Reichsmarschall
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Periodic grandstanding about nuclear capabilities are not uncommon between India and Pakistan. We are quite used to the nuke bluster. However, there have been subtle changes in their respective positions over the last few months or so.
There are new weapons, delivery platforms and, importantly, more proactive doctrines regarding the use of nuclear weapons.
The doctrines have not, perhaps, changed in actuality, but when higher-ups in the decision-making process wonder aloud and in public about reconsidering their stand on the first-use policy, it is worth taking note.
The N-armed nations have roughly 120-130 nuclear warheads each and enough delivery systems to deploy these warheads.
They do not share much bonhomie, having fought at least four wars and engaged in dozens of skirmishes. Some analysts opine that India may be considering a relook at its nuclear doctrine to allow a first strike against neighbouring Pakistan.
Both countries have tested weapons specific to their avowed doctrine in the recent past.
Pakistan tested a missile that they claimed could evade interceptor missiles which India tested at least twice.
And as India tested its home-made n-powered submarine, Pakistan claimed it has tested its own SLBM, there were some suggestions that it was a failed test. However, that isn't the focus, the intent is.
India's Chief Of Army Staff General Bipin Rawat recently spoke about the plan for a fast, localised conventional invasion of parts of Pakistan.
Add it to the fact that the Indian Army did carry out a covert cross-border strike, although not aimed at Pakistan's armed forces, it indicates a rearrangement of the basic strategic plan to deal with adverse situations.
However, a limited but strong response may be linked to not provoking a Pakistani retaliation, possibly with nuclear weapons.
The very idea that Pakistan would respond with a nuclear strike against India is not beyond comprehension.
In fact, Pakistan can use smaller, tactical nuclear weapons in advance or in anticipation of an Indian action.
No side can technically afford to go second. Photo: Reuters
The problem with this type of strategic doctrine is that there is glaring scope of miscalculation by each side. A scaled conventional conflict could easily escalate into a full-blown nuclear war — it is not a doomsday prediction, it is a definite possibility.Global geopolitics is not helping the scenario.
As India races to counter China and Pakistan tries to keep up with the aggression, and with the US being closer to India than ever before, there are doubts whether Washington will likely broker peace between India and Pakistan in the future.
Guided by simple logic, if Pakistan must have any chance of winning a war against India, it will use its nuclear weapons — almost all of it.
If India wishes to counter it in any way, it has got to be preemptive, simply because any n-tipped missile in the subcontinental theatre would take barely 10 minutes to start hitting targets, irrespective of who launches them.
So no side can technically afford to go second. A scary scenario.
There is no immediate threat, but along with a strong Indian response — guaranteed in the event of cross-border terror adventurism — factors like non-state actors and the rising pitch of rhetoric can lead to disaster.
Even a limited nuclear exchange between the neighbours would affect some 50 lakh people and kill close to 20 lakh directly and in the famines that may follow
There are new weapons, delivery platforms and, importantly, more proactive doctrines regarding the use of nuclear weapons.
The doctrines have not, perhaps, changed in actuality, but when higher-ups in the decision-making process wonder aloud and in public about reconsidering their stand on the first-use policy, it is worth taking note.
The N-armed nations have roughly 120-130 nuclear warheads each and enough delivery systems to deploy these warheads.
They do not share much bonhomie, having fought at least four wars and engaged in dozens of skirmishes. Some analysts opine that India may be considering a relook at its nuclear doctrine to allow a first strike against neighbouring Pakistan.
Both countries have tested weapons specific to their avowed doctrine in the recent past.
Pakistan tested a missile that they claimed could evade interceptor missiles which India tested at least twice.
And as India tested its home-made n-powered submarine, Pakistan claimed it has tested its own SLBM, there were some suggestions that it was a failed test. However, that isn't the focus, the intent is.
India's Chief Of Army Staff General Bipin Rawat recently spoke about the plan for a fast, localised conventional invasion of parts of Pakistan.
Add it to the fact that the Indian Army did carry out a covert cross-border strike, although not aimed at Pakistan's armed forces, it indicates a rearrangement of the basic strategic plan to deal with adverse situations.
However, a limited but strong response may be linked to not provoking a Pakistani retaliation, possibly with nuclear weapons.
The very idea that Pakistan would respond with a nuclear strike against India is not beyond comprehension.
In fact, Pakistan can use smaller, tactical nuclear weapons in advance or in anticipation of an Indian action.
No side can technically afford to go second. Photo: Reuters
The problem with this type of strategic doctrine is that there is glaring scope of miscalculation by each side. A scaled conventional conflict could easily escalate into a full-blown nuclear war — it is not a doomsday prediction, it is a definite possibility.Global geopolitics is not helping the scenario.
As India races to counter China and Pakistan tries to keep up with the aggression, and with the US being closer to India than ever before, there are doubts whether Washington will likely broker peace between India and Pakistan in the future.
Guided by simple logic, if Pakistan must have any chance of winning a war against India, it will use its nuclear weapons — almost all of it.
If India wishes to counter it in any way, it has got to be preemptive, simply because any n-tipped missile in the subcontinental theatre would take barely 10 minutes to start hitting targets, irrespective of who launches them.
So no side can technically afford to go second. A scary scenario.
There is no immediate threat, but along with a strong Indian response — guaranteed in the event of cross-border terror adventurism — factors like non-state actors and the rising pitch of rhetoric can lead to disaster.
Even a limited nuclear exchange between the neighbours would affect some 50 lakh people and kill close to 20 lakh directly and in the famines that may follow
