Zarvan
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On May 27, 1964, a day of great importance in independent India's history, The New York Times carried a Rawalpindi-datelined report. It said, "Sheik Mohammed Abdullah, the Kashmiri leader, announced tonight (on May 26) that he expected President Mohammad Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to meet in New Delhi in June 'to discuss ways of finding a satisfactory solution' to Kashmir problem. Authoritative Pakistani quarters confirmed this disclosure."
Nehru had sent Abdullah as his personal emissary to meet Pakistan's military ruler to explore ideas for normalising Indo-Pak relations by settling the Kashmir issue once and for all. The prospect of a Nehru-Ayub summit in New Delhi in June 1964 suddenly created great expectations of a major breakthrough. According to several subsequent accounts, Nehru was open to some bold and out-of-the-box initiatives for an India-Pakistan rapprochement, not dissimilar to the ones his successors Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Dr Manmohan Singh would explore decades later. Ayub, too, was not averse to improving relations with India.
Alas, the much-anticipated summit was not to take place. On the day Sher-e-Kashmir arrived in Azad Kashmir to announce the news to fellow-Kashmiris (a massive crowd had gathered to greet him), Nehru breathed his last.
I have recounted this historical episode just to underscore a well-known fact: it is not often that the light of hope flashes across the dark sky of India-Pakistan relations. Sadly, when it does, something or the other happens to nullify the hope. Atal Bihari Vajpayee's bus yatra to Lahore in February 1999 and his fruitful talks with Nawaz Sharif, were followed by Pakistan's betrayal in Kargil. Significantly, Gen Pervez Musharraf, the architect of Kargil, later mooted the innovative Four-Point Formula to solve the Kashmir problem and reached a fair degree of consensus with Dr Manmohan Singh. Before the Indian PM could travel to Pakistan to discuss the issue further, the 26/11 terror attacks on Mumbai happened. Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid an unexpected visit to Lahore in December 2015 and the picture of him walking hand-in-hand with Nawaz Sharif raised much hope of a thaw in Indo-Pak relations. The hope was shattered by the terror attack, within a week, on the Pathankot Air Force station.
Hope made a faint reappearance this week with some surprising news from Islamabad. General Qamar Jawed Bajwa, Pakistan's army chief, said that he favours improvement in Indo-Pak relations and that the army is willing to fully back the political establishment's initiative for normalisation of ties with India. This statement is significant for two reasons.
One, for too long, we in India, who have been spirited advocates of "uninterrupted and uninterruptible talks" with Pakistan, have faced a sharp question from critics and sceptics: "But who in Pakistan should India talk to? The real power centre in Pakistan is the army headquarters in Rawalpindi, and not the Prime Minister's Office. And the men in uniform are opposed to improvement in Indo-Pak relations." Gen Bajwa's statement, assuming it is sincere, shows that there is some welcome change of thinking in the top echelons of the Pakistani army. And how is his sincerity to be tested anyway? Only by engaging Pakistan, including the Pakistani army establishment, in talks. Therefore, his peace overture cannot and should not be rebuffed by the Indian establishment as either disingenuous or inconsequential.
The second reason that invests Gen Bajwa's statement with significance is its venue. In a move that has earned praise from both the Pakistani political establishment and the media, the army chief visited parliament and addressed its members (senators) on a wide range of issues pertaining to national security and foreign policy. He is also reported to have told the senators that he has faith in democratic rule and that it is not the army's duty to govern the country. In a country where friction between the military and political establishments has routinely led to coups and crises, this rare interaction between an army chief and elected representatives has been hailed as an attempt to reduce the institutional dissonance in Pakistan. Therefore, the Modi government should not cynically dismiss his reported assurance of support to the peace process.
There are, of course, some grounds for India to move rather cautiously on Gen Bajwa's peace overture. The peace process has suffered many setbacks and false starts in the past. Disconcertingly, in the same interaction in the Pakistani senate, the army chief - from a legitimate Indian point of view - contradicted himself by defending Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) chief Hafiz Saeed, the mastermind of 26/11. According to media reports, when asked about Saeed's role in "fighting for the country", Gen Bajwa said: "Like every other Pakistani, Saeed can also take up the Kashmir cause." He should know that India will never trust Pakistan's intentions to improve bilateral relations if its military establishment continues to view as useful proxies the terrorist outfits that target India. Only last week, Saeed openly called for Kashmir's "liberation" from India as revenge for India's support to Bangladesh's liberation in 1971. Clearly, defence of the likes of Hafiz Saeed and desire for peace with India cannot go together. Pakistan must stop its awkward efforts to make a distinction between "bad" terrorists and "good" terrorists.
The hope generated by Gen Bajwa's statement is faint for yet another reason. Even though he has said the army would back efforts by Pakistan's political establishment to improve relations with India, today's stark reality is that the civilian government in Islamabad is one of the weakest in the country's troubled democratic history. Had Nawaz Sharif been the Prime Minister today, and were his relations with the army establishment smooth, the Modi government would have surely been far more sanguine about believing Gen Bajwa's words. Sharif was ousted from office in July, and his successor Shahid Khaqan Abbasi cannot be expected to invest his non-existent political capital in restarting the peace process with India.
Notwithstanding this domestic complexity in Pakistan, even the half-optimistic signal from Islamabad deserves a constructive response from New Delhi. In the struggle for peace, no positive-looking pointer should be rejected, especially one coming from Pakistan's principal and permanent ruling establishment. Both Modi and his aides should also know that Gen Bajwa's outlook is reassuringly moderate and modern on an issue of critical importance for Pakistan's internal peace and stability - and critical also for its external relations. In a separate speech in Quetta some days ago, he voiced, in unequivocal words, concern over madrassas that have mushroomed all over Pakistan. He said the country needed to "revisit" the religious school concept since it did not prepare students for the modern world. Lamenting that "more madrassas than schools were built in Pakistan during the last 40 years," he asked a startling question - "So what will these students become: will they become Maulvis or they will become terrorists?"
This was not an off-the-cuff remark by Gen Bajwa. Indeed, a day after taking over command of the Pakistan Army last year, he declared his determination to continue the military establishment's "war on terror to its logical end, and purge the country completely of terrorism". He has reiterated this commitment on many occasions. After all, more Pakistani soldiers and security personnel have been killed by terrorists than have lost their lives in all the wars the country has fought with India.
Pakistan's fight against terrorism and religious extremism is complex and protracted. It is fighting this internal enemy which is its own creation. Nevertheless, there is growing recognition in Pakistan's civilian as well as military establishments (as is evident from Gen Bajwa's latest statement) that peace with India would weaken the lethal power and mass appeal of terrorist and extremist outfits, who thrive in an anti-India atmosphere. Many also further believe that peace and cooperation with India would promote stability, domestic peace, better governance and development in Pakistan. China, which has emerged as Pakistan's closest ally, also shares this belief, especially because smooth implementation of the ambitious China-Pakistan Economic Corridor demands a peaceful and stable Pakistan. One should, therefore, not be surprised if Beijing has played a role in Gen Bajwa holding out the olive branch to India.
It is clearly time for India and Pakistan to resume the stalled bilateral dialogue on all issues, including Kashmir. In doing so, both countries should learn a lesson from history. As has so often happened in the past, right from the time of the tragic denouement to the Nehru-Ayub summit, the Indo-Pak peace process may hit roadblocks again. Terror may strike yet again. Nevertheless, the process must be re-started - and taken to its logical conclusion without hesitation and interruption.
(The writer was an aide to India's former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.)
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed within this article are the personal opinions of the author. The facts and opinions appearing in the article do not reflect the views of NDTV and NDTV does not assume any responsibility or liability for the same.
https://www.ndtv.com/opinion/how-modi-should-read-pak-army-chiefs-talk-on-india-hafiz-saeed-1790409
Nehru had sent Abdullah as his personal emissary to meet Pakistan's military ruler to explore ideas for normalising Indo-Pak relations by settling the Kashmir issue once and for all. The prospect of a Nehru-Ayub summit in New Delhi in June 1964 suddenly created great expectations of a major breakthrough. According to several subsequent accounts, Nehru was open to some bold and out-of-the-box initiatives for an India-Pakistan rapprochement, not dissimilar to the ones his successors Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Dr Manmohan Singh would explore decades later. Ayub, too, was not averse to improving relations with India.
Alas, the much-anticipated summit was not to take place. On the day Sher-e-Kashmir arrived in Azad Kashmir to announce the news to fellow-Kashmiris (a massive crowd had gathered to greet him), Nehru breathed his last.
I have recounted this historical episode just to underscore a well-known fact: it is not often that the light of hope flashes across the dark sky of India-Pakistan relations. Sadly, when it does, something or the other happens to nullify the hope. Atal Bihari Vajpayee's bus yatra to Lahore in February 1999 and his fruitful talks with Nawaz Sharif, were followed by Pakistan's betrayal in Kargil. Significantly, Gen Pervez Musharraf, the architect of Kargil, later mooted the innovative Four-Point Formula to solve the Kashmir problem and reached a fair degree of consensus with Dr Manmohan Singh. Before the Indian PM could travel to Pakistan to discuss the issue further, the 26/11 terror attacks on Mumbai happened. Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid an unexpected visit to Lahore in December 2015 and the picture of him walking hand-in-hand with Nawaz Sharif raised much hope of a thaw in Indo-Pak relations. The hope was shattered by the terror attack, within a week, on the Pathankot Air Force station.
Hope made a faint reappearance this week with some surprising news from Islamabad. General Qamar Jawed Bajwa, Pakistan's army chief, said that he favours improvement in Indo-Pak relations and that the army is willing to fully back the political establishment's initiative for normalisation of ties with India. This statement is significant for two reasons.
One, for too long, we in India, who have been spirited advocates of "uninterrupted and uninterruptible talks" with Pakistan, have faced a sharp question from critics and sceptics: "But who in Pakistan should India talk to? The real power centre in Pakistan is the army headquarters in Rawalpindi, and not the Prime Minister's Office. And the men in uniform are opposed to improvement in Indo-Pak relations." Gen Bajwa's statement, assuming it is sincere, shows that there is some welcome change of thinking in the top echelons of the Pakistani army. And how is his sincerity to be tested anyway? Only by engaging Pakistan, including the Pakistani army establishment, in talks. Therefore, his peace overture cannot and should not be rebuffed by the Indian establishment as either disingenuous or inconsequential.
The second reason that invests Gen Bajwa's statement with significance is its venue. In a move that has earned praise from both the Pakistani political establishment and the media, the army chief visited parliament and addressed its members (senators) on a wide range of issues pertaining to national security and foreign policy. He is also reported to have told the senators that he has faith in democratic rule and that it is not the army's duty to govern the country. In a country where friction between the military and political establishments has routinely led to coups and crises, this rare interaction between an army chief and elected representatives has been hailed as an attempt to reduce the institutional dissonance in Pakistan. Therefore, the Modi government should not cynically dismiss his reported assurance of support to the peace process.
There are, of course, some grounds for India to move rather cautiously on Gen Bajwa's peace overture. The peace process has suffered many setbacks and false starts in the past. Disconcertingly, in the same interaction in the Pakistani senate, the army chief - from a legitimate Indian point of view - contradicted himself by defending Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) chief Hafiz Saeed, the mastermind of 26/11. According to media reports, when asked about Saeed's role in "fighting for the country", Gen Bajwa said: "Like every other Pakistani, Saeed can also take up the Kashmir cause." He should know that India will never trust Pakistan's intentions to improve bilateral relations if its military establishment continues to view as useful proxies the terrorist outfits that target India. Only last week, Saeed openly called for Kashmir's "liberation" from India as revenge for India's support to Bangladesh's liberation in 1971. Clearly, defence of the likes of Hafiz Saeed and desire for peace with India cannot go together. Pakistan must stop its awkward efforts to make a distinction between "bad" terrorists and "good" terrorists.
The hope generated by Gen Bajwa's statement is faint for yet another reason. Even though he has said the army would back efforts by Pakistan's political establishment to improve relations with India, today's stark reality is that the civilian government in Islamabad is one of the weakest in the country's troubled democratic history. Had Nawaz Sharif been the Prime Minister today, and were his relations with the army establishment smooth, the Modi government would have surely been far more sanguine about believing Gen Bajwa's words. Sharif was ousted from office in July, and his successor Shahid Khaqan Abbasi cannot be expected to invest his non-existent political capital in restarting the peace process with India.
Notwithstanding this domestic complexity in Pakistan, even the half-optimistic signal from Islamabad deserves a constructive response from New Delhi. In the struggle for peace, no positive-looking pointer should be rejected, especially one coming from Pakistan's principal and permanent ruling establishment. Both Modi and his aides should also know that Gen Bajwa's outlook is reassuringly moderate and modern on an issue of critical importance for Pakistan's internal peace and stability - and critical also for its external relations. In a separate speech in Quetta some days ago, he voiced, in unequivocal words, concern over madrassas that have mushroomed all over Pakistan. He said the country needed to "revisit" the religious school concept since it did not prepare students for the modern world. Lamenting that "more madrassas than schools were built in Pakistan during the last 40 years," he asked a startling question - "So what will these students become: will they become Maulvis or they will become terrorists?"
This was not an off-the-cuff remark by Gen Bajwa. Indeed, a day after taking over command of the Pakistan Army last year, he declared his determination to continue the military establishment's "war on terror to its logical end, and purge the country completely of terrorism". He has reiterated this commitment on many occasions. After all, more Pakistani soldiers and security personnel have been killed by terrorists than have lost their lives in all the wars the country has fought with India.
Pakistan's fight against terrorism and religious extremism is complex and protracted. It is fighting this internal enemy which is its own creation. Nevertheless, there is growing recognition in Pakistan's civilian as well as military establishments (as is evident from Gen Bajwa's latest statement) that peace with India would weaken the lethal power and mass appeal of terrorist and extremist outfits, who thrive in an anti-India atmosphere. Many also further believe that peace and cooperation with India would promote stability, domestic peace, better governance and development in Pakistan. China, which has emerged as Pakistan's closest ally, also shares this belief, especially because smooth implementation of the ambitious China-Pakistan Economic Corridor demands a peaceful and stable Pakistan. One should, therefore, not be surprised if Beijing has played a role in Gen Bajwa holding out the olive branch to India.
It is clearly time for India and Pakistan to resume the stalled bilateral dialogue on all issues, including Kashmir. In doing so, both countries should learn a lesson from history. As has so often happened in the past, right from the time of the tragic denouement to the Nehru-Ayub summit, the Indo-Pak peace process may hit roadblocks again. Terror may strike yet again. Nevertheless, the process must be re-started - and taken to its logical conclusion without hesitation and interruption.
(The writer was an aide to India's former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.)
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed within this article are the personal opinions of the author. The facts and opinions appearing in the article do not reflect the views of NDTV and NDTV does not assume any responsibility or liability for the same.
https://www.ndtv.com/opinion/how-modi-should-read-pak-army-chiefs-talk-on-india-hafiz-saeed-1790409
