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China's New International Mindset?

Edison Chen

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China's New International Mindset?
I read this news on Sina.com, find it very interesting.
@LeveragedBuyout @Chinese-Dragon @Raphael @TaiShang @ChineseTiger1986 @Nihonjin1051

This change goes beyond the idea floated some years ago of a "G2" (a US-China special relationship). The G2 idea was based on faulty thinking: of U.S.-Chinese ties as isolated from the rest of the world. This time, the concept is more comprehensive, and in many ways reassuring, because it accepts US leadership for both the U.S. and for the many countries that feared being left out of the new strong bond between Washington and Beijing.

As for the reasons the change occurred, we can only infer them. There are possibly a number of historical and political reasons that brought about the Chinese change of heart. There could, possibly, have been a new historical analysis — the way the Chinese love to think about problems: that there is a sense of history which changes according to civilizations; the Chinese have their own, Indians have their own, and so on — that helped form this new mindset.

The United States inherited a leading role in the world from the British Empire, which took it on from the French, and before them the Dutch in the late 17th century, who took it on from the Spanish, who first started the globalization process with the discovery of America in the late 15th century.

America, in other words, inherited a world shaped by values and rules conceived of by Western countries for over 500 years. Before the discovery of America, the world worked in different major areas: Europe, India, China, for instance, but with only loose connections between one another. The discovery of America for the first time made an effort in connecting all sides. These values and rules are largely alien to China's historical tradition, yet they are widely accepted not only by Western countries, but also by the world at large. China seems to have realized the extreme difficulty of simply barging into a world already shaped by centuries of traditions alien to it. Moreover, since the fall of the Qing Empire about a century ago, these Western traditions had already partially entered Chinese political discourse. Since then, the foundation of the People's Republic has been organized according to Western Marxist values.

With a mindset shaped by economic calculations, the Chinese may have realized that challenging this present system, toppling it, and replacing it with something more "Chinese" could be an extremely risky and costly proposition. China may have concluded that, in the process, it might well be defeated or suffer great losses; that it would be much more effective and economical just to join the system and play a constructive role while slowly and steadily introducing Chinese tenets For thousands of years they have thrived without many ties with the West, why should they now accept all the Western values into their system?

Political concerns also possibly helped shape the new thinking. The Chinese, along with everyone else, saw the U.S. completely defeat the USSR in the Cold War, even though the USSR was much stronger scientifically and politically than China is now. The USSR had been at the center of a vast web of allied states; it had an appealing ideology that made inroads among many intellectuals and working people of the Western world, and it had "converted" many of them to "Soviet beliefs." China has no allies, no system of values or any ideology making inroads in the West; it is pretty isolated. So, politically, if it were to engage in a head-on confrontation with the Western world, the outcome could be even worse than that with the USSR.

As further proof, one could look at the extreme difficulties of Russia now as it tries to confront America. Despite the fact that Washington is coming out of 14 years of setbacks and poor political management in the Middle East and Central Asia, it still has quite easily managed to put Moscow on the defensive over Ukraine. Russia's invasion may not be over, but Putin has been put on the defensive. This is already a result visible to China, and may well have been enough to lead it to a new way of thinking.

The final element is the massive rebound in 2014 of the American economy, officially recording growth of about 5% at the end of 2014. The Chinese are still wondering what made America grow so much in one year. What is clear is that the development of new technologies and the ability to innovate and blaze new trails in economic growth is playing a huge role. The new technologies for extracting oil and gas through fracking, to store and save energy -- such as batteries for Tesla cars, which look as if they could revolutionize the auto industry -- have impressed a whole new dynamic into America's economic system and geopolitics. The Middle East, which, thanks to its oil reserves, was so crucial to the global economy until a couple of years ago, has largely been sidelined. In addition, the present plunge in oil prices seems to beckon a new season of cheap energy, which could spur unforetold developments in many areas.

This expansion, plus possible investments in rebuilding America's poor infrastructure, could boost growth in the future. Those potential improvements are all signs that America's decline might not be inevitable, as many pundits worldwide recently predicted, and may well have led China to underscore the necessity of treading carefully and not underestimating Washington's capabilities.

On the political side, this change of heart underscores, internally, President Xi's new clout in politics. He managed to shelve critics with different views on foreign policy. These differing views, and the difficulty in finding a unified voice, have been plaguing Chinese foreign policy for virtually two decades.

The new position of Wang Yang can, in fact, be seen as a result of internal party cleansing. According to a report by Xinhua News Agency on December 29, the Politburo of the Communist Party announced that, "within the party there will be absolutely no tolerance for factionalism and gangs; no way to use the party to pursue individual benefits or to form gangs and cliques."

Furthermore, Xi's new stance -- admitting the influence and role of the U.S. in the world -- in a way could be a late response to Obama's policies toward China in 2009. Immediately after his election, Obama seemed to offer China a sweeping opportunity for cooperation. This offer was received in a lukewarm fashion by Beijing, then plagued by deep rifts on crucial political choices. Now, of course, times and conditions are different, but Xi, in more than one way, seems to be trying to set the clock back -- and forward.

It is still too early to see how these statements will play out. The U.S. now may be less ready to welcome a Chinese opening, and the world largely seems far more confused than just six years ago. Moreover, no one is yet clear, possibly not even the Chinese, what the meaning to the existing world order of the "constructive contributions," mentioned by Wang Yang, will be.
 
China's New International Mindset?
I read this news on Sina.com, find it very interesting.
@LeveragedBuyout @Chinese-Dragon @Raphael @TaiShang @ChineseTiger1986 @Nihonjin1051

This change goes beyond the idea floated some years ago of a "G2" (a US-China special relationship). The G2 idea was based on faulty thinking: of U.S.-Chinese ties as isolated from the rest of the world. This time, the concept is more comprehensive, and in many ways reassuring, because it accepts US leadership for both the U.S. and for the many countries that feared being left out of the new strong bond between Washington and Beijing.

As for the reasons the change occurred, we can only infer them. There are possibly a number of historical and political reasons that brought about the Chinese change of heart. There could, possibly, have been a new historical analysis — the way the Chinese love to think about problems: that there is a sense of history which changes according to civilizations; the Chinese have their own, Indians have their own, and so on — that helped form this new mindset.

The United States inherited a leading role in the world from the British Empire, which took it on from the French, and before them the Dutch in the late 17th century, who took it on from the Spanish, who first started the globalization process with the discovery of America in the late 15th century.

America, in other words, inherited a world shaped by values and rules conceived of by Western countries for over 500 years. Before the discovery of America, the world worked in different major areas: Europe, India, China, for instance, but with only loose connections between one another. The discovery of America for the first time made an effort in connecting all sides. These values and rules are largely alien to China's historical tradition, yet they are widely accepted not only by Western countries, but also by the world at large. China seems to have realized the extreme difficulty of simply barging into a world already shaped by centuries of traditions alien to it. Moreover, since the fall of the Qing Empire about a century ago, these Western traditions had already partially entered Chinese political discourse. Since then, the foundation of the People's Republic has been organized according to Western Marxist values.

With a mindset shaped by economic calculations, the Chinese may have realized that challenging this present system, toppling it, and replacing it with something more "Chinese" could be an extremely risky and costly proposition. China may have concluded that, in the process, it might well be defeated or suffer great losses; that it would be much more effective and economical just to join the system and play a constructive role while slowly and steadily introducing Chinese tenets For thousands of years they have thrived without many ties with the West, why should they now accept all the Western values into their system?

Political concerns also possibly helped shape the new thinking. The Chinese, along with everyone else, saw the U.S. completely defeat the USSR in the Cold War, even though the USSR was much stronger scientifically and politically than China is now. The USSR had been at the center of a vast web of allied states; it had an appealing ideology that made inroads among many intellectuals and working people of the Western world, and it had "converted" many of them to "Soviet beliefs." China has no allies, no system of values or any ideology making inroads in the West; it is pretty isolated. So, politically, if it were to engage in a head-on confrontation with the Western world, the outcome could be even worse than that with the USSR.

As further proof, one could look at the extreme difficulties of Russia now as it tries to confront America. Despite the fact that Washington is coming out of 14 years of setbacks and poor political management in the Middle East and Central Asia, it still has quite easily managed to put Moscow on the defensive over Ukraine. Russia's invasion may not be over, but Putin has been put on the defensive. This is already a result visible to China, and may well have been enough to lead it to a new way of thinking.

The final element is the massive rebound in 2014 of the American economy, officially recording growth of about 5% at the end of 2014. The Chinese are still wondering what made America grow so much in one year. What is clear is that the development of new technologies and the ability to innovate and blaze new trails in economic growth is playing a huge role. The new technologies for extracting oil and gas through fracking, to store and save energy -- such as batteries for Tesla cars, which look as if they could revolutionize the auto industry -- have impressed a whole new dynamic into America's economic system and geopolitics. The Middle East, which, thanks to its oil reserves, was so crucial to the global economy until a couple of years ago, has largely been sidelined. In addition, the present plunge in oil prices seems to beckon a new season of cheap energy, which could spur unforetold developments in many areas.

This expansion, plus possible investments in rebuilding America's poor infrastructure, could boost growth in the future. Those potential improvements are all signs that America's decline might not be inevitable, as many pundits worldwide recently predicted, and may well have led China to underscore the necessity of treading carefully and not underestimating Washington's capabilities.

On the political side, this change of heart underscores, internally, President Xi's new clout in politics. He managed to shelve critics with different views on foreign policy. These differing views, and the difficulty in finding a unified voice, have been plaguing Chinese foreign policy for virtually two decades.

The new position of Wang Yang can, in fact, be seen as a result of internal party cleansing. According to a report by Xinhua News Agency on December 29, the Politburo of the Communist Party announced that, "within the party there will be absolutely no tolerance for factionalism and gangs; no way to use the party to pursue individual benefits or to form gangs and cliques."

Furthermore, Xi's new stance -- admitting the influence and role of the U.S. in the world -- in a way could be a late response to Obama's policies toward China in 2009. Immediately after his election, Obama seemed to offer China a sweeping opportunity for cooperation. This offer was received in a lukewarm fashion by Beijing, then plagued by deep rifts on crucial political choices. Now, of course, times and conditions are different, but Xi, in more than one way, seems to be trying to set the clock back -- and forward.

It is still too early to see how these statements will play out. The U.S. now may be less ready to welcome a Chinese opening, and the world largely seems far more confused than just six years ago. Moreover, no one is yet clear, possibly not even the Chinese, what the meaning to the existing world order of the "constructive contributions," mentioned by Wang Yang, will be.

Thanks, @Edison Chen , great find.

I find this to be a thoughtful article, and mostly agree with the premise, but perhaps you can clarify a point which confuses me.

The discovery of America for the first time made an effort in connecting all sides. These values and rules are largely alien to China's historical tradition, yet they are widely accepted not only by Western countries, but also by the world at large. China seems to have realized the extreme difficulty of simply barging into a world already shaped by centuries of traditions alien to it. Moreover, since the fall of the Qing Empire about a century ago, these Western traditions had already partially entered Chinese political discourse.

This doesn't ring true to me from my shallow understanding of Chinese history, but please let me know if you see it differently. China saw itself in the imperial years as the center of the known world, the connecting tissue between the various known powers at the time, and Chinese culture was foundational in the development of many other, if not most, Asian cultures. I don't view the discovery of America as being the first time all sides were connected; it was simply the first time for the West. Is this system of connectedness really new to China, or is it the intrusion of alien culture into China that is new?

With a mindset shaped by economic calculations, the Chinese may have realized that challenging this present system, toppling it, and replacing it with something more "Chinese" could be an extremely risky and costly proposition. China may have concluded that, in the process, it might well be defeated or suffer great losses; that it would be much more effective and economical just to join the system and play a constructive role while slowly and steadily introducing Chinese tenets For thousands of years they have thrived without many ties with the West, why should they now accept all the Western values into their system?

Again, I realize the article was written by a Westerner, which may explain this, but I doubt China thinks this way. I don't believe China wants to impose a sui generis Chinese system on the world, it simply wants to use those pieces of the Western system that work well, discard those parts that don't work well, and adapt the system as well as possible to Chinese culture. That doesn't seem so radical to me--in fact, that's what every country does. Germany's social democracy looks very different from America's, and Japan's state capitalism was a mystery to us for 15 years, even though both of these countries were also nominally in--and of--the Western system. China is not so different that it can't do the same, right? After all, isn't that what China has been doing for the last 30 years? No one in the West expects China to look exactly like us, I think it is a more subtle expectation of convergence to a meeting point. Remember, China isn't the only one changing. We are, too.

The Chinese are still wondering what made America grow so much in one year.

Heh, I guess the self-aggrandizement was unavoidable. Somehow, I doubt the Chinese care.

The new position of Wang Yang can, in fact, be seen as a result of internal party cleansing. According to a report by Xinhua News Agency on December 29, the Politburo of the Communist Party announced that, "within the party there will be absolutely no tolerance for factionalism and gangs; no way to use the party to pursue individual benefits or to form gangs and cliques."

Every time I read something like this, I am struck by how similar this is to George Washington's attempts to prevent the formation of political parties in the US. It's yet another sign that we are converging, but China, being newer to democracy, is still refining its process. I don't think this is a sign that China has decided to give up its aspirations to lead in the world, just that it must know what it is and consolidate its own identity before it can articulate how its values should shape the global system.

Again, it was never my impression that China wanted to replace the system as it stands with its own system, but rather, China wanted the ability to shape the system and steer it in a direction more aligned with its own values. Where it can do that, it does (e.g. WTO, UN). Where it cannot, it creates a parallel structure (AIIB, NDB, etc.). I actually think a G-2 would be very convenient for China, and fit in well with its stated goals (Russia and East/SE Asia for China, Europe and the Western Hemisphere for the US, Central Asia and Africa TBD).

Is that a fair representation of mainstream thought in China?
 
Again, it was never my impression that China wanted to replace the system as it stands with its own system, but rather, China wanted the ability to shape the system and steer it in a direction more aligned with its own values. Where it can do that, it does (e.g. WTO, UN). Where it cannot, it creates a parallel structure (AIIB, NDB, etc.). I actually think a G-2 would be very convenient for China, and fit in well with its stated goals (Russia and East/SE Asia for China, Europe and the Western Hemisphere for the US, Central Asia and Africa TBD).

Very well put, sir. Indeed, the key phrase is "parallel structure," rather than an alternative; a fine but quite dramatic difference. This I have also attempted to point out in my upcoming research article. A systemic alternative is quite different from a systemic parallel. Alternative suggests a more contentious view of the present world whereas a parallel suggests 1. national sovereignty and the right to pursue one's own political discourse, 2. the availability of parallel modes that are not essentially designed as alternatives but might in fact become so if the appeal exceeds that of the present order.

China does not seem to wish to outright challenge the (Western) order as such, but, experimentally and incrementally see what is working and what is not working. While adopting the working part, China does envision to develop its own structures for the parts that it deems not working -- sort of a marketplace of ideas and material structures. AIIB and such can be seen under the light of this parallel structuring. These are not definitely to overthrow the existing structures such as the WB but only to bring one more product to the market.

Not every country is capable of promoting parallel systems, let alone alternatives; it takes an aggregated power of material wealth and ideas that emerge from those material structures. The development itself is peaceful by nature as it does not seek system overthrow. But, the systemic leader(s) might view it as a threat, then it becomes destructive. China';s vision of new type of great (major) power relationship can be read in this light. What the concept suggests is just systemic flexibility for the parallels to emerge freely. Obviously, while most of those parallels would wither away in time, some might catch up and then become a real alternative if the majority of international state actors opt for it.
 
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