REPORT 1: SOUTH KOREAN SECURITY PERSPECTIVES
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North Korea Remains No. 1 Concern
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¶5. (C) There is broad consensus among South Korean security
experts that the ROK should be most concerned about three
countries: The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the
People's Republic of China, and Japan. Despite seven years
of North-South engagement policy, there was universal
agreement that North Korea continues to pose the greatest
challenge to maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula.
There are, however, differing opinions as to why that is the
case. The majority remain concerned about the DPRK's one
million strong Korean Peoples Army (KPA), its ability to rain
mortar shells upon the city of Seoul, and its newly
demonstrated nuclear capability. None believe the North will
launch a premeditated attack upon the South, but many worry
that a belligerent, perhaps even accidental, clash of forces
might someday spark a crisis that could escalate to war. A
small, but significant number of South Koreans fear that the
United States might precipitate war by launching a preemptive
strike against North Korean nuclear facilities.
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¶6. (C) The scenario that most worries Korean security
experts, however, is a possible (some say inevitable)
breakdown of internal control within North Korea's
authoritarian military regime, prompted perhaps by the death
of DPRK leader Kim Jong-il. The possibility of a precipitous
decline in the North Korean economy was also often cited as a
significant concern. According to Dr. Yoon Young-kwan, a
former ROK Foreign Minister and now a professor at Seoul
University, South Korea's provision of large amounts of aid
to the North is primarily aimed at preventing that kind of
"hard landing." For that reason, many Koreans view such aid
as an important part of the ROK's national security budget,
Yoon explained. Whatever might prompt a crisis with the
North, the possibility that any one of the above scenarios
could in fact occur has kept the DPRK atop the list of South
Korean security concerns.
Concerned About China or Japan? Depends On Whom You Ask
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¶7. (C) The North Korea problem aside, there were starkly
differing opinions among security experts as to the proper
prioritization of South Korea's remaining security concerns.
Second place on the list was either China or Japan, depending
on the person consulted. Some expressed serious concerns
about Japanese intentions, while others voice little or no
concerns at all. Others pointed instead to the People's
Republic of China as the greatest threat to Korean autonomy,
or more often as a long term challenge to the South Korean
economy.
Japan
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¶8. (C) Dr. Moon Chung-in, former chair of Roh Moo-hyun's
Presidential Committee on East Asia Regional Issues, agreed
that North Korea remains Seoul's number one concern,
especially in light of the asymmetric threat posed by DPRK
nuclear weapons. He added, however, that the ROK military
strongly desires to better equip itself to deal with "other
contingencies." Most of the experts consulted pointed out
that aside from controversial historical issues, overall
relations between Japan and the ROK had improved dramatically
over the past decade. Acknowledging that most Koreans did
not view Japan as a security threat today, Dr. Moon
nonetheless pointed out that many Koreans did worry that
Japan could once again become a threat because of a
"follow-the-herd mentality" that he said made the Japanese
capable "under certain conditions" of changing their
intentions toward Korea dramatically. While this is an
amorphous basis upon which to construct the ROK's national
security strategy, we can confirm such views are widely held
among the Korean people. South Koreans therefore tend to
view everything the Japanese government does -- from
acquisition of Aegis class destroyers to Prime Minister Abe's
comments about the comfort women issue -- through that prism.
¶9. (C) Concerns about Japan are by no means universal in the
ROK. Dr. Andrei Lankov, a historian at Kookmin University,
believes the "Japanese threat" has been wildly over-inflated
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for domestic political reasons. Many Koreans understand
this, but widespread "Japan bashing" by Korean politicians
has created a problem because it has distorted the average
citizen's view of reality. Informed Korean elites, like
former ROK Foreign Minister Han Seung-joo, have very little
concern about Japanese military power. Ambassador Han
pointed out that as long as the U.S.-Japan Alliance remained
strong, Japan would be in no position to pose a genuine
threat to the ROK. Dr. Kim Byung-kook, Director of the East
Asia Institute at Korea University agreed, pointing out that
despite occasional "political chest-thumping" on
anti-Japanese themes, ever increasing personal, economic,
educational and cultural exchanges between Japan and the ROK
will far outweigh the political rhetoric. Others, like
former Foreign Minister Yoon went further in his comments,
arguing that South Korea should do more to build its
relationship with Japan because Japanese political, and
especially economic, support would be necessary to stabilize
the Korean Peninsula following the collapse of North Korea.
China
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¶10. (C) A number of the security experts we interviewed,
such as Hyun In-taek, Director of the Ilmin International
Relations Institute, and a foreign policy advisor to the
leading GNP presidential candidate Lee Myung-bak, noted the
disconcerting build-up of China's Peoples Liberation Army
(PLA) as a more realistic long-term threat to Korean
autonomy. Most, however, like Ambassador Han Seoung-joo,
voiced what appears to be a more commonly held view in Korea
today. He said the PRC currently poses no threat to the ROK,
is in fact well thought of, and affords many economic
opportunities for Korean companies in the short to mid-term.
At the same time, he said, many Koreans believe China does
pose a significant challenge to the South Korean economy, and
perhaps even to its autonomy, in the longer term. Others who
held this view pointed out that historically it was China,
not Japan, that posed the greatest threat to Korea. They
were concerned that Beijing's position on a unified Korean
Peninsula was uncertain, while its lack of political and
military transparency made it an unpredictable force in the
region. Park Se-il, President of the Hansun Foundation for
Freedom and Prosperity, warned that while Beijing has
consistently called for denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula, it in fact has been more interested in maintaining
its special relationship with Pyongyang than in exercising
its influence to get North Korea to give up its nuclear
weapons.
¶11. (C) For now, however, economic rather than military
factors dominate ROK thinking with regard to China. While it
was not readily understood outside of Korea, our
interlocutors claimed the ROK's engagement strategy toward
North Korea was directed more at concerns about future
economic competition with China, than it was about altering
North Korean behavior. People ascribing to that view saw the
North as an inexpensive labor pool and source of needed raw
materials the South hopes to harness for its own economic
progress, while denying those same economic assets to its PRC
competitors. For them, the ROK's "Peace and Prosperity
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Policy" is a useful economic hedge against a rising China.
¶12. (C) Final important threads in Korean thinking about
China includes their concern about a possible decline in the
U.S.-China relationship. Dr. Kim Byung-kook said that any
deterioration in Washington's relations with Beijing would be
"disastrous" for the ROK. That concern was evident when the
Ambassador informed the ROK Foreign Ministry in January that
the PRC had successfully destroyed one of its old satellites
with an ASAT missile. Upon hearing that information, the
only question the Foreign Minister asked in response was:
How will it affect relations between the United States and
China? Others in the ROK speculate the United States might
make a deal with China, and/or North Korea, at the expense of
relations with the South. Still others suggest the ROK might
one day sacrifice its Alliance with the United States for
closer relations with China.
Maneuvering to Meet All Challenges
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¶13. (C) What is the Republic of Korea doing on its own to
meet its perceived threats? Not much, according to Soongsil
University political science professor Kang Won-taek. Kang
accused the ROK leadership of lacking a vision of the future.
Recently, the South Korean government has been seeking "a
more balanced relationship" with the United States, but to
what end? Kang asked. Others consider such a charge to be
unfair, given the tremendous uncertainty the South Korean
government faces over what will happen to North Korea, and
the divergent views of Koreans toward China and Japan.
¶14. (C) There does, however, appear to be a consensus among
Korean security experts that the ROKG is, and should be,
preparing to meet all possible challenges. They tend to
describe the ROK's strategic vision as incorporating three
main elements: 1) Peaceful coexistence with its neighbors;
2) Retaining a strong alliance with the United States as the
backbone of its national security policy, and; 3) Expansion
of relations with other countries outside the region, such as
India and the countries of the Middle East (the latter in
order to meet its energy security needs). In addition, the
ROK is also modernizing its own military forces under its
Defense Reform 2020 (DR 2020) plan. DR 2020 places primary
emphasis on increasing South Korea's air and naval
capabilities, paid for in part by significant reductions in
the size of the ROK Army.
¶15. (C) Overall, DR 2020 is seen as a prudent effort on the
part of the South Korean government to provide needed
enhancements to South Korea's overall security capabilities.
Analysis of ROK military acquisition plans reveals much about
South Korean intentions. Most notable is that the ROK Navy
is embarking on an aggressive effort to establish a new naval
base on Cheju Island, and to create a "blue water" navy
comprised of three or more "expeditionary groups." The
result will be a far more mobile fleet that includes
Aegis-class KDX III destroyers and type 214 diesel
submarines. The proposed naval base, which will most likely
be built at Wimiri Harbor, is an ideal location from which to
sail east to Japan, west to China or south to Tawian and the
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vital sea lines of communication that flow through Southeast
Asia. Other strong motivations that emerged from our
discussions included South Korea's desire to reach parity
with the Japan Maritime Self Defense Forces, and its
perceived need to enhance its capabilities to defend its
claims of sovereignty over the Socotra and Liancourt Rocks,
disputed with China and Japan respectively.
¶16. (C) Defense Minister Kim told visiting Director of
Central Intelligence Hayden on March 27 that Japan and China
are both increasing their military power, but that both blame
each other as the reason for having to do so. The ROK is
"stuck in the middle," the Defense Minister said, so it must
be mindful of what both China and Japan are doing as they
militarize. There are indications this tendency on the part
of South Korea to hedge its bets in the region applies to
other aspects of its diplomatic, as well as national security
policy. For example, the ROK appears to be attempting to
align itself with both of the two largest powers in the
region, the United States and China. At the same time,
however, South Korea is also working to build other
relationships within the international community. Its
successful campaign to get Ban Ki-moon elected UN Secretary
General, and its troop contribution to UNIFIL are examples of
this intent. Former Foreign Minister Han Seung-joo said that
in order to "survive," South Korea must work to gain a
greater global role. He revealed that a key part of the ROKG
plan is to increase its ODA contributions substantially.
¶17. (C) In sum, South Korea is attempting to maneuver among
the various powers in the region, and expand its role in the
world at large. It cannot be certain whom to trust, or where
its interests might run afoul of others in the future.
According to Professor Moon, that is the proper
interpretation of what President Roh meant when he called for
the ROK to become a "balancer" in the region. That is the
wrong word to describe it, Moon explained, because the United
States is the true balancer in the region. But since the ROK
does not entirely trust the intentions of other regional
powers, it believes it is necessary to maneuver politically
and diplomatically among them, while also standing up
militarily to the countries that surround it, Dr. Moon
explained. Former ROK Prime Minister Lee Hong-koo noted that
throughout history when one of Korea's neighbors became a
hegemonic power, the balance was broken in the region and the
Korean people suffered as a result. Korea would suffer again
if China, Japan, or Russia were to emerge as a regional
hegemonic power, Ambassador Lee explained.
¶18. (C) Another Korean analyst aptly described how the South
Korean security perspective affects the ROK's Alliance with
the United States. He noted that the ROK is like a
medium-sized boat that is "maneuvering" to keep from getting
blocked in by, or crushed between, other larger vessels
operating in the same waters. In that sense, he said, the
ROK's Alliance with the United States is akin to that smaller
boat following in the wake of an aircraft carrier. The
arrangement works to the benefit of the Korean captain so
long as he doesn't trail too close or drift too far away, and
most important, as long as the aircraft carrier is going in
the direction he wants it to go.
