angeldemon_007
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The recent cancellation of two scheduled bilateral exercises by the Russian side has brought to light the existence of some strains in the otherwise robust Indo-Russian defence partnership. An assertive Indian officialdom aggravated by indifferent Russian sales support is causing the latter to resort to short term pressure signaling. Nevertheless, these hiccups are actually reflective of the fact that India now has many suitors and is expanding its geopolitical space, something that Russia may ultimately have to come to terms with.
The current Indo-Russian defence relationship is executed under the aegis of the Indo-Russian Intergovernmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation (IRIGC-MTC) which meets on an annual basis. Institutionalized ties between the two countries provide for a deep partnership which includes besides co-development and joint marketing of weapons, regular military exercises and exchanges on an annual basis. It was for one of these annual exercises christened "INDRA",that a flock of Indian warships had anchored at Vladivostok. Unfortunately however, the Russian Navy called off the exercises citing an unavailability of ships which had apparently been deployed for aiding Tsunami relief operations in Japan. As a result the Indian ships had to sail back home without any further activity. Compounding matters, the Russians subsequently also cancelled an otherwise routine army exercise slated to be held in India stating that they had little time to prepare for this particular round.
The Eleventh hour cancellations have of course left the Indian side angry. As the Indian Chief of Naval Staff recorded in a subsequent interview "Vladivostok is nearly 5,000 miles away from here [India]. So for us to plan a deployment of ships all the way there takes a lot of planning and costs lots of money to deploy ships at such distances" adding that "to that extent, there was an element of disappointment where exercises were not held at the final stages".
Indian sources feel that such signals on the part of the Russians has in the immediate to do with the Indians increasingly raising issues about spares support and delayed delivery timelines in bilateral meetings, sometimes quite vociferously. Of late, Russia's Rosbornoexport has been routinely making demands for price revisions on continuing warranties and is even looking for fresh contracts on customer support deals hitherto clinched. The same kind of situation is also extant if one moves on from spares to whole weapon systems. India for instance is yet to receive the Nerpa, an Akula-II class nuclear submarine that it has leased from Russia at a cost of 650 million dollars and was originally slated to be received by the Indian Navy in 2008 but could not on account of a fatal training accident on board the ship. Earlier, India had to pay more than twice the original amount to get Moscow to complete the rerfurbishment of the carrier INS Vikramaditya formerly the Admiral Gorshkov, which is also delayed by four years and will arrive on Indian shores only in late 2012.
Going back to the question of after sales support the Indian military is now so exasperated that in recent months it has issued global tenders for line servicing a large part of its eastern bloc equipment, in a move bound to aggravate the Russian original equipment makers (OEMs) further. Indeed there is certainly more than just a hint of resentment on the Russian side if comments made at unofficial interactions are anything to go by.
However such observations are not merely a result of the Indians being candid on customer support. They probably reveal deeper Russian insecurities about the future of the Indian arms bazaar especially after losing out on the coveted 10 billion dollar plus Medium Multi-role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) contract to Europe. Moreover, Russia has to now compete not just with Israel and Europe but also with the United States which despite also being disappointed in the MMRCA contract is notching up quite a few successes on the support and surveillance side of things.
And the Americans seem to be going the extra mile to make a mark in the Indian market. Russian delays on important programs such as Nerpa or the delivery of frigates, contrast poorly with the timely delivery of special operations optimized C-130Js for the Indian Air force. Various constituencies in America are also pushing for selling strategic grade systems to India and making calls for the joint development of weapons platforms. For instance in June, the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) asked the American Defense Department to study the 'desirability and feasibility 'of an F-35 sale to India besides "exploring the option of jointly developing a new jet trainer".
Clearly, more avenues are opening up for India to create strategic partnerships in the defence realm. Of course none of these are as mature as the long standing Indo-Russian co-operation on such matters, but the Indians feel that although the avowed aim is one of progressing from a "buyer-seller" relationship to co-development, the Russians continue to presume to be the senior player in the partnership. This is evidenced by the fact that even though the Indian side will be contributing half the expense for the development of the HAL-Sukhoi Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) programme the work share will be heavily skewed in Russia's favour making it look more like a sale than a joint initiative. Additionally the Russians are also delaying transferring technology on key programmes such as the T-90 Bhishma tank being built under license in India.
In the past Indo-Russian cooperation has seen Indian money keep flagging Russian enterprises afloat while the Indian military has received systems such as the Su-30 MKI which were a generation ahead of what even the Russian Air force flew at the time. The Indian Prime Minister in 2009 openly thanked the Russians for their support while launching India's first indigenous nuclear submarine. However relationships can seldom rest on past laurels and the almost regular delay in deliveries and erratic spares provision is making the Indians fret and look elsewhere. Given that the Chinese market is increasingly being lost as well on account of rapid indigenization, Russia would do well to pull its number one customer closer.
For India, giving up on the Russians altogether is obviously not an option and not desirable either in keeping with the need for India to diversify it sources of arms supply. At the end of the day "balance of interests" would probably lead both to a new equilibrium in keeping with a more varied geo-strategic environment.
IBNLive : Saurav Jha's Blog : From Russia without love
The current Indo-Russian defence relationship is executed under the aegis of the Indo-Russian Intergovernmental Commission on Military Technical Cooperation (IRIGC-MTC) which meets on an annual basis. Institutionalized ties between the two countries provide for a deep partnership which includes besides co-development and joint marketing of weapons, regular military exercises and exchanges on an annual basis. It was for one of these annual exercises christened "INDRA",that a flock of Indian warships had anchored at Vladivostok. Unfortunately however, the Russian Navy called off the exercises citing an unavailability of ships which had apparently been deployed for aiding Tsunami relief operations in Japan. As a result the Indian ships had to sail back home without any further activity. Compounding matters, the Russians subsequently also cancelled an otherwise routine army exercise slated to be held in India stating that they had little time to prepare for this particular round.
The Eleventh hour cancellations have of course left the Indian side angry. As the Indian Chief of Naval Staff recorded in a subsequent interview "Vladivostok is nearly 5,000 miles away from here [India]. So for us to plan a deployment of ships all the way there takes a lot of planning and costs lots of money to deploy ships at such distances" adding that "to that extent, there was an element of disappointment where exercises were not held at the final stages".
Indian sources feel that such signals on the part of the Russians has in the immediate to do with the Indians increasingly raising issues about spares support and delayed delivery timelines in bilateral meetings, sometimes quite vociferously. Of late, Russia's Rosbornoexport has been routinely making demands for price revisions on continuing warranties and is even looking for fresh contracts on customer support deals hitherto clinched. The same kind of situation is also extant if one moves on from spares to whole weapon systems. India for instance is yet to receive the Nerpa, an Akula-II class nuclear submarine that it has leased from Russia at a cost of 650 million dollars and was originally slated to be received by the Indian Navy in 2008 but could not on account of a fatal training accident on board the ship. Earlier, India had to pay more than twice the original amount to get Moscow to complete the rerfurbishment of the carrier INS Vikramaditya formerly the Admiral Gorshkov, which is also delayed by four years and will arrive on Indian shores only in late 2012.
Going back to the question of after sales support the Indian military is now so exasperated that in recent months it has issued global tenders for line servicing a large part of its eastern bloc equipment, in a move bound to aggravate the Russian original equipment makers (OEMs) further. Indeed there is certainly more than just a hint of resentment on the Russian side if comments made at unofficial interactions are anything to go by.
However such observations are not merely a result of the Indians being candid on customer support. They probably reveal deeper Russian insecurities about the future of the Indian arms bazaar especially after losing out on the coveted 10 billion dollar plus Medium Multi-role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) contract to Europe. Moreover, Russia has to now compete not just with Israel and Europe but also with the United States which despite also being disappointed in the MMRCA contract is notching up quite a few successes on the support and surveillance side of things.
And the Americans seem to be going the extra mile to make a mark in the Indian market. Russian delays on important programs such as Nerpa or the delivery of frigates, contrast poorly with the timely delivery of special operations optimized C-130Js for the Indian Air force. Various constituencies in America are also pushing for selling strategic grade systems to India and making calls for the joint development of weapons platforms. For instance in June, the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) asked the American Defense Department to study the 'desirability and feasibility 'of an F-35 sale to India besides "exploring the option of jointly developing a new jet trainer".
Clearly, more avenues are opening up for India to create strategic partnerships in the defence realm. Of course none of these are as mature as the long standing Indo-Russian co-operation on such matters, but the Indians feel that although the avowed aim is one of progressing from a "buyer-seller" relationship to co-development, the Russians continue to presume to be the senior player in the partnership. This is evidenced by the fact that even though the Indian side will be contributing half the expense for the development of the HAL-Sukhoi Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) programme the work share will be heavily skewed in Russia's favour making it look more like a sale than a joint initiative. Additionally the Russians are also delaying transferring technology on key programmes such as the T-90 Bhishma tank being built under license in India.
In the past Indo-Russian cooperation has seen Indian money keep flagging Russian enterprises afloat while the Indian military has received systems such as the Su-30 MKI which were a generation ahead of what even the Russian Air force flew at the time. The Indian Prime Minister in 2009 openly thanked the Russians for their support while launching India's first indigenous nuclear submarine. However relationships can seldom rest on past laurels and the almost regular delay in deliveries and erratic spares provision is making the Indians fret and look elsewhere. Given that the Chinese market is increasingly being lost as well on account of rapid indigenization, Russia would do well to pull its number one customer closer.
For India, giving up on the Russians altogether is obviously not an option and not desirable either in keeping with the need for India to diversify it sources of arms supply. At the end of the day "balance of interests" would probably lead both to a new equilibrium in keeping with a more varied geo-strategic environment.
IBNLive : Saurav Jha's Blog : From Russia without love
