China hadn’t come in front until 2018. Expecting Chinese boots on the ground to help Pakistan in a war against India is not on the cards, but India had been raising formations specifically to stand against China therefore 100% of Indian army cannot be committed against Pakistan army in the event of war. Would indian army move units from its Leh based Corps against Pakistan if there is a threat of escalation on LOC is debatable. In Kargil war Indian army moved some units from there, now maybe not. The two front war for India is also discussed since 2018. I didn’t follow that much as i concentrated more on COIN war inside Pakistan rather than a conventional war scenario.
There is far, far more concern about China's actions on the LAC, than about anything at all from Pakistan, excepting during times like the recent Poonch deaths of four jawans.
Some of the tension surrounding the China question is due to the government's lies about the real situation, where they allowed the PLA to slice away a little bit of territory at a time until a significant amount of area had been lost. The Army realised too late that it was on its own, and took independent action late in the day; some small recovery was the result, led by a night movement on a strategic point right on the boundary between opposed formations. As usual, the government claimed all the credit, while simultaneously untruthfully denying any change in the situation.
Quite clearly, the PLA were acting on explicit instructions from their political masters to achieve certain goals. Every action they took and actions that they are still taking are clearly planned. So, the riot without gunfire that took place between two mobs of soldiers that took 20 Indian lives, including a battalion commander, and an undisclosed number of Chinese lives, probably not more than half of that, is being countered with increasing wariness and readiness to contest all points, while still avoiding gunfire. At Doklam, after the withdrawal, the PLA has been building infrastructure at a very high speed, and on their side of the boundary, they have built a road network, and buildings for residence and shelter from bad weather. In addition, their actions have led to the Bhutanese seeking a direct settlement of boundary lines, contrary to their treaty obligations. India is unlikely to oppose this, as it will put a certain stretch of border out of dispute, and allow concentration on the rest.
This much is clear, the earlier split of 23 Indian divisions on the western frontier and 8 on the northern frontiers is no longer tenable. It seems that if there had been no restraints, the Indian Army would have left the formations on the west undisturbed, and would have liked to increase the forces on the northern frontier, the LAC, to several times the present 8 divisions +. This would imply a desired strength of around 39 to 40 divisions, much lighter on armour, and mechanisation, but well equipped with artillery and helicopters.
It is unlikely that the conservative present leadership of the Army will disturb the forces on the northern frontier to divert any forces to the west. All the more so given the total suspicion of PLA intentions. So on the west, it will continue to be (if I recall correctly) 25 PA divisions facing 23 IA divisions.
The point is that conversely, Pakistan may be wrong to expect active support from the PLA, other than the expected raising troop strength in the frontier regions to put additional mental pressure on the IA commands. So these stories being tossed around suggesting PLA support are unreal.
It’s not the capability that’s the problem, it’s the mindset. Expecting Rommels or Pattons in leadership of both armies is not really a good idea. Maybe one or two generals shine from each side out of 20 who will be directly involved in combat in during war.
So far, from whatever I have read, on the Indian side, there has been only one Corps commander of any merit, Sagat Singh. I would not like to express any opinion on the Pakistani side, not with you and PanzerKiel members of this forum.
