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Is India prepared for a two-front war with Pakistan-China?
Our defence forces have been singularly unable to adjust the military thinking to the fact that we also possess nuclear weapons.
POLITICS
| THE BIGGER PICTURE | 4-minute read | 14-03-2016
MANOJ JOSHI
But that was not just the Air Force speaking, but the considered view of the government of India framed in an operational directive given by the defence minister to the three services in 2009. It enjoins them to be ready for a two-front war, never mind that the services have never in the past two decades been resourced to fight even one short war with one adversary.
Threats
There are several issues here. First is the question of assessing the nature of threats to India's security. Surely, with a million plus Army, a 600 plus combat aircraft and a powerful Navy, India is not exactly a pushover, even for a Sino-Pak combine in a conventional war.
Second, the two-front scenario has been the proverbial nightmare that India has confronted since the mid-1960s. It probably came closest to fructifying in the September 1965 India-Pakistan war when China issued an ultimatum to India to cease fire, and also moved some forces in the Sikkim area to aid beleaguered Pakistan.
Also read - China reorganising military, does Modi have a plan?
Our Soviet alliance checked China in the 1971 war, and there were never any serious indications that Beijing would indeed get into the fight, despite Henry Kissinger egging China on to attack India.
During the Kargil War when Pakistan sought Chinese help, even the rhetoric was absent and Beijing politely told Pakistan to get Washington to pull its chestnuts out of the fire.
Third is the more serious issue of nuclear weapons. Most reasonable people will assume that a state known to have nuclear weapons is likely to use them only in the face of mortal danger.
Also read - What US cosying up with Pakistan over nuclear talks says about a clueless India
Even if India shot off just ten nuclear weapons, they would be enough to destroy two major cities and kill tens of millions of people in Pakistan or China and, of course, the other way around as well. Which leader would contemplate such an outcome?
The Chinese are much more focused on this issue and believe that the chances of all-out war are remote. They prepare their forces to win what they call "informationised local wars" whether on the seas or the land.
Weapons
India has been singularly unable to adjust its military thinking to the fact that it also possesses nuclear weapons. This is because the politicians have decreed that nuclear weapons are not really weapons, they are political instruments meant to be used only for retaliation, or to prevent nuclear blackmail.
Also read - H-Bomb: Rest of the world just as dangerous as North Korea
So, while the weapons delivery systems are embedded in the military, their command and control is entirely civilian. Most military personnel do not know anything about India's nuclear capabilities and act on the belief that their job is to fight a conventional war, while the government of the day will hopefully come through if it goes nuclear.
While the civilians must, indeed, command the nuclear forces, they must understand that they are, in the ultimate analysis, weapons, resting at the very top of the escalatory ladder. Militaries may not control the employment of such weapons, but they should be fully cognisant about their use and integrate them in their planning scenarios.
"Campaigns"
One consequence of mentally separating nuclear and conventional weapons is that the outlook of the Indian military has not changed. So, it still sees itself conducting World War II like "campaigns" against adversaries. The Army continues to hold a large fleet of tanks in its armoury, even though the plans that were made for their use have been shelved because they will trip Pakistan's red lines.
India need not unilaterally disarm, but it could consider a verifiable reduction of armour - the most aggressive land weapons system - with Pakistan.
Also read - Why India must worry but not panic over Pakistan's nuclear cry
Besides enhancing stability in India-Pakistan relations, the money saved could be utilised for enhancing the mobility and firepower of our forces facing China.
The Modi government has a unidimensional focus on modernising the equipment of the military; perhaps it should provide some leadership in modernising their organisation and strategy.
And, in the meanwhile, initiate a conversation with China and Pakistan about nuclear weapons and their dangers.
(Courtesy ofMail Today.)
Is India prepared for a two-front war with Pakistan-China?
Our defence forces have been singularly unable to adjust the military thinking to the fact that we also possess nuclear weapons.
POLITICS
| THE BIGGER PICTURE | 4-minute read | 14-03-2016
MANOJ JOSHI
- 342
Total Shares
But that was not just the Air Force speaking, but the considered view of the government of India framed in an operational directive given by the defence minister to the three services in 2009. It enjoins them to be ready for a two-front war, never mind that the services have never in the past two decades been resourced to fight even one short war with one adversary.
Threats
There are several issues here. First is the question of assessing the nature of threats to India's security. Surely, with a million plus Army, a 600 plus combat aircraft and a powerful Navy, India is not exactly a pushover, even for a Sino-Pak combine in a conventional war.
Second, the two-front scenario has been the proverbial nightmare that India has confronted since the mid-1960s. It probably came closest to fructifying in the September 1965 India-Pakistan war when China issued an ultimatum to India to cease fire, and also moved some forces in the Sikkim area to aid beleaguered Pakistan.
Also read - China reorganising military, does Modi have a plan?
Our Soviet alliance checked China in the 1971 war, and there were never any serious indications that Beijing would indeed get into the fight, despite Henry Kissinger egging China on to attack India.
During the Kargil War when Pakistan sought Chinese help, even the rhetoric was absent and Beijing politely told Pakistan to get Washington to pull its chestnuts out of the fire.
Third is the more serious issue of nuclear weapons. Most reasonable people will assume that a state known to have nuclear weapons is likely to use them only in the face of mortal danger.
Also read - What US cosying up with Pakistan over nuclear talks says about a clueless India
Even if India shot off just ten nuclear weapons, they would be enough to destroy two major cities and kill tens of millions of people in Pakistan or China and, of course, the other way around as well. Which leader would contemplate such an outcome?
The Chinese are much more focused on this issue and believe that the chances of all-out war are remote. They prepare their forces to win what they call "informationised local wars" whether on the seas or the land.
Weapons
India has been singularly unable to adjust its military thinking to the fact that it also possesses nuclear weapons. This is because the politicians have decreed that nuclear weapons are not really weapons, they are political instruments meant to be used only for retaliation, or to prevent nuclear blackmail.
Also read - H-Bomb: Rest of the world just as dangerous as North Korea
So, while the weapons delivery systems are embedded in the military, their command and control is entirely civilian. Most military personnel do not know anything about India's nuclear capabilities and act on the belief that their job is to fight a conventional war, while the government of the day will hopefully come through if it goes nuclear.
While the civilians must, indeed, command the nuclear forces, they must understand that they are, in the ultimate analysis, weapons, resting at the very top of the escalatory ladder. Militaries may not control the employment of such weapons, but they should be fully cognisant about their use and integrate them in their planning scenarios.
"Campaigns"
One consequence of mentally separating nuclear and conventional weapons is that the outlook of the Indian military has not changed. So, it still sees itself conducting World War II like "campaigns" against adversaries. The Army continues to hold a large fleet of tanks in its armoury, even though the plans that were made for their use have been shelved because they will trip Pakistan's red lines.
India need not unilaterally disarm, but it could consider a verifiable reduction of armour - the most aggressive land weapons system - with Pakistan.
Also read - Why India must worry but not panic over Pakistan's nuclear cry
Besides enhancing stability in India-Pakistan relations, the money saved could be utilised for enhancing the mobility and firepower of our forces facing China.
The Modi government has a unidimensional focus on modernising the equipment of the military; perhaps it should provide some leadership in modernising their organisation and strategy.
And, in the meanwhile, initiate a conversation with China and Pakistan about nuclear weapons and their dangers.
(Courtesy ofMail Today.)
Is India prepared for a two-front war with Pakistan-China?
