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analysis: The missing piece William B Milam
There is one element the US cannot provide: the mindset (or will) needed by Pakistani civilian and military leaders to get the job done. Perhaps the tools that the presidents strategy will provide, and the assurance of long-term US support, will strengthen those Pakistanis who understand the threat to their state and enable them to modify that mindset
Although Spring arrived officially about ten days ago, and daylight savings time two weeks before that, the weather we expect to accompany this season seems, as the economists say, a lagging indicator. But the weather is warm today, the sun has appeared through clouds that have kept temperatures down and streets wet for the past few days. Physical signs of the advent of real Spring are everywhere, including in peoples dress. The celebrated Cherry Blossoms have bloomed again, more or less in the nick of time, and other trees and plants are showing signs of life.
For policy wonks, however, even the cold weather of February and March felt like Spring as new policy after new policy blossomed from an administration in a hurry to stop the economic bleeding and make course corrections some quite radical to policies it inherited from its predecessor. The economic and financial meltdown occupied its attention, and ours, in the early weeks. A fiscal stimulus package was passed in what may be record time. The outline of a credit market/bank recovery package got what is most politely called an underwhelming reception, but that turned more enthusiastic when the markets saw the details some weeks later.
President Obama took other actions under his executive authority that warmed us during those wintry days: he ordered the Guantanamo prison closed within a year; his Attorney General redefined torture to include torture. A relatively detailed exit strategy from Iraq was worked out, though it doesnt perhaps meet all the desiderata Obama the candidate said he wanted during the election campaign.
The president recently submitted a huge and risky budget, which incorporates expenditures for his main campaign promises like healthcare, and he will face opposition on this in Congress. But in all, it has been an enormously productive initial 70 days: 30 days remain of the mythical 100 that new presidents are supposed to have before the political honeymoon is over. We shall see if that rule of thumb holds up.
The new policies havent lacked for critics. Despite his reaching out for bipartisan support, the fiscal stimulus received no Republican votes in the House and the three moderate Republicans that supported it in Senate were its margin of victory. Former Vice President Cheney took vociferous exception to the rulings on torture and Gitmo, though that only enhanced the positive reception those policies got in most quarters.
On Friday, the president turned to his most pressing foreign policy problem (much more so than Iraq) as he laid out a revamped strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan. The core was presented on TV that morning, and several additional points have come out in subsequent public appearances over the past few days. This policy outline will also have its critics, not least in Pakistan. But it seems to me to incorporate some signals to the Pakistani political class and intelligentsia that they ought to welcome.
Among the most vociferous US critics will be those who advocate a minimalist policy for what they believe is the Afghan quagmire. They are mainly concerned with the presidents clear intention to stay the course in Afghanistan to persevere, modifying policy where necessary until Afghanistan is stabilised and no longer vulnerable to Taliban takeover and/or Al Qaeda re-entry.
Several conclusions flow from the presidents statements. First, Pakistan and Afghanistan are interdependent parts of the same foreign policy problem the struggle against several varieties of radical extremism which threaten not only all the countries of the region but the US and the West. A second conclusion is that Pakistan is now viewed through a somewhat different lens than before. It remains a critical ally, but a troubled one in which ambiguity about objectives and dangers distorts the mindset.
It is the mindset that this new strategy must try to address, and this will require, I suspect, much deeper, more detailed, mutual understandings between the two governments. Pakistans existential challenge from the various different extremist groups within its borders, all related in some way or other to Al Qaeda, is now, in fact, regarded as the most immediate foreign/security policy problem.
One of the more insidious, yet understandable, problems of mindset has been the view held by many Pakistanis that the US will pack up and leave Afghanistan before the job there is complete, leaving Pakistan to deal with the fallout. The history that leads to this common view is not as straightforward as is commonly believed, but the central issue is whether this new strategy is, in any way, a minimalist strategy, one which would allow the US to declare victory and get out before the job is complete. The answer that I read from the presidents statements is that this strategy is anything but minimalist.
A concomitant feeling in Pakistan is that the US is a sometime friend an ally when it needs Pakistans help, forgotten when we dont. This idea has morphed these days into the feeling, propagated by a significant proportion of the public media despite almost daily evidence to the contrary, that the struggle against extremism is not Pakistans struggle. (I wonder if the families of victims of the bombed Jamrud Mosque, the most recent example as of today, would agree.)
The long-term commitment that the new strategy makes to much increased assistance for economic and social development in Pakistan should go some way to alleviate that feeling. Also, as one goes through the white paper that outlines this new strategy, one notes much more emphasis than previously on helping Pakistani civil society build a stronger democracy.
It is all there, in one way or another. The white paper is firm and clear on the presidents intention to persevere until the danger of extremism to the region and the US is extirpated. It is less clear and often vague about the details of the tools vastly increased economic assistance, a shift to counter-insurgency training and equipment in military assistance, a more regional approach, etc. that the strategy envisages.
This is, no doubt, to leave room for adjusting programmes over time. It is also to leave room for bargaining with Congress, through which much of the assistance packages will have to pass, and which will have its own ideas, some of which will likely include adding some pet conditions to some of the aspects of the package. I suspect the president and the administration would like to see a clean bill emerge from the congressional deliberations and will bargain as hard as possible to get it.
There is one piece missing, and that involves the Pakistani mindset toward India. There are a number of analysts (include me on that list) who believe that until the India-centricity of Pakistani foreign and security policy is substantially modified, the country will find it very difficult to adjust its sights to the real danger the state of Pakistan faces from the West. This adjustment not only involves the army, though it is a critical actor in this drama, but the whole of civil society itself.
The India-centric focus of much of society and the military is, arguably, responsible for much of Pakistans deficiencies as a state, a nation, and a society. That is a subject that I may take up in some future column. This one is about President Obamas strategy to help Pakistan overcome the existential challenge it faces.
This strategy appears to me to contain the all the essential elements that the US can provide to make it effective assuming the US can deliver them in a timely manner. But there is one element the US cannot provide: the mindset (or will) needed by Pakistani civilian and military leaders to get the job done. Perhaps the tools that the presidents strategy will provide, and the assurance of long-term US support, will strengthen those Pakistanis who understand the threat to their state and enable them to modify that mindset.
William B Milam is a senior policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington and a former US Ambassador to Pakistan and Bangladesh
http:///www.dailytimes.com.pk
There is one element the US cannot provide: the mindset (or will) needed by Pakistani civilian and military leaders to get the job done. Perhaps the tools that the presidents strategy will provide, and the assurance of long-term US support, will strengthen those Pakistanis who understand the threat to their state and enable them to modify that mindset
Although Spring arrived officially about ten days ago, and daylight savings time two weeks before that, the weather we expect to accompany this season seems, as the economists say, a lagging indicator. But the weather is warm today, the sun has appeared through clouds that have kept temperatures down and streets wet for the past few days. Physical signs of the advent of real Spring are everywhere, including in peoples dress. The celebrated Cherry Blossoms have bloomed again, more or less in the nick of time, and other trees and plants are showing signs of life.
For policy wonks, however, even the cold weather of February and March felt like Spring as new policy after new policy blossomed from an administration in a hurry to stop the economic bleeding and make course corrections some quite radical to policies it inherited from its predecessor. The economic and financial meltdown occupied its attention, and ours, in the early weeks. A fiscal stimulus package was passed in what may be record time. The outline of a credit market/bank recovery package got what is most politely called an underwhelming reception, but that turned more enthusiastic when the markets saw the details some weeks later.
President Obama took other actions under his executive authority that warmed us during those wintry days: he ordered the Guantanamo prison closed within a year; his Attorney General redefined torture to include torture. A relatively detailed exit strategy from Iraq was worked out, though it doesnt perhaps meet all the desiderata Obama the candidate said he wanted during the election campaign.
The president recently submitted a huge and risky budget, which incorporates expenditures for his main campaign promises like healthcare, and he will face opposition on this in Congress. But in all, it has been an enormously productive initial 70 days: 30 days remain of the mythical 100 that new presidents are supposed to have before the political honeymoon is over. We shall see if that rule of thumb holds up.
The new policies havent lacked for critics. Despite his reaching out for bipartisan support, the fiscal stimulus received no Republican votes in the House and the three moderate Republicans that supported it in Senate were its margin of victory. Former Vice President Cheney took vociferous exception to the rulings on torture and Gitmo, though that only enhanced the positive reception those policies got in most quarters.
On Friday, the president turned to his most pressing foreign policy problem (much more so than Iraq) as he laid out a revamped strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan. The core was presented on TV that morning, and several additional points have come out in subsequent public appearances over the past few days. This policy outline will also have its critics, not least in Pakistan. But it seems to me to incorporate some signals to the Pakistani political class and intelligentsia that they ought to welcome.
Among the most vociferous US critics will be those who advocate a minimalist policy for what they believe is the Afghan quagmire. They are mainly concerned with the presidents clear intention to stay the course in Afghanistan to persevere, modifying policy where necessary until Afghanistan is stabilised and no longer vulnerable to Taliban takeover and/or Al Qaeda re-entry.
Several conclusions flow from the presidents statements. First, Pakistan and Afghanistan are interdependent parts of the same foreign policy problem the struggle against several varieties of radical extremism which threaten not only all the countries of the region but the US and the West. A second conclusion is that Pakistan is now viewed through a somewhat different lens than before. It remains a critical ally, but a troubled one in which ambiguity about objectives and dangers distorts the mindset.
It is the mindset that this new strategy must try to address, and this will require, I suspect, much deeper, more detailed, mutual understandings between the two governments. Pakistans existential challenge from the various different extremist groups within its borders, all related in some way or other to Al Qaeda, is now, in fact, regarded as the most immediate foreign/security policy problem.
One of the more insidious, yet understandable, problems of mindset has been the view held by many Pakistanis that the US will pack up and leave Afghanistan before the job there is complete, leaving Pakistan to deal with the fallout. The history that leads to this common view is not as straightforward as is commonly believed, but the central issue is whether this new strategy is, in any way, a minimalist strategy, one which would allow the US to declare victory and get out before the job is complete. The answer that I read from the presidents statements is that this strategy is anything but minimalist.
A concomitant feeling in Pakistan is that the US is a sometime friend an ally when it needs Pakistans help, forgotten when we dont. This idea has morphed these days into the feeling, propagated by a significant proportion of the public media despite almost daily evidence to the contrary, that the struggle against extremism is not Pakistans struggle. (I wonder if the families of victims of the bombed Jamrud Mosque, the most recent example as of today, would agree.)
The long-term commitment that the new strategy makes to much increased assistance for economic and social development in Pakistan should go some way to alleviate that feeling. Also, as one goes through the white paper that outlines this new strategy, one notes much more emphasis than previously on helping Pakistani civil society build a stronger democracy.
It is all there, in one way or another. The white paper is firm and clear on the presidents intention to persevere until the danger of extremism to the region and the US is extirpated. It is less clear and often vague about the details of the tools vastly increased economic assistance, a shift to counter-insurgency training and equipment in military assistance, a more regional approach, etc. that the strategy envisages.
This is, no doubt, to leave room for adjusting programmes over time. It is also to leave room for bargaining with Congress, through which much of the assistance packages will have to pass, and which will have its own ideas, some of which will likely include adding some pet conditions to some of the aspects of the package. I suspect the president and the administration would like to see a clean bill emerge from the congressional deliberations and will bargain as hard as possible to get it.
There is one piece missing, and that involves the Pakistani mindset toward India. There are a number of analysts (include me on that list) who believe that until the India-centricity of Pakistani foreign and security policy is substantially modified, the country will find it very difficult to adjust its sights to the real danger the state of Pakistan faces from the West. This adjustment not only involves the army, though it is a critical actor in this drama, but the whole of civil society itself.
The India-centric focus of much of society and the military is, arguably, responsible for much of Pakistans deficiencies as a state, a nation, and a society. That is a subject that I may take up in some future column. This one is about President Obamas strategy to help Pakistan overcome the existential challenge it faces.
This strategy appears to me to contain the all the essential elements that the US can provide to make it effective assuming the US can deliver them in a timely manner. But there is one element the US cannot provide: the mindset (or will) needed by Pakistani civilian and military leaders to get the job done. Perhaps the tools that the presidents strategy will provide, and the assurance of long-term US support, will strengthen those Pakistanis who understand the threat to their state and enable them to modify that mindset.
William B Milam is a senior policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington and a former US Ambassador to Pakistan and Bangladesh
http:///www.dailytimes.com.pk
