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http://www.thecordobafoundation.com/attach/CIR_EngArabic_09_WEB.pdf
Arab and Muslim National Security: Debating the Iranian Dimension
In contemplating the relationship between Iran and the Islamic movements in the Arab world there is very little to prevent the latter from organising the tenets of this relationship from a religious, Sunni perspective. The real dilemma, however, lies in the wheels of history which has pulled the world much closer to a modern democratic state with very little role for religion and religious discourse. Iran, on other hand, draws upon history and past events to revive sectarian belief systems in many Arab countries as part of its efforts to shore up its political influence through religious sectarianism.
What are the criteria – for regulating and assessing the relationship with Iran – that these Islamic movements and Arab countries should adopt especially since it is very likely that these movements will have a major leadership role to play? Should the Palestinian issue and a general religious dimension be the basis of this relationship? Will this not pose a major threat to Arab national security such as the case with Iraq whose demographic changes over the past 150 years have distanced it from the Arab order?
Syria, Lebanon, the events in Yemen and the gradual conversion of the Zaidi sect to the teachings of Al-Ithna Ashriya (The Twelver Shi’ism) are all cases in point in addition to Iran’s attempts to covert the Alawites of Turkey to Twelver Shi’ism. 1
Conversely, should we adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the principles of democracy and UN resolutions whose own Enlightenment project championed faith as a purely personal matter. It is worth noting that countries like France, the US and Britain are revisiting their own Enlightenment-based modes of thinking due to a firm belief that these modes have negatively impacted their national security.
A brief history of the Islamic Republic of Iran
The first to conquer Iran was the Caliph Abu-Bakr As-Siddiq. During the reign of Omar Ibn Al-Khattab, Muslim conquests expanded as far as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Most of the Farsi (Persian) population converted to Islam and were eventually governed by the Umayyad, Abbasids, Kurds, Seljuks, Ghaznis and Khwarazmis.
The Mughal Empire (Mongol Il Khans, not Mughal Timurids in India) which ruled Iran destroyed almost all traces of the Islamic civilizations that preceded them. Turco-Mongol dynasties ruled the country until the beginning of the 16th century when the Safavids Shiite dynasty sought to convert the whole country to the Shiite sect by force. This marked a turning point in Iran’s history and the beginning of a fierce sectarian struggle with the Ottoman empire. Iraq formed the stage for many of these conflicts resulting in the disappearance of most of its urban centres, even more than they were destroyed by the Mongols. The population of Basra, for example, was reduced to as few as 5000 people in 1840, most of whom were slaves imported from Zanzibar. 2
This shift to the Shiite Islam created a rift between Iran and the rest of the Islamic world, a historical disjuncture that was destined to form the basis of all future policies. The Salavid dynasty was gravely weakened and soon made way for other dynasties such as the Afshari, Zandi, Qajari, Pahlavi before the establishment of the Islamic republic under the leadership of Khomeini in 1979.
Who is the ruler of Iran?
Iran is governed by a number of interrelated power centres; some are official (constitutional government) and others unofficial like the politicoreligious institutions and semi-military forces under the leadership of influential clergy. The president is entrusted with running the day to day affairs of the country and has no authority in determining strategic policies of foreign and domestic politics or any control over the army or security apparatuses, all of which fall within the jurisdiction of the Supreme leader who runs the country through a network of clergy in collaboration with the office of the president. Unofficial centres of power control the direction of Iranian politics through the person of the president who has very little say in these matters. This decision-making dualism gives rise to many conflicts in Iran with the likelihood of a full-blown confrontation one day between the Supreme leader and the Council of Guardian Council on the one hand and the parliament on the other.
The official constitutional leadership of Iran comprises a number of institutions: The Assembly of Experts, the Supreme Leader, the president, the parliament, the cabinet, the judiciary, state radio and television, the army, the Revolutionary Guard and security apparatuses.
The unofficial centres of power comprise four overlapping entities: The centre is represented by the most influential clergy in parliament, the government, shura councils and the judiciary. The second entity consists of the highest-ranking officials other than the clergy. The third entity comprises figures from the revolutionary committees, the Basij, security apparatuses, and senior media officials. The fourth entity is represented by civil society figures and former government officials. This last one mediates between the regime and civil society to demand social and political reforms peacefully and from within the system.
All these entities are controlled by the Revolutionary Islamic leadership made up of clergy and other figures. It would be reductionist to label either of the two parties as moderate or extreme since their positions tend to shift according to the issue at hand. Iranians, however, refer to the two sides as Islamic left or the new left, and the Islamic right and progressive right-wing. These centres of power notwithstanding, the revolutionary government cannot exercise total political and intellectual control over the country. A grey area exists within which many members of the clergy -- many of whom were the original supporters of the revolution and wield a lot of power among the people -- operate in order to carry out peaceful reforms. The state’s attempts to neutralise these figures for what they perceived were their too liberal stands vis-a-vis the economy and social issues have not been very successful. Among these are the Freedom Movement of Iran and several reformist groups under guidance of Abdul-Karim Suresh and the secularist Iranian Nationalist Party, in addition to a big group of influential clergy who reject Khomeini’s and the current Supreme Leader’s theories about the notion of the supreme leader. Finally, there are smaller groups whose aims is to overthrow the regime such as the Marxist armed group Mojahedin-eKhalq (MEK), the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran and some Sunni Islamist thinkers.
Despite all these clash of interests, Iran has succeeded in securing strategic victories such as its gains in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bahrain, Yemen, and the eastern parts of Saudi Arabia are almost under the sway of the Iranian government. Syria, however, will in all likelihood be a huge setback for Iran once the revolution there ousts the regime in effect severing Iran’s ties with the Shiites in Lebanon -- almost thirty years of hard work totally wasted.
Arab National Security: A myth or a reality?
Is it feasible to speak of an Arab national security supported by all Arab countries or are there as many forms of security as there are Arab countries? What are the basic components of such Arab national security?
“National security” is a modern political term which refers to a country’s ability to safeguard itself through the use of economic, military and political force. Food security, energy and military power are indispensable for national security. Western definitions of the term try to steer clear of including cultural security or what some prominent Western politicians referred to as “preserving Western way of life” during the War on Terror, a definition with Western cultural and religious undertones.
What are the pillars of the Arab national cultural security from the perspective of Islamic movements in power or about to assume power in the Arab world? What are the bases of Arab Islamic culture and is there room for disagreement with other perspectives with regards to interpreting the movement of history and to what extent?
Points of discussion:
1 Can Iran – with its current cultural structure and its national security strategies – be considered a threat to the national and cultural security of the Arab-Islamic world? If so, how does that threat compare in proportion to the threats posed by the US and Israel? The Turkish experience in this regard could be examined to explore its relationship with the US and the rise of Islamic movements there.
2 How can we explain the strategic differences between the various Islamic movements’ approaches to the Iranian problem? Undoubtedly, geography and the Palestinian issue are the two most important reasons but if the Islamic movements have not been able to reach a consensus on how to regulate their relationship Iran, how can they possibly formulate a comprehensive approach that could also win the approval of the opposition who share power with the Islamists?
3 What are the pillars of this national security and is the Islamic culture a main component? If so, how can this culture be defined? If there is a consensus on the need to secure an Arab national security, can the Islamic movement offer a precise definition of such security that would remove it from the realm of the theoretical to the realm of the practical and bring together the security of the Gulf, North Africa, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent?
Key thoughts and ideas from the discussion in chronological order:
Participants engaged in a lengthy debate about Arab national security.
1 National security is a term associated with the birth of the modern nation state. Nations reach a consensus on their national security by prioritizing threats and coordinating efforts between various security and political apparatuses for the purposes of protecting the state through economic and military power.
2 Democratic countries usually avoid references to cultural security allowing for more individual freedoms, what Western politicians fondly refer to as “the Western way of life”. A sudden realisation that local cultures are losing ground to immigrant cultures and religions has prompted Europe and the US to reconsider their original position on the matter especially in light of the fact that most Westerners are not very keen on the religious aspects of their identities.
3 National security in Europe and the US is determined by influential political figures and reflects the spirit of the times. The US National Security Council, for example, formulates policies for both the president and security apparatuses. The US army creed of the 1960s is different from that of the 21st century, for instance. In our part of the world, many Islamic leaders formulate policies and address issues related to national security in a manner that is not consistent with the needs of the time.
4 We are currently witnessing the birth of new economic, political and cultural leaderships with their own vision and ideas about national security. Evaluating the dangers posed to our national security may lead to disagreements on how best to tackle them. It is, thus, imperative we agree on what defines our national security and accord each a certain level of priority to avoid the kinds of disagreements that have wreaked havoc with the Islamic Movement and its ability to attract popular support.
5 One is here reminded of the fact that several US military and security apparatuses had prior knowledge of Japan’s intention to attack Pearl Harbour but the lack of coordination led to a miscalculation of the risks, hence the decision to establish the National Security Council.
6 A question may be posed at this juncture: what are the priorities of Islamic and Arab national security and why are all these disagreements among Islamic movements about evaluating the risks posed to these forms of national security?
7 The problem of prioritising elements of national security is not limited to Islamic movements. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, several Arab countries grappled with the notion of national security. Prior to the Arab Spring, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt were considered the biggest threat to state security but now with the Brotherhood in power, many research centres, media institutions and security apparatuses are finding it difficult to reconcile this new reality with their entrenched beliefs about the Brotherhood as a major threat.
8 Contemporary Islamic movements have not come up with any solid theories on how best to approach national security for various reasons. The political upheavals of the past two years have been marked by an inability to agree on the basic elements of national security. The conflict between Islamists and governments which has polarised the masses began with the Camp David Accords which the Islamists and most Egyptians fiercely opposed but upon assuming power Islamists realised that national unity dictated they respect the agreement for the time being.
9 Is it possible to formulate new approaches to foreign policy and international relations similar to the ones devised by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu which could then be adopted by government institutions and religious and political organisations? Alternatively, are there more urgent solutions to the current crises?
10 Islamic movements, especially in Egypt, seem at a loss as to how to deal with Iran. There appears to be huge gaps in their understanding of the cultural and religious dimensions of Iranian foreign policy, especially Iranian influence on some parts of the Arab world but these gaps are being gradually tackled particularly following the political upheavals in Syria.
11 We assume wrongly there is a consensus within Islamic movements on the assessment and prioritisation of dangers to national security. For example, are threats posed to religious and cultural identity greater than those posed by occupation? There are many reasons at the heart of these disagreements, some geographic while others are cultural pertaining to each locale’s perception of Western powers.
12 The notion of national security, or the term ‘security’ has very negative connotations in the Arab world where they have been inextricably linked to the popular imagination with oppression, intelligence services, persecution, and torture. Islamic leadership in general do not possess a clear understanding of the meaning of national security.
13 Threats to national security may not be in the form of a state or a regime but any entity. Clear and present danger that comes from an enemy, Israel for example, would not be a bone of contention between any parties but the problem lies with ‘hidden’ enemies.
14 Threats to national security are those that represent an existential danger to country or a population, not a system of government. A group of people converting from one religion to another would constitute a great demographic threat that could give rise to sectarian and intellectual conflict. Such demographic pockets in some Arab countries pose a threat to society regardless of how small they are.
15 We need to operate under the framework of an Islamic Movement which in its inception was fairly homogenous. Unfortunately, that is no longer the case and it is the aim of these meetings to create a consensus on the threats facing Arab countries.
16 Being oblivious to these threats could lead to the fragmentation of Islamic movements, especially the major ones. Many feel it would be pointless to support those Islamic movements that are incapable of facing up to these challenges and threats.
17 There is security on the level of the nation-state but there is no Arab, national or Islamic security. Most of the Arab countries worked hard to satisfy the eastern and western blocs during the Cold War. Even a country like Sudan could not find support or protection from neighbouring countries when it was divided.
18 The same issues plague Islamic movements. Although Islamic movements in the Arab world may seem on the surface to be homogeneous and inspired by the same intellectual sources, there is lack of coordination and total chaos as evidenced by what happened in Iraq and Syria. Palestine is probably the only issue these movements agree on.
19 There were disagreements on the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. These movements do not adhere to a single strategic framework that would allow them to formulate unified policies in cases of emergencies like, for example, the current situation in Syria and Iraq.
20 Coordination is a must, not only at the level of leaderships but middleleadership and executive committees.
21 One cannot debate the issue of Islamic movements without referring to their style of government which follows some general rules of politics such as the well-known saying that there are no permanent friends or enemies but permanent interests.
22 Turkey’s political success lies in its flexibility in dealing with various issues including its relationship with Israel. It is important that we do not allow emotions to cloud our perception of international relations. Many Islamists criticised the Egyptian government for opening channels of communication with the Iranian governments and considering it part of the solution to the Syrian dilemma. The reality of Iran’s influence cannot be ignored and if Egypt can find a solution -- in collaboration with Iran -- then that might save the lives of tens of thousands of people.
23 The Egyptian government should be given the chance to engage in political manoeuvres especially in light of the pressures exerted by Gulf countries and some international and domestic elements on the young government. This kind of manoeuvre has a precedent in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s decision to deal with the Iraqi regime which was simultaneously oppressing its Iraqi sister movement.
24 Coordinating efforts between Islamic movements could be to the detriment of some local issues since these movements are accused of exporting their ideas and of being translational.
25 Sometimes the threat from another country could be misjudged or underestimated or overestimated. What are the criteria that Islamic movements should draw upon to properly evaluate these dangers? Maybe agreeing on some criteria would help unify our vision.
26 If we take, for example, the Islamic Movement in Iraq, we will notice that it is facing serious challenges from expanding Turkish economic interests, Iranian cultural and sectarian influence, and Kurdish expansionism. So, how is it to react to all these threats and which ones should be prioritised?
27 What are the Shari’a bases for prioritising these threats? In the Iraqi example, can it be argued that the Kurdish nationalist ambitions are more dangerous than the Shiite ones?
28 Does the term “national security” refer to the national security of the Muslim umma, the Islamic group or all the Arab Muslim states?
29 Threats to national security rest on three axes: identity, land and resources. It is our task to preserve all three.
30 Our traditional point of reference when speaking about threats to our national security are the United States, Israel and Russia (while it occupied Afghanistan). Israel still lives in the Arab consciousness as the biggest threat to Arab Islamic culture. But Iran has emerged over the past two years as a major source of threat to the Arab world.
31 Prior to the Syrian revolution, there was no consensus on what constitutes the greatest threat to our national security, but it has since become evident that the Iranian threat is much bigger than American and Israeli threats.
32 Islamic movements have to take this shift into consideration. Is this the right approach? Will it secure our national security in the future? Some have argued that the old priorities remain about what poses the gravest threat to our existence, culture and identity.
33 Temporary interests should not blind us to glaring facts. Those calling for an alliance with Iran should remember that it is a huge threat to our culture and religion.
34 We emphasise that national security and its priorities are subject to change all the time and are not constant.
35 When we speak of national security, we sometimes mean the security of the state. In the example of Egypt, national security refers to Egyptian national security.
36 Determining national or Islamic security through the experience of Islamic movements is very difficult because these movements used to be considered a threat to national security by ruling elite and the state security apparatuses. This means an Islamic movement is not really in a position to formulate a comprehensive plan for securing national security that all powers within the state could possibly agree upon, let alone other Arab countries.
37 Islamic movements have inherited countries whose security is threatened by the United States, Iran, Israel and deep states.
38 There are successful models like the Turkish experience and Hamas’ success in putting together a security apparatus capable of facing up to external threats. What should be our point of departure; with that which is being threatened or with the power threatening us?
39 We should examine one specific source of threat, for example the Iranian threat, and develop strategies for warding it off without engaging in the more laborious process of formulating a general understanding of what constitutes Islamic national security.
40 We should pay attention to other threats we are more likely to ignore. For example, if we compare the cultural threat of Western media, we may realise it is a bigger threat to our culture than Israel. That would entail we arrive at a specific understanding and definition of what is meant by national security.
41 We share a lot with non-Muslim societies because of media penetration and advances in technology. It is thus impossible to formulate an understanding of national security without taking into consideration other nations that share our views and ideas.
42 Geographic distance is a huge obstacle in appreciating the nature of threats. Those living in Morocco may find it difficult to comprehend the Iranian threat to Iraqi integrity. In the aftermath of the US occupation of Iraq, an Iraqi military leader remarked that everyone knows that the US is an occupying force but the bigger threat comes from Iran which has sought to change the cultural and religious identity of Iraq by gradually controlling all its institutions.
43 When the Islamic Movement talks about national and Islamic security, we should have a clear vision about political, economic and cultural security. What is it that we are hoping to achieve - political stability or power-sharing? Economic security and self-sufficiency or a stable culture immune to foreign influences?
44 By lacking a clear vision, the Islamic Movement itself poses a threat to national security.
45 Twenty three years after coming to power, the Sudanese government has failed to find viable solutions to its economic problems and the high levels of unemployment. It appears that very little of the theoretical literature of the movement in Sudan has been of any use in finding real solutions.
46 There are major shortcomings within Islamic movements in reaching a consensus on the basic tenets of their strategies.
47 Extremism and chaos make it very difficult to reach a unified vision for national security.
48 Islamic movements have a duty to self-reform. It is our belief that there is a pressing need to bring Islamic leaderships together to formulate strategies of governance that reflect the needs of modern societies.
49 Islamic movements do not possess any viable experiences of government they could draw upon. Neither Sudan, nor Iran or Saudi Arabia represent models that could be adopted.
50 Iran represents the biggest threat and poses a direct political, security and cultural risk of which Iraq is the prime example.
51 Iran invested a lot of money and effort destroying Iraq from within through bribery and purchasing loyalties.
52 The difference between the US and Iran is that the former and its agents are rejected by our societies but Iran infiltrates through people who carry out its agenda under the cover of religion with the aim of destroying our history, religion and culture.
53 The issue of national security is first and foremost academic and requires lot of research. Our group today is simply made up of Islamic leadership from various countries who may not be the best to formulate strategies for securing national security.
54 Islamic movements should coordinate more to ensure their political stands are more homogeneous. It is not yet unclear why there seems to be a great chasm between Islamic movements over whether to support the Syrian revolution or not.
55 Prior to the Arab Spring, there was a political apparatus in the UK regulating and coordinating, albeit quite loosely, the work of the Islamic movements but that is no longer the case although the need of such an apparatus now is more than ever.
56 Islamic movements need practical measures more than theoretical ones since, in theory at least, they seem to agree that the biggest sources of threat are the US, Israel and Iran.
57 We don’t disagree over the need to support the efforts of the Syrian people but this necessitates better organisation and more meetings. We should not also forget that there are disagreements even among the members of the same Islamic movement in every country.
58 No one contests the fact that the Islamic movement lacks any clear theoretical vision which is why, when faced with any political contingency, these movements tend to draw upon what is available out there until they formulate their own means of solving problems.
59 The raison d’etre of the Islamic Movement is essentially political so it is a grave strategic mistake to remain without a comprehensive political theory. The Movement began after the collapse of the Ottoman empire and the colonial onslaught on the Arab world which resulted in dividing up Arab and Muslim nations. Decades of political marginalisation meant the Movement has not been able to formulate its own theoretical approach to governance.
60 What is national security for nations? Is it political, economic, geographic or cultural security? Economic threats are usually the result of some nations’ attempts to impoverish other nations. There are threats to our moral codes that stem from cultural and media invasions of other cultures.
61 Iran is geographically and socially linked to us. During the reign of the Shah, the Iranian threat was of a military nature, not a religious or sectarian one but the 1979 Revolution changed all that. Khomeini’s theory of the Velayat e-Faqih (Guardianship of Islamic Jurists) shifted Iranian ambitions and made them more expansionist in association with a sectarian and cultural war against the region.
62 As Islamic movements, we share with other non-Islamist parties their vision of what constitutes a geographic and economic threat to our countries but they don’t share our view of cultural threats.
63 It is true that Turkey poses an economic threat to Arab Muslim countries (for example, building dams along the Tigris and Euphrates and flooding our markets with cheap goods that weaken our economic base). But as an Islamic Movement, we believe that this threat is not as dangerous as those attempts to reshape our identity, values and consequently, our history.
64 Some countries in Northern Africa and Egypt may choose to deal with Iran to serve its economic interests without giving much thought to the cultural and intellectual threat posed by Iran to countries in the Gulf and Iraq.
65 We need cultural programs that would protect Muslim societies and similar approaches to reform Shiite thought if at all possible. We should strive to encourage Shiites to rethink many of their theories and approaches if they wished to avoid conflict and play a positive role in the region.
66 Portraying Iran as a monster and placing it on par with Israel and the United States is a grave mistake. Each one poses a different risk and thus requires a different strategy to deal with.
67 In the introduction to this briefing paper, it was noted that Islamic movements are gradually adopting a less sectarian and more democratic forms of thought while Iran is doing the exact opposite leaving the door open for it to spread Shiite thought without much resistance from the political secular approaches that are slowly taking root in some Arab countries. What are the means available to stop that from happening?
68 Not only is Iran a threat to the Arab Spring but the Arab Spring is a threat to Iran as well. Here we ask if the Arab Spring has the power to threaten Iran? The Iranian project in the region had previously expanded due to the absence of an Islamist project that could challenge its ambitions since most Islamist movements were persecuted by Arab regimes and the only available option was the Turkish model which arrived too late.
69 The Iranian threat is not only in cultural in nature. A study by Durham University (UK) exposed the Iranian economic infiltration in the 6th of October city. Iran succeeded in this feat by recruiting Iraqi businessmen of Iranian origins who worked in the Revolutionary Guard. Mubarak’s government reacted by closing down some of these companies which posed a great threat to the economy.
70 There were virtually no real efforts or intellectual endeavours to put an end to the Iranian sectarian onslaught especially following the occupation of Iraq. There were a number of Wahhabi or Salafi efforts but nothing else. Adnan Zarzour recently authored a book, The Sunna between Sunnis and Twelvers and another study by Mohammad Ammara in Al-Azhar journal about Muhib Adeen Alkhabi’s views on the Shiite sect.
71 Reaching a consensus on Arab and Islamic national security among Islamic movements requires that we abandon the state of polarisation we are currently witnessing.
72 Iran was at one point the target of a Western conspiracy and in our opinion it was not Iran that initiated this attack against the Muslims. It simply swallowed the Western bait of pitting the Sunnis against the Shiites. Many among us believe that we should not wage a war against Iran since it is a Muslim country but Iran colluded with the West in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. We no longer have any choice but to defend ourselves against Iran.
73 We are not worried about Iran’s cultural project because it is irrational and holds a belief system too absurd to attract anyone. It is the demographic expansion, such as the one in Syria that we should be worried about.
74 Islamic Fiqh (jurisprudence) has a theory about fending off attackers. It applies to Iran but not to Israel because in the case of Iran our only purpose is to ward off any attacks and defend ourselves.
75 Although there is a consensus among Islamic movements that Iran poses a great threat but some of the statements about this matter are sometimes no more than diplomatic proclamations than statements that reflect what these movements truly believe.
76 We need to be more precise when making such statements to avoid giving out the wrong impressions.
77 Some conferences held under the pretext of bringing Muslims together are large-scale projects funded by Iran and are often used to serve Iran politically and undermine our religious and historical frames of reference.
78 We cannot help but wonder why Iran funds and supports holding these religious conferences and dialogues in countries with no record of sectarian strife but refuses to hold them in countries that have a long history of sectarian disagreements such as Iraq, Iran (Lebanon?) and Iran. The answer is because Iran fans the fires of sectarian hatred.
79 We are in agreement that Iran has a sectarian, ethnic, Persian agenda and that it buys people’s loyalties and leaders in the Muslim world. If we had our own agenda, we would be doing the same. The problem lies in us as an ineffective party. Where are our central plan and our strategies?
80 We stress that Iran is part of a much bigger project and it has swallowed the bait. It is the West that will reap the benefits of a conflict between Shiites and Sunnis. We need to examine those facts very carefully.
81 It is in the very nature of Shiite thought to reject any other identity. It thrives on disagreements and differences with other sects and is constantly in search for a political being. The US did not exist back when the Safavids ruled over Iran and yet Iran was in direct conflict with the rest of the region like it is today.
82 Iran will spare no effort in colluding with any external power to launch attacks against Arab and Muslim countries to alter their religious identities. The US would not have succeeded in occupying Iraq and Afghanistan without Iranian help. Iran even had dealings with Israel during the Iraq-Iran war.
83 Iran not only helped the United States but the latter actually handed over Iraq to Iran and allowed it to expand into Syria. Several other Western countries supported Shiite expansionism in the region. France which used to be the Maronites biggest supporter shifted its allegiance to Syria and its Lebanese allies.
84 If Iran persists in this approach, it will incur hefty losses because in the end it will be left fighting the great majority of the Arab Islamic world. The first sign that it is losing the war is the gradual deterioration of its Syrian ally who is the main supporter of Iran’s allies in Lebanon.
1 nakash, Yitzhak (2003). The Shi’i of Iraq, (Princeton university Press, second edition), p.25
2 Fatah, Hala (1997). The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia, and the Gulf 1745-1900, The university of new York Press: new York, p.69.
Arab and Muslim National Security: Debating the Iranian Dimension
In contemplating the relationship between Iran and the Islamic movements in the Arab world there is very little to prevent the latter from organising the tenets of this relationship from a religious, Sunni perspective. The real dilemma, however, lies in the wheels of history which has pulled the world much closer to a modern democratic state with very little role for religion and religious discourse. Iran, on other hand, draws upon history and past events to revive sectarian belief systems in many Arab countries as part of its efforts to shore up its political influence through religious sectarianism.
What are the criteria – for regulating and assessing the relationship with Iran – that these Islamic movements and Arab countries should adopt especially since it is very likely that these movements will have a major leadership role to play? Should the Palestinian issue and a general religious dimension be the basis of this relationship? Will this not pose a major threat to Arab national security such as the case with Iraq whose demographic changes over the past 150 years have distanced it from the Arab order?
Syria, Lebanon, the events in Yemen and the gradual conversion of the Zaidi sect to the teachings of Al-Ithna Ashriya (The Twelver Shi’ism) are all cases in point in addition to Iran’s attempts to covert the Alawites of Turkey to Twelver Shi’ism. 1
Conversely, should we adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the principles of democracy and UN resolutions whose own Enlightenment project championed faith as a purely personal matter. It is worth noting that countries like France, the US and Britain are revisiting their own Enlightenment-based modes of thinking due to a firm belief that these modes have negatively impacted their national security.
A brief history of the Islamic Republic of Iran
The first to conquer Iran was the Caliph Abu-Bakr As-Siddiq. During the reign of Omar Ibn Al-Khattab, Muslim conquests expanded as far as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Most of the Farsi (Persian) population converted to Islam and were eventually governed by the Umayyad, Abbasids, Kurds, Seljuks, Ghaznis and Khwarazmis.
The Mughal Empire (Mongol Il Khans, not Mughal Timurids in India) which ruled Iran destroyed almost all traces of the Islamic civilizations that preceded them. Turco-Mongol dynasties ruled the country until the beginning of the 16th century when the Safavids Shiite dynasty sought to convert the whole country to the Shiite sect by force. This marked a turning point in Iran’s history and the beginning of a fierce sectarian struggle with the Ottoman empire. Iraq formed the stage for many of these conflicts resulting in the disappearance of most of its urban centres, even more than they were destroyed by the Mongols. The population of Basra, for example, was reduced to as few as 5000 people in 1840, most of whom were slaves imported from Zanzibar. 2
This shift to the Shiite Islam created a rift between Iran and the rest of the Islamic world, a historical disjuncture that was destined to form the basis of all future policies. The Salavid dynasty was gravely weakened and soon made way for other dynasties such as the Afshari, Zandi, Qajari, Pahlavi before the establishment of the Islamic republic under the leadership of Khomeini in 1979.
Who is the ruler of Iran?
Iran is governed by a number of interrelated power centres; some are official (constitutional government) and others unofficial like the politicoreligious institutions and semi-military forces under the leadership of influential clergy. The president is entrusted with running the day to day affairs of the country and has no authority in determining strategic policies of foreign and domestic politics or any control over the army or security apparatuses, all of which fall within the jurisdiction of the Supreme leader who runs the country through a network of clergy in collaboration with the office of the president. Unofficial centres of power control the direction of Iranian politics through the person of the president who has very little say in these matters. This decision-making dualism gives rise to many conflicts in Iran with the likelihood of a full-blown confrontation one day between the Supreme leader and the Council of Guardian Council on the one hand and the parliament on the other.
The official constitutional leadership of Iran comprises a number of institutions: The Assembly of Experts, the Supreme Leader, the president, the parliament, the cabinet, the judiciary, state radio and television, the army, the Revolutionary Guard and security apparatuses.
The unofficial centres of power comprise four overlapping entities: The centre is represented by the most influential clergy in parliament, the government, shura councils and the judiciary. The second entity consists of the highest-ranking officials other than the clergy. The third entity comprises figures from the revolutionary committees, the Basij, security apparatuses, and senior media officials. The fourth entity is represented by civil society figures and former government officials. This last one mediates between the regime and civil society to demand social and political reforms peacefully and from within the system.
All these entities are controlled by the Revolutionary Islamic leadership made up of clergy and other figures. It would be reductionist to label either of the two parties as moderate or extreme since their positions tend to shift according to the issue at hand. Iranians, however, refer to the two sides as Islamic left or the new left, and the Islamic right and progressive right-wing. These centres of power notwithstanding, the revolutionary government cannot exercise total political and intellectual control over the country. A grey area exists within which many members of the clergy -- many of whom were the original supporters of the revolution and wield a lot of power among the people -- operate in order to carry out peaceful reforms. The state’s attempts to neutralise these figures for what they perceived were their too liberal stands vis-a-vis the economy and social issues have not been very successful. Among these are the Freedom Movement of Iran and several reformist groups under guidance of Abdul-Karim Suresh and the secularist Iranian Nationalist Party, in addition to a big group of influential clergy who reject Khomeini’s and the current Supreme Leader’s theories about the notion of the supreme leader. Finally, there are smaller groups whose aims is to overthrow the regime such as the Marxist armed group Mojahedin-eKhalq (MEK), the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran and some Sunni Islamist thinkers.
Despite all these clash of interests, Iran has succeeded in securing strategic victories such as its gains in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bahrain, Yemen, and the eastern parts of Saudi Arabia are almost under the sway of the Iranian government. Syria, however, will in all likelihood be a huge setback for Iran once the revolution there ousts the regime in effect severing Iran’s ties with the Shiites in Lebanon -- almost thirty years of hard work totally wasted.
Arab National Security: A myth or a reality?
Is it feasible to speak of an Arab national security supported by all Arab countries or are there as many forms of security as there are Arab countries? What are the basic components of such Arab national security?
“National security” is a modern political term which refers to a country’s ability to safeguard itself through the use of economic, military and political force. Food security, energy and military power are indispensable for national security. Western definitions of the term try to steer clear of including cultural security or what some prominent Western politicians referred to as “preserving Western way of life” during the War on Terror, a definition with Western cultural and religious undertones.
What are the pillars of the Arab national cultural security from the perspective of Islamic movements in power or about to assume power in the Arab world? What are the bases of Arab Islamic culture and is there room for disagreement with other perspectives with regards to interpreting the movement of history and to what extent?
Points of discussion:
1 Can Iran – with its current cultural structure and its national security strategies – be considered a threat to the national and cultural security of the Arab-Islamic world? If so, how does that threat compare in proportion to the threats posed by the US and Israel? The Turkish experience in this regard could be examined to explore its relationship with the US and the rise of Islamic movements there.
2 How can we explain the strategic differences between the various Islamic movements’ approaches to the Iranian problem? Undoubtedly, geography and the Palestinian issue are the two most important reasons but if the Islamic movements have not been able to reach a consensus on how to regulate their relationship Iran, how can they possibly formulate a comprehensive approach that could also win the approval of the opposition who share power with the Islamists?
3 What are the pillars of this national security and is the Islamic culture a main component? If so, how can this culture be defined? If there is a consensus on the need to secure an Arab national security, can the Islamic movement offer a precise definition of such security that would remove it from the realm of the theoretical to the realm of the practical and bring together the security of the Gulf, North Africa, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent?
Key thoughts and ideas from the discussion in chronological order:
Participants engaged in a lengthy debate about Arab national security.
1 National security is a term associated with the birth of the modern nation state. Nations reach a consensus on their national security by prioritizing threats and coordinating efforts between various security and political apparatuses for the purposes of protecting the state through economic and military power.
2 Democratic countries usually avoid references to cultural security allowing for more individual freedoms, what Western politicians fondly refer to as “the Western way of life”. A sudden realisation that local cultures are losing ground to immigrant cultures and religions has prompted Europe and the US to reconsider their original position on the matter especially in light of the fact that most Westerners are not very keen on the religious aspects of their identities.
3 National security in Europe and the US is determined by influential political figures and reflects the spirit of the times. The US National Security Council, for example, formulates policies for both the president and security apparatuses. The US army creed of the 1960s is different from that of the 21st century, for instance. In our part of the world, many Islamic leaders formulate policies and address issues related to national security in a manner that is not consistent with the needs of the time.
4 We are currently witnessing the birth of new economic, political and cultural leaderships with their own vision and ideas about national security. Evaluating the dangers posed to our national security may lead to disagreements on how best to tackle them. It is, thus, imperative we agree on what defines our national security and accord each a certain level of priority to avoid the kinds of disagreements that have wreaked havoc with the Islamic Movement and its ability to attract popular support.
5 One is here reminded of the fact that several US military and security apparatuses had prior knowledge of Japan’s intention to attack Pearl Harbour but the lack of coordination led to a miscalculation of the risks, hence the decision to establish the National Security Council.
6 A question may be posed at this juncture: what are the priorities of Islamic and Arab national security and why are all these disagreements among Islamic movements about evaluating the risks posed to these forms of national security?
7 The problem of prioritising elements of national security is not limited to Islamic movements. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, several Arab countries grappled with the notion of national security. Prior to the Arab Spring, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt were considered the biggest threat to state security but now with the Brotherhood in power, many research centres, media institutions and security apparatuses are finding it difficult to reconcile this new reality with their entrenched beliefs about the Brotherhood as a major threat.
8 Contemporary Islamic movements have not come up with any solid theories on how best to approach national security for various reasons. The political upheavals of the past two years have been marked by an inability to agree on the basic elements of national security. The conflict between Islamists and governments which has polarised the masses began with the Camp David Accords which the Islamists and most Egyptians fiercely opposed but upon assuming power Islamists realised that national unity dictated they respect the agreement for the time being.
9 Is it possible to formulate new approaches to foreign policy and international relations similar to the ones devised by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu which could then be adopted by government institutions and religious and political organisations? Alternatively, are there more urgent solutions to the current crises?
10 Islamic movements, especially in Egypt, seem at a loss as to how to deal with Iran. There appears to be huge gaps in their understanding of the cultural and religious dimensions of Iranian foreign policy, especially Iranian influence on some parts of the Arab world but these gaps are being gradually tackled particularly following the political upheavals in Syria.
11 We assume wrongly there is a consensus within Islamic movements on the assessment and prioritisation of dangers to national security. For example, are threats posed to religious and cultural identity greater than those posed by occupation? There are many reasons at the heart of these disagreements, some geographic while others are cultural pertaining to each locale’s perception of Western powers.
12 The notion of national security, or the term ‘security’ has very negative connotations in the Arab world where they have been inextricably linked to the popular imagination with oppression, intelligence services, persecution, and torture. Islamic leadership in general do not possess a clear understanding of the meaning of national security.
13 Threats to national security may not be in the form of a state or a regime but any entity. Clear and present danger that comes from an enemy, Israel for example, would not be a bone of contention between any parties but the problem lies with ‘hidden’ enemies.
14 Threats to national security are those that represent an existential danger to country or a population, not a system of government. A group of people converting from one religion to another would constitute a great demographic threat that could give rise to sectarian and intellectual conflict. Such demographic pockets in some Arab countries pose a threat to society regardless of how small they are.
15 We need to operate under the framework of an Islamic Movement which in its inception was fairly homogenous. Unfortunately, that is no longer the case and it is the aim of these meetings to create a consensus on the threats facing Arab countries.
16 Being oblivious to these threats could lead to the fragmentation of Islamic movements, especially the major ones. Many feel it would be pointless to support those Islamic movements that are incapable of facing up to these challenges and threats.
17 There is security on the level of the nation-state but there is no Arab, national or Islamic security. Most of the Arab countries worked hard to satisfy the eastern and western blocs during the Cold War. Even a country like Sudan could not find support or protection from neighbouring countries when it was divided.
18 The same issues plague Islamic movements. Although Islamic movements in the Arab world may seem on the surface to be homogeneous and inspired by the same intellectual sources, there is lack of coordination and total chaos as evidenced by what happened in Iraq and Syria. Palestine is probably the only issue these movements agree on.
19 There were disagreements on the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. These movements do not adhere to a single strategic framework that would allow them to formulate unified policies in cases of emergencies like, for example, the current situation in Syria and Iraq.
20 Coordination is a must, not only at the level of leaderships but middleleadership and executive committees.
21 One cannot debate the issue of Islamic movements without referring to their style of government which follows some general rules of politics such as the well-known saying that there are no permanent friends or enemies but permanent interests.
22 Turkey’s political success lies in its flexibility in dealing with various issues including its relationship with Israel. It is important that we do not allow emotions to cloud our perception of international relations. Many Islamists criticised the Egyptian government for opening channels of communication with the Iranian governments and considering it part of the solution to the Syrian dilemma. The reality of Iran’s influence cannot be ignored and if Egypt can find a solution -- in collaboration with Iran -- then that might save the lives of tens of thousands of people.
23 The Egyptian government should be given the chance to engage in political manoeuvres especially in light of the pressures exerted by Gulf countries and some international and domestic elements on the young government. This kind of manoeuvre has a precedent in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s decision to deal with the Iraqi regime which was simultaneously oppressing its Iraqi sister movement.
24 Coordinating efforts between Islamic movements could be to the detriment of some local issues since these movements are accused of exporting their ideas and of being translational.
25 Sometimes the threat from another country could be misjudged or underestimated or overestimated. What are the criteria that Islamic movements should draw upon to properly evaluate these dangers? Maybe agreeing on some criteria would help unify our vision.
26 If we take, for example, the Islamic Movement in Iraq, we will notice that it is facing serious challenges from expanding Turkish economic interests, Iranian cultural and sectarian influence, and Kurdish expansionism. So, how is it to react to all these threats and which ones should be prioritised?
27 What are the Shari’a bases for prioritising these threats? In the Iraqi example, can it be argued that the Kurdish nationalist ambitions are more dangerous than the Shiite ones?
28 Does the term “national security” refer to the national security of the Muslim umma, the Islamic group or all the Arab Muslim states?
29 Threats to national security rest on three axes: identity, land and resources. It is our task to preserve all three.
30 Our traditional point of reference when speaking about threats to our national security are the United States, Israel and Russia (while it occupied Afghanistan). Israel still lives in the Arab consciousness as the biggest threat to Arab Islamic culture. But Iran has emerged over the past two years as a major source of threat to the Arab world.
31 Prior to the Syrian revolution, there was no consensus on what constitutes the greatest threat to our national security, but it has since become evident that the Iranian threat is much bigger than American and Israeli threats.
32 Islamic movements have to take this shift into consideration. Is this the right approach? Will it secure our national security in the future? Some have argued that the old priorities remain about what poses the gravest threat to our existence, culture and identity.
33 Temporary interests should not blind us to glaring facts. Those calling for an alliance with Iran should remember that it is a huge threat to our culture and religion.
34 We emphasise that national security and its priorities are subject to change all the time and are not constant.
35 When we speak of national security, we sometimes mean the security of the state. In the example of Egypt, national security refers to Egyptian national security.
36 Determining national or Islamic security through the experience of Islamic movements is very difficult because these movements used to be considered a threat to national security by ruling elite and the state security apparatuses. This means an Islamic movement is not really in a position to formulate a comprehensive plan for securing national security that all powers within the state could possibly agree upon, let alone other Arab countries.
37 Islamic movements have inherited countries whose security is threatened by the United States, Iran, Israel and deep states.
38 There are successful models like the Turkish experience and Hamas’ success in putting together a security apparatus capable of facing up to external threats. What should be our point of departure; with that which is being threatened or with the power threatening us?
39 We should examine one specific source of threat, for example the Iranian threat, and develop strategies for warding it off without engaging in the more laborious process of formulating a general understanding of what constitutes Islamic national security.
40 We should pay attention to other threats we are more likely to ignore. For example, if we compare the cultural threat of Western media, we may realise it is a bigger threat to our culture than Israel. That would entail we arrive at a specific understanding and definition of what is meant by national security.
41 We share a lot with non-Muslim societies because of media penetration and advances in technology. It is thus impossible to formulate an understanding of national security without taking into consideration other nations that share our views and ideas.
42 Geographic distance is a huge obstacle in appreciating the nature of threats. Those living in Morocco may find it difficult to comprehend the Iranian threat to Iraqi integrity. In the aftermath of the US occupation of Iraq, an Iraqi military leader remarked that everyone knows that the US is an occupying force but the bigger threat comes from Iran which has sought to change the cultural and religious identity of Iraq by gradually controlling all its institutions.
43 When the Islamic Movement talks about national and Islamic security, we should have a clear vision about political, economic and cultural security. What is it that we are hoping to achieve - political stability or power-sharing? Economic security and self-sufficiency or a stable culture immune to foreign influences?
44 By lacking a clear vision, the Islamic Movement itself poses a threat to national security.
45 Twenty three years after coming to power, the Sudanese government has failed to find viable solutions to its economic problems and the high levels of unemployment. It appears that very little of the theoretical literature of the movement in Sudan has been of any use in finding real solutions.
46 There are major shortcomings within Islamic movements in reaching a consensus on the basic tenets of their strategies.
47 Extremism and chaos make it very difficult to reach a unified vision for national security.
48 Islamic movements have a duty to self-reform. It is our belief that there is a pressing need to bring Islamic leaderships together to formulate strategies of governance that reflect the needs of modern societies.
49 Islamic movements do not possess any viable experiences of government they could draw upon. Neither Sudan, nor Iran or Saudi Arabia represent models that could be adopted.
50 Iran represents the biggest threat and poses a direct political, security and cultural risk of which Iraq is the prime example.
51 Iran invested a lot of money and effort destroying Iraq from within through bribery and purchasing loyalties.
52 The difference between the US and Iran is that the former and its agents are rejected by our societies but Iran infiltrates through people who carry out its agenda under the cover of religion with the aim of destroying our history, religion and culture.
53 The issue of national security is first and foremost academic and requires lot of research. Our group today is simply made up of Islamic leadership from various countries who may not be the best to formulate strategies for securing national security.
54 Islamic movements should coordinate more to ensure their political stands are more homogeneous. It is not yet unclear why there seems to be a great chasm between Islamic movements over whether to support the Syrian revolution or not.
55 Prior to the Arab Spring, there was a political apparatus in the UK regulating and coordinating, albeit quite loosely, the work of the Islamic movements but that is no longer the case although the need of such an apparatus now is more than ever.
56 Islamic movements need practical measures more than theoretical ones since, in theory at least, they seem to agree that the biggest sources of threat are the US, Israel and Iran.
57 We don’t disagree over the need to support the efforts of the Syrian people but this necessitates better organisation and more meetings. We should not also forget that there are disagreements even among the members of the same Islamic movement in every country.
58 No one contests the fact that the Islamic movement lacks any clear theoretical vision which is why, when faced with any political contingency, these movements tend to draw upon what is available out there until they formulate their own means of solving problems.
59 The raison d’etre of the Islamic Movement is essentially political so it is a grave strategic mistake to remain without a comprehensive political theory. The Movement began after the collapse of the Ottoman empire and the colonial onslaught on the Arab world which resulted in dividing up Arab and Muslim nations. Decades of political marginalisation meant the Movement has not been able to formulate its own theoretical approach to governance.
60 What is national security for nations? Is it political, economic, geographic or cultural security? Economic threats are usually the result of some nations’ attempts to impoverish other nations. There are threats to our moral codes that stem from cultural and media invasions of other cultures.
61 Iran is geographically and socially linked to us. During the reign of the Shah, the Iranian threat was of a military nature, not a religious or sectarian one but the 1979 Revolution changed all that. Khomeini’s theory of the Velayat e-Faqih (Guardianship of Islamic Jurists) shifted Iranian ambitions and made them more expansionist in association with a sectarian and cultural war against the region.
62 As Islamic movements, we share with other non-Islamist parties their vision of what constitutes a geographic and economic threat to our countries but they don’t share our view of cultural threats.
63 It is true that Turkey poses an economic threat to Arab Muslim countries (for example, building dams along the Tigris and Euphrates and flooding our markets with cheap goods that weaken our economic base). But as an Islamic Movement, we believe that this threat is not as dangerous as those attempts to reshape our identity, values and consequently, our history.
64 Some countries in Northern Africa and Egypt may choose to deal with Iran to serve its economic interests without giving much thought to the cultural and intellectual threat posed by Iran to countries in the Gulf and Iraq.
65 We need cultural programs that would protect Muslim societies and similar approaches to reform Shiite thought if at all possible. We should strive to encourage Shiites to rethink many of their theories and approaches if they wished to avoid conflict and play a positive role in the region.
66 Portraying Iran as a monster and placing it on par with Israel and the United States is a grave mistake. Each one poses a different risk and thus requires a different strategy to deal with.
67 In the introduction to this briefing paper, it was noted that Islamic movements are gradually adopting a less sectarian and more democratic forms of thought while Iran is doing the exact opposite leaving the door open for it to spread Shiite thought without much resistance from the political secular approaches that are slowly taking root in some Arab countries. What are the means available to stop that from happening?
68 Not only is Iran a threat to the Arab Spring but the Arab Spring is a threat to Iran as well. Here we ask if the Arab Spring has the power to threaten Iran? The Iranian project in the region had previously expanded due to the absence of an Islamist project that could challenge its ambitions since most Islamist movements were persecuted by Arab regimes and the only available option was the Turkish model which arrived too late.
69 The Iranian threat is not only in cultural in nature. A study by Durham University (UK) exposed the Iranian economic infiltration in the 6th of October city. Iran succeeded in this feat by recruiting Iraqi businessmen of Iranian origins who worked in the Revolutionary Guard. Mubarak’s government reacted by closing down some of these companies which posed a great threat to the economy.
70 There were virtually no real efforts or intellectual endeavours to put an end to the Iranian sectarian onslaught especially following the occupation of Iraq. There were a number of Wahhabi or Salafi efforts but nothing else. Adnan Zarzour recently authored a book, The Sunna between Sunnis and Twelvers and another study by Mohammad Ammara in Al-Azhar journal about Muhib Adeen Alkhabi’s views on the Shiite sect.
71 Reaching a consensus on Arab and Islamic national security among Islamic movements requires that we abandon the state of polarisation we are currently witnessing.
72 Iran was at one point the target of a Western conspiracy and in our opinion it was not Iran that initiated this attack against the Muslims. It simply swallowed the Western bait of pitting the Sunnis against the Shiites. Many among us believe that we should not wage a war against Iran since it is a Muslim country but Iran colluded with the West in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. We no longer have any choice but to defend ourselves against Iran.
73 We are not worried about Iran’s cultural project because it is irrational and holds a belief system too absurd to attract anyone. It is the demographic expansion, such as the one in Syria that we should be worried about.
74 Islamic Fiqh (jurisprudence) has a theory about fending off attackers. It applies to Iran but not to Israel because in the case of Iran our only purpose is to ward off any attacks and defend ourselves.
75 Although there is a consensus among Islamic movements that Iran poses a great threat but some of the statements about this matter are sometimes no more than diplomatic proclamations than statements that reflect what these movements truly believe.
76 We need to be more precise when making such statements to avoid giving out the wrong impressions.
77 Some conferences held under the pretext of bringing Muslims together are large-scale projects funded by Iran and are often used to serve Iran politically and undermine our religious and historical frames of reference.
78 We cannot help but wonder why Iran funds and supports holding these religious conferences and dialogues in countries with no record of sectarian strife but refuses to hold them in countries that have a long history of sectarian disagreements such as Iraq, Iran (Lebanon?) and Iran. The answer is because Iran fans the fires of sectarian hatred.
79 We are in agreement that Iran has a sectarian, ethnic, Persian agenda and that it buys people’s loyalties and leaders in the Muslim world. If we had our own agenda, we would be doing the same. The problem lies in us as an ineffective party. Where are our central plan and our strategies?
80 We stress that Iran is part of a much bigger project and it has swallowed the bait. It is the West that will reap the benefits of a conflict between Shiites and Sunnis. We need to examine those facts very carefully.
81 It is in the very nature of Shiite thought to reject any other identity. It thrives on disagreements and differences with other sects and is constantly in search for a political being. The US did not exist back when the Safavids ruled over Iran and yet Iran was in direct conflict with the rest of the region like it is today.
82 Iran will spare no effort in colluding with any external power to launch attacks against Arab and Muslim countries to alter their religious identities. The US would not have succeeded in occupying Iraq and Afghanistan without Iranian help. Iran even had dealings with Israel during the Iraq-Iran war.
83 Iran not only helped the United States but the latter actually handed over Iraq to Iran and allowed it to expand into Syria. Several other Western countries supported Shiite expansionism in the region. France which used to be the Maronites biggest supporter shifted its allegiance to Syria and its Lebanese allies.
84 If Iran persists in this approach, it will incur hefty losses because in the end it will be left fighting the great majority of the Arab Islamic world. The first sign that it is losing the war is the gradual deterioration of its Syrian ally who is the main supporter of Iran’s allies in Lebanon.
1 nakash, Yitzhak (2003). The Shi’i of Iraq, (Princeton university Press, second edition), p.25
2 Fatah, Hala (1997). The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia, and the Gulf 1745-1900, The university of new York Press: new York, p.69.
