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Indian diplomats and politicians do not tire of saying that the country deserves a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. But that position calls for leadership. New Delhi has yet to demonstrate that it is even a regional leader, let alone a global heavyweight
If Indias savvy Ambassador to the United Nation is an uneasy man these days, he cannot be faulted. Just over a year ago he was euphoric, and on the eve of the UN General Assembly annual session, Hardeep Puri told a prominent Indian television channel: India entered the (UN Security Council) after 19 years, and we have no intentions of leaving. Brushing aside reservations of China, he was confident that by 2012 India will join the elite club of veto powers and become a permanent member of the UNSC. In his assessment, even December 2012 was only an outer limit and India could make it much earlier.
Despite the bravado, nothing has happened. Indias two-year term ends in December. Perhaps as a face-saving device, New Delhi propped up Bhutan to contest the seat it would vacate. But with last weeks resounding election of South Korea as the representative of the Asia-Pacific region, Mr Puri would undoubtedly be hoping for human memory to be fickle.
This is not the first time that Indian diplomats have fallen victims to their own rhetoric and over-confidence. In 1996, a diplomat proudly proclaimed that India would take the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the UN General Assembly and defeat it. When the CTBT was put to vote on September 10, 1996, only Bhutan and Gaddafis Libya sided with New Delhi, while 158 countries voted for the unjust CTBT. Things were no different a decade later; in 2006 India tested its international influence by unsuccessfully fielding Shashi Tharoor as a successor to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Having been associated with various UN agencies for over two decades, Mr Tharoor should have been more realistic of Indias international influence. Diplomatic niceties are not synonymous with influences and votes.
These diplomatic setbacks are a part of the larger problem facing, or some might say created, by India. Emboldened by its economic growth, New Delhi has been brazenly seeking a greater role for itself. Indeed, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was not off the mark when she depicted India as one of the self-appointed frontrunners for permanent UNSC membership. When this classified internal State Department cable of July 2009 was put out by WikiLeaks, there was considerable anger and consternation; though uncomfortable her remark may have been, Ms Clinton was at least brutal and accurate.
Time has thus, come for an informed debate concerning Indias great power aspirations, its usefulness and the cost of acquiring such a status. Such a debate should address three important issues. One, what makes a country a great power? Despite all past glories, India was a great power only during the British Raj and hence it has no experience of being a great power and what that entails. Much of the arguments happen without a precedent or reference point, thereby contributing to a lopsided understanding. If India were to appreciate all that it entails to gain that power, it would have to closely examine the examples of others to understand its attributes, cost and benefits and learn from them.
Indeed, great power is more of a headache than a privilege. The current status of the US is a classic example. Its ongoing economic crisis and resultant political weakening had not prevented other countries from expecting a greater American role. It had to resolve, handle or manage a host of problems ranging from the financial crisis in the Eurozone to the Iranian nuclear controversy to tensions over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the Pacific. As President Barack Obama knows, this omnipresent role does not come with corresponding gains.
The role of a great power does not come easily and will require Indias ability and willingness to stand up on various issues and be counted. Ivy league membership is neither bestowed for good behaviour nor secured through application. It is only earned; earned by the hard way. Countries never become a great power merely because they pursue a populist course of action, but by their ability and willingness to pursue unpopular decisions in pursuit of their national interests. Regional unpopularity, for example, did not dissuade Russia and China from rallying around the beleaguered Assad regime in Syria.
Unlike the popular notion, great power is not an invitation to the high table but it demands a leadership role. Even in its immediate South Asian neighbourhood, Indias politico-diplomatic role is minimal; conflicts in Nepal, Sri Lanka or Afghanistan were resolved or being resolved without New Delhi playing any meaningful role. Its aspiration for a permanent membership of the UNSC is also not backed by financial clout. Currently India is the fourth largest economy of the world; but during 2012 it contributed just 0.5 per cent of the UN budget whereas Japan, another aspirant, contributed over 12.5 per cent.
Like individuals, nations also have a tendency to exaggerate their importance and influence. Every politician wants to be the President or Prime Minister; many nations have great power aspiration. Most of the international tensions are the result of the exaggerated self-importance. Thus, international diplomacy is not about winning arguments and proving points, and the UN is not a debating club for gaining brownie points. Diplomacy is more about winning friends and influencing countries. This means finding common grounds and seeking quid pro quos. Such tasks can be accomplished only by silent action and less talk.
These bring us to the basic problem: The national psyche. There is a tendency within the country to equate declaration with accomplishments and manifestos with achievements. No serious of student of India, especially those sitting in important foreign capitals, can ignore the yawning gap between statements and actions. Indias credibility would be tested not by its sweet promises but by its ability to walk the talk. This is true for the political class and the intelligentsia, and it became far too obvious over the civil nuclear deal with the US. There were supporters and critics, but not many asked a simple but serious question: Can Manmohan Singh deliver what he promised in Washington? In the ultimate analysis, this credibility gap will determine Indias status.
By all probability, Mr Puri would be hoping to leave New York before January 2013, lest he would be reminded of not leaving the UNSC. One can still learn from this unfortunate episode: Actions are always louder, hence it is sensible to speak less.
Now stop asking for the moon
If Indias savvy Ambassador to the United Nation is an uneasy man these days, he cannot be faulted. Just over a year ago he was euphoric, and on the eve of the UN General Assembly annual session, Hardeep Puri told a prominent Indian television channel: India entered the (UN Security Council) after 19 years, and we have no intentions of leaving. Brushing aside reservations of China, he was confident that by 2012 India will join the elite club of veto powers and become a permanent member of the UNSC. In his assessment, even December 2012 was only an outer limit and India could make it much earlier.
Despite the bravado, nothing has happened. Indias two-year term ends in December. Perhaps as a face-saving device, New Delhi propped up Bhutan to contest the seat it would vacate. But with last weeks resounding election of South Korea as the representative of the Asia-Pacific region, Mr Puri would undoubtedly be hoping for human memory to be fickle.
This is not the first time that Indian diplomats have fallen victims to their own rhetoric and over-confidence. In 1996, a diplomat proudly proclaimed that India would take the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the UN General Assembly and defeat it. When the CTBT was put to vote on September 10, 1996, only Bhutan and Gaddafis Libya sided with New Delhi, while 158 countries voted for the unjust CTBT. Things were no different a decade later; in 2006 India tested its international influence by unsuccessfully fielding Shashi Tharoor as a successor to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Having been associated with various UN agencies for over two decades, Mr Tharoor should have been more realistic of Indias international influence. Diplomatic niceties are not synonymous with influences and votes.
These diplomatic setbacks are a part of the larger problem facing, or some might say created, by India. Emboldened by its economic growth, New Delhi has been brazenly seeking a greater role for itself. Indeed, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was not off the mark when she depicted India as one of the self-appointed frontrunners for permanent UNSC membership. When this classified internal State Department cable of July 2009 was put out by WikiLeaks, there was considerable anger and consternation; though uncomfortable her remark may have been, Ms Clinton was at least brutal and accurate.
Time has thus, come for an informed debate concerning Indias great power aspirations, its usefulness and the cost of acquiring such a status. Such a debate should address three important issues. One, what makes a country a great power? Despite all past glories, India was a great power only during the British Raj and hence it has no experience of being a great power and what that entails. Much of the arguments happen without a precedent or reference point, thereby contributing to a lopsided understanding. If India were to appreciate all that it entails to gain that power, it would have to closely examine the examples of others to understand its attributes, cost and benefits and learn from them.
Indeed, great power is more of a headache than a privilege. The current status of the US is a classic example. Its ongoing economic crisis and resultant political weakening had not prevented other countries from expecting a greater American role. It had to resolve, handle or manage a host of problems ranging from the financial crisis in the Eurozone to the Iranian nuclear controversy to tensions over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the Pacific. As President Barack Obama knows, this omnipresent role does not come with corresponding gains.
The role of a great power does not come easily and will require Indias ability and willingness to stand up on various issues and be counted. Ivy league membership is neither bestowed for good behaviour nor secured through application. It is only earned; earned by the hard way. Countries never become a great power merely because they pursue a populist course of action, but by their ability and willingness to pursue unpopular decisions in pursuit of their national interests. Regional unpopularity, for example, did not dissuade Russia and China from rallying around the beleaguered Assad regime in Syria.
Unlike the popular notion, great power is not an invitation to the high table but it demands a leadership role. Even in its immediate South Asian neighbourhood, Indias politico-diplomatic role is minimal; conflicts in Nepal, Sri Lanka or Afghanistan were resolved or being resolved without New Delhi playing any meaningful role. Its aspiration for a permanent membership of the UNSC is also not backed by financial clout. Currently India is the fourth largest economy of the world; but during 2012 it contributed just 0.5 per cent of the UN budget whereas Japan, another aspirant, contributed over 12.5 per cent.
Like individuals, nations also have a tendency to exaggerate their importance and influence. Every politician wants to be the President or Prime Minister; many nations have great power aspiration. Most of the international tensions are the result of the exaggerated self-importance. Thus, international diplomacy is not about winning arguments and proving points, and the UN is not a debating club for gaining brownie points. Diplomacy is more about winning friends and influencing countries. This means finding common grounds and seeking quid pro quos. Such tasks can be accomplished only by silent action and less talk.
These bring us to the basic problem: The national psyche. There is a tendency within the country to equate declaration with accomplishments and manifestos with achievements. No serious of student of India, especially those sitting in important foreign capitals, can ignore the yawning gap between statements and actions. Indias credibility would be tested not by its sweet promises but by its ability to walk the talk. This is true for the political class and the intelligentsia, and it became far too obvious over the civil nuclear deal with the US. There were supporters and critics, but not many asked a simple but serious question: Can Manmohan Singh deliver what he promised in Washington? In the ultimate analysis, this credibility gap will determine Indias status.
By all probability, Mr Puri would be hoping to leave New York before January 2013, lest he would be reminded of not leaving the UNSC. One can still learn from this unfortunate episode: Actions are always louder, hence it is sensible to speak less.
Now stop asking for the moon
