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The Indian Ballistic Missile Defence Programme is an initiative to develop and deploy a multi-layered ballistic missile defence system to protect from ballistic missile attacks
Introduced in light of the ballistic missile threat from Pakistan and China, it is a double-tiered system consisting of two interceptor missiles, namely the Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile for high altitude interception, and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile for lower altitude interception. The two-tiered shield should be able to intercept any incoming missile launched 5,000 kilometres away
PAD was tested in November 2006, followed by AAD in December 2007. With the test of the PAD missile, India became the fourth country to have successfully developed an Anti-ballistic missile system, after United States, Russia, Israel.[5] On 6 March 2009, India again successfully tested its missile defence shield, during which an incoming "enemy" missile was intercepted at an altitude of 75 km
Background
Since the early 90s, India has faced the threat of ballistic missile attacks from Pakistan against which it has fought multiple wars in the past and also from China. With the heightening of tensions in the region, and in response to Pakistan's deployment of M-11 missiles bought from China, in August 1995, the Indian Government procured six batteries of Russian S-300 Surface-to-air missiles to protect New Delhi and other cities.[according to whom?] In May 1998, India for the second time (since its first test in 1974) tested nuclear weapons (see Pokhran-II), followed by Pakistan (see Chagai-I) with its first-ever nuclear test. With Pakistan's testing of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems, this threat intensified. India has also developed and tested missile delivery systems (see IGMDP).[citation needed]
In 1999, the Kargil War between India and Pakistan became the first direct conflict between two declared nuclear powers. As the war progressed, the first hint of the possible use of a nuclear weapon was on 31 May, when Pakistani foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmad made a statement warning that an escalation of the limited conflict could lead Pakistan to use "any weapon" in its arsenal.[7] This was immediately interpreted as an obvious threat of a nuclear retaliation by Pakistan in the event of an extended war. The leader of Pakistan's senate noted that "the purpose of developing weapons becomes meaningless if they are not used when they are needed."[8] Some experts believe that following nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistani military was emboldened by its nuclear deterrent cover to markedly increase coercion against India.[9]
Development of an anti-ballistic missile system began in late 1999, suggesting that India initiated the programme in light of Pakistan's eschewing of a nuclear No first use policy and heightened tensions during the Kargil war including a possibility of full-scale nuclear war
U.S. Should Not Approve Sale of Arrow Missile Defense System to India
India is reportedly interested in acquiring the Arrow theater ballistic missile defense system from Israel. Developed jointly by Israel and the United States, Arrow is designed to intercept short and medium-range ballistic missiles at high altitudes, and could potentially be used by India to defend against Pakistan’s nuclear-capable Ghauri and Shaheen missiles.
Israel has already sold India the Green Pine radar system, which tracks incoming ballistic missiles and transmits target data to Arrow’s battle management system and interceptors. However, because the U.S. was a partner in the Arrow program, Israel cannot sell the system to India without U.S. approval. The Bush administration has not yet decided whether to allow the sale to proceed.
Given the history of mistrust and conflict in South Asia and the importance of U.S. non-proliferation interests, the U.S. should not approve the Arrow deal.
ARROW WILL FURTHER DESTABILIZE SOUTH ASIA
The introduction of anti-ballistic missile systems such as Arrow into South Asia could further destabilize an already volatile region, increasing the danger of a crisis escalating into a new war. During a crisis situation, such as that which followed last December’s terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, missile defenses could encourage India to pursue more offensive-minded military options. For example, India might be more eager to launch strikes against militant training camps, missile batteries, and other strategic targets located in Pakistan, believing that it can rely on the Arrow system to limit the damage from any retaliatory Pakistani strike to an acceptable level.
Pakistan would likely change its military posture and planning in response to perceived vulnerabilities created by India’s deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems. Fearing a crippling stike by India, Pakistan might mate warheads to ballistic missiles and deploy them on high alert. Suspicious of Indian intentions during a crisis, Pakistan might also become more willing to launch a first strike.
ARROW WILL ACCELERATE THE ARMS RACE IN SOUTH ASIA
According to Karl Inderfurth, former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, “Were India to proceed with an investment in missile defense, one thing is certain: Pakistan will respond in some fashion, either by increasing its offensive capability to counter such a defensive shield or by pursuing its own form of missile defense wherever they could obtain it. That is an iron law of the action-reaction cycle in South Asia.”
In addition to its destabilizing effect on security in South Asia, an arms race will further impoverish the people of India and Pakistan at a time when both countries should be focusing on poverty alleviation and economic development. According to the United Nations Human Development Index, India ranks 124th and Pakistan 138th out of 173 countries in terms of quality of life— far behind several other developing countries.
THE SALE MAY VIOLATE THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established in 1987 to restrict the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles and related technology. The 33 states that are currently members of the MTCR voluntarily agree to enforce common export control policies on all key equipment, systems, and technologies for missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.
Last January the U.S. reportedly asked Israel to defer selling the Arrow to India, in part because of possible conflicts with MTCR export restrictions. According to one administration official, “The Arrow is an MTCR category-one missile” that, while defensive in nature, could be converted into an offensive weapon. Although the Arrow is probably too small to serve as an effective delivery platform for nuclear weapons, some of its key technologies could be used by India to advance its ballistic missile program.
APPROVAL OF THE ARROW SALE WILL UNDERMINE U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS
Even if the U.S. determines that the transfer of Arrow to India is permissible under the MTCR, allowing the sale to proceed might still undercut efforts to stop the proliferation of ballistic missiles and technology to terrorists and hostile states. Countries that the U.S. considers major ballistic missile supplier states— such as Russia, China, and North Korea— could point to the Arrow sale as evidence that the U.S. is not serious about non-proliferation and therefore has no right to insist that they curtail their own missile exports.
REWARD PEACE, NOT BRINKMANSHIP
Proponents of the Arrow sale argue that India should be rewarded for exercising restraint in its current standoff with Pakistan. However, the crisis is far from over, and tensions could come to a boil at any point. Hundreds of thousands of Indian and Pakistani troops remain deployed along the border between the two countries. Mortar and artillery fire across the Line of Control in Kashmir occurs almost daily, and militant extremists continue to commit acts of terrorism in Kashmir. Pakistan has not completely curtailed the activities of these extremists, and India adamantly refuses to enter into any dialogue with Pakistan.
It is appropriate for the U.S. to continue to strengthen military ties with India, especially when the war on terrorism is the focus of such cooperation. However, in the current security environment in South Asia, the U.S. must take a firm stand against the sale of military goods that could further destabilize the region and undermine U.S. non-proliferation efforts. Only after India and Pakistan enter into a serious and sustained dialogue on Kashmir and other issues should the U.S. consider rewarding them with advanced military systems and technologies that are consistent with our international non-proliferation commitments.
Conclusion:
By not developing it's own Ballistic Missile De fence Program me, Pakistan is open for Nuclear Attack by India; While Pakistan will not be able to retaliate
Indian Ballistic Missile Defence Programme - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
U.S. Should Not Approve Sale of Arrow Missile Defense System to India | Center for Arms Control & Non-Proliferation
Introduced in light of the ballistic missile threat from Pakistan and China, it is a double-tiered system consisting of two interceptor missiles, namely the Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile for high altitude interception, and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile for lower altitude interception. The two-tiered shield should be able to intercept any incoming missile launched 5,000 kilometres away
PAD was tested in November 2006, followed by AAD in December 2007. With the test of the PAD missile, India became the fourth country to have successfully developed an Anti-ballistic missile system, after United States, Russia, Israel.[5] On 6 March 2009, India again successfully tested its missile defence shield, during which an incoming "enemy" missile was intercepted at an altitude of 75 km
Background
Since the early 90s, India has faced the threat of ballistic missile attacks from Pakistan against which it has fought multiple wars in the past and also from China. With the heightening of tensions in the region, and in response to Pakistan's deployment of M-11 missiles bought from China, in August 1995, the Indian Government procured six batteries of Russian S-300 Surface-to-air missiles to protect New Delhi and other cities.[according to whom?] In May 1998, India for the second time (since its first test in 1974) tested nuclear weapons (see Pokhran-II), followed by Pakistan (see Chagai-I) with its first-ever nuclear test. With Pakistan's testing of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems, this threat intensified. India has also developed and tested missile delivery systems (see IGMDP).[citation needed]
In 1999, the Kargil War between India and Pakistan became the first direct conflict between two declared nuclear powers. As the war progressed, the first hint of the possible use of a nuclear weapon was on 31 May, when Pakistani foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmad made a statement warning that an escalation of the limited conflict could lead Pakistan to use "any weapon" in its arsenal.[7] This was immediately interpreted as an obvious threat of a nuclear retaliation by Pakistan in the event of an extended war. The leader of Pakistan's senate noted that "the purpose of developing weapons becomes meaningless if they are not used when they are needed."[8] Some experts believe that following nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistani military was emboldened by its nuclear deterrent cover to markedly increase coercion against India.[9]
Development of an anti-ballistic missile system began in late 1999, suggesting that India initiated the programme in light of Pakistan's eschewing of a nuclear No first use policy and heightened tensions during the Kargil war including a possibility of full-scale nuclear war
U.S. Should Not Approve Sale of Arrow Missile Defense System to India
India is reportedly interested in acquiring the Arrow theater ballistic missile defense system from Israel. Developed jointly by Israel and the United States, Arrow is designed to intercept short and medium-range ballistic missiles at high altitudes, and could potentially be used by India to defend against Pakistan’s nuclear-capable Ghauri and Shaheen missiles.
Israel has already sold India the Green Pine radar system, which tracks incoming ballistic missiles and transmits target data to Arrow’s battle management system and interceptors. However, because the U.S. was a partner in the Arrow program, Israel cannot sell the system to India without U.S. approval. The Bush administration has not yet decided whether to allow the sale to proceed.
Given the history of mistrust and conflict in South Asia and the importance of U.S. non-proliferation interests, the U.S. should not approve the Arrow deal.
ARROW WILL FURTHER DESTABILIZE SOUTH ASIA
The introduction of anti-ballistic missile systems such as Arrow into South Asia could further destabilize an already volatile region, increasing the danger of a crisis escalating into a new war. During a crisis situation, such as that which followed last December’s terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, missile defenses could encourage India to pursue more offensive-minded military options. For example, India might be more eager to launch strikes against militant training camps, missile batteries, and other strategic targets located in Pakistan, believing that it can rely on the Arrow system to limit the damage from any retaliatory Pakistani strike to an acceptable level.
Pakistan would likely change its military posture and planning in response to perceived vulnerabilities created by India’s deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems. Fearing a crippling stike by India, Pakistan might mate warheads to ballistic missiles and deploy them on high alert. Suspicious of Indian intentions during a crisis, Pakistan might also become more willing to launch a first strike.
ARROW WILL ACCELERATE THE ARMS RACE IN SOUTH ASIA
According to Karl Inderfurth, former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, “Were India to proceed with an investment in missile defense, one thing is certain: Pakistan will respond in some fashion, either by increasing its offensive capability to counter such a defensive shield or by pursuing its own form of missile defense wherever they could obtain it. That is an iron law of the action-reaction cycle in South Asia.”
In addition to its destabilizing effect on security in South Asia, an arms race will further impoverish the people of India and Pakistan at a time when both countries should be focusing on poverty alleviation and economic development. According to the United Nations Human Development Index, India ranks 124th and Pakistan 138th out of 173 countries in terms of quality of life— far behind several other developing countries.
THE SALE MAY VIOLATE THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established in 1987 to restrict the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles and related technology. The 33 states that are currently members of the MTCR voluntarily agree to enforce common export control policies on all key equipment, systems, and technologies for missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.
Last January the U.S. reportedly asked Israel to defer selling the Arrow to India, in part because of possible conflicts with MTCR export restrictions. According to one administration official, “The Arrow is an MTCR category-one missile” that, while defensive in nature, could be converted into an offensive weapon. Although the Arrow is probably too small to serve as an effective delivery platform for nuclear weapons, some of its key technologies could be used by India to advance its ballistic missile program.
APPROVAL OF THE ARROW SALE WILL UNDERMINE U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS
Even if the U.S. determines that the transfer of Arrow to India is permissible under the MTCR, allowing the sale to proceed might still undercut efforts to stop the proliferation of ballistic missiles and technology to terrorists and hostile states. Countries that the U.S. considers major ballistic missile supplier states— such as Russia, China, and North Korea— could point to the Arrow sale as evidence that the U.S. is not serious about non-proliferation and therefore has no right to insist that they curtail their own missile exports.
REWARD PEACE, NOT BRINKMANSHIP
Proponents of the Arrow sale argue that India should be rewarded for exercising restraint in its current standoff with Pakistan. However, the crisis is far from over, and tensions could come to a boil at any point. Hundreds of thousands of Indian and Pakistani troops remain deployed along the border between the two countries. Mortar and artillery fire across the Line of Control in Kashmir occurs almost daily, and militant extremists continue to commit acts of terrorism in Kashmir. Pakistan has not completely curtailed the activities of these extremists, and India adamantly refuses to enter into any dialogue with Pakistan.
It is appropriate for the U.S. to continue to strengthen military ties with India, especially when the war on terrorism is the focus of such cooperation. However, in the current security environment in South Asia, the U.S. must take a firm stand against the sale of military goods that could further destabilize the region and undermine U.S. non-proliferation efforts. Only after India and Pakistan enter into a serious and sustained dialogue on Kashmir and other issues should the U.S. consider rewarding them with advanced military systems and technologies that are consistent with our international non-proliferation commitments.
Conclusion:
By not developing it's own Ballistic Missile De fence Program me, Pakistan is open for Nuclear Attack by India; While Pakistan will not be able to retaliate
Indian Ballistic Missile Defence Programme - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
U.S. Should Not Approve Sale of Arrow Missile Defense System to India | Center for Arms Control & Non-Proliferation
