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This chapter examines the information aspects of ship defense against ASCMs while those ships conduct TBMD. Overall, the defense problem is analyzed as a double-queuing problem. First, the launched ASCMs and ballistic missiles in a given time period, T, enter an initial engagement queue based on an assessment of the likelihood that cruise missiles will be a threat to the defenders (two Aegis cruisers) or that the ballistic missiles will be a threat to critical infra-structure targets. Second, if no interceptor missile defeats the incoming attack missiles, one of two things will occur: ASCM leakers will join a second queue to be “serviced” by the Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) on board the cruisers, or ballistic missile damage to
land targets will be assessed.1
We begin by discussing the development of the “initial engagement
queue” and the rate at which that queue is populated or the arrival
rate of missiles for each time period. Next, we develop the appro-
priate “service” rates depending on the shooting policy established.
Finally, we address the leaker or terminal queue.
______________
1
http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/weapons/wep-phal.html. Phalanx
provides ships of the U.S. Navy with a “last-chance” defense against antiship missiles
and littoral warfare threats that have penetrated other fleet defenses. Phalanx auto-
matically detects, tracks, and engages antiair warfare threats, such as antiship missiles
and aircraft, while the Block 1B’s man-in-the-loop system counters the emerging lit-
toral warfare threat.
INITIATING EVENTS
Two Aegis cruisers are assigned to cover the area of operations as depicted in Figure 3.1 in order to defend against a likely enemy cruise and ballistic missile attack. Given their role in defending friendly territory, the cruisers are also likely to be targets and therefore they
are prepared to defend against such an attack. Although it is likely that other ships would be in the area of operations, for purposes of this analysis, we assume that only the two Aegis
cruisers are involved in the attack and in the defensive operations.
Measures of Performance and Force Effectiveness
The Aegis cruisers have two (competing) missions: defend against cruise missile attacks against themselves and prevent enemy ballistic missiles from destroying key allied infrastructure targets. For both missions, the obvious measure of success is survivability; that is, the fraction of the critical infrastructure targets that survive the attack and the “fraction” of the cruisers that survive the attack. In the case of the cruisers, the “fraction surviving” may not be meaningful in that a single hit by a cruise missile is likely to result in damage sufficient to
render the ship useless.
Given the two missions, priority is clearly given to defending the two Aegis cruisers. If they fail to defend themselves, they cannot conduct TBMD.
Depending on the nature of the attack, this can pose serious problems for the defense of allied infrastructure targets.
Few uncertainties are considered in this analysis. We assume that the AN/SPY-1 radars on board the cruisers will detect and track all missiles the enemy is able to launch with certainty.2
Only those missiles considered likely to hit infrastructure targets and the cruisers are considered a threat.
We further assume that through the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) process, the size of the enemy missile attack inventory is known. It is also possible that the fixed launch sites would be known as a result of the same process. The locations of sea- or land-
based mobile launch sites are not likely to be known. However, we assume air and sea supremacy, and therefore these are no longer a serious threat. The minimum time required to launch an attack can also be estimated. What is not known, however, is the attack distri-
bution for ballistic missiles and cruise missiles—i.e., how the enemy will schedule the attack to ensure that the friendly infrastructure targets are destroyed while minimizing interference from the defending cruisers. Knowing the attack distribution contributes directly to the allocation
of missile interceptors and therefore to the effective defense of both the cruisers and the friendly infrastructure targets. Defenders may determine that they have ample defensive weapons, for example, and therefore respond more aggressively. A measure of performance
therefore is the degree to which the friendly commander “knows” the enemy’s attack distribution.
Before the attack begins little is known,
and at the end of the attack the distribution is known with certainty.
______________
2
The heart of the Aegis system is an advanced, automatic detect and track, multifunc-
tion phased-array radar, the AN/SPY-1. This high-powered (four-megawatt) radar is
able to perform search, track, and missile guidance functions simultaneously with a
track capacity of more than 100 targets. The computer-based command and decision
element is the core of the Aegis combat system.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1449/MR1449.ch3.pdf
This is a 50 page technical analysis for military professional and everyone who is interested in BMD and CMD
land targets will be assessed.1
We begin by discussing the development of the “initial engagement
queue” and the rate at which that queue is populated or the arrival
rate of missiles for each time period. Next, we develop the appro-
priate “service” rates depending on the shooting policy established.
Finally, we address the leaker or terminal queue.
______________
1
http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/weapons/wep-phal.html. Phalanx
provides ships of the U.S. Navy with a “last-chance” defense against antiship missiles
and littoral warfare threats that have penetrated other fleet defenses. Phalanx auto-
matically detects, tracks, and engages antiair warfare threats, such as antiship missiles
and aircraft, while the Block 1B’s man-in-the-loop system counters the emerging lit-
toral warfare threat.
INITIATING EVENTS
Two Aegis cruisers are assigned to cover the area of operations as depicted in Figure 3.1 in order to defend against a likely enemy cruise and ballistic missile attack. Given their role in defending friendly territory, the cruisers are also likely to be targets and therefore they
are prepared to defend against such an attack. Although it is likely that other ships would be in the area of operations, for purposes of this analysis, we assume that only the two Aegis
cruisers are involved in the attack and in the defensive operations.
Measures of Performance and Force Effectiveness
The Aegis cruisers have two (competing) missions: defend against cruise missile attacks against themselves and prevent enemy ballistic missiles from destroying key allied infrastructure targets. For both missions, the obvious measure of success is survivability; that is, the fraction of the critical infrastructure targets that survive the attack and the “fraction” of the cruisers that survive the attack. In the case of the cruisers, the “fraction surviving” may not be meaningful in that a single hit by a cruise missile is likely to result in damage sufficient to
render the ship useless.
Given the two missions, priority is clearly given to defending the two Aegis cruisers. If they fail to defend themselves, they cannot conduct TBMD.
Depending on the nature of the attack, this can pose serious problems for the defense of allied infrastructure targets.
Few uncertainties are considered in this analysis. We assume that the AN/SPY-1 radars on board the cruisers will detect and track all missiles the enemy is able to launch with certainty.2
Only those missiles considered likely to hit infrastructure targets and the cruisers are considered a threat.
We further assume that through the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) process, the size of the enemy missile attack inventory is known. It is also possible that the fixed launch sites would be known as a result of the same process. The locations of sea- or land-
based mobile launch sites are not likely to be known. However, we assume air and sea supremacy, and therefore these are no longer a serious threat. The minimum time required to launch an attack can also be estimated. What is not known, however, is the attack distri-
bution for ballistic missiles and cruise missiles—i.e., how the enemy will schedule the attack to ensure that the friendly infrastructure targets are destroyed while minimizing interference from the defending cruisers. Knowing the attack distribution contributes directly to the allocation
of missile interceptors and therefore to the effective defense of both the cruisers and the friendly infrastructure targets. Defenders may determine that they have ample defensive weapons, for example, and therefore respond more aggressively. A measure of performance
therefore is the degree to which the friendly commander “knows” the enemy’s attack distribution.
Before the attack begins little is known,
and at the end of the attack the distribution is known with certainty.
______________
2
The heart of the Aegis system is an advanced, automatic detect and track, multifunc-
tion phased-array radar, the AN/SPY-1. This high-powered (four-megawatt) radar is
able to perform search, track, and missile guidance functions simultaneously with a
track capacity of more than 100 targets. The computer-based command and decision
element is the core of the Aegis combat system.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1449/MR1449.ch3.pdf
This is a 50 page technical analysis for military professional and everyone who is interested in BMD and CMD
