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The growing military relations between China and Bangladesh have regional security implications, says the anaylist
By Malladi. Rama Rao
It is difficult to characterise the China-Bangladesh relations in the conventional mould. Dhaka has been heavily depending on Beijing for its defence requirements and development needs. This has made Bangladesh easily vulnerable to Chinese pressure and persuasions. China sees its foothold in Bangladesh as a part of its quest to establish its regional power profile; and as a means to challenge India in its own South Asian backyard. Bangladesh looks to China because of Myanmar factor as well.
Successive governments which came to office in Dhaka after the assassination of Sheikh Mujib-ur Rehman in 1975 have contributed to cementing of ties with China. Their own anti-India approach, some deft foot-work by Pakistan and Chinas willingness to open the purse strings led to the upswing in the ties and resulted in China emerging today as a very important factor in Bangladeshs foreign relations.
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, despite the popular mandate won by her Awami League, may not tinker with the foreign policy in the short to medium term. Firstly pro-India image limits her turf space. Secondly, she cannot let her immediate predecessor, Khaleda Zia, steal the Bangladesh first and foremost thunder. Hasina gave ample demonstration of this resolve in her earlier term itself when the Bangladesh Rifles under the command of a trusted aide delivered a bloody nose to the Indian Border Security Force.
Whatever are the political ifs and buts, Hasina government cannot gloss over the reality that Bangladesh armed forces are dependent on Chinas military hardware. The Army is equipped with Chinese tanks, the Navy with Chinese frigates and missile boats, and the Air Force with Chinese fighter jets. Both countries have a defence cooperation agreement in place since 2002. It covers military training and defence production also.
In 2006, China supplied 65 artillery guns and 114 missile and related systems. Most of the tanks (T-59, T-62, T-69 and T-79), armoured personnel carriers (APCs), artillery pieces, small arms and personal weapons in the Bangladesh army are of Chinese origin. Plans are afoot to acquire 155mm PLZ-45/Type -88 (including transfer of technology) and 122mm Type-96 as well as MBRLS from China by 2011.
The Chinese wares with the Bangladesh Navy are truly wide-ranging. These raise questions on the scope, direction and intentions of Bangladesh navy. The Chinese platforms in its possession include the 053-H1 Jianghu I class frigates with 4x HY2 missiles, Huang Feng Class missile boats, Type-024 missile boats, Huchuan and P-4 class torpedo boats, Hainan class sub chasers, Shanghai class gun boats and Yuchin class LCUs.
The BNS Khalid Bin Walid has been retrofitted with HQ-7 SAM from China. Admiral Zhang Lianzhong, former Commander of PLA Navy had promised during a one-on-one meeting with his Bangladesh counterpart full cooperation in the sophisticated naval management.
In so far the Air Force is concerned, it has been getting steady supplies from 1977 the year Bangladesh-China relations graduated from a state of total negation into which the ties were pushed as a result of China siding with Pakistan during the Liberation War in 1971 and using veto to block the new nations entry into the UN. It has thus far received 16 F-7BGs, F7 and Q 5 fighters and PT 6 trainers.
Bangladesh set up a missile launch pad near the Chittagong Port with assistance from China. The maiden test was carried out on May 12, 2008 with active participation of Chinese experts. Land attack anti-ship cruise missile C-802A was test fired shortly afterwards from the frigate, BNS Osman near Kutubdia island in the Bay of Bengal. This missile is said to have a strike range of 120kms.
What strikes the test is the Chinese signature. BNS Osman (commissioned 1989) is a 1500-ton Chinese built Jianghu class warship. The C-802A missile is a modified version of Chinese Ying Ji-802 (western version SACCADE). The weight was reduced from 815kg to 715 kg to increase the strike range.
China has been eying Chittagong Port to supplement its hold over Gwadar port in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka. Some spadework was completed by the time Awami League led Grand Alliance trounced Bangladesh National Party (BNP) led four-party alliance in 2008 parliamentary elections.
China is adopting the time tested East India Company route to gain access to Chittagong Port. It has promised development of the port for enhanced trade. Perched here it should be easy for China to monitor Indian missile tests at Chandipur-at-sea near Balasore (on the Indian east coast). Also keep tabs on naval activity in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal by inter-linking its electronic listening systems at Coco Island (Myanmar) and the staging/listening systems deployed on the Bangladesh soil.
PLA Navy can be expected to pamper and pressurise Bangladesh Navy to open its facilities for use as a countervailing force against the Indian Navy. The wide disparities in the India-Bangladesh naval order of battle provide a perfect setting for the friendly entry. It in turn will greatly facilitate smooth operation of Chinese frigates and submarines in the North Andaman Sea.
There is a talk of China getting military basing rights in the Chittagong belt. As and when the wish is fulfilled, China stands to acquire the ability to monitor army deployment in North-east India. Additionally, several strategic Indian Air Force bases at Bagdogra, Hashimara and Tezpur, to just name a few, and Indian military aircraft deployed in the region will come under a Bangladesh-China electronic and radar surveillance network.
Chittagong is already serving as delivery port for Chinese arms meant for various Indian insurgent groups particularly, the United Liberation Front of Asom ULFA) which have sanctuaries in Bangladesh. ULFA has reportedly shifted its base to China in the recent months though its leadership continues to nurture business interests set up in Dhaka with the patronage of ISI and Bangladesh intelligence over two-three decades ago.
China has maintained contacts ULFA in Dhaka. It is also in touch with another North-east Indian outfit, National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), which is fighting for independence in the province of Nagaland. NSCN has been in talks with Delhi for over seven-years. Yet, China has been allowing them (as also ULFA) to procure arms, ammunition and communication equipment from Yunnan.
From a regional security perceptive, Chinas engagement with Bangladesh for access and bases has the potential to alter the security scenario, trigger regional tensions and much more. From an Indian perspective, the growing Bangladesh China military contacts will make the Siliguri corridor vulnerable for the first time since India became independent in 1947.
Often described as the Chicken Neck, this 200 km long and 40 km wide corridor connects mainland India by rail, road and air with its North-eastern region of seven provinces. One of these provinces is Arunachal Pradesh. China has been claiming some 90,000 sq. kms of Arunachal as its own and this has become a constant source of tension in the China-India relations.
China has also been claiming Tawang, the home to an ancient Buddhist monastery, in Arunachal Pradesh. Chinese army marched into Tawang during the 1962 war. Though much water has since flown into the Brahmaputra, the very claim over Tawang increases Siliguri corridors vulnerability.
There is a significant PLA deployment along the borders, on the Arunachal side, which is to the east of Siliguri, and on the Bhutan side to the north of Siliguri. It is in the South of Siliguri, PLA has never had a direct or indirect presence. The Sino-Bangladesh friendship is bridging the void, in a manner of speaking, because Siliguri corridor figures prominently in the Sino doctrine and in its friendship with Bangladesh what with the arm-twisting of India to allow a trade route through the corridor.
There is empirical evidence to show that China is not worried of Islamic radicalism in Bangladesh. In fact, it perceives the deepening hold of Islamists under Pakistan patronage as a strategic advantage in its relations with India.
Read against this backdrop, the unofficial China paper on severing India from its north-eastern region makes eminent sense. Pakistan, which has never forgiven India for its 1971 tragedy, has been working through the ****** route to settle its own scores. It has developed jihadi launch pads in Bangladesh and Nepal. Whether it is working with them or not, the Siliguri corridor contains elements that destabilise the region.
One additional dimension of China-Bangladesh relations needs close examination. It relates to nuclear tie-up. As of now, after toying up with the Chinese offers, Dhaka has turned to Moscow to set up a nuclear power plant. By this decision Hasina government has pushed into cold storage the carefully worked out plans of Khaleda Zia regime. Chinas interest in the Bangladesh nuclear establishment goes back to the year 2000, when Zhongyuan Engineering Corporation offered to supply a 300 MW nuclear power plant under its technical collaboration programme. It also offered suppliers credit to import Chinese equipment and electro-mechanical products.
How Russia pipped China is a different story. China is not known to take a no for a no particularly when its stakes are so high. It can be expected to sugar coat its offer in a bid to grab a large share of the Bangladesh N-market since Dhaka has big plans to over come power shortages that have been plaguing infrastructure development.
Policy Research Group - Strategic Insight - Dynamics of China-Bangladesh relations
P.S.: The article is from 2010 but I think it shows how worried Hindustanis are about growing relations of BD and China.
By Malladi. Rama Rao
It is difficult to characterise the China-Bangladesh relations in the conventional mould. Dhaka has been heavily depending on Beijing for its defence requirements and development needs. This has made Bangladesh easily vulnerable to Chinese pressure and persuasions. China sees its foothold in Bangladesh as a part of its quest to establish its regional power profile; and as a means to challenge India in its own South Asian backyard. Bangladesh looks to China because of Myanmar factor as well.
Successive governments which came to office in Dhaka after the assassination of Sheikh Mujib-ur Rehman in 1975 have contributed to cementing of ties with China. Their own anti-India approach, some deft foot-work by Pakistan and Chinas willingness to open the purse strings led to the upswing in the ties and resulted in China emerging today as a very important factor in Bangladeshs foreign relations.
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, despite the popular mandate won by her Awami League, may not tinker with the foreign policy in the short to medium term. Firstly pro-India image limits her turf space. Secondly, she cannot let her immediate predecessor, Khaleda Zia, steal the Bangladesh first and foremost thunder. Hasina gave ample demonstration of this resolve in her earlier term itself when the Bangladesh Rifles under the command of a trusted aide delivered a bloody nose to the Indian Border Security Force.
Whatever are the political ifs and buts, Hasina government cannot gloss over the reality that Bangladesh armed forces are dependent on Chinas military hardware. The Army is equipped with Chinese tanks, the Navy with Chinese frigates and missile boats, and the Air Force with Chinese fighter jets. Both countries have a defence cooperation agreement in place since 2002. It covers military training and defence production also.
In 2006, China supplied 65 artillery guns and 114 missile and related systems. Most of the tanks (T-59, T-62, T-69 and T-79), armoured personnel carriers (APCs), artillery pieces, small arms and personal weapons in the Bangladesh army are of Chinese origin. Plans are afoot to acquire 155mm PLZ-45/Type -88 (including transfer of technology) and 122mm Type-96 as well as MBRLS from China by 2011.
The Chinese wares with the Bangladesh Navy are truly wide-ranging. These raise questions on the scope, direction and intentions of Bangladesh navy. The Chinese platforms in its possession include the 053-H1 Jianghu I class frigates with 4x HY2 missiles, Huang Feng Class missile boats, Type-024 missile boats, Huchuan and P-4 class torpedo boats, Hainan class sub chasers, Shanghai class gun boats and Yuchin class LCUs.
The BNS Khalid Bin Walid has been retrofitted with HQ-7 SAM from China. Admiral Zhang Lianzhong, former Commander of PLA Navy had promised during a one-on-one meeting with his Bangladesh counterpart full cooperation in the sophisticated naval management.
In so far the Air Force is concerned, it has been getting steady supplies from 1977 the year Bangladesh-China relations graduated from a state of total negation into which the ties were pushed as a result of China siding with Pakistan during the Liberation War in 1971 and using veto to block the new nations entry into the UN. It has thus far received 16 F-7BGs, F7 and Q 5 fighters and PT 6 trainers.
Bangladesh set up a missile launch pad near the Chittagong Port with assistance from China. The maiden test was carried out on May 12, 2008 with active participation of Chinese experts. Land attack anti-ship cruise missile C-802A was test fired shortly afterwards from the frigate, BNS Osman near Kutubdia island in the Bay of Bengal. This missile is said to have a strike range of 120kms.
What strikes the test is the Chinese signature. BNS Osman (commissioned 1989) is a 1500-ton Chinese built Jianghu class warship. The C-802A missile is a modified version of Chinese Ying Ji-802 (western version SACCADE). The weight was reduced from 815kg to 715 kg to increase the strike range.
China has been eying Chittagong Port to supplement its hold over Gwadar port in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka. Some spadework was completed by the time Awami League led Grand Alliance trounced Bangladesh National Party (BNP) led four-party alliance in 2008 parliamentary elections.
China is adopting the time tested East India Company route to gain access to Chittagong Port. It has promised development of the port for enhanced trade. Perched here it should be easy for China to monitor Indian missile tests at Chandipur-at-sea near Balasore (on the Indian east coast). Also keep tabs on naval activity in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal by inter-linking its electronic listening systems at Coco Island (Myanmar) and the staging/listening systems deployed on the Bangladesh soil.
PLA Navy can be expected to pamper and pressurise Bangladesh Navy to open its facilities for use as a countervailing force against the Indian Navy. The wide disparities in the India-Bangladesh naval order of battle provide a perfect setting for the friendly entry. It in turn will greatly facilitate smooth operation of Chinese frigates and submarines in the North Andaman Sea.
There is a talk of China getting military basing rights in the Chittagong belt. As and when the wish is fulfilled, China stands to acquire the ability to monitor army deployment in North-east India. Additionally, several strategic Indian Air Force bases at Bagdogra, Hashimara and Tezpur, to just name a few, and Indian military aircraft deployed in the region will come under a Bangladesh-China electronic and radar surveillance network.
Chittagong is already serving as delivery port for Chinese arms meant for various Indian insurgent groups particularly, the United Liberation Front of Asom ULFA) which have sanctuaries in Bangladesh. ULFA has reportedly shifted its base to China in the recent months though its leadership continues to nurture business interests set up in Dhaka with the patronage of ISI and Bangladesh intelligence over two-three decades ago.
China has maintained contacts ULFA in Dhaka. It is also in touch with another North-east Indian outfit, National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), which is fighting for independence in the province of Nagaland. NSCN has been in talks with Delhi for over seven-years. Yet, China has been allowing them (as also ULFA) to procure arms, ammunition and communication equipment from Yunnan.
From a regional security perceptive, Chinas engagement with Bangladesh for access and bases has the potential to alter the security scenario, trigger regional tensions and much more. From an Indian perspective, the growing Bangladesh China military contacts will make the Siliguri corridor vulnerable for the first time since India became independent in 1947.
Often described as the Chicken Neck, this 200 km long and 40 km wide corridor connects mainland India by rail, road and air with its North-eastern region of seven provinces. One of these provinces is Arunachal Pradesh. China has been claiming some 90,000 sq. kms of Arunachal as its own and this has become a constant source of tension in the China-India relations.
China has also been claiming Tawang, the home to an ancient Buddhist monastery, in Arunachal Pradesh. Chinese army marched into Tawang during the 1962 war. Though much water has since flown into the Brahmaputra, the very claim over Tawang increases Siliguri corridors vulnerability.
There is a significant PLA deployment along the borders, on the Arunachal side, which is to the east of Siliguri, and on the Bhutan side to the north of Siliguri. It is in the South of Siliguri, PLA has never had a direct or indirect presence. The Sino-Bangladesh friendship is bridging the void, in a manner of speaking, because Siliguri corridor figures prominently in the Sino doctrine and in its friendship with Bangladesh what with the arm-twisting of India to allow a trade route through the corridor.
There is empirical evidence to show that China is not worried of Islamic radicalism in Bangladesh. In fact, it perceives the deepening hold of Islamists under Pakistan patronage as a strategic advantage in its relations with India.
Read against this backdrop, the unofficial China paper on severing India from its north-eastern region makes eminent sense. Pakistan, which has never forgiven India for its 1971 tragedy, has been working through the ****** route to settle its own scores. It has developed jihadi launch pads in Bangladesh and Nepal. Whether it is working with them or not, the Siliguri corridor contains elements that destabilise the region.
One additional dimension of China-Bangladesh relations needs close examination. It relates to nuclear tie-up. As of now, after toying up with the Chinese offers, Dhaka has turned to Moscow to set up a nuclear power plant. By this decision Hasina government has pushed into cold storage the carefully worked out plans of Khaleda Zia regime. Chinas interest in the Bangladesh nuclear establishment goes back to the year 2000, when Zhongyuan Engineering Corporation offered to supply a 300 MW nuclear power plant under its technical collaboration programme. It also offered suppliers credit to import Chinese equipment and electro-mechanical products.
How Russia pipped China is a different story. China is not known to take a no for a no particularly when its stakes are so high. It can be expected to sugar coat its offer in a bid to grab a large share of the Bangladesh N-market since Dhaka has big plans to over come power shortages that have been plaguing infrastructure development.
Policy Research Group - Strategic Insight - Dynamics of China-Bangladesh relations
P.S.: The article is from 2010 but I think it shows how worried Hindustanis are about growing relations of BD and China.
