How subversion,diversion,EW, can throw a country into chaos-The Romanian revolution of 1989

[flamer84]

Ceausescu and Romanian Sovereignty

Romania was an important German ally in WWII, but changed sides on 23 August 1944. In accordance with agreements of the Jalta Conference, the country subsequently came within the Soviet sphere of influence, and was one of signatories of the Warsaw Pact.

The Romanian leadership managed to convince the Soviets to withdraw all troops from the country in June 1958. After that, Romania slowly adopted a form of nationalistic communism quite similar to that of neighboring Yugoslavia and became the least compliant of the Soviet satellites. In 1964 cooperation between the Romanian and USSR intelligence services virtually ended and relations with Moscowworsened especially since the dictator Nicolae Ceausescu established himself in power in 1965. Subsequently, in some matters, Romaniahas taken stands in direct opposition to Soviet policy, as in its continuing diplomatic relations with Communist China, Albania, and Israel.

Before long, the Romanian dictator was a thorn in the side of the Soviets. In August 1968, when the USSR and all other countries of the Warsaw Pact intervened in Czechoslovakia, Ceausescu denounced the invasion in a public speech, declaring it for a brutal interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign country. Romania was the only Warsaw Pact country not to participate, and subsequently it remained only a passive member of the Eastern Bloc: since August 1968, the Romanian ground forces did not participate in any Warsaw Pact exercise. Ceausescu showed strong tendencies on Romanian self-sufficiency, especially in regards of procuring armament for the military. Thus, while Romania was receiving substantial military equipment and training from the USSR in the 1950s, since the late 1960s it began searching for alternatives - in country, in the West and among non-aligned states. During the following years Ceausescu established an increasingly good image of himself and his country in the West, which was mostly due to his stand against the Soviets. Good relations with France (resulting in contracts for license production of Alouette III and Puma helicopters, as well as Renault cars), United Kingdom (resulting in contracts for license production of Rolls Royce Viper engines, BAC 1-11 and BN-2 Islander aircraft), Canada (resulting with the first non-Soviet nuclear reactor built in Eastern Europe), USA (with particularly good relations with Nixon’s administrations, Boeing 707 deliveries) were rising eyebrows in Kremlin time and again.

However, Ceausescu ruled Romania with help of the "Departamentul Securitatii Statului" (DSS) – the State Security Department, popularly known as “Securitatea” which was foremost busy controlling all aspects of public life in Romania through intelligence and repression. Securitatea was involved in espionage of literally everybody: like the former “Stazi” in East Germany, it maintained a wide net of informants, infiltrating economic structures, financial institutions, the executive and the legislature. Intercepting phone calls and placing "bugs" were also common practice. In this way, the DSS was perceived as being omni-present in every bureau, shop or home around the country and maintained order as much trough direct actions as trough the fear generated in the public by the fact that it could "listen" anything, anytime, and anybody could potentially be an informant.

In the 1980s, the Romanian regime became increasingly radical and isolated, with a very strong nationalist character. Ceausescu's clique developed an immense personality cult for him and his wife, surpassed in size and lack of realism only by the North Korean one. Like Ceausescu, Securitatea was hated in the public, but nobody was able to admit this openly, then the omni-presence of informants and agents ascertained that any dissident could be swiftly and decisively dealt with. At the political level, the communist regime saw the “Perestroika” efforts of the Soviet leader Gorbachev, almost as another Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia; his drive to replace old Communist leaders of East European countries by reformers was considered dangerous.

By 1989, Romania was the last of the Warsaw Pact countries in which there were no reforms, quite on the contrary food and energy shortages began to resemble those found during a war or inside a third world country. The reformist Soviet leadership was not interested in having a potentially hostile regime on its borders; however it could not support an opposition or a reformative wing within the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) as there were none. Besides, the Securitatea would quite certainly learn about such efforts. But, if there was a popular uprising - even one sparked by foreign agents - the snowball effect was guaranteed due to the immense public discontent and in the case of a military repression, the Soviets would be provided with a reason to launch an invasion with the reasoning of “protecting Romanian people from their own dictator”.


Air Force

Romania has an old and proud aviation history, being one of the first countries where aircraft were imagined, built and flown, as well as a rich history of domestic aerospace industry. The first military air unit of the Romanian Army was established already in 1893, and was a balloon observation unit. As early as 1903, the first plans for an original aircraft were published, but it was not before 1906 that this plane was indeed flown by its inventor, Traian Vuia. Nevertheless, already four years later the first fan-jet powered plane in the world was built and flown – even if in an uncontrollable fashion – by Henri Coanda.

Romania became only the fifth nation world-wide to have an air force established as a separate military branch: the Romanian Flying Corps came into being already on 30 April 1913, as a branch subordinated directly to the Ministry of War, and having 80 pilots and 25 air observers at the time. It participated in the Second Balkan War shortly thereafter, in June-July 1913, flying observation and liaison sorties. During World War I, this corps actively participated in fighting against Austro-Hungarian, German and Bulgarian forces, even after most of the country was overrun by these, enjoying a very strong French support. The air arm experienced its “Golden Ages” in the 1920s and 1930s, when it was mainly equipped with domestic airplanes manufactured by no less but seven Romanian factories. Over 2.000 military and civilian airplanes were built by Romanian companies within 18 years.

In 1940, a number of German instructors arrived and the "Aeronautica Regala Romana" - ARR, Royal Romanian Aeronautics, was completely reorganized and then significantly increased, so that it participated very actively in the war against USSR, between 1941 and 1944. By the early 1944, however, the ARR was severely depleted and weakened due to the increasing number of Allied attacks against strategically important oilfields in Ploiesti area. On 20 August 1944, the Red Army breached the Romanian-German front in Moldova, and three days later a coup led by King Michael deposed the military dictator Antonescu and his cabinet, leading to fierce fighting between the Romanians and Germans, on 24 and 25 August, involving both air forces. When the Soviets finally reached Bucharest, on 30 August, the south of the country was already free of all German troops: the rest of these retreated behind Transylvanian mountains. Thus, the Romanians changed sides on their own, right before being overrun by the Soviets. Afterwards, the ARR actively fought against Germany and Hungary during campaigns over Romanian, Hungarian, Czechoslovak and Austrian territories.

In 1947, the prefix “Royal” was dropped and the Air Force, “Fortele Aeriene ale Republicii Populare Romane” – Air Force of the Popular Republic of Romania – was reorganized along Soviet lines. On 10 August 1950, a new national insignia derived from the Red Star design was adopted. The first Yakovlev Yak-23 and Yak-17UTI fighter jets were supplied in 1951, followed by MiG-15s, the next year, and MiG-17s and Il-28s in 1955, when the official designation of the air force was changed to "Aviatia Militara" (AvM) - Military Aviation. In 1958, the first supersonic fighter – MiG-19 – entered service, followed by MiG-21F-13s, four years later. In 1956 the first helicopter unit was established, flying 4 Soviet-made Mil Mi-4s and, starting from 1962, also SM-2 and SM-1s – the Polish made variants of the Mi-1.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Romania re-established its aviation industry and obtained licence for production of some Western types, including Aérospatiale SA.316B Alouette III, SA.330 H/L Puma, Britten-Norman BN-2 Islander and BAC 1-11. Simultaneously, a strike fighter was developed and manufactured in cooperation with Yugoslavia, in the frame of the YUROM project, that resulted in the IAR-93/J-22 Orao – the only non-Soviet fighter-bomber ever built and flown in an air force of a (at least officially) Warsaw Pact member state. Experience accumulated in these programs permitted the development and building of an indigenous jet trainer, the IAR-99.

As of 1989, the AvM had approximately 32.000 personnel, of which less than one third were conscripts. The air force had an inventory of 512 combat aircraft, and was also responsible for transport, reconnaissance and helicopters, with the primary mission of defending the country against invasion while protecting and supporting the ground forces and navy. Theoretically divided into three tactical divisions, the AM's basic organizational structure was the Regiment, housed by a single base. The commander in chief in December 1989 was Gen. Iosif Rus.

As far as jets are concerned, they mainly flew Soviet-made MiG-21s and MiG-23s, but many MiG-15s and a few MiG-17 were still available for ground attack, as well as a large number of IAR-93s. Finally, on 21 December 1989, the first 4 MiG-29s arrived in Romania ferried by Soviet pilots (MiG-29 A serials 41, 46 and MiG-29 UB serials 15 and 23), but the first flights with Romanian pilots began only in April 1990. The helicopter fleet consisted of roughly 100 each IAR-316B Alouette III and IAR-330L Puma, plus less than 30 Mi-8T/PS. The lack of a dedicated attack/anti-tank helicopter was partially suplemented by the posibility to arm all helicopter types mentioned above - mostly with unguided rockets. Altough all jet fighter units were trained, besides interception and air combat, for ground attack, only two regiments were designated fighter-bomber regiments and trained specifically for ground attack and CAS.

The “Aurel Vlaicu Flight Academy” had a large number of training aircraft based on three airfields in close proximity to each other, as follows:

Focsani AB (grass airfield)
19 School Liaison Regiment
- IAR-823 and Yak-52

Boboc AB
20 School Fighter-Bomber Regiment
- IAR-823, L-29, L-39ZA and IAR-99

Buzau AB (grass airfield)
21 School Transport Regiment
- An-2R/T and IAR-316B

The operational units were:

Ianca AB
49 Fighter-Bomber Regiment
- 1/49 Fighter-Bomber Squadron, IAR-93MB/DC (not yet operational)
- 2/49 Fighter-Bomber Squadron, MiG-15 (S-102)
- 3/49 Fighter-Bomber Squadron, MiG-15 (S-102)

Mihail Kogalniceanu (near the Black Sea shore)
57 Fighter Regiment
- 1/57 Fighter Squadron, MiG-29A/29UB (not yet operational, replacing MiG-21M/UM)
- 2/57 Fighter Squadron, MiG-23MF/UB
- 3/57 Fighter Squadron, MiG-23MF/UB
- 143 Pilotless Reconnaissance Squadron, VR-3 Reis (Tu-143)

Turnisor AB (Sibiu)
58 Helicopter Regiment
- 1/58 Helicopter Squadron, IAR-330L
- 2/58 Helicopter Squadron, IAR-316B

Ghimbav Airfield/ICA Brasov (Brasov)
58 Helicopter Regiment (det.)
- 1/58 Helicopter Squadron, IAR-316B

Tuzla AB (near the Black Sea shore)
59 Helicopter Regiment
- 1/59 Helicopter Squadron, IAR-330L
- 2/59 Helicopter Squadron, IAR-316B

Tecuci AB
60 Helicopter Regiment
- 141 Helicopter Squadron, IAR-330L
- 183 Helicopter Squadron, IAR-316B

Boteni AB (also known as Titu)
61 Helicopter Regiment
- 1/61 Helicopter Squadron, IAR-330L
- 2/61 Helicopter Squadron, IAR-316B

Craiova AB
67 Fighter-Bomber Regiment
- 1/67 Fighter-Bomber Squadron, IAR-93 A/MB/B/DC
- 2/67 Fighter-Bomber Squadron, IAR-93 A/MB/B/DC
- 3/67 Fighter-Bomber Squadron, MiG-15 (S-102), MiG-17F/PF

Campia Turzii AB (also known as Luna)
71 Fighter Regiment
- 1/71 Fighter Squadron, MiG-21MF/UM
- 2/71 Fighter Squadron, MiG-21M/UM
- 3/71 Fighter Squadron, MiG-21M/UM

Caransebes AB
73 Helicopter Regiment
- 1/73 Helicopter Squadron, IAR-330L
- 2/73 Helicopter Squadron, IAR-316B

Fetesti AB (also known as Borcea)
86 Fighter Regiment
- 1/86 Fighter Squadron, MiG-21MF/UM
- 2/86 Fighter Squadron, MiG-21PFM/U/US
- 3/86 Fighter Squadron, MiG-21PFM/U/US
- 38 Reconaissance Squadron, Harbin H-5R/B, HJ-5

Otopeni AB (Bucharest)
50th Aerial Transport Flotilla An-24V/RV/R/RT, An-26, An-30, BN-2 Islander, ROMBAC 1-11, Il-18, Boeing 707-3K1C; IAR-316B, IAR-330L, Mi-8T/PS, Mi-17, SA365N Dauphin 2

Deveselu AB
91 Fighter Regiment
- 1/91 Fighter Squadron, MiG-21MF-75/UM
- 2/91 Fighter Squadron, MiG-21MF/UM
- 3/91 Fighter Squadron, MiG-21PFM/UM

Alexeni AB
94 Helicopter Regiment
- 1/94 Helicopter Squadron, Mi-8T
- 2/94 Helicopter Squadron, IAR-316B
- 131 Helicopter Navigator Training Squadron, IAR-316B, IAR-330L, Mi-8T

Giarmata AB (Timisoara)
93 Fighter Regiment
- 1/93 Fighter Squadron, MiG-23MF/UB
- 2/93 Fighter Squadron, MiG-21MF-75/UM
- 3/93 Fighter Squadron, MiG-21MF-75/UM
- 31 Reconnaissance Squadron MiG-21R/UM

Bacau AB
CIAv - Centrul de Instructie a Aviatiei (acting as operational conversion unit)
- 1st Squadron, MiG-21M/UM
- 2nd Squadron, MiG-21PFM/US
- 3rd Squadron, MiG-21PF/U (to be replaced by MiG-21M/UM displaced from Mihail Kogalniceanu by MiG-29s)

The national air defence system (AAT) was under a different command, being responsible for the radar network and fixed SAM sites, led by Gen. Mircea Mocanu. The main defensive asset was the SA-2 (S-75M3 Volhov) with 5Ia23 type missiles, deployed in 13 sites protecting the Bucharest - Ploiesti - Brasov area. Four SA-3 batteries (S-125 M1A Neva) armed with 5V27D (V-601) missiles were also available, being deployed to form an inner ring to protect the capital. The area around Bucharest and Ploiesti belonged to the 1st SAM Brigade, while Brasov with its vital industries and helicopter factory was defended by the 11th SAM Regiment. Another two SA-2 regiments were available, garrisoned at Galati and Resita (the latter with four batteries deployed in the Deva-Huneadoara-Orastie area). The early warning network consisted of 36 radar sites spread across the country, equipped with Soviet built P-37, PRV-13, P-18, P-14, P-19 and three ST-68 (36D6) radars; as well as the first indigenous radars START-1. They ground IFF interogator system used was L22 "Parola".

The Army operated all mobile SAM types (SA-6,-7,-8 and -9), together with a large number of quadruple 14.5 mm machine guns (MR-4), twin-barreled 30 mm guns (A-436 Model 1980) and outdated M1939, 85 mm guns. The only SPAAG in service were a number of BTR-40 equipped with 2x14,5 mm guns. Heavier 57 mm (S-60) radar guided anti-aircraft guns and the old 37mm ones were under the control of the AAT, being deployed around airbases and airports (usually 2-3 sites with 6-8 guns) and as close-in protection for the fixed SAM sites (one AAA site for each SAM site). Three army regiments were equipped with 15 SA-6 batteries, having each 5 batteries with 4 launchers and based at Bucharest (48 Reg.), Craiova (51 Reg.) and Medgidia (53 Reg.). A single SA-8 regiment (the 50th) was active with 16 launchers since mid-1989, based near Cluj-Napoca. All SAM and AAA units belonging to the Army were subordinated to the AAT from the operational point of view.

As of 1989, the Romanian armed forces had around 3000 SA-2,-3,-6,-7,-8 and -9 missiles at their disposal. Also in spring 1989, a few SPN-30 electronic warfare systems entered service withthe 147th Regiment based at Bucharest.

 

[flamer84]

In the late 80's there was a lot of discontent at all ranks within the military. Funding, spares and fuel for training were cut down to a minimum. An average pilot generally got only 15-20 flying hours per year, while poorly fed army conscripts were used as cheap workforce in construction, agriculture and mining. Officers were prevented from getting higher ranks (and wages) at the appropriate time. Even though new equipment was still being aquired, it was mostly from domestic production - not always of the necessary quality or sophistication. More advanced weapons were aquired from the USSR only in small quantities. Consequently, in 1989 the Romanian armed forces were likely the worst equipped in the Warsaw Pact, and with a very low combat readiness, which would be brutally highlighted in the subsequent events.

Starting from 1984 the Romanian Air Force reintroduced its old roundel, consisting of Romanian national colors as national marking - instead of the Red Star with a yellow and blue circle in the middle. At approximately the same time its MiG-21s - the backbone of the air force - were repainted in a color similar to "ghost grey" overall. This is how most of AM's MiG-21s appeared in 1989. Typical load for interception purposes at the time consisted of two R-3S (AA-2 Atoll) missiles on outboard underwing stations, and two RS-2US (AA-1 Alkali B) missiles (mounted on APU-68UM launch rails) on inboard underwing pylons, as well as a single centerline 490 liter drop tank. For air-to-ground tasks, these aircraft would carry UB-16-57 rocket launchers, 100-250 kg bombs, S-24 rockets as well as a single centerline drop tank. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)


Uprising in Timisoara

Ceausescu had been advised by the Securitatea some two months in advance that civil unrest will be provoked and supported from outside the country, but took no action, believing that the people is loyal to him and nothing could happen. During the last few years, Romanians would illegally cross the western border into Hungary and Yugoslavia on an almost daily basis, with the aim of reaching Western Europe. They were put into refugee camps and usually allowed to go to Austria and further. However, from autumn 1989, the Hungarian authorities started sending back large numbers of these people. Among them, Securitatea informants who reveled during debriefings that training centers were established in the refugee camps across the border, where those who volonteered received psychological and practical training in provoking unrests in an urban environment.

Even more disturbing was the huge number of Soviets entering the country, especially trough Moldova. Especially between 15-20 December, the number of Soviet “tourists” increased 3 times compared to the numbers from previous years, in the same timeframe. Notably, the overwhelming majority of them were young males in their 20s and 30s, all driving brand new Ladas. A very small fraction of them took hotel rooms in the major cities, while the rest "vanished", preffering to sleep in their cars in relatively remote locations. This is well known and documented, since Securitatea carefully surveyed all foreigners activities in the country. It is estimated that over 4000 of these unlikely tourists entered the country in that period.


The revolt of Romanian masses against the oppressive regime of Ceausescu and Securitatea began in the town of Timisoara, on 15 December 1989, when ethnic Hungarian reverend Laszlo Tokes held a speech in front of a group of his followers, which were dispersed, and some arrested by police (Militia) and Securitatea agents. What started as a small meeting turned the next day into a major demonstration against Ceausescu’s regime: riot police and Securitatea attempted to disperse the crowd of several thousands, causing a noisy and bloody fight in the streets.

The next day, on 17 December a huge crowd gathered again, marching on the Communist Party Headquarters and city hall. Once again, the security authorities reacted with brutality: tear gas and water cannons were used initially, but then the security forces together with a significant contingent of Army troops opened fire into the crowds, killing dozens. That morning, in Bucharest, Ceausescu and the Executive Political Committee decided to neutralize any resistance by force.

As if nothing had happened, on the morning of 18 December, Ceausescu left for a state visit to Iran (where, between others, he negotiated a possible sale of over 100 IAR-93 fighter-bombers to the IRIAF). Unprecedented security measures were taken, as the presidential Boeing 707 (registration YR-ABD) was escorted by 4 MiGs all the way from take-off in Bucharest to the limit of Romanian territorial waters over the Black Sea; same thing being done for the return flight. His visit was cut short however, when on 20 December some 100.000 people demonstrated on the streets of Timisoara and the Army troops sided with them.

Map of main air bases and other important airfields in Romania, as of 1989. (Map by Tom Cooper, based on Encarta 2003 software)

Unrest within the Air Force

Taken by surprise by the force of the revolt, Ceausescu attempted to buy time. He sent negotiators to Timisoara while deploying additional troops to crush the rebellion; simultaneously, on the evening of 20 December, he appeared on the TV, explaining that the unrest in Timisoara was a deed of “hooligans”.

Ceausescu’s TV-appearance was closely monitored by the AvM personnel based at Giarmata AB, near Timisoara. The situation there was very tense already since 16 December, when the locally-based 93 Fighter Regiment was put on alert. Contrary to the rest of Romanian population and members of armed forces, the officers of the 93 Regiment knew exactly what was going on because they were in telephone contact with their families in the city. An AM pilot of this unit later recalled in an interview to Razvan Belciuganu (published by Jurnalul National, on 20 September 2004) about what happened on the evening of 20 December:
- “…the pilots decided they had to do something. The only ones who believed what Ceausescu said were the unit commander and the counter-intelligence officer. They were both escorted out of the air base at gunpoint. The commander of the air defence unit at the base told the pilots he had orders to shot down any airplane attempting to take off.
- “Will you shoot?” asked the pilots.
- “It’s an order!” he replied.
- “The one who gave you that order is no longer at the base. So we’ll come to an agreement when the time comes. Meanwhile prepare to defend the airfield if we are attacked from the air!” said the pilots.

The pilots decided that if there was any sign that the base would come under attack from other units of the Romanian armed forces, they would take off and seek refuge in Yugoslavia – fighting their way out if it was needed. All the MiG-21s and MiG-23s in operational condition were armed with air-to-air missiles and refueled. The commander of the 1/93 Squadron, Colonel Surcu, demanded “large air-to-ground, radio-guided missiles” to be mounted on his aircraft (almost certainly Kh-23 air-to-ground missiles): if they were to flee toYugoslavia, he was determined to strike the headquarters of the Securitatea in downtown Timisoara on the way out. Simultaneously, three trucks loaded with machine guns and ammunition were prepared for evacuation of ground personnel: in the case of an attack against the airfield, they were to set the fuel and ammunition storage buildings on fire and fight their way out or set for Yugoslavia on secondary roads.

By the morning of 21 December, problems for Ceausescu’s regime were brewing at the ICA Brasov facility, in Ghimbav, near Brasov, a factory that was manufacturing and overhauling license-built Aérospatiale SA.316B Alouette III (as IAR-316s) and SA.330H/L Pumas (as IAR-330s). There, the few IAR-316 Alouettes detached from 58 Helicopter Regiment in operational condition were ordered to be prepared and armed for an attack against Timisoara. Each helicopter was armed with four UB-4 launchers for four unguided rockets caliber 57mm. The pilots of this detachment were not the least pleased with the idea: they went through assembling facilities, explaining to the assembled workers about their orders, and expressing their discontent. The news spread rapidly, and within minutes, larger groups of workers gathered at the apron of the local airfield. ICA Brasov’s director, Major Ioan Georgescu, appeared as well, and was immediately faced with questions why was the truth about Timisoara hidden, as well as demands for the helicopters not to be sent there.

Colonel Arama, the test pilot at ICA Brasov, took off in an armed IAR-316 and took a position some 30m above the crowd. Enraged, the workers started screaming at Georgescu and others:
- “Is this why we are building helicopters? So you can kill us with them? Make it land immediately!”

Under pressure, Georgescu ordered Arama to land at once; instead, the pilot flew some 10km away, towards Sanpetru, where he fired his unguided rockets into an empty forest. On return, Arama landed near the crowd, where his helicopter was immediately checked. Finding that its rocket launchers were empty, the engineers took the pods and batteries away from this and all the other operational helicopters, and decided to keep them under guard in order to prevent any kind of retaliation. The rest of workers then marched toBrasov, where they joined the people already demonstrating in the streets.

Hardly 48 hours later, these helicopters were made operational again and flew reconnaissance and combat sorties over and aroundBrasov. The need for such flights was so pressing, the technicians at IAR sent into combat even the sole prototype of IAR-317 Airfox (a small antitank helicopter based on the Alouette); a big mistake, as medium and lower echelons in the armed forces didn’t knew about the prototype’s existence. For them it was unknown, thus “terrorist” so it was shot at with small arms. It received 7 bullets, but managed to land safely back at the factory, with the crew unharmed.

Aside from Pumas, the Romanians have also obtained license for production of SA.316B Alouette III, and these entered service with AM in considerable number, under local designation "IAR-316". Like Pumas, Romanian Alouettes could also be armed with rocket pods (UB-4, 57mm), the maximum load being four (two on each side of the rear cabin). At least one of AM's IAR-316s was shot down during the Revolution of 1989. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

Secret Coup

Obviously without information about first unrests within the military, Ceausescu was determined to keep himself in power. On the freezingly cold morning of 21 December, he appeared on the balcony of the Central Comitee (CC) building in Bucharest to address a crowd of several tens of thousands in a televised speech. All of a sudden, calls from the crowd began to interrupt his speech; Securitatea agents reacted by beating and arresting some of the protesters. Then the situation went out of the control, when the mass became violent and attempted to break police cordons. Security forces opened fire, killing and arresting dozens of civilians. The fighting spread and chaos ensued as the crowd refused to disperse.

The chaos that followed Ceausescu’s last public appearance on 21 December was the signal that his power was crumbling. Even more demonstrators assembled in Bucharest and other large Romanian cities during the 21st and on the morning of 22 December, huge crowds locking in standoffs with the Army at all the main squares. The situation became even tenser when news began to circulate that there was dissidence within the military.

On the morning of 22 December, Gen. Vasile Milea, Minister of Defence, committed suicide (or, according to some evidence, he was killed) while being in the Central Comitee building (CC). Ceausescu named Gen. Victor Athanasie Stanculescu (vice-minister at the time) as the next Minister of Defence. Crowds were gathering around the building and started to force the entry, so Stanculescu and Securitatea Gen. Marin Neagoe (commanding the 5th section of DSS, tasked with protecting Ceausescu) persuaded the latter to take a helicopter and flea. At 11:33, the order was issued to Gen. Iosif Rus, head of the AM to provide the helicopter.

One of four presidential SA365N Dauphin 2 (no. 203) took off from Otopeni with a Mi-8 as escort. Only the Dauphin landed on the roof of the CC, and at take-off - which took place at 12:09 - it was so overloaded that the pilot struggled to get it airborne as some protesters reached the roof. Inside were the crew (pilot Col. Vasile Malutan, copilot Col. Mihai Stefan and flight engineer Stelian Dragoi), Nicolae Ceausescu, his wife Elena Ceausescu, her bodyguard (Securitatea Capt. Marian Rusu), Securitatea Maj. Florian Rat acting as bodyguard for Ceausescu plus two members of the government – Manea Manescu and Emil Bobu. Everybody in the helicopter thought they would go to Otopeni, where the two presidential Boeing 707 (YR-ABD and YR-ABB) were fueled up and ready to leave. Instead Ceausescu asked to go further north to Snagov (his secondary residence).

After a 12 minutes flight the Dauphin landed and remained there until 12:47 when it took off without Manescu and Bobu. At Ceausescu’s request (who day-dreamed to rally the local workers around himself and regain power) they flew towards Pitesti, altough Otopeni tower requested them to land there. Malutan, the pilot, knew exactly what was going on and wanted to get rid of Ceausescu. En route, nearBoteni AB, he made up a story thet they have been located by the air defences and will be shot down. He landed at 13:09 near the Bucharest-Targoviste road, where Ceausescu, Elena and Maj. Florian Rat took a car. They were arrested later in the day and taken to an Army unit near Targoviste.

The popular uprising was exploited by a group of former high-ranking Party officials and military officers to seize power. Some of the men within this clique had been plotting a coup against Ceausescu already since the 1970s. On 22 December at noon, hardly 30 minutes after Ceausescu fled, they announced on the national TV to have taken control of the government. The backgrounds of this coup remain unclear to this day, and there are not few Romanians all too concerned to talk openly about what exactly happened. It appears, that the coup was supported by the Soviet intelligence, foremost the KGB and GRU - the latter had recruited former Romanian General Nicolae Militaru, which was uncovered as a Soviet spy and expelled from the Army in 1978. Ion Iliescu, the new leader which quickly emerged after Ceausescu fled had swiftly appointed Militaru as Minister of Defence on 23 december, replacing Stanculescu.


Fake Air Attack

From the moment the clandestine activity of various foreign agents and groups within the Romanian military and security apparatus began, the country was subjected to an act of unprecedented electronic warfare. Jamming of radars and radio communications was widespread; vivid operations of unidentified helicopters, aircraft and even unmanned aerial vehicles was recorded as flights were observed penetrating Romanian airspace from various directions, and Romanian fighters and helicopters were scrambled to intercept. For strong political reasons – mainly connected to the wish of new Romanian authorities to keep the image of the military “clean” of any actions against populations, but for other reasons as well – most of this clandestine activities remain unexplained until today, even if there are strong reasons to suspect massive involvement of the Soviets, who were closely monitoring the developments in Romania, perhaps with the objective of preparing an armed intervention of one sort and purpose or the other. The effects of these operations were amplified by the tension and confusion within the military, resulting in a number of friendly fire incidents, foremost between Army units.

The first signs of unusual aerial activity over Romania were recorded around 18:30hrs, on 22 December, immediately after the landing of a Tarom BAC 1-11 (reg. YR-BCK) passenger aircraft at Arad underway on the line Bucharest-Timisoara-Arad-Bucharest. Most radars around the country have detected numerous unidentified contacts. The preliminary report published by the Romanian Secret Service about events in Timisoara, in December 1989, cited that the locally based UM 01942 (“Military Unit 01942”, a radar unit of the Timisoara Air Defence Division, located 4 km north of Giarmata AB), had its radar stations at maximum alert, and that these detected a large number of objects moving towards the state border from north, north-west, west and south – from the USSR, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria at the same time. At the time, there was no jamming yet, and thus the Romanian operators considered these targets to be real.

Approximately 20-25km away from the border, all the targets disappeared from the radar screens – only to re-appear one hour later, this time well inside the country, and apparently converging on various air bases and air defence sites. Officers of the UM 01942 have had no doubts: they were tracking a total of 41 unidentified, slow moving objects inside the Romanian airspace, all flying at very low levels, and this meant that a heliborne assault against their country was underway.

Major Stelian Bouleanu from 93 Fighter Regiment later recalled:
- “…at 19:00hrs, I got orders to take off. The plane was armed with air-to-air missiles and live rounds for the gun. A number of targets appeared on radars and my mission was to find and destroy them – if ordered to do so. I went somewhere about the Mures River, and patrolled approximately between Lipova and Savarsin… No helicopters!
- The radar (GCI) then gave me other coordinates and I flew to Caransebes. Nothing! Lugoj…Nothing! I’m flying around the west of the country, looking for invisible helicopters, and can’t find anything. After this I came to a very clear conclusion: no airborne force was attacking us. Our radars went crazy, inventing whole groups of helicopters that appeared to be approaching, landing, bombing or attacking urban areas and economic objectives! I reported about this when I returned to my airfield.

The UM 01864/C, at Pecica, detected a helicopter. Shortly after, a helicopter was observed while landing troops at Semlac. Two others appeared seconds later: one in Pecica and another in Curtici, while two helicopters were detected while approaching Arad airport. Local air defence units immediately opened fire.

Radars of the 1st SAM Brigade, composed of nine battalions (SAM sites) spread at a distance of 30 to 40 kilometers around Bucharest, and responsible for the defence of Romanian capital, also detected a number of targets. One of its officers later recollected:
- The general situation in the air offered the image of an air attack against the capital and heliborne landings. This picture appeared on the main radar scopes of the brigade, but also on local radars of other air defence units around Bucharest. Simultaneously, there was information that these sites were also attacked from the ground. It looked like the enemy planes came from the Danube, manoeuvring towards Bucharest, or coming directly from the Sea, above Constanta and Urziceni. Our missile units appeared subjected to a total war!

In addition to the 1st SAM Brigade, the 1st Romanian Army has had the 52nd SAM Regiment near Bucharest as well, equipped with SA-6 and having one battery on permanent quick alert. Additional AAA units were deployed at Otopeni and Baneasa airports, as well as with the 57th Tank Division at Pantelimon, which had one AAA battery in full alert at any given time. During the night, the situation became more and more complex, with additional targets emerging. Eventually, ever more units were granted permission to open fire.

The Commander of the 1st Surface to Air Missile Brigade, a highly experienced officer with ten live firing exercises on ranges inKazakhstan, as well as an extensive briefing on experiences from the Lebanon War, in 1982, ordered firing action only against targets that were clearly within the kill zone. His unit fired six SAMs, all of which appeared to have hit. Afterwards, suspecting a bluff, he ordered the SAMs to cease fire and sent his subordinates to bring him at least once piece of metal from one of downed aircraft. The commander of the battery positioned near the village of Miahai Bravu, reported that some of the engaged targets should have been hit only six kilometers from his position. He sent a team there, but this found nothing. While the SAMs ceased fire, anti-aircraft guns continued firing.

For the rest of the night additional reports about activity of unidentified flying objects inside the Romanian airspace were reported by other AM units as well. Around 22:24hrs, an unidentified helicopter was detected in south-eastern Romania. Coming from Otopeni, it approached to a point some 40km west of Alexeni AB. When only eight kilometers away, around 22:38hrs, it disappeared from the radar, only to re-appear two minutes later, now barely four kilometres away. At a distance of two kilometres, it suddenly made a 90 degrees turn to the left, then reached the Ialomita River, where it turned again at 90 degrees, following the river towards west. Several of people at the air base had the opportunity to take a look at this helicopter when it passed by and identified it as a French-made Aérospatiale SA.365 Dauphin: there were four Dauphins in Romania at the time, all used for VIP-transport.

Almost simultaneously, a similar scene occurred at the Boteni AB, the base of the 61 Helicopter Regiment, 38 kilometres west from Otopeni. What appeared to be a big transport aircraft was detected some 40km due west, at an altitude of only 200m and speed of about 400km/h. This plane was underway towards Alexeni, and definitely larger than any of the Antonov An-24, An-26 or An-30s in AM service at the time. By 22:38hrs, the plane was apparently trying to land in Alexeni, when it disappeared from the radar, some 15km away from the runway.

Around 22:44hrs, an aircraft was indeed observed approaching Alexeni AB, simultaneously with a helicopter (probably again the same Dauphin observed previously). One minute later, anti-aircraft guns of this airfield opened fire at both targets (which were underway with their navigation lights turned off), but these climbed to a level of between 3.000 and 4.000m, evading fire. After climbing, the aircraft continued towards east, reappearing on radar at 22:47hrs, now some 15km east of Alexeni, at a level of 4.000m and speed of 600km/h.

There are unconfirmed rumors that this was a Soviet transport aircraft which had landed at otopeni a few hours earlier, full of commandos sent to "help the Revolution". Immediately after touchdown it was confronted by heavily armed Romanian troops with orders to shoot if anyone attempts to disembark. After a tense standoff lasting a few hours, it took off for the USSR, attempting to land at Alexeni en route.





Decision in the East

As Major Bouleanu concluded already in the early evening, no aerial attack against Romania occurred. Most of the dozens of targets detected by the radars of the Giarmata early warning unit were fake – a result of powerful jamming from unknown sources. With very few exceptions, none of the targets could be tracked for periods of time that would be sufficient to mount an interception.

One of staff officers from the 1st SAM Brigade concluded, - “This action could have been undertaken by only one “actor”: the Soviet Army. Before 1989, all our battle positions and their geographical locations were reported to Moscow – in accordance with the Warsaw Pact Treaty. The Soviets also knew all our communication-, range-finding- and guidance frequencies – current and reserve ones.

This was confirmed by Commander Radu Borcea, head of the EW-Section of the AvM: - “Most of our equipment was Soviet-made. They knew what they gave us, they knew the frequencies, they knew everything. This is how all the interferences in our communication frequencies can be explained.”

Correspondingly, Gen. Stefan Gusa, cief of the General Staff, made a fateful decision, ordering the AvM interceptors and helicopters to remain on the ground, and air defence units to open fire at anything that was flying.

In the wake of this order, clandestine activities inside the Romanian airspace increased. Subsequent inquiry by the AAT division of the Romanian military concluded that the involved forces – especially those that initiated electronic warfare attacks against the radar net – did not belong to any of Romanian military or security branches. This conclusion is clearly recorded in the Document S443/02-04-1990, issued by the Central Institute for Military Equipment:
”Technical characteristics of the assets existent in the Romanian armed forces exclude the possibility of conducting such actions by the forces destined for electronic warfare available within the country”.

Not all of the attacks were fake: in fact, some of electronic warfare actions have obviously been coordinated with ground attacks. These were not particularly fierce, and mainly resulted in exchanges of small arms fire, but this was well placed.

At 00:35hrs of 23 December 1989, Boteni AB was attacked by small arms fire. The guards returned fire and the attackers disappeared. Almost simultaneously, targets resembling helicopters were detected while approaching Giarmata AB, but they disappeared from radar scopes.

In the following hours and by the early morning, the radars at Boboc AB, north of Alexeni, detected the following targets during this night:
- two or three objects underway south of Ramnicu-Sarat, flying towards Braila at various altitudes and speeds;
- Between six and eight objects in the area of Bucharest, flying towards Ploesti-Mizil, at altitudes between 500 and 5.000m
- Between six and eight objects flying from Lipia to Boboc at speeds between 150 and 300km/h.

At 01:15, 01:40, 02:20, 02:24, 04:01 and 05:45hrs, a total of six drones were observed while approaching Alexeni AB. Each of them operated as a single-ship that carried a large red light at the rear. All flew at a level around 500 meters, at speeds between 100 and 150km/h. Most of these helicopters approached from the direction of the village Manasia, nearby. All were fired upon and every time they would make 120 degrees turn to the left or right, exploding some five or ten seconds after changing direction. No wreckage was found on the following morning.

An SA-6 battery belonging to the 51st Army regiment located 8 km west of Circea, defending the early warning radars based there, as well as Craiova AB and IAv (airplane factory) Craiova (which built IAR-93 and 99s) further to the north, reported shooting down three helicopters between 01:40 and 02:55hrs. The search teams found no wreckage on the ground. During the same period of time, the personnel of the 183rd Helicopter Squadron at Tecuci AB – in eastern Romania - reportedly observed two helicopters passing by and opened fire at them, while at Tuzla AB (on the coast of the Black Sea), personnel of the 59 Helicopter Regiment observed helicopters approaching the airfield and turning off their navigation lights. Given that radio intercepts showed that their crews were communicating in Romanian, they were not shot at. At 01:55hrs, somebody dropped parachute flares over Giarmata AB, these being observed by members of the 31st Reconnaissance Squadron.

Reconstructed radar plots showing the intense and chaotic aerial image in south-western Romania. What can be noted is the very slow speed and long tracks of a few targets – probably radar-reflective balloons. Most of the targets appeared from nowhere, only to disappear after 10 minutes or so, thus making any interception effort useless. The large number of targets explains the high consumption of SA-6 missiles by the Army's 51st SAM Regiment near Craiova

”Battle” for Mihail Kogalniceanu AB



Not only the Bucharest area and the south-west of the country were seeing so much action in the night from 22 to 23 December 1989, plenty of activity was taking place in the east, around Mihail Kogalniceanu AB, on the Black Sea coast.

The first sign of trouble were four helicopters that approached at high altitude (between 4.000 and 6.000m), at 02:02hrs, identified by their navigation lights. When air defences opened fire, all four disappeared. Slightly over half an hour later, this air base was attacked by small arms fire: the perimeter was breached and the attackers fired at installations belonging to the 57 Fighter Regiment. After some time, the defence forces managed to repel this raid.

Around 04:40hrs, a single helicopter was spotted between six and eight kilometers away from the runway and approaching directly towards the control tower. It was engaged by AAA as soon as it reached the RFA (acronym for close radio-beacon in Romanian), and disappeared shortly, only to land a few minutes later. It was IAR-330 Puma #76 of the 59 Helicopter Regiment from Tuzla AB. The crew was safe, but it remains unclear why this helicopter took off in the first place, given the general order for all flying assets to remain on the ground. It was fired upon due to poor communication of the crew with the air controllers and their failure to follow the landing procedure indicated by the tower.

By the morning of 23 December, news appeared that there was fierce fighting on the streets of several major cities. Confusing reports were broadcasted on TV and radio about brutality of the security authorities, Army units switching to the side of people and battling security forces, and Ion Iliescu emerging as a leader of the National Salvation Front (FSN) which established itself as the new ruling body.

Around 12:50hrs, unknown helicopters and ground forces were reported 27km away from Sfantu Gheorghe, in the Danube Delta, and two MiGs were scrambled from Kogalniceanu AB to inspect. Whether these were MiG-23s or MiG-21s remains unknown (MiG-29s were not yet operational), but reports in the Romanian press indicate they did two attack passes, launching unguided rockets (probably caliber 57mm, from UB-16 or UB-32s), and larger rockets (perhaps S-24s) as well. After the second pass, their pilots were ordered to abort the attack and return to base.

Shortly after, a second pair of MiGs was ordered to perform a combat air patrol in the area of Sulina, Macin and Babadag, but they found no targets or any other unusual activity. Additional missions were flown by MiGs from Kogalniceanu in the afternoon. Between 15:25 and 16:25hrs, several reconnaissance sorties were flown along the coastline and off-shore oil rigs, as well as over Sfantu Gheorghe, but no unusual activity was detected. Finally, between 18:45 and 19:26hrs, a flying object was tracked over the Black Sea, some 25km away form the coast. No lock-on by the local SAM-units could be obtained however, as heavy active jamming was emitted by the target.

A MiG-23MF of 57 Fighter Regiment based at Mihail Kogalniceanu as seen in the late 1980s, painted in a camouflage pattern that was in widespread use at the time of the Revolution in Romania. MiG-23MFs in service with the 93 Fighter Regiment, at Giarmata AB, at the time, were painted either in a green-brown two-tone camo or in a four tone camo (dark and light green, brown and tan). Some Floggers in both regiments kept their original grey. Radomes of these aircraft were either white, or medium grey. Usual combat loads were two R-23R/T (AA-7 Apex) and two R-13M (AA-2 Atoll) air-to-air missiles and one PTB-800 centerline tank for interception tasks, or two Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry) air-to-ground missiles, a Delta NM guidance pod and one R-13M (AA-2 Atoll) air-to-air missile, plus one PTB-800 centerline tank, for air-to-ground tasks. R-60 (AA-8 Aphid) were also carried, both on single and double launchers. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

Except for MiGs from Kogalniceanu AB, other flying units of the AvM were active on this day as well – despite of the order from Gen. Gusa. The Alouette helicopters at ICA Brasov were returned to flying condition and armed already during the 22nd December, and they flew several combat sorties in support of the uprising, opening fire on a number of occasions. Several found themselves on receiving end: one Alouette landed in Brasov with minor damage during the night from 22 to 23 December, while another returned with a bullet in one of the pilots’ seats.

Also, sometimes during the 23rd, an unknown helicopter opened fire against an Army armoured personnel carrier near Otopeni AB, killing one soldier and causing the vehicle to catch fire. During the same day a Puma (probably from Boteni AB) was ordered to attack some “terrorists” supposedly hiding in a cemetery in Bucharest. The Puma crew found some activity going on and opened fire with a 12,7 mm DShKM machine gun mounted in the port side door. The suspects were in fact some guys digging a grave: luckily none of them were hit. The whole incident was filmed by a TV crew which was passing trough the area.

Sometimes during the days of 23 or 24 December the personnel of the Boboc AB, the base of the AvM Flying School, received orders to send two trucks to a nearby ammunition depot and pick up some bombs to arm their aircraft. Strange enough, at the same time the command post received a message that two trucks with terrorists dressed in blue overalls are moving in direction of the ammunition depot. Then, as now, blue was the color of overalls worn by AM ground crews, but the Commander of this airfield failed to notice this and immediately scrambled two L-39ZAs, with orders for the trucks to be destroyed. To the luck of ground crews in trucks, the ammunition depot was situated in a dense forest, and the L-39-pilots could not locate the trucks.

Chaos in the Air

The next crisis developed in the west of the Romania, announcing another night of numerous bogus radar contacts, unidentified aircraft and helicopters, as well as skirmishes on the ground. Once again, a number of “attackers” appeared on radar scopes: “helicopter”-type targets were approaching from Sannicolau-Timis towards Arad, while others were apparently operating over the Ceala forest. UM 01380 confirmed detection of helicopters even over downtown Arad, and the air defences of the local airfield opened fire again – without any success. Shortly after, two unknown aircraft were spotted over the city, while a formation of helicopters was detected while approaching from Caransebes (base of the 73 Helicopter Regiment). Two helicopters were observed while passing the valley of the Mures River and landing near the chemical plant at Vladimirescu.


In the evening of 23 december, at 17:08 the IAR-330 Puma “72” of the 58 Helicopter Regiment from Sibiu (crew pilot Maj. Tudor Nicolae, copilot Cpt. Motica Victor, flight engineer Galaftion Stefan) was sent at Deva, in order to pick up two “Militia” (Police) generals, Constantin Vasile Nuta and Velicu Mihalea who had been instrumental in suppressing the Timisoara revolt on 17 December. They were arrested by the army while on a train to Bucharest. Initially the helicopter was supposed to carry them to Sibiu, but orders changed and they were sent to Alba Iulia instead. While flying towards their destination, at around 20.00, they were fired upon by army soldiers, who had been ordered to shoot at any aircraft approaching the city, as they were “terrorist”. Hit by 12 bullets caliber 7,62 mm which damaged the fuel and hydraulic lines, the Puma caught fire in flight and crashed on a hillside somewhere between the village Blandiana and Alba Iulia. All 5 on board died. It is interesting to note that later on a small monument was established on the crash site, but mentioning only the three crewmembers of this helicopter.



This was not the first helicopter lost, but it was the first case in which the crew died. During the the night of 22 to 23 December, the AvM lost another Puma, while one was damaged. Two Pumas from 61 Helicopter Regiment came under fire from their own air defence troops shortly after taking off from Boteni AB. One of the helicopters transported ammunition to resupply the paratroopers deployed in Bucharest: like in a miracle, the crew led by pilot capt. Emil Zamfir nicknamed "Gipsy" managed to crash land and run away before the helicopter blew up. The wreck burned for two hours, with exploding ammunition popping out from time to time. The second IAR-330 from this formation was hit as well, but suffered only minor damage.


The chaos was complete, just like during the previous night. By the morning of 24th December, various AAT units were to report detecting a total of no less but 365 unidentified flying objects with their radars during the night, of which a “formation” of 14 flew a mock attack against UM 01942.

Between 16:20 and 23:20hrs, several aircraft were detected approaching Deveselu AB at ranges between 12 and 30 kilometers. When the anti-aircraft defences opened up all targets turned away and climbed, exiting the range of the guns. This air base remained under similar “attack” from 00:55 until 16:55hrs of 24 December.

At 01:30hrs on 24 December, a rather silent helicopter was spotted some four kilometers away from Fetesti (Borcea) AB. Moments later, it opened fire against housing facilities before turning away towards west and apparently landing some eight kilometers away. Search teams found nothing at the supposed landing site.

Half an hour later, another MiG was scrambled from Kogalniceanu AB, this time to intercept a target approaching to 40km from north-east. As soon as the MiG was airborne, the target turned away, flying along the Danube river. This time, the interceptor was well placed, and the pilot managed to establish a lock-on. Before he could fire, however, the target began emitting strong active jamming, and it disappeared from the radars around 02:56 hrs. Obviously in response to this action, Kogalniceanu AB was again attacked by unknown ground forces, around 03:30hrs, approaching from north-east. After a short, but intense fire exchange these retreated in the same direction from which they came. Obviously, whoever was interested in steering unrest and insecurity at this airfield was not particularly successful.

With Ceausescu captured, the National Salvation Front (FSN) claimed control of the revolution and established a provisional government. Uncertainty and terror still prevailed however, as different elements of the regime fought for their survival – openly or clandestinely. By the morning, there were larger and smaller battles raging between various Army units, supported and at the same time hampered by civilians, and unknown elements all around the country, and especially in Bucharest. During the fighting in the suburbs of Romanian capital, an IAR-316B Alouette III was shot down by small arms fire, near the road leading to Craiova. The pilot got a bullet in the butt, but survived, together with the rest of the crew.



One of the most painful losses of the whole crisis occurred on 24 December at around 18:35hrs, when the helicopters with side-numbers 82 and 89 were sent from Tuzla AB to look for two unidentified “helicopters”, tracked by the radar. In turn, Puma 89 was intercepted by a MiG-21MF from the 86th Fighter Regiment based at Fetesti; after the GCI told the pilot that everything that is airborne is “enemy”, he opened fire downing the helicopter and killing all four on board (pilot Lt.Col. Eftimie Serghei, copilot Cpt. Enache Grigore Mihai, flight engineers Deleanu Gheorghe and Petrea Stefan). The wreckage of the unlucky 89 came down between villages of Ion Corvin and Adamclisi. Officially, the cause of the crash was a “technical failure that brought down in flames the helicopter”.

Finally, at Alexeni AB, two Mi-8Ts of the 94 Helicopter Regiment were fired at and hit several times some five minutes after take off by the elements of an air defence unit at Adancata. This obvious case of fratricide fire illustrates at best the chaos caused by sabotage within the chain of command of the Romanian military in these days. The air defence unit in Adancata was subordinated to Alexeni AB, and its commander was in the central command post at Alexeni when the incident occurred. He and his subordinates were advised that two friendly helicopters would pass overhead, but immediately afterwards the personnel at the anti-aircraft battery received a direct call from someone claiming to be a well-known high ranking officer, who ordered them to shoot down the helicopters. The crews of the two Mi-8s were lucky, then nobody got hurt. The same kind of diversion led to the downing of the two Pumas at Boteni AB mentioned above.

As of the late 1980s, Romanian IAR-330 Pumas wore no standardized camouflage, even if colors used were always the same. Romanian Pumas differ in several points from these helicopters in service elsewhere. The first and most obvious point are different aerials, as well as the lack of maintenance instructions-stencils around the fuselage. Probably the most interesting detail, however, is the fact that Romanian-built examples were rather well-armed: they could carry pylons for four UB-16-57 rocket pods (these were usually left in "bare metal"), as well as two containers for single-barreled NR-23 guns on both sides of the forward fuselage, plus a door-mounted 12,7mm DShKM machine gun. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

Ceausescu's last helicopter trips

At 09:45 in the morning of 25 December, two Puma helicopters (serial 90 and 92), each with their crews (pilot, co-pilot and flight engineer) and 8 paratroopers - professional soldiers who volunteered for a very dangerous mission – took off from Boteni AB. The pilotswere instructed to go to Bucharest and land near the Ghencea stadium. There, they picked up 14 people: military judges, advocates and prosecutors as well as a few representatives of the new leadership - Gen. Stanculescu among them, leading the whole group. They were ordered by the latter to fly to Targoviste, where Ceausescu and his wife were to be put on trial urgently. Puma 90, flown bt Capt. Mircea Militaru flew in front and Puma 92 with pilot Maj. Cristian Mateiciuc at the controls some 100 meters behind. They were zigzagging at 10-15 meters of altitude with 180-200 km/h in rather poor visibility (1-1,5 km) due to fog.

En route, the two Pumas met up with another 3 Puma helicopters from their regiment which acted as escorts. The meeting point was the village Manesti, near Ploiesti. Major Cristian Mateiciuc remembers: “ The meet-up with the three helicopters was done perfectly, all five reaching the meeting area at the same time. We identified each other by plain sight. The choppers were flown by captains Emil Zamfir, Gheorghe Boborel and Octavian Tudor. Zamfir was the pilot who’s helicopter had been hit in the air above the airbase, in the first night of the Revolution, and had fallen in flames. The crew saved themselves as in a miracle. I did not expect to see him, and than leading the formation. It was something fantastic, had impressed me profoundly. His wife was pregnant in the ninth month, he had been shot down once, and now – on another helicopter, in another combat mission.”

They landed in the Targoviste garrison at 13:00. Ceausescu and his wife were court martialed and executed by 3 of the paratroopers. Their bodies were put on Puma 92, and both helicopters with all the men that arrived in them took off for Boteni – where they refuelled and 4 of the 8 paratroopers disembarked. Than they flew back to Bucharest; as a witness remembers “we were crammed inside the Puma, with the body bags dripping blood at our feet”. The flight back to Bucharest was made in the same way as all the other flights thatday – with navigation lights and radios turned off for fear of being shot down. The flight was made even more dramatic by the fact thatPuma 90 developed a problem with one of the engines and had to shut it down – nevertheless the crews pressed on and after delivering the passengers and bodies in the capital returned to Boteni early in the night.


Army vs. Securitatea



In the early hours of 25 December, search parties from Mihail Kogalniceanu AB found signs that unknown troops were present in the field some five kilometers south-west from the airfield for some time. Nothing special was found, except remnants of few cigarettes, unimportant pieces of military equipment and few shallow shelters, but it was assumed that the ones who attacked the airfield on the previous two nights camped there. According to unconfirmed rumors, the attackers could have been the Soviet SPETSNAZ troops.

Meanwhile, the Romanian national TV showed the bodies of Ceausescu and his wife, thus marking the “end” of the eleven days long “uprising”. After that, fighting in the cities as well as unauthorized aerial activities subsided dramatically, the last shots being fired on 26 December. However, 1116 people were left dead in this period of time and 4089 wounded – 957 being killed after the evening of 22 December, around 75% of the latter being military personnel. Most victims were shot by 19 years old Army conscripts, majority of whom were drafted barely two months before the uprising, and had only one live fire exercise behind them, but found themselves under immense pressure by officers who ordered them to “fight terrorists” inside the cities. Being “trigger happy”, the young conscripts killed dozens of civilians. The Romanian Army, organized to fight “World War III”, proved poorly prepared for the situation and the vast majority of engagements were actually cases of fratricide fire, caused by fake orders or diversions: unknown persons would fire at one unit from the general direction of another one and then fled before all hell broke loose. A number of civilians got their hands on weapons and tried to “help” the army, but they only managed to increase the confusion and number of casualties.

In the days following the uprising, the new Romanian leader, Ion Iliescu, did everything possible to deny that the Army fired on demonstrators at Ceausescu’s order – regardless if in Timisoara or in Bucharest: having a vested interest to clean up the military’s image, Iliescu and his aides claimed that Securitatea units and unknown “terrorists” (including Soviets and Arabs) did all the shooting at civilians. While it is possible that some of Securitatea-agents were operating in the guise of Army units, and there is strong evidence that some foreigners were indeed involved in firings against Army and other security units, it is certain that practically all the branches of the Romanian military were involved in attempts to put down the uprising until the moment when Ceausescu fled, on 22 December at noon.

Amazingly – and in spite of what is usually reported in the West - the Securitatea appears not to have opened fire after Ceausescu fell from power. The Romanian state security knew very well what was going on in the Eastern Europe and knew that Ceausescu’s case was a lost one. Besides, on 22 December, the armed units of the Securitatea and the police were put under military control and – with most of their men locked up in barracks – had almost no active role in the subsequent fighting. Members of the Securitatea were no fanatics (at least most of them were none): correspondingly, the omni-present Romanian state security could not openly side with anyone: the dieing regime, the military, or the coup-plotters. Surely, the powers of this organization were such that not few of its elements survived until today, and are still influential in the Romanian society. And, certainly, it is perfectly possible that a number of agents and cells within military or security authorities became active at one point or the other, or have exploited the situation for subversion and diversion, which would explain the very high number of fratricide fire incidents that occurred. However, there is no firm confirmation that the Securitatea as organization actively participated in attempts to put down the uprising of 1989 after the dictator fled, on 22 December. On the contrary, there are strong indications that most of the actions undertaken to create chaos within the Romanian military were undertaken by foreign powers. For all these reasons, it is solely the lack of efforts of serious historical research on the part of Romanian authorities (as much as the fact that ex-Securitatea people are not especially keen to talk in the public) which is to blame for the Securitatea being accused for shooting at civilians after 22 December, when Ceausescu fell.

So it happened that the only Securitatea’s armed unit known to have actively participated in the fighting was the USLA – a SWAT-type asset, specialized in anti-terrorist and urban warfare. This unit was decimated in one of fratricide clashes with Army, caused by poor leadership and chaos within the chain of command.

When it comes to AvM’s performance in those chaotic days, some general statistics were published ever since, which provide an insight into how intensive the air – and especially – electronic warfare was. In total, between 22 and 25 December, the AvM jets were scrambled 52 times: only in five cases were their pilots able of detecting one or more targets with their radars. Except in one case, no lock-ons were obtained – foremost due to severe active jamming. During the same period of time, helicopters flew a total of 26 sorties. A large portion of the fighter scrambles were performed by the IAR-93s of the 67th Fighter-Bomber Regiment at Craiova on 23 and 24 December (17 sorties totaling 15 h 18 min). During the events, 5 helicopters were downed (2 with the loss of the crews) and at least 7 were hit but managed to land safely at their bases.

Air defence units reported even more activity. Timisoara’s AAT Division alone detected 761 unidentified flying objects in this period of time (22-25/26 December). A number of these were engaged by air defence forces, which opened fire - country wide - on no less but 1.194 occasions. Cpt. Eng. Nica Gavril, commander of the 51st SAM Regiment from Craiova remembered later, during an interview for the local press, that they had been on alert since 17 December. On 22 December at 08:00 they were in combat ready condition, as unidentified targets started to appear in the border area. These began to approach Craiova at around 12.45 that day, and this virtual attack, coupled with strong jamming on a wide range of frequencies went on with various intensities until midnight 25/26 December. During this period, 78 targets entered the area of responsability of the 51st Regiment. 19 of them were within range, and 17 of these were fired upon.

A total of 58 SAMs were fired, most of them in the night from 22 to 23 December. Half of them were expended by the 51st Missile Regiment, based at Craiova, which launched 29 SA-6s. The 1st SAM Brigade, in charge of the SAM ring around the capital, fired 6 SA-2s; The 53rd Regiment (UM 01459) from Medgidia launched 6 SA-6, out of which two failed to detonate; the 50th Regiment (UM 01215) from Floresti, based near Cluj-Napoca, fired four SA-8s, while at Resita a total of 12 SA-2s were expended, along with large quantities of anti-aircraft ammunition. In total over 3000 AA shells were fired.

No confirmed SAM-kills were scored – at least none that were ever officially confirmed as such, despite the fact that more than 60% of missiles were observed on radar scopes as detonating near or on target. Search parties sent to supposed crash sites found (almost) nothing: in few cases, small amounts of debris, ranging in weight form 290 grams to 19 kilograms, consisting of metallic foil, burnt plastic and small mechanisms. There were obviously two types of targets: helium-filled balloons with radar reflectors, consisting of metallic foil, and some sort of small drones, sometimes carrying lights and/or emitting helicopter-engine noises. The later were relatively seldom observed, then they were mainly operated at night, yet their radar echo, size and flight profiles closely resembled helicopters.

The only exception regarding results of SAM-attacks might have occurred on 28 December 1989. On this morning a TAROM (Romanian national carrier) An-24RV reg. YR-BMJ (c/n 77310801) took off from Otopeni for a flight to Belgrade in what was to be the first international fight since the uprising. Apart from the crew of 6 (among them commander Mihail Moldoveanu, pilot Valter Jurcovan, cabin crew Machidan Elena), there was only one passenger on board: an English journalist called Ian Perry. Perry carried plenty of tapes and videos containing takes of what exactly was going on during the uprising in the Headquarters of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party – one of the hot spots of the revolution. When 55km south-west of Bucharest, the plane was hit by a SAM and crashed into the Malinoasa forest, near the village of Visina. The wreckage was spread over one square kilometer and all 7 on board perished. Shortly after the crash, a helicopter overflew the area and a number of cars reached the site, the people in the cars collecting the tapes that escaped the crash. The subsequent inquiry found traces of chemical materials identical to those used for propellants and explosives in SAMs: surely, an air defence site near Boteni AB was within the range, but reported no firing that day. The official cause of the catastrophe was subsequently declared to have been either “bad weather”, or “collision with an unknown flying object, that hit the tail area”, while the aircraft was “underway to Belgrade to pick up humanitarian supplies”.

It remains unclear how much did the Aviatia Militara – renamed back to Fortele Aeriene Romane following the fall of Ceausescu – draw any important lessons from this event. Certainly, when Romanian military was completely reorganized in the following years, the air force was given priority status and – contrary to air arms of other former Warsaw Pact countries – in the 1990s it was not as drastically decreased in size. On the contrary, while some units were disbanded, and others moved to different air bases, in general, the RoAF was modernized through cooperation with Israel (that resulted in modification of almost all the surviving MiG-21M/MF/UMs in the frame of the Project “Lancer”, two squadrons of Puma helicopters upgraded as gunships in the frame of the SOCAT program, the Soim upgrade of the IAR-99 trainer), and the USA (which supplied four Lockheed C-130B Hercules transports in 1996-97, Shadow 600 UAVs in 1998 and five FPS-117 long range radars in 1998-99).

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