Watch Tower: IAF'S strategic reach
It must always be kept in mind that it is undeclared war in J & K that could spark the wider conflagration and that is why "Gagan Shakti" acquires its relevance- Vinod Vedi
The Indian Air Force (IAF) conducted an exercise code named "Gagan Shakti" in the Western and South Western Air Commands. In territorial terms, the operational area of these two commands covers the entire plains of Punjab as also the desert of Rajasthan and extends deep into the Arabian Sea. It must have provided a realistic replication of threat assessment and power projection in defence and attack across our western land frontiers and into the maritime domain.
South Western Army Command has been created recently. It has the potential to live up to the doctrine for "effect-based operations". In essence that would mean the optimal utilisation of not just air and land based military assets but also that available in the maritime ambiance-a combination designed to ensure swift, effective action over a wide theatre.
At a recent interaction with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal SP Tyagi made a significant enunciation that in a geopolitical crisis India would have to be able to "forget geographical boundaries to protect India's interests outside its boundaries" It is, given the vast dispersion of India's land and maritime boundaries, no small task.
Given the acquisition of new weapons and force-multiplier equipment in recent years and the fact that the IAF has been holding joint exercises with friendly countries in the neighbourhood as well as with extra-regional military powers there remains the need to formalise the lessons thus learned into viable tactical and strategic doctrines. Hence "Gagan Shakti"!
The Indian armed forces are currently confronted by an undeclared war from Pakistan soil. It is a war in which military personnel in civilian clothes have infiltrated and are even today, massed in their thousands close to the Line of Control to try to infiltrate into Jammu and Kashmir in enough strength to be able to make a declaration of independence on behalf of the Kashmiri people. They have not been able to do so in the past sixteen years (of insurgency in J and K) is because the Indian security forces have been able to deny them the critical mass that could bring success to their nefarious deeds.
Yet, in this operation the Indian Air Force is not been involved in interdiction operations against the terrorists and their sanctuaries and bases inside Azad Kashmir. Its primary charge is logistical support for troops posted along the LoC right up to the Siachen Glacier. It was only when Pakistani troops of the Northern Light Infantry entered enmass into the Dras-Kargil sector to try and redraw the Line of Control that the IAF was asked to pound the positions occupied by the intruders on the mountains overlooking the strategic highway to Leh.
For the IAF, Gagan Shakti provided an opportunity to focus on how best it can assist land operations by the Army and maritime manoeuvres by the and on how best it will be able to replicate the spectacular success it notched by striking against the Karachi harbour in 1971. Pakistan has since acquired new weapons; its naval assets have been shifted further westwards to Ormara where it has set up a naval dockyard to build French submarines. Further west at Pasni on the Makaran coast and at Gwadar, it is creating new naval facilities with the help of the Chinese.
Because of the undeclared war in Jammu and Kashmir, we keep hearing demands for "hot pursuit" operations against the terrorists and their camps in Azad Kashmir. It has not been tried because defence policy is guided by foreign policy besides New Delhi's reluctance to act in such a brazen manner whatever be the provocation.
The discussion on this issue often brings up front a reference to Israel and its operation at Entebbe years ago. If we have to learn anything from Israeli operation it is the attention Israel had paid to the last detail including bringing along a personage as hefty and as dark as Idi Amin, the then Ugandan President. Champions of 'emulate Israel' campaign will do well to remember that Israel was not confronted by a superior conventionally armed opponent. Nor was there the danger of nuclear retaliation at Entebbe.
Kargil has shown us that a limited war, marked with ferocity and speed of conventional forces, if intelligently used, can make way for victory. In other words, there should be complete synergy between the air, the land, and the ocean-based military assets for the achievement of the goals "beyond boundaries" as Air Chief Marshal Tyagi put it.
IAF's new acquisitions are the Sukhois long-range multi-role fighters, airborne refuellers and space-based sensors; it has learned to use them to advantage. Melding air operations with ground attack by the army and maritime operations by the navy would make for high combat mobility and great lethality because it would make for concentration of war effort.
India's assessment of threat is based on the capabilities its potential enemies possess. Thus the range, weapons carrying capacity and the types of smart munitions available with the potential adversary would be the bench marks to assess whether intentions are really underpinned by capabilities.
The employment of India's own military capabilities may become imperative in situations like taking of Indians as hostages in Afghanistan where it is contributing substantially to economic reconstruction. Further afield, off the coast of Sudan where an Indian merchant vessel was hijacked by pirates.
These episodes stoke debates on whether the accent of Indian military preparedness should be on the improvement and expansion of conventional fighting capabilities or should Special Forces be raised to meet specific requirements like the Kandahar hijack episode.
Over a period events beyond the Oxus (Amu Darya) in Central Asia will impinge on Indian national interests as its economic interest expands and grows. Similar is the case with the Indian Ocean rim countries or on the African continent on the one side and Asean on the other.
Yet it must always be kept in mind that it is undeclared war in Jammu and Kashmir that could spark the wider conflagration and that is why "Gagan Shakti" acquires its relevance.
Syndicate Features
http://www.centralchronicle.com/20061103/0311303.htm
