur point
He means that during the procezs of developments the engine thrust has been increased to the current 98 kn. Whether this is improvements to the engine alone or by sacrificing MTBO is something that is not clear. I suspect and wish it is the former as some improvements have been mads by the Chinese on RD93 or maybe by the Russians.
There is an iñteresting offshoot to this. The RD93MA is due to come out in 2018. The projected thrust is 98kn but the simple RD93 is producing similar thrust so what does one stand to gaiñ by a new engine other than FADEC and possibly longer MTBO. Unless thrust is projected to increase as well. We need the additional thrust to power the AESA and other goodies that will come with block 3.
Comments invited and welcome.
Araz
 
no US giving used F-16's to Pakistan.In 2015 14 are deliver yet and 4 left

USA F-16 Fighting Falcon
F-16A/B Block 15
F-16A/B Block 15 OCU
F-16C/D Block 50/52+
F-16A/B Block 15 ADF
F-16C/D Block 52

1983 40
2005 14
2010 18
2014 13
2015 14

Jordan Air force 13 f-16 have been upgraded in 2014 by Turkish Aerospace Industries in Ankara and are use in Pakistan air force these 14 planes are newly added in Pakistan air force

i am new in this forum so they are not allowing me to put a web link a here but u can search on google or on
the express tribune
I dont think anymore F16s have been inducted since the Jordanian ones.
 
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