China: The Unsatisfied Power

[Genesis]

Recently, much has been made of the German Empire and China comparison, while I largely agree, the iteration of the Empire choosen was less agreeable. The choice of the World War 1 Germany was the obvious choice for those that want to view China as a revisionist power and a destabilizing power, and in many ways it is true, but upon closer examination, China actually bares far more resemblence to the revisionist but stabilizing power of Bismark Germany.

Bismark wanted a united Germany and a European order that has a major, but not exclusive German input. Wanting of power and prestige is just human nature and it not only exist in China, but also in the US, and even the Indonesians want some sort of leadership role in ASEAN.

How China handles this, is important to the 21st century, but the US and ASEAN + 2's response are also significant. However, due to the nature of this "conflict," and the fact US is at it's peak and China still closer to the beginning than the end, the initiative is squarely on us, and our actions

The topic at hand is how would China proceed based on concrete evidence and actions, while drawing similarities and differences from the past to better judge the future.

The most glaring omission from the Western analysts, and the biggest difference between the two German empires, is patience. China may be revisionist and in some ways destabilizing, but it is patient, which makes it more stabilizing than not.

To some it is a distinction without a difference, but it is this distinction that makes all the difference. China is rising, it is gaining strength both on the international stage and the regional stage. Side effect of 30 years of unrelenting growth.

With great power comes great responsibility, not because we got bit by a magical spider, but because we are literally everywhere, and we have the ability to make that change. People will expect it, both domestic and abroad. The US cannot say that we must help with Ebola, ISIS, and climate change, while cockblock us on other issues closer to home and far more important to our own strategic interests.

Bismark's idea of a satisfied power and gradual shift in power is of great similarity to the China of the present and past. China was not much of an expansion power save for very brief periods in our history. To think China will simply roll over the entire ASEAN and Japan is about as crazy as to think we will simply live in a world order where the second and soon to be first economy has less say in international affairs than France and less influence in Asia than Japan.

China has no ambition to rule all of Asia, and really doesn't want to, the number of headcases in Asia is no less than in Africa, and anyone getting into that mess better bring enough Advil, cause the headaches will keep on coming.

In reality it is not the China Seas today and tomorrow the Philippines, it's more like we are stopping at the China Seas, cause our health issurance don't cover non-prescription drugs.

The often described of aggressive expansion of the China Seas is both the truth and fabrication at the same time. The end game for the China seas, if played right and there is every indication that it is, will be largely devoit of blood shed and will result in the re-establishing of the status quo in favor of China through sheer dominance in the field of economics, technological and political, as well as time.

Ironically, it is the fact China isn't a dictatorship that makes it far more likely time will be the main weapon, rather than actual weapons. A departure even from Bismark Germany, the wishes of one man is not the state policy of China, and thus Chinese interests don't align with personal interests and in the interest of China, the continued growth of China in all fields while at the same time advancing our interests is far more adventagous than a blantant attack on the current world order and disrupt the order that has served China so well and will continue to do so in the future.

The evidence of this is the establishmenrt of the BRICS bank and the Asian infrastructure bank. The headquarters is in China, but the power is not only divided, but in the case of the BRICS bank, China mostly gave away leadership positions.

The need of the hour is to establish as the centre for global politics, as to the actual governance, that can be left to later when China has gathered more momentum.

The Chinese military modernization, for as much has been said of it's aggressive posture, in reality only 1.4% has been alocated, though the actual figure is probably closer to 2%-2.5%. This still pales in comparison to the military super powers of US and Russia, and is a clear indication of Chinese mindset.

We could easily upgrade all our ground forces to modern standards, we already have all the models, and factories, but that would require money that would otherwise need to go into other sectors, and just advancing on the military front has never been the goal of China, we also need to wait for other sectors to catch up, like becoming the biggest economy and finishing up the Silk road as well as improve the living standard of Chinese citizens, including but not limiting to tackling polution, and thus our soft power and stand higher on the moral high ground.

We created the AIDZ in East China Sea, but not South, we moved a Rig to a disputed area, and we had a stand off with Philippines, all didn't result in actual conflict, and all were controled as well as easily reversed if the situation called for it.

Fact of the matter is we can do a multiple of things that we are not doing to their fullest, because we realize our shortcomings, and our moves are one step at a time, never the invasion of Russia and declaring war on the whole of the world powers.

China's demand of South China Sea is both logical and has historical bases, whether these historical reasons should play is another matter. Simply blocking China's claim will do as much as France's desire to hold on to continental power.

China is at a point where US and China's interest will colide at some point due to the extent of the US power and the continue extention of Chinese interests. As of this moment China holds close to no cards and bluffing isn't going to work, as we are neither insane like North Korea, nor respected like Russia.

Thus it is in China's interest to remake it into a situation where China cannot be threatend or forced to do anything, but it is on the negotiation table that the great matters of the day are decided. A multipolar world.

The domination of the China Seas is in keeping with the need for a strategic buffer between the US and China. However if anyone wants to argue for freedom of navigation and resources, to that I say, become the biggest trading nation first before making the case that the biggest trading nation wants to disrupt the world's busiest trade route and taking instead of trading.

To sum up, to all those that say Asia is the second coming of WW1 Europe, they need to look again.

 

[LeveragedBuyout]

Thank you for this thought-provoking post. I like the general tilt of your thinking, but I wanted to comment on some specific points and ask for clarification. I hope my Chinese friends will not interpret these comments as belligerence, but rather as a relatively dispassionate presentation of an American perspective.

Recently, much has been made of the German Empire and China comparison, while I largely agree, the iteration of the Empire choosen was less agreeable. The choice of the World War 1 Germany was the obvious choice for those that want to view China as a revisionist power and a destabilizing power, and in many ways it is true, but upon closer examination, China actually bares far more resemblence to the revisionist but stabilizing power of Bismark Germany.

I find this to be an artificial delineation of the German Empire. Bismarck fought three wars as chancellor, so whatever "stabilizing" he did was an attempt to protect Germany from being outmaneuvered, not out of an altruistic spirit or a desire for peace for Europe. Perhaps you can clarify this a bit more, because we can easily compare Bismarck's thought process with China's (as you assert), but it was precisely the "balance of power" calculation that led to the "entangling alliances" that precipitated WWI. Surely that is an outcome that China hopes to avoid, but your narrative doesn't seem to touch on that issue.

However, due to the nature of this "conflict," and the fact US is at it's peak and China still closer to the beginning than the end, the initiative is squarely on us, and our actions

I keep seeing this claim from Chinese citizens, and the relation to Deng Xiaoping's saying about hiding capabilities and biding time. The problem with this is that the rest of the world is not comprised of idiots, so even if China pleads weakness, no one believes it. China is a world power, perhaps a superpower, in the world's eyes, so China is certainly not "closer to the beginning." In fact, @Chinese-Dragon has asserted that within 10 years, China's rise to dominance will be complete, and I tend to agree.

The most glaring omission from the Western analysts, and the biggest difference between the two German empires, is patience. China may be revisionist and in some ways destabilizing, but it is patient, which makes it more stabilizing than not.

I would agree with you, but the SCS issues, the provocation of India during the Xi-Modi meeting, and the ADIZ don't seem to jibe with that view. It would be more accurate to say China had been patient, but now sees a window of opportunity for action. I don't blame it for that thought process, but we cannot call today's China a "stabilizing" force, at least not in Asia.

The US cannot say that we must help with Ebola, ISIS, and climate change, while cockblock us on other issues closer to home and far more important to our own strategic interests.

This is the crux of the difference between the American mindset and the Chinese mindset. Ebola, ISIS, climate change--these are not American problems, they are global problems. Ebola and climate change don't differentiate based on nationality, as much as China might hope they do. Increasingly, neither does ISIS, or at least, Islamic terrorism. We both face all of these issues, so it is not unreasonable to ask for China's participation in solving them.

China's strategic interests benefit China alone, so it is reasonable to expect the US to oppose China on initiatives that exclusively benefit China. Perhaps you can elaborate on why you believe the US is obligated to help China with its strategic goals, but China is not obligated to help with global issues.

In reality it is not the China Seas today and tomorrow the Philippines, it's more like we are stopping at the China Seas, cause our health issurance don't cover non-prescription drugs.

We have no basis to believe that. I am not saying that China is lying, but there's no reason to believe that China would stop at the SCS if it sees it can take whatever it wants there without opposition. And why should it stop there?

The often described of aggressive expansion of the China Seas is both the truth and fabrication at the same time. The end game for the China seas, if played right and there is every indication that it is, will be largely devoit of blood shed and will result in the re-establishing of the status quo in favor of China through sheer dominance in the field of economics, technological and political, as well as time.

i.e. "if played right" = submit to China. Is it reasonable to expect other sovereign nations to do so in the modern era? They are no longer tributary states, and there's another powerful player in Asia that presents an attractive alternative.

Ironically, it is the fact China isn't a dictatorship that makes it far more likely time will be the main weapon, rather than actual weapons. A departure even from Bismark Germany, the wishes of one man is not the state policy of China, and thus Chinese interests don't align with personal interests and in the interest of China, the continued growth of China in all fields while at the same time advancing our interests is far more adventagous than a blantant attack on the current world order and disrupt the order that has served China so well and will continue to do so in the future.

Agreed, that's why talk of hastening the arrival of a multi-polar world is so disturbing. China has done well under the current world order, and it seems to want to overturn this objectively beneficial system in return for an unproven new system, for what? Prestige? I'm still waiting for a historical precedent of a multi-polar world that was more stable and prosperous than Pax Americana.

The Chinese military modernization, for as much has been said of it's aggressive posture, in reality only 1.4% has been alocated, though the actual figure is probably closer to 2%-2.5%. This still pales in comparison to the military super powers of US and Russia, and is a clear indication of Chinese mindset.

Truthfully, this is the argument that is most convincing to me. If China wanted to threaten its neighbors, it easily could use its capacity for rearming to do so in short order. The fact that it has kept its military expenditure relatively modest provides comfort--but at the same time, it will be a glaring warning signal if China decides to significantly increase military spending.

We created the AIDZ in East China Sea, but not South, we moved a Rig to a disputed area, and we had a stand off with Philippines, all didn't result in actual conflict, and all were controled as well as easily reversed if the situation called for it.

It's one thing to create an ADIZ in the east as a buffer for the mainland, it's another to impose one in the south and essentially force sovereign nations to ask China for permission to fly home from a third party (e.g. from the Philippines to Vietnam, crossing a Chinese-declared ADIZ). An ADIZ in the SCS would probably be interpreted as casus belli, which is why China didn't do it--not out of altruism or a desire to be conciliatory to its neighbors. The proof is the oil rig business. And again, the PLA behavior during the Xi-Modi meeting calls into question just how controlled certain actions are.

China's demand of South China Sea is both logical and has historical bases, whether these historical reasons should play is another matter. Simply blocking China's claim will do as much as France's desire to hold on to continental power.

It's logical in the sense that if China can get it without a war, it should try. If I were in that position, I would try, too. But it's really hard to justify the nine-dash line based on history, because history changes. The artificial freezing of time at 1945 will not last forever, so if China insists on claiming the entire SCS all the way down to Indonedia, it should be prepared for push-back.

The domination of the China Seas is in keeping with the need for a strategic buffer between the US and China. However if anyone wants to argue for freedom of navigation and resources, to that I say, become the biggest trading nation first before making the case that the biggest trading nation wants to disrupt the world's busiest trade route and taking instead of trading.

It's clear that China's aims aren't to control the SCS to choke off trade, but rather to exploit the natural resources that can be found in the area. The problem is that this rush to grab resources (and islands to secure the resources) risks precipitating a backlash that might result in a disruption to trade. To me, this is the most confusing part of the Chinese stance: would it risk trillions of dollars of trade in order to get 100% of the resources, when it could preserve the trade and negotiate agreements for, say, 50% of the resources? I understand that China has proposed joint exploration and extraction with the other SCS nations, but the failure to reach agreement doesn't seem to justify a unilateral appropriation of the resources. Again, I understand China's thought process, but there's a point where China goes a bridge too far. Taking an island here or there is one thing, taking the entire nine-dash line is something else.

I acknowledge that China's leadership has been superb for the last few decades, which makes me wonder at the ulterior motive behind these geopolitical moves. I read an article recently that argued that the US should back away from pressuring China to embrace democracy, because the truth of the matter is that the Chinese elite is cosmopolitan, rational, and measured, but the Chinese citizenry is emotional, nationalistic, and xenophobic, so a democratic China could be our worst nightmare. I suspect that the SCS moves are thus less about the resources than about satisfying some of the more extreme elements in the populace, in the same way that the anti-corruption drive has been used to buy goodwill for the structural reforms. Is there something to this, or am I off base, here?

Anyway, thanks again for your article. You often contribute original content, and it's a refreshing change from the usual copy-paste threads that PDF users usually create (me included). Please keep up the good work.

 

[Genesis]

Thank you for this thought-provoking post. I like the general tilt of your thinking, but I wanted to comment on some specific points and ask for clarification. I hope my Chinese friends will not interpret these comments as belligerence, but rather as a relatively dispassionate presentation of an American perspective.



I find this to be an artificial delineation of the German Empire. Bismarck fought three wars as chancellor, so whatever "stabilizing" he did was an attempt to protect Germany from being outmaneuvered, not out of an altruistic spirit or a desire for peace for Europe. Perhaps you can clarify this a bit more, because we can easily compare Bismarck's thought process with China's (as you assert), but it was precisely the "balance of power" calculation that led to the "entangling alliances" that precipitated WWI. Surely that is an outcome that China hopes to avoid, but your narrative doesn't seem to touch on that issue.

No two situations are exactly alike, while Bismark wanted to control the German states, China doesn't. Even during the zenith of Chinese power, we could care less what the other nations are doing.

Balance of power in certain situations are necessary, this is especially true now. China is at the stage where it has some power and money, it's expected to do things that benefit the world, however we are not brought into discussions, China cannot even discuss the China Sea's issues with the US on a equal footing. The fact of the matter is the US is right at China's door step, seeing as how the Cuban missile crisis happened, I'm assuming, US also doesn't like others having that kind of stick that close to its face.

The most important aspect is we are no saints, if we are to do something, we need certain things in return, much as the US already have.

I keep seeing this claim from Chinese citizens, and the relation to Deng Xiaoping's saying about hiding capabilities and biding time. The problem with this is that the rest of the world is not comprised of idiots, so even if China pleads weakness, no one believes it. China is a world power, perhaps a superpower, in the world's eyes, so China is certainly not "closer to the beginning." In fact, @Chinese-Dragon has asserted that within 10 years, China's rise to dominance will be complete, and I tend to agree.

I'm not saying we are pleading weakness but we are not as great as @Chinese-Dragon thinks, yet.

Objectively, our military needs serious work in aviation, especially helicopters, and quality control. We lack combat experience, our expedition for 2 million men is third world, and too many of our weapons are in development or not there in number.

Economically, as much as Huawei is a power, it's no Apple, Baidu is no Google, Alibaba is what it is, but more importantly, it's the little things that needs to be standardized like food safety, copy right, labor laws, anti discrimination laws. I mean we got a store in Beijing that bans Chinese, and we can't do anything because we don't have a law that prohibits it, so all it is at this point is in bad taste, not illegal.

We have a ton of ground to cover, we are like 12 year old Yao Ming, really tall and looks like an adult from afar, but very much still a child.

I would agree with you, but the SCS issues, the provocation of India during the Xi-Modi meeting, and the ADIZ don't seem to jibe with that view. It would be more accurate to say China had been patient, but now sees a window of opportunity for action. I don't blame it for that thought process, but we cannot call today's China a "stabilizing" force, at least not in Asia.

What are we doing? Why are we not firing? I doubt US would do anything concrete if we had fired during a tense moment that makes it hard to tell who fired first.

The reason is gradual change. We can't change too fast, but also can't not change. Some Indians are starting to realize it now. The Chinese occupied disputed areas are hardly talked about, as are the Chinese occupied islands, it is the other's land and islands that are on the table.

More and more we will alter perception, and soon, even keeping half of what they had would be consider a major win.

China is about as stabilizing as a rising power can be. There's bound to be friction, US didn't get where it did by backing down.

This is the crux of the difference between the American mindset and the Chinese mindset. Ebola, ISIS, climate change--these are not American problems, they are global problems. Ebola and climate change don't differentiate based on nationality, as much as China might hope they do. Increasingly, neither does ISIS, or at least, Islamic terrorism. We both face all of these issues, so it is not unreasonable to ask for China's participation in solving them.

China's strategic interests benefit China alone, so it is reasonable to expect the US to oppose China on initiatives that exclusively benefit China. Perhaps you can elaborate on why you believe the US is obligated to help China with its strategic goals, but China is not obligated to help with global issues.

ME problems benefit China yes, but America created that problem. On the whole it seems America is more noble and China is selfish, it just so happens America already solved most of it's problems within its immediate sphere.

But China will be the top trading partner of Latin America within at most 2 decades, then we can see where we stand in terms of "global issues."

Think of it this way, I can donate to charity, but a bum can't. The bum isn't selfish, he just doesn't have the luxury to do so. To me donating benefits me in making me look good and gets me in with girls. I be lying if I said I give a damn about the people I'm giving money to.

We have no basis to believe that. I am not saying that China is lying, but there's no reason to believe that China would stop at the SCS if it sees it can take whatever it wants there without opposition. And why should it stop there?

True, there isn't any reason to believe we would, and in reality we won't. However, anything after South China Sea, would be China and US competing for global influence, and thus much less personal. The wars over the colonies are far less than the wars between the major European powers on the continent.

i.e. "if played right" = submit to China. Is it reasonable to expect other sovereign nations to do so in the modern era? They are no longer tributary states, and there's another powerful player in Asia that presents an attractive alternative.

I knew someone would make that claim. By played right, I actually mean, give and take. At this point, I have a rough idea of how it would be, but it's not submit, if it is, war is far more simplistic and way faster.

Agreed, that's why talk of hastening the arrival of a multi-polar world is so disturbing. China has done well under the current world order, and it seems to want to overturn this objectively beneficial system in return for an unproven new system, for what? Prestige? I'm still waiting for a historical precedent of a multi-polar world that was more stable and prosperous than Pax Americana.

Pax Americana doesn't exist anymore. If China remains that Maoist China, then going multi polar would be insane. However, China is here and will only add to our bargaining chip, you can't just ignore it and say because of this we should that.

A 3 year old would be safe under his parents, but at some point he would become an adult, and he would no longer listen, you can't continue to treat him like that, for his own good or not, because it won't work anymore.

China cannot be pushed around that easily anymore, even if it is true, Pax Americana is good, that world no longer exist.

Truthfully, this is the argument that is most convincing to me. If China wanted to threaten its neighbors, it easily could use its capacity for rearming to do so in short order. The fact that it has kept its military expenditure relatively modest provides comfort--but at the same time, it will be a glaring warning signal if China decides to significantly increase military spending.

We would never do that. It's insane and stupid, a war over influence needs a lot more than some advance fighters. Soviets were never really in the running for victory after the 60s or 70s, because they are lacking in every other field.

A basketball who can just shoot is Kyle Korver not Michael Jordan.

It's one thing to create an ADIZ in the east as a buffer for the mainland, it's another to impose one in the south and essentially force sovereign nations to ask China for permission to fly home from a third party (e.g. from the Philippines to Vietnam, crossing a Chinese-declared ADIZ). An ADIZ in the SCS would probably be interpreted as casus belli, which is why China didn't do it--not out of altruism or a desire to be conciliatory to its neighbors. The proof is the oil rig business. And again, the PLA behavior during the Xi-Modi meeting calls into question just how controlled certain actions are.

The rigs and Modi incident are to me calculated risks, they turn out to be losses, sure, but there is a reason it's called a risk, chance of failure is good.

For every failure we have a victory, after the 2012 stand off, we effectively control mass amount of previously Philippine held rocks and territory that resulted in our ships' continuous presence there. We have pushed Indian border perception, further than we ever had.

Just because we failed at some, doesn't mean it's a net loss, it just means we are not God.

It's logical in the sense that if China can get it without a war, it should try. If I were in that position, I would try, too. But it's really hard to justify the nine-dash line based on history, because history changes. The artificial freezing of time at 1945 will not last forever, so if China insists on claiming the entire SCS all the way down to Indonedia, it should be prepared for push-back.

We are preparing for it. To be blunt, if there is no push back, this would just be a waste of time.

It's clear that China's aims aren't to control the SCS to choke off trade, but rather to exploit the natural resources that can be found in the area. The problem is that this rush to grab resources (and islands to secure the resources) risks precipitating a backlash that might result in a disruption to trade. To me, this is the most confusing part of the Chinese stance: would it risk trillions of dollars of trade in order to get 100% of the resources, when it could preserve the trade and negotiate agreements for, say, 50% of the resources? I understand that China has proposed joint exploration and extraction with the other SCS nations, but the failure to reach agreement doesn't seem to justify a unilateral appropriation of the resources. Again, I understand China's thought process, but there's a point where China goes a bridge too far. Taking an island here or there is one thing, taking the entire nine-dash line is something else.

I acknowledge that China's leadership has been superb for the last few decades, which makes me wonder at the ulterior motive behind these geopolitical moves. I read an article recently that argued that the US should back away from pressuring China to embrace democracy, because the truth of the matter is that the Chinese elite is cosmopolitan, rational, and measured, but the Chinese citizenry is emotional, nationalistic, and xenophobic, so a democratic China could be our worst nightmare. I suspect that the SCS moves are thus less about the resources than about satisfying some of the more extreme elements in the populace, in the same way that the anti-corruption drive has been used to buy goodwill for the structural reforms. Is there something to this, or am I off base, here?

Anyway, thanks again for your article. You often contribute original content, and it's a refreshing change from the usual copy-paste threads that PDF users usually create (me included). Please keep up the good work.

The resources are not that big of a deal.

I suspect that the SCS moves are thus less about the resources than about satisfying some of the more extreme elements in the populace, in the same way that the anti-corruption drive has been used to buy goodwill for the structural reforms. Is there something to this, or am I off base, here?

While not entirely true, this is far closer to the truth than resources. The thing about legitimacy in China is that economic development is no longer the only thing people are after. People want prestige, they want to feel good about themselves.

Napoleon essentially killed off 2 million of his own people through war, but he came back was quick and successful, his nephew Napoleon III was still able to invoke such passion that he turned a republic into an empire.

You watch American news, if America completely let others handle global issues and becomes a follower, would they still support the government, even if the economy is good?

 

[Chinese-Dragon]

I read an article recently that argued that the US should back away from pressuring China to embrace democracy, because the truth of the matter is that the Chinese elite is cosmopolitan, rational, and measured, but the Chinese citizenry is emotional, nationalistic, and xenophobic, so a democratic China could be our worst nightmare. I suspect that the SCS moves are thus less about the resources than about satisfying some of the more extreme elements in the populace, in the same way that the anti-corruption drive has been used to buy goodwill for the structural reforms. Is there something to this, or am I off base, here?

I think the issue is that when it comes to democracy in developing countries, issues like emotion/nationalism/xenophobia can become very big selling points in favor of a prospective political candidate.

In a developed economy, where there is a high level of general education, this kind of pandering to fear is less of an issue (though still an issue of course).

Take India's recent election of Modi for instance. Now there is no doubt that some small percentage of "extreme elements" were supporting him because of his reputation, and hoped that he would take care of the Muslim problem they see their country as having. Luckily for the rest of India, Modi isn't quite as crazy as his reputation would make him out to be.

Or let's say the leaders being elected in the Middle East. They pander to fear in a similar way, but with a more religious focus to their politics. This was one of the reasons why the Arab Spring turned out to be a disappointment for many.

The idea for us has always been... first become a developed economy, then political reforms later. This has been the pattern throughout East Asia, and even in the Western developed nations. America for example was a superpower in 1945, but it took till 1964 for the Civil Rights Act.

For China it will be a slow process, but the silver lining is that China's development process is going fast.

In fact, @Chinese-Dragon has asserted that within 10 years, China's rise to dominance will be complete, and I tend to agree.

Not exactly "complete", what I generally say is that we will have some degree of strategic breathing room in 2025. Since that is when we will be at a "decent" level of economic and military power.

By then, we will technically be classified as a "developed" country by World Bank definitions, however still low on the totem pole in terms of per capita income. So there will still be a long way to go after that.

And it will take several decades more after that point to reach a level of power that could be described as "dominant" (currently only America is dominant in a global sense). And even after that point, America will still be a dominant power. I don't think this world will ever have China as the sole superpower, like America currently is. It will probably be some kind of a power sharing agreement/understanding between the major powers.

 

[LeveragedBuyout]

@Genesis @Chinese-Dragon Excellent points, thank you for your feedback. This again comes down to a learning process, specifically how the US is learning to deal with a peer of a kind it's never had before (the USSR was a different kind of peer), and China's attempt to formulate "a new kind of great power relations" to prevent the Thucydides Trap. So far, so good, even though we've had a few tensions appear. I'm optimistic we'll get there in one piece, even if we have a scare or two on the way.

If you don't mind, I would be curious about some other users' opinions on @Genesis 's article. I therefore would like to invite @TaiShang @Nihonjin1051 @SvenSvensonov @alaungphaya @somsak @beijingwalker @Black Flag @Carlosa @cnleio @Edison Chen @gambit @hans @kyle Chiang @Lure @madokafc @xesy @Zsari to contribute their feedback and thinking. This has the potential to become a very productive thread.

 

[SvenSvensonov]

@SvenSvensonov

I appreciate the tag, but when it comes to US-Chinese politics, military comparisons or economic "d*** measuring contests", I prefer to stay on the sidelines, keep my opinions and thoughts to myself and watch the events unfold. Too often we end up with two sides, both presenting their opinions and "facts" but never reaching a consensus. I'll keep an eye on this thread, but will not participate in it.

 

[Chinese-Dragon]

Agreed, that's why talk of hastening the arrival of a multi-polar world is so disturbing. China has done well under the current world order, and it seems to want to overturn this objectively beneficial system in return for an unproven new system, for what? Prestige? I'm still waiting for a historical precedent of a multi-polar world that was more stable and prosperous than Pax Americana.

For reasons of our national safety.

Back in the 1970's, when China and America were technically "allies", America didn't have to worry about China much. We were at a very low level of economic and military strength. The only threat in America's view was an ideological one, since this was before our 1978 market reforms, and we were still ideologically communist.

Now is a different era to be sure, thirty years after our market reforms have been completed. China is now no longer an ideological threat to America, since we do not export ideology.

But our economic and military power has grown, and America's gaze is slowly turning our way. America has an unprecedented amount of influence in the global economic system, and would even be able to militarily blockade us (though sustaining huge losses) in the event of a more serious escalation of hostilities.

Chinese leadership (and Confucian societies in general, like those in East Asia) tend to be risk-averse much of the time, whether it comes to financial affairs or strategic ones. Risk is not good for business.

Maybe a multipolar (or even a bi-polar world... food for thought) world, would not be better for global peace, who knows really. But it will make us a bit safer in our home region. And so we must take that step.

Anyway, both the Chinese and US governments are "rational" actors. Nobody wants a nuclear war, so as usual, the world most probably end up in a state of Cold peace. And who knows what the Middle East situation will look like, so far into the future though. Maybe in that future, the UN (with more cooperation between the major powers) could turn out to be useful, or at least better than today.

 

[LeveragedBuyout]

Maybe a multipolar (or even a bi-polar world... food for thought) world, would not be better for global peace, who knows really. But it will make us a bit safer in our home region. And so we must take that step.

I laughed out loud when I read the bolded part. Sometimes it feels like we are talking about a mentally ill patient, but then again, maybe that's the best way to look at geopolitics. But otherwise, a very reasoned and well-thought position. We can already see China allying itself with Russia in the new multi-polar order. Besides NK and Pakistan, do you see any other natural allies for China?

Anyway, both the Chinese and US governments are "rational" actors. Nobody wants a nuclear war, so as usual, the world most probably end up in a state of Cold peace. And who knows what the Middle East situation will look like, so far into the future though. Maybe in that future, the UN (with more cooperation between the major powers) could turn out to be useful, or at least better than today.

Agreed. Perhaps it's beyond the scope of this thread, but I find it curious that peripheral powers often seem the most stable. China at the edge of Asia, Britain at the edge of Europe, isolated Australia, distant US... it's comforting knowing that China brackets the arc on instability on one side, while we tackle it on the other. Hopefully we can come up with a joint strategy at some point for stabilizing the region, but until then, containment will have to do.

 

[SipahSalar]

China is very good at minding its own business. They've been doing it for 2000 years after all. I think a world with China as a superpower will not be much different from the world of today. Because they are not being pushed by ideologies of previous super powers (ie democracy and communism). They just want to prosper and be left alone.

 

[Genesis]

Now is a different era to be sure, thirty years after our market reforms have been completed. China is now no longer an ideological threat to America, since we do not export ideology.

Our ideology is very unclear at the moment, what is it? Half Capitalist, half Socialist, a little Communism on the side? We both like progress, we both like money, we both like freedom(definition of it differ, and degree of it differ).

If we did export ideology, it would be almost an exact replica of the American model, just in different stages of development.

But our economic and military power has grown, and America's gaze is slowly turning our way. America has an unprecedented amount of influence in the global economic system, and would even be able to militarily blockade us (though sustaining huge losses) in the event of a more serious escalation of hostilities.

Regarding that, I think it's over analyzed, America and China won't ever go that far. The recent climate deal illustrates this. We both attack each other, we are the human right abuser with the aggressive expansion problem, America is the meddling foreign power hell bent on undermining our interests, but at the end of the day, we both depend on each other for prestige, leverage against other nations, and support at home.

This deal gave both government a major accomplishment in terms of foreign policy, that we are both at the front of the pact in terms of climate control and upping both nation's standing in terms of responsible governance. Let's not forget with this deal, we are both leveraging other nations to do similar deals or at least be able to use it as a stick to hit others (India).

We may have problems between us, but like the Republicans and Democrats, bi partisanship are needed sometimes, and we would never destroy one another.

Nobody likes to watch a one man opera.

Maybe a multipolar (or even a bi-polar world... food for thought) world, would not be better for global peace, who knows really. But it will make us a bit safer in our home region. And so we must take that step.

Whether it be safer or not, or peaceful or not, is not really up for discussion anymore, we are already here, multi polar is happening whether good or bad. It's up to us to determined how it goes.

I laughed out loud when I read the bolded part. Sometimes it feels like we are talking about a mentally ill patient, but then again, maybe that's the best way to look at geopolitics. But otherwise, a very reasoned and well-thought position. We can already see China allying itself with Russia in the new multi-polar order. Besides NK and Pakistan, do you see any other natural allies for China?

North Korea? Ally? The Chinese alliance will shape up in time. It will most likely include most if not all of ASEAN, South(unified) Korea, African states, Middle Easten nations and South Asia.

This doesn't seem likely now, but it's the natural progression of things to me. Korea will eventually completely ally with China, we are just too close, and we also hold the unification card, at some point, that's going to play.

ASEAN, despite recent tensions, are the natural allies of China, they cannot, nor should they want to not be in China's silk road, SCS will conclude at some point, most of ASEAN likes China enough even now.

South Asia, obviously Bangledesh, and Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, they are close to allies now, but overall, the Chinese market will become what America is to China in the next 10-20 years, and that would be the clincher for this part of the world.

Bangledesh already export more to china than India.

African and Middle Eastern states, are an obvious choice, and depending on the Israeli question, we may see some or a lot of participation.

I must however say, the type of alliances that the US has isn't something we may want to pursue, it has many short comings and could be especially dangerous if a Bi Polar world does happen.

Oh and did I mention America itself. No, I'm not kidding.

 

[LeveragedBuyout]

Oh and did I mention America itself. No, I'm not kidding.

We were allies once, and we don't have overlapping claims anywhere, so it's indeed possible. Who knows what the future will hold, but a US-China alliance is certainly a viable one, and I've often said that of the Asian cultures, Chinese culture reminds me the most of my own. You have also stated that China can be seen as following in the footsteps of the US in its economic and geopolitical development, so a confluence of interests is certainly in the cards--all we need is a shared external threat as a catalyst. My bet is on the issue of terrorism. Or the upcoming alien invasion.

 

[Chinese-Dragon]

Our ideology is very unclear at the moment, what is it? Half Capitalist, half Socialist, a little Communism on the side? We both like progress, we both like money, we both like freedom(definition of it differ, and degree of it differ).

If we did export ideology, it would be almost an exact replica of the American model, just in different stages of development.

I like to think our ideology now is simply "實事求是" (seek truth from facts).

Great quote from the Book of Han which was written over 2000 years ago.

Basically pragmatism. Being practical and realistic.

Or an expanded form, Hu Jintao's "科學發展觀" (Scientific development concept).

The ideology stems from the basic premise that it is possible for the state to engineer sustainable development through tested and proven methodologies of governance. Such a scientific approach is said to minimize conflict amongst different interest groups in society in order to maintain stability on the national level, in turn fostering economic and cultural advancement.

Some other nations are interested in some concepts of this idea, though they will tend to adapt it to their own systems.

 

[Force-India]

Does China aggression has this connection?

Does past matter to communist China? Actions tells so....

 

[TaiShang]

The problem with this is that the rest of the world is not comprised of idiots, so even if China pleads weakness, no one believes it. China is a world power, perhaps a superpower, in the world's eyes, so China is certainly not "closer to the beginning."

But China is really "closer to the beginning" in terms of economic development while its actual capabilities might be above average. Also, as I understand it, China does not "plead weakness" but states that its priorities have not been met yet. You may have the power and ability to jump to the fifth stair from the first maybe, but this comes only at the expense of the three stairs in between that are missed. China does want to climb the stairs one by one, while other members of international community (at least some of them) may want to see China to take a long jump. This is against China's vital national interests. Let the global matters be handled by those that have already tested and tasted each and every stairs. This does not mean that, in theory, China does lack a conceptualization of global governance. It does, and on the paper, it is all available, starting from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

This is the crux of the difference between the American mindset and the Chinese mindset. Ebola, ISIS, climate change--these are not American problems, they are global problems. Ebola and climate change don't differentiate based on nationality, as much as China might hope they do. Increasingly, neither does ISIS, or at least, Islamic terrorism. We both face all of these issues, so it is not unreasonable to ask for China's participation in solving them.

ISIS is particularly a US/UK+KSA-Turkey-Qatar problem. That's very clear to China's strategy-makers even though US may or may not think so. On Ebola, you are right, and China has been doing much more than the others in terms of providing vital humanitarian assistance in Ebola-hit countries. US, by the way, has shown some mismanagement on the issue in the beginning although they seem to be picking up now.

Climate change, well, we have to talk this on a multilateral basis -- as we did in APEC. China is slowly but resolutely building up a more sustainable economy as the polluting industries are moving elsewhere. Hence, China will catch up with the global standards even if it did not want to.

China's strategic interests benefit China alone, so it is reasonable to expect the US to oppose China on initiatives that exclusively benefit China. Perhaps you can elaborate on why you believe the US is obligated to help China with its strategic goals, but China is not obligated to help with global issues.

People here hardly believe that US strategic interests benefit everybody or US acts even a bit for the good of others without considering its own first. But, certain actions may have positive implications: E.g., by fighting terrorism in Somalia, the US might be helping others indirectly. I do not know. But, from the same perspective, others also benefit from China's economic emergence. Since the Financial Crisis, China contributed to the world growth more than the others. Does China do that on wholly altruistic grounds? No. But that's benefiting others while you benefit yourself.

China has done well under the current world order, and it seems to want to overturn this objectively beneficial system in return for an unproven new system, for what? Prestige? I'm still waiting for a historical precedent of a multi-polar world that was more stable and prosperous than Pax Americana.

Well, I think it is already in the making. And it has already benefited the world by, for instance, stopping a US-led military campaign on Syria. That was a good thing even though, from the point of view of US' own strategic interests, it was a bad thing. Of course, US government likes to think that whatever benefits itself, benefits others. That's cannot be any farther from the truth.

China does not particularly want to overturn the current system. It simply creates alternatives. Others may like it and come and join -- or not. That's up to them. If the US finds this challenging, then, sorry for the inconvenience. China won't be stopped from creating its own alternatives. The fiction that China benefited from Pax-US does not cut anything, really. No body wants any favor from the US and China's rise is primarily thanks to its own people and government. Within the same system (and outside the sphere of US' preferential treatment), there are more failures than successes.

We can already see China allying itself with Russia in the new multi-polar order. Besides NK and Pakistan, do you see any other natural allies for China?

Alignment with Russia is strategic, not particularly military. That's a very precious partnership for China. Other than Russia, is there any other that China would like to have a similar arrangement with? Which other country could bring as much benefit as Russia potentially can? None.

China does not want military alliances. The SCO serves the anti-terrorism and separatism purpose and, being exposed to the Central Asia, that's a defensive pact for China, not offensive. But economically, China does have many natural allies and even deeper relationship with the rest of the world than the US.

Neither Pakistan nor NK is military allies.

 

[xesy]

Does China aggression has this connection?

Does past matter to communist China? Actions tells so....

Actually for a nation that considers the past a relic of their culture, such brutalities and crimes caused by Japan in WW2 could hardly forgotten. Not every Chinese is a communist, but they are nationalists for sure.

I believe having a common enemy brought people together, otherwise they would just start fighting among themselves. Chinese leaders smartly take advantages of people's patriotic to maintain the stability of the society, while using all those fighting spirits to boost the hard and soft power the nation needs to rise. However, I am against Chinese leaders using old grudes to downgrade images of other nations and making demands because of that.