General Kayani speaks up against the Kerry Lugar Bill

[graphican]

KLB will kill two birds with one stone.

1- Fill the mouth of beggars and they will be able to prove to their lords in America that we care their concerns more than that of our countrymen, so we are the right people and you must keep backing us.

2- The Internal destabilizing factor, the Army which the government is always afraid of, could be tied with the rope of foreign influence. (Even if not fully then to some degree as Military is also dependent on the same guarantors for its supplies)

If they would turn the bill down, (which is highly unlikely), this will harm credibility of PPP even further and it will be proven yet another time that government is incapable and dishonest with the country. If government keeps the bill, I am sure every single American attempt to interfere (as the KLB suggests) with the matters of immense National importance would create resistance between the government and Patriotic Elements in Pakistan. In my opinion, KLB is more of a KILL-BILL for the government and they die either ways.

 

[fatman17]

EDITORIAL: Politically divided again

Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has taken the debate over the Kerry-Lugar Bill to the National Assembly where it can be either accepted or rejected on the basis of a majority vote. The bill is important for Pakistan, not only in terms of the unprecedentedly high grant in aid from the US, but also in terms of acceptance of Pakistan’s economy for the investors of the world, though there is debate even among development economists on its usefulness.

A surface view would be that if the Bill is rejected by Pakistan, the money it is to receive over the next five years will not be available. But the US, looking at the difficulties faced by Islamabad in the shape of an almost universal rejection, may modify the “conditionalities” of the Bill which are clearly intrusive. Its Afghan policy depends on cooperation from Pakistan and the coming operation in South Waziristan is an important link in that policy.

But it will have to figure out the multiple cracks in the politics of Pakistan and the growing anti-Americanism in the country. The opposition to the Bill has multiple strands, including of course the desire of the political actors to cause the government to collapse and make way for mid-term elections. Politicians inside the parliament seem to be moved by more motivations than just the issue of intrusion by the US, though it is easy to peg those motivations on the poor wording of the Bill. Politicians who rejected the 2008 elections want to pull down a house they had no hand in building.

The absence of the PMLN leader Mr Nawaz Sharif from Pakistan has been interpreted many ways, but what he says from London seems to hint that the days of President Asif Ali Zardari and his party in power are about to be over. He says he tried to advise Zardari to take the right decisions only to have a deaf ear turned to him. Mr Sharif is the most popular leader in Pakistan and smaller leaders are rebuking him for not attacking the PPP government now that it is caught out on a limb on the Kerry-Lugar Bill. His second-echelon leadership however is busy with its wrecking ball and his younger brother has gone and met the army chief before the army decided it didn’t like the Bill. The PMLQ, gradually disembarrassing itself of the moral burden of having supported a pro-American general in power, wants to reinstate itself by vocalising against the Bill. The PMLQ is doing even better than the PMLN — Nawaz Sharif has promised a quicker normalisation with India — by being tough on India.

The JUI of Maulana Fazlur Rehman is buttressing its rapidly eroding prestige among the pro-Taliban Pashtuns of the Tribal Areas by breaking away from the government on the Bill. As an ally of the PPP, it was never a comfortable party because of its vulnerabilities vis-à-vis the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Before the crisis over the Bill broke, Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s talent for “flexibility” was nearing its end and he had reluctantly put the government on notice about — hear this — further Islamisation of laws! The fight over the Bill is therefore a godsend for him.

The ANP and the MQM inside the PPP alliance were most driven by “realism” over the Bill because of the way they have been targeted by the Taliban. Their mind is not fuzzy over the internal threat, but they cannot help being mindful of the odds facing Mr Zardari and his party. They don’t want a mid-term election and are aware that the army is not in their camp. Therefore both are “consulting” — with Altaf Hussain going public with his concern over the important quarters that are opposed to the Bill.

“Realism” has undermined “law” in Pakistan in the recent past, but the blame has been put on the PPP. Musharraf can’t be hanged because of realpolitik but his going free is attributed to the PPP government’s being an extension of the Musharraf era. The media is going through its most emotional convulsion hoping the Supreme Court will get the PPP down through a ruling on the NRO, triggering a mid-term election to bring the PMLN to power. Pakistan is once again politically unstable because the parties that seem “united” against the PPP do not really agree on any realistic future course of action.

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

 

[Awesome]

Remember in some bizzaro way, the US wants us to take the money more than we might itself want it.

If these conditions are rejected today, the US will be back to the drawing board on how to control the Pakistani leadership. For the first time ever the US would need the approval of the Pakistani public's sentiment. Can we set that precedent?

Right now most of Pakistan's discussions have revolved around the fact that we need to reject the conditions, and not around that we need to reject the aid. Hence "experts" like Almeida are theorizing ultimately we'll accept the terms from the US - simple lender-borrower dynamic.

But instead if the deal was changed and we got US contracts for things like our export products then that will totally change the US-Pakistan relationship. Maybe the objection should go one step further and reject handouts of any sort, no matter what toppings they put on it.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Aid is not going to be rejected, since the PPP and allies have a majority in parliament and they are sold on it.

But if the opposition sticks to its guns, and the media keeps highlighting the issue, the PPP will pay a heavy price for choosing to stick with the aid (especially if the conditions remain the same) come election time. Unfortunately, elections are still over three years away, which gives the PPP plenty of time to get the issue under the rug.

On the PPP's side, their calculus is probably that if they bite the bullet now (unpopularity of accepting the aid) and they can turn around the economy and pacify Waziristan and FATA to some extent, they can rightfully go into the next elections pointing at some major achievements such as Swat, Waziristan and most importantly, economic recovery. Right now they are losing the public on all fronts except Swat - economy is struggling, inflation is down quite a bit but things like the sugar crises are undermining them, power shortage continues and is now projected to last into next year despite some RPP's coming on line.

Right or wrong, IMO the PPP leadership is convinced the economy needs this aid (they are claiming $30 billion total over ten years, including military assistance that does not so far have a value, but expected to be over $1 billion/year) to recover and that recovery will eventually result in PPP success at the polls.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Mid-term elections will not happen unless there is a military coup (which is unlikely under Kiyani).

The President might be removed because of the NRO, but that seems unlikely any time soon as well. And even if he were removed, that does not mean the entire PPP government has to go or parliament dissolved. A new President will be elected and the current government will continue.

 

[Xeric]

i dont think with the military being so 'annoyed' on the conditions it would be easy for the govt to debate it out. Though the US is willing to talk with the military on the issue but then i personally feel that the military would stick with its stance and the bill would near it demise, yet as the amount is quite tempting, the govt would have to work up a middle route.

 

[Xeric]

news.outlookindia.com | Zardari to Meet Kayani to Allay Concerns Over US Aid Bill

Zardari to Meet Kayani to Allay Concerns Over US Aid Bill

M Zulqernain/Lahore | Oct 09, 2009

With Pakistan Army expressing serious concern over some of the provisions in the US aid bill, President Asif Ali Zardari will hold talks with its chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani to allay the military's concerns over conditions attached to the legislation.

Pakistan People's Party spokesperson Fauzia Wahab said the party will work to address the military's concerns instead of adopting a path of confrontation on the issue as some elements want to create a rift between the armed forces and the ruling party.

"President Asif Ali Zardari will talk to army chief Gen Kayani on the matter," she told PTI.

"President Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani believe that some political elements want a confrontation between the army and the PPP over this issue but they will not be allowed to succeed," Wahab said.

"I will talk to the army chief and I do not see any problem speaking to the US about the concerns raised by the army," Wahab quoted Zardari as saying.

A meeting of the army's corps commanders chaired by Kayani on Wednesday expressed serious concern about the conditions in the Kerry-Lugar bill affecting Pakistan's national interests.

The army's objections primarily relate to clauses about Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, ending support for cross-border activities by Pakistan-based militant groups and the civilian government's role in military promotions and appointments.

"Our opponents will try their best to capitalize on the situation but we will have to act very carefully and wisely. We will have to take the army on board on the aid bill and remove all misunderstandings," Wahab quoted Zardari as saying.

The President has also advised PPP leaders to take steps to negate the "propaganda" campaign launched by political rivals but to be "very careful" when it comes to the army's concerns over the Kerry-Lugar bill.

A senior PPP leader, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said some sections of the party had expressed displeasure over the army coming out in public with its concerns as this amounted to undermining the civilian government's authority.

"After writing a letter to the Prime Minister on the issue, the corps commanders should not have issued a statement to the media. If the army has reservations on the issue, there are appropriate forums to discuss them," the leader said.

The leader added that the PPP-led government has fully backed the army and mustered public and political support for operations against the Taliban in Swat. "The army has no right to publicly criticise the moves of the democratic government," the leader said.

 

[batmannow]

news.outlookindia.com | Zardari to Meet Kayani to Allay Concerns Over US Aid Bill

Zardari to Meet Kayani to Allay Concerns Over US Aid Bill

M Zulqernain/Lahore | Oct 09, 2009

With Pakistan Army expressing serious concern over some of the provisions in the US aid bill, President Asif Ali Zardari will hold talks with its chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani to allay the military's concerns over conditions attached to the legislation.

Pakistan People's Party spokesperson Fauzia Wahab said the party will work to address the military's concerns instead of adopting a path of confrontation on the issue as some elements want to create a rift between the armed forces and the ruling party.

"President Asif Ali Zardari will talk to army chief Gen Kayani on the matter," she told PTI.

"President Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani believe that some political elements want a confrontation between the army and the PPP over this issue but they will not be allowed to succeed," Wahab said.

"I will talk to the army chief and I do not see any problem speaking to the US about the concerns raised by the army," Wahab quoted Zardari as saying.

A meeting of the army's corps commanders chaired by Kayani on Wednesday expressed serious concern about the conditions in the Kerry-Lugar bill affecting Pakistan's national interests.

The army's objections primarily relate to clauses about Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, ending support for cross-border activities by Pakistan-based militant groups and the civilian government's role in military promotions and appointments.

"Our opponents will try their best to capitalize on the situation but we will have to act very carefully and wisely. We will have to take the army on board on the aid bill and remove all misunderstandings," Wahab quoted Zardari as saying.

The President has also advised PPP leaders to take steps to negate the "propaganda" campaign launched by political rivals but to be "very careful" when it comes to the army's concerns over the Kerry-Lugar bill.

A senior PPP leader, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said some sections of the party had expressed displeasure over the army coming out in public with its concerns as this amounted to undermining the civilian government's authority.

"After writing a letter to the Prime Minister on the issue, the corps commanders should not have issued a statement to the media. If the army has reservations on the issue, there are appropriate forums to discuss them," the leader said.

The leader added that the PPP-led government has fully backed the army and mustered public and political support for operations against the Taliban in Swat. "The army has no right to publicly criticise the moves of the democratic government," the leader said.

stupid, media & stupid PPPP!
ALL they want is to sell "PAKISTAN" for a cheap price, & they want PA KEEP , itself quite!

 

[Awesome]

The US has already hinted it would show flexibility on the objected conditions. It was Zardari who actually insisted upon those conditions, not the US, the US just got an extra bonus point. They want Pakistan to take the money not be forced into rejecting it.

It was Zardari's bright idea alone. Now he'll try to play the "I made the US change its stance" card.

 

[Awesome]

BBC NEWS | South Asia | Pakistan amends anti-terror laws

Pakistan amends anti-terror laws (on conditions of KLB)

The government of Pakistan has amended its anti-terrorism laws to increase the remand period for the interrogation of terror suspects from 30 to 90 days.
Correspondents say that the move is one of the conditions of a recent bill passed by the US Congress which triples non-military aid to Pakistan.

The Kerry-Lugar bill provides an annual outlay of $1.5bn for five years.
Under the bill, the US will certify that Pakistan is working to dismantle its nuclear proliferation networks.

According to Pakistani media reports, several conditions were imposed on Pakistan to ensure the aid goes where it is intended - including a stipulation that Pakistan strengthen its counter-terrorism and anti-money laundering laws.

 

[Awesome]

A two week old draft:

The Kerry-Lugar Bill: details and conditions



Saturday, September 26, 2009
News Desk

WASHINGTON: The following is the text of the Kerry-Lugar Bill passed by the Senate on Thursday, Sept 24, 2009. It will now go to the House of Representatives and if passed without amendments, will be sent to President Barack Obama for signing into law:

S.1707

Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by Senate)

SEC. 203. LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE.

(a) Limitation on Security-related Assistance: For fiscal years 2011 through 2014, no security-related assistance may be provided to Pakistan in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.

(b) Limitation on Arms Transfers: For fiscal years 2012 through 2014, no letter of offer to sell major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC 2751 et seq.) and no license to export major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to such Act in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.

(c) Certification: The certification required by this subsection is a certification by the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, to the appropriate congressional committees that: (1) the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks;

(2) the Government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups, consistent with the purposes of assistance described in section 201, including taking into account the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has made progress on matters such as (A) ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighbouring countries; (B) preventing al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighbouring countries, closing terrorist camps in the Fata, dismantling terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; and (C) strengthening counterterrorism and anti-money laundering laws; and (3) the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.

(d) Certain Payments: (1) IN GENERAL- Subject to paragraph (2), none of the funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, or any amounts appropriated to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), may be obligated or expended to make payments relating to (A) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-YAD signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006; (B) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-NAP signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006; and C) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-SAF signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006.

(2) EXCEPTION: Funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 may be used for construction and related activities carried out pursuant to the Letters of Offer and Acceptance described in paragraph (1).

(e) Waiver: (1) IN GENERAL - The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may waive the limitations contained in subsections (a), (b), and (d) for a fiscal year if the Secretary of State determines that is important to the national security interests of the United States to do so.

(2) PRIOR NOTICE OF WAIVER: The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may not exercise the authority of paragraph (1) until seven days after the Secretary of State provides to the appropriate congressional committees a written notice of the intent to issue to waiver and the reasons therefore. The notice may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

(f) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined: In this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

SEC. 204. PAKISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITY FUND.

(a) For Fiscal Year 2010: (1) IN GENERAL - For fiscal year 2010, the Department of State’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), hereinafter in this section referred to as the `Fund’, shall consist of the following: (A) Amounts appropriated to carry out this subsection (which may not include any amounts appropriated to carry out title I of this Act).

(B) Amounts otherwise available to the Secretary of State to carry out this subsection.

(2) PURPOSES OF FUND: Amounts in the Fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year are authorised to be used by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defence, to build and maintain the counterinsurgency capability of Pakistan under the same terms and conditions (except as otherwise provided in this subsection) that are applicable to amounts made available under the Fund for fiscal year 2009.

(3) TRANSFER AUTHORITY: (A) IN GENERAL - The Secretary of State is authorised to transfer amounts in the fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year to the Department of Defence’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32) and such amounts may be transferred back to the Fund if the Secretary of Defence, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determines that such amounts are not needed for the purposes for which initially transferred.

(B) TREATMENT OF TRANSFERRED FUNDS: Subject to subsections (d) and (e) of section 203, transfers from the Fund under the authority of subparagraph (A) shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes and for the same time period as amounts in the Department of Defence’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund.

(C) RELATION TO OTHER AUTHORITIES: The authority to provide assistance under this subsection is in addition to any other authority to provide assistance to foreign countries.

(D) NOTIFICATION: The Secretary of State shall, not less than 15 days prior to making transfers from the Fund under subparagraph (A), notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing of the details of any such transfer.

(b) Submission of Notifications: Any notification required by this section may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined: In this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

SEC. 205. REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVILIAN CONTROL OF CERTAIN ASSISTANCE

(a) Requirements: (1) IN GENERAL - For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, any direct cash security-related assistance or non-assistance payments by the United States to the Government of Pakistan may only be provided or made to civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan.

(2) DOCUMENTATION: For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defence, shall ensure that civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan have received a copy of final documentation provided to the United States related to non-assistance payments provided or made to the Government of Pakistan.

(b) Waiver: 1) SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE: The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defence, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to security-related assistance described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 150 (International Affairs) if the Secretary of State certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.

(2) NON-ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS: The Secretary of Defence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to non-assistance payments described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 050 (National Defence) if the Secretary of Defense certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.

(c) Application to Certain Activities- Nothing in this section shall apply with respect to (1) any activities subject to reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.); (2) any assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation in democratic processes; (3) any assistance or payments if the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that subsequent to the termination of assistance or payments a democratically elected government has taken office; (4) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 1208 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375; 118 Stat. 2086), as amended; (5) any payments made pursuant to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; and (6) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 943 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110-417; 122 Stat. 4578).

(d) Definitions- In this section (1) the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations of the Senate; and (2) the term ‘civilian government of Pakistan’ does not include any government of Pakistan whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.

TITLE III—STRATEGY, ACCOUNTABILITY, MONITORING, AND OTHER PROVISIONS SEC. 301. STRATEGY REPORTS.

(a) Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report- Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing United States policy and strategy with respect to assistance to Pakistan under this Act. The report shall include the following: (1) A description of the principal objectives of United States assistance to Pakistan to be provided under title I of this Act.

(2) A general description of the specific programs, projects, and activities designed to achieve the purposes of section 101 and the respective funding levels for such programs, projects, and activities for fiscal years 2010 through 2014.

(3) A plan for program monitoring, operations research, and impact evaluation research for assistance authorized under title I of this Act.

(4) A description of the role to be played by Pakistani national, regional, and local officials and members of Pakistani civil society and local private sector, civic, religious, and tribal leaders in helping to identify and implement programs and projects for which assistance is to be provided under this Act, and of consultations with such representatives in developing the strategy.

(5) A description of the steps taken, or to be taken, to ensure assistance provided under this Act is not awarded to individuals or entities affiliated with terrorist organizations.

(6) A projection of the levels of assistance to be provided to Pakistan under this Act, broken down into the following categories as described in the annual `Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Determining the Eligibility of Candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account Assistance’: (A) Civil liberties. (B) Political rights. (C) Voice and accountability. (D) Government effectiveness. (E) Rule of law. (F) Control of corruption. (G) Immunization rates. (H) Public expenditure on health. (I) Girls’ primary education completion rate. (J) Public expenditure on primary education. (K) Natural resource management. (L) Business start-up. (M) Land rights and access. (N) Trade policy. (O) Regulatory quality. (P) Inflation control. (Q) Fiscal policy.

(7) An analysis for the suitable replacement for existing Pakistani helicopters, including recommendations for sustainment and training.

(b) Comprehensive Regional Strategy Report: (1) SENSE OF CONGRESS: It is the sense of Congress that the achievement of United States national security goals to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan requires the development of a comprehensive plan that utilizes all elements of national power, including in coordination and cooperation with other concerned governments, and that it is critical to Pakistan’s long-term prosperity and security to strengthen regional relationships among India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

(2) COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: The President shall develop a comprehensive interagency regional security strategy to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan, including by working with the Government of Pakistan and other relevant governments and organizations in the region and elsewhere, as appropriate, to best implement effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts in and near the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the FATA, the NWFP, parts of Balochistan, and parts of Punjab.

(3) REPORT: (A) IN GENERAL- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the comprehensive regional security strategy required under paragraph (2).

(B) CONTENTS- The report shall include a copy of the comprehensive regional security strategy, including specifications of goals, and proposed timelines and budgets for implementation of the strategy.

(C) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED: In this paragraph, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (i) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (ii) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(c) Security-related Assistance Plan- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for the proposed use of amounts authorized for security-related assistance for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014. Such plan shall include an assessment of how the use of such amounts complements or otherwise is related to amounts described in section 204.

SEC. 302. MONITORING REPORTS.

(a) Semi-Annual Monitoring Report- Not later than 180 days after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), and every 180 days thereafter through September 30, 2014, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the assistance provided under this Act during the preceding 180-day period. The report shall include—

(1) a description of all assistance by program, project, and activity, as well as by geographic area, provided pursuant to title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, including the amount of assistance provided for each program or project, and with respect to the first report a description of all amounts made available for assistance to Pakistan during fiscal year 2009, including a description of each program, project, and activity for which funds were made available; (2) a list of persons or entities from the United States or other countries that have received funds in excess of $100,000 to conduct projects under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, which may be included in a classified annex, if necessary to avoid a security risk, and a justification for the classification; (3) with respect to the plan described in section 301(a)(3), updates to such plan and a description of best practices to improve the impact of the assistance authorized under title I of this Act; (4) an assessment of the effectiveness of assistance provided under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report in achieving desired objectives and outcomes as guided by the plan described in section 301(a)(3), and as updated pursuant to paragraph (3) of this subsection, including a systematic, qualitative, and where possible, quantitative basis for assessing whether desired outcomes are achieved and a timeline for completion of each project and program; (5) a description of any shortfall in United States financial, physical, technical, or human resources that hinder the effective use and monitoring of such funds; (6) a description of any negative impact, including the absorptive capacity of the region for which the resources are intended, of United States bilateral or multilateral assistance and recommendations for modification of funding, if any; (7) any incidents or reports of waste, fraud, and abuse of expenditures under title I of this Act; (8) the amount of funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to section 102 that were used during the reporting period for administrative expenses or for audits and program reviews pursuant to the authority under sections 101(c)(2) and 103; (9) a description of the expenditures made from any Chief of Mission Fund established pursuant to section 101(c)(5) during the period covered by the report, the purposes for which such expenditures were made, and a list of the recipients of any expenditures from the Chief of Mission Fund in excess of $100,000; (10) an accounting of assistance provided to Pakistan under title I of this Act, broken down into the categories set forth in section 301(a)(6); (11) an evaluation of efforts undertaken by the Government of Pakistan to (A) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist and terrorist groups in the FATA and settled areas; (B) eliminate the safe havens of such forces in Pakistan; (C) close terrorist camps, including those of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed; (D) cease all support for extremist and terrorist groups; (E) prevent attacks into neighbouring countries; (F) increase oversight over curriculum in Madrassas, including closing Madrassas with direct links to the Taliban or other extremist and terrorist groups; and (G) improve counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering laws, apply for observer status for the Financial Action Task Force, and take steps to adhere to the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism; (12) a detailed description of Pakistan’s efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise; (13) an assessment of whether assistance provided to Pakistan has directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, whether by the diversion of United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan’s financial resources that would otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons program; (14) a detailed description of the extent to which funds obligated and expended pursuant to section 202(b) meet the requirements of such section; and (15) an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration.

(b) Government Accountability Office Reports:

(1) PAKISTAN ASSISTANCE STRATEGY REPORT: Not later than one year after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains (A) a review of, and comments addressing, the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report; (B) recommendations relating to any additional actions the Comptroller General believes could help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of United States efforts to meet the objectives of this Act; (C) a detailed description of the expenditures made by Pakistan pursuant to grant assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC.

 

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

I think PMLN ,PMLQ,ANP and JUI would vote against the bill or to remove some of the pitfalls in the bills .

 

[evolutionist]

I know by saying this I am going to unnerve a lot of participants and I will get a lot of responses. But current situation of terrorist acts like the one in Peshawar could be result of tactical mistake by Kiyani not to attack South Waziristan sooner. What is he waiting for? He is giving them enough time to prepare and devise counter strategies. He has to bring the fight to TTP & AQ in their backyard to defend their homes, property & pride. They will have to call back their cadres from all over to Waziristan to defend OBL & company. Now they have the upper hand & trying to wear out the Public opinion and increase misery to innocent people by carrying out suicide attacks. Kiyani can't be a such a good military strategist. We will see what happens only time will tell who is right.

 

[Awesome]

I know by saying this I am going to unnerve a lot of participants and I will get a lot of responses. But current situation of terrorist acts like the one in Peshawar could be result of tactical mistake by Kiyani not to attack South Waziristan sooner. What is he waiting for? He is giving them enough time to prepare and devise counter strategies. He has to bring the fight to TTP & AQ in their backyard to defend their homes, property & pride. They will have to call back their cadres from all over to Waziristan to defend OBL & company. Now they have the upper hand & trying to wear out the Public opinion and increase misery to innocent people by carrying out suicide attacks. Kiyani can't be a such a good military strategist. We will see what happens only time will tell who is right.

What has that got to do anything with the Kerry Lugar Bill?

Many other threads discussing that

 

[fatman17]

I know by saying this I am going to unnerve a lot of participants and I will get a lot of responses. But current situation of terrorist acts like the one in Peshawar could be result of tactical mistake by Kiyani not to attack South Waziristan sooner. What is he waiting for? He is giving them enough time to prepare and devise counter strategies. He has to bring the fight to TTP & AQ in their backyard to defend their homes, property & pride. They will have to call back their cadres from all over to Waziristan to defend OBL & company. Now they have the upper hand & trying to wear out the Public opinion and increase misery to innocent people by carrying out suicide attacks. Kiyani can't be a such a good military strategist. We will see what happens only time will tell who is right.[/QUOTE]

oh really! which glass house u r living in !!!