After Pakistan's elections

[Bang Galore]

The Indian government should resist the temptation to make a grand gesture of friendship towards Nawaz Sharif

Shyam Saran

The leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (N), Nawaz Sharif, has received a decisive and powerful mandate from the Pakistani electorate in the recently concluded elections. He has publicly committed himself to improving relations with India, picking up the threads from 1999, when he played host to the then Indian prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, at a summit in Lahore. The Lahore spirit of peace and reconciliation between the two countries swiftly evaporated on the heights of Kargil, where the armed forces of the two sides fought a limited but bloody war. How real are the prospects of Pakistan under Nawaz Sharif picking up the pieces again with the Indian prime minister, who is convinced that peace with Pakistan remains an essential condition for India's own march towards an enhanced regional and global role?

It may be worthwhile to look at what is unlikely to change in Pakistan's posture towards India.


One, Kashmir will remain the "core issue" for Pakistan. It figures in the PML (N) manifesto, and Mr Sharif has reiterated his intention to put Kashmir on the bilateral agenda. In fact, giving prominence to the Kashmir issue will help him deflect and dilute the Pakistani army's well-known opposition to him. It would also reassure his constituency of right-wing and religious elements, including ****** groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba. For this reason, one should be sceptical of him delivering on his promises to investigate the Kargil war or the Mumbai terrorist attack.

Two, given PML(N)'s close association with ****** and fundamentalist groups, it is unlikely that serious curbs would be put on them. In fact, some of these groups may well feel emboldened by the PML (N)'s assumption of political power. Thus, there is unlikely to be a clear break from the long-standing policy of using cross-border terrorism as an instrument of state policy - although in seeking to improve relations with India, they may be put under more strict constraint. We may expect calculated remission but no elimination of the threat of ****** terror.

Three, Mr Sharif has been reticent about his party's views on the Afghan Taliban or on how he sees Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan. It is not only the Pakistani army but even the political-bureaucratic elite in the country that believes that Pakistan deserves a proprietary role in Afghanistan and that the 2014 US withdrawal offers an opening to enhance Pakistan's strategic relevance both regionally and globally. India has had no place in Pakistan's vision of a future Afghanistan and this is unlikely to change.

Four, Pakistan's alliance with China and its "all-weather friendship" with that country will remain intact. The India focus of the Sino-Pak nexus is unlikely to diminish.

Within these continuing constraints, there could still be prospects for positive change in India-Pakistan relations and these ought to be pursued. On the Indian side, it would be necessary to rein in the temptation to seek a thorough makeover of bilateral relations through dramatic, though mostly atmospheric, gestures. India and Pakistan have different historical narratives. Each milestone in our bilateral relations is interpreted differently in our two countries. This disconnect can change only slowly and incrementally. Hence the best policy to adopt is to seek improved relations in small doses, whose cumulative impact over a period may still be substantive. We should learn from the experience of Kargil and other similar instances. Grand gestures on either side or an attempt to depart significantly from the established narrative are usually followed by a deliberate and often violent effort to reverse any perceived improvement in relations. It would be far better to move in measured and graduated steps to expand bilateral engagement and mutual trust and confidence. In this context, promoting trade and investment, further liberalising travel, encouraging people-to-people relations, may appear to be a modest agenda, but perhaps more sustainable.

The consolidation of civilian democracy in Pakistan is to be welcomed wholeheartedly and there should be a readiness on India's part to explore whatever opportunities emerge for promoting peace between our two countries. This should be done even though the overall narrative continues to be adversarial. While pursuing such opportunities, it should be ensured that we keep a careful watch on how the adversarial continuities referred to earlier in this column play themselves out. Any positive change in atmospherics is welcome, but this should never disarm our ability or willingness to confront developments that undermine our vital interests. Inviting Mr Sharif to visit India was a good move by our prime minister, but substantive progress in our relations will need to be pursued with a careful mix of patience and caution. There continues to be a risk that cross-border terrorist attacks by hostile ****** groups in Pakistan will derail any substantive progress towards peace and co-operation between the two countries. Unless the new government in Islamabad abandons the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy, India-Pakistan relations will continue to follow the pattern of dialogue-disruption-dialogue. Will Nawaz Sharif have the will and courage to break out of this pernicious pattern of the past by putting the ****** elements out to pasture? That will be the real test from the Indian perspective.

The writer is a former foreign secretary. He is currently Chairman, RIS, and Senior Fellow, CPR

 

[Icewolf]

Wow this guy a certain obsession with word "jihaadi"...

Anyways, Pakistan & India can never be close, our national interests do not coincide with eachother, NS should forget about being nice to india and focus on pakistan

 

[Bang Galore]

Nawaz Sharif victory: Why India must erect more robust fences

Praveen Swami

It’s strange how soon it was forgotten, that autumn evening in 2008 when President Asif Ali Zardari danced with the angels and all was about to be well in the world. “India has never been a threat to Pakistan”,” he told the Wall Street Journal in his midtown Manhattan suite, “I, for one, and our democratic government is not scared of Indian influence abroad”. He called the Islamist insurgents in Kashmir “terrorists. He spoke of a future where Pakistani factories would feed India’s huge cement needs, Pakistani ports helped decongest India’s clogged ones.

Muhammad Ajmal Kasaab and nine other Lashkar-e-Taiba were, we know from subsequent investigations, were at about that time making their preparations for 26/11.

Now, as Nawaz Sharif prepares to take office as Pakistan’s Prime Minister in the wake of a sweeping electoral triumph, New Delhi ought be reminding itself of this cautionary tale. In an interview to CNN-IBN’s Karan Thapar, Sharif has said everything Indians could hope for—and then some. He urged a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Kashmir, and promised that he would “make sure that the Pakistani soil is not used for any such [terrorist] designs against India”. He spoke of enhanced trade ties, said he would examine allegations ISI involvement in 26/11, and promised full disclosure on Kargil: enough to melt the most hardened cynic’s heart.

In geopolitics, as in life, there’s this good rule of thumb: if it looks too good to be true, it probably isn’t true. Though we’re likely to get reams of gushing commentary from candle-waving enthusiasts in coming days, there’s reason for caution.

There’s this reason, for one: the last time Sharif was prime minister, things didn’t go so well. In February, 1999, he and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee signed the Lahore Declaration, committing both countries “to implementing the Shimla Agreement in letter and spirit”. Three months later, Indian and Pakistani troops were exchanging fire in Kargil.

Even as the Lahore agreement was being drafted, we now know, Pakistani troops were being trained to push their way across the Line of Control. From 26 May and 29 May, 1999 conversations between army chief General Pervez Musharraf and his chief of general staff, Lieutenant-General Muhammad Aziz, intercepted by the Research and Analysis Wing, we also know Sharif was briefed on the fighting. Sharif insists he was told of the operation only after the war began. Musharraf insists Sharif was briefed about it back in February, 1999, before the Lahore deal.

From an Indian point of view, it doesn’t matter either way: Pakistan’s army, not the politicians, clearly call the shots on India.

This isn’t going to change—which is the second reason for being cautious. The Pakistani defence analyst Ayesha Siddiqa notes that “a democratic transition does not mean the army is ready to surrender its control over security and foreign policies. Afghanistan (by extension Iran as well), India, the US and China are critical to the GHQ’s [General Head Quarters’] interests. These are non-negotiable areas”.

It’s true. In 2008, remember, Zardari ordered civilian control of Pakistan’s notorious Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, Less than two years on, he was ruefully conceding that “for the time being, this matter has been shelved”. For all of Zardari’s make-nice words, he couldn’t push through a deal on Kashmir, terrorism or even most-favoured nation status for India. General Pervez Ashfaq Kayani flatly said that “Pakistan army was an “India-centric institution”.

For those who doubt that the ISI still calls the political shots, watch this video, from around 10:10, in which a candidate for Imran Khan’s party happily admits that the intelligence service picked him to stand for election. This isn’t unusual: party lists are routinely submitted to the ISI’s political cell, maker and breaker of governments gone by, for clearance.

The third reason why we shouldn’t expect too much is this: Nawaz Sharif is beholden to the dregs of Pakistan’s jihadist movement, and the debt’s certain to be called in. In the election campaign, Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz allied with the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi—responsible for the killings of hundreds of Pakistan’s Shi’a minority and a welter of terrorist strikes. Sharif’s cosy relationship with Islamists dates back to 2008, when the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan helped ensure the election of his brother, Shahbaz Sharif, from Bhakkar in South Punjab. Malik Ishaq, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi’s head, was received with garlands by PML-N workers on his release from prison in July, 2011. The Sharif have also had long-standing links with the Lashkar-e-Taiba.

There has been barely a peep of condemnation out of Sharif on the massacres of Shi’a in Pakistan, variously attributed to opportunism, ideological empathy—and fear.This shouldn’t surprise us: by one credible account, judges used to offer Ishaq tea and cookies during his criminal trials.

Ehsanullah Ehsan, the spokesperson of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, made clear the jihadists see Sharif as one of their own. In a statement, Ehsan stated the TTP’s reason for bombings and attacks on the Pakistan People’s Party, the Awami National party and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement “their secular doctrine”.

It’s possible some kind of confrontation will prove inevitable in the long run—tigers brought up the back-yard tend to eventually do damage to their masters—but Sharif’s immediate response is likely going to be appeasement of the powerful, and savage, forces which helped him win.

For Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, this ought be a moment to step back and introspect. The Prime Minister’s expansive pursuit of peace with Pakistan has been built on circumstances which are an historical anomaly. Following 9/11, the United States tempered Pakistan’s pursuit of its covert war strategies against India—fearful that a crisis that would compromise its position in Afghanistan. In 2001-2001, following the near-war between India and Pakistan, it persuaded then-President Pervez Musharraf to back down on support for Kashmir jihadist groups, and enter into a ceasefire with India. Pakistan, in turn, faced an escalating spiral of violence within the country—again diminishing its appetite for confrontation abroad.

These pressures facilitated a year-on-year fall of violence in Kashmir from 2002—and paved a way for diplomats Satinder Lambah and Tariq Aziz to formulate the outlines of a final-status deal on the dispute.

Now, as the United States prepares to leave the region, and Pakistan lurches ever-deeper into crisis, thee post-9/11 shackles will fall away. It’s entirely possible the Pakistan army will push for a hostile posture on India—hoping to attract the jihadists arrayed against it back into the fold. Sharif may have no choice but to comply. Let’s also remember that democratically-elected governments with a clear mandate don’t always have good outcomes: the last truly free and fair election in Pakistan, Shuja Nawaz points out, ended up splitting the country in two.

Ever since Kayani took office, notably, he has focussed on mending fences with jihadists. Fighting along the Line of Control has increased; the ISI, we know from the testimony of Pakistani-American jihadist David Headley, actively backed 26/11. The Kashmir peace deal was buried.

For a decade, Prime Minister Singh worked towards a seamless South Asia, believing trade and people-to-people contact it will pave the way for a durable peace. The dream is a pleasant one, but historically ill-founded: Europe on the eve of 1914, after all, was more integrated than at any time in history. Prime Minister Singh may be tempted to revive his pursuit of a borderless world now Pakistan has a strong civilian government—but the real lesson emerging from the election is that India needs to start erecting robust fences, not dismantle them.

http://www.firstpost.com/world/nawa...dia-must-erect-more-robust-fences-773931.html

 

[RazPaK]

Dear Indians,

Take a hike.

 

[Bang Galore]

Pakistan turns a corner, but let’s go easy on Aman Ki Asha dreams

It’s fair to say that the prospect of seeing Nawaz Sharif as Pakistan Prime Minister, following his party’s election victory on Saturday, represents for India the “least worst” outcome. Given Nawaz Sharif’s record of endeavouring for entente with India in his previous tenure in office, and his own experience of elemental distrust with the Pakistan Army – which overthrew him in a coup in 1999 – there is reason to believe that his government won’t nurse the visceral anti-India hatred that has characterised other political formations and institutions in Pakistan in the past.

Campaigning ahead of the elections, Nawaz Sharif spoke reassuringly of his earnestness about building relations with India, even going so far as to suggest that he would hold an inquiry into the Kargil war that led up to his ejection from power by the then Army chief Gen Pervez Musharraf. Along with his manifest attempts to reach out to Indian journalists who were in Pakistan to cover the elections, it signals that he is pressing all the right buttons and projecting his government as arguably being the most “India-friendly” that the Pakistani electorate would have thrown up.


To the extent that India, grappling with myriad problems at home, could do with a lot less venom from our neighbour to the northwest, Nawaz Sharif’s return to power does give reason for measured optimism of an improvement in bilateral relations.

There are other reasons too for Indians, watching the election process in Pakistan, to be inspired by the refusal of Pakistan’s voters to be intimidated by Talibani threats to boycott the elections. The impressive voter turnout, despite the violence during the campaign and on election day, points to a touching faith in the capacity to bring about democratic change that resonates among Pakistani people. Some of the credit for that, of course, goes to Imran Khan, who inspired a new generation of Pakistanis to overcome their cynicism and vote (although his supporters’ cussedness about accepting their party’s inability to measure up to the heightened expectations of a tsunami is disappointing).

And, yet, the eruption of “Aman Ki Asha” sentiments (most visibly in newspaper headlines and editorial commentary in India) is excessively premature and sets India up to repeat the mistakes of the past. We’re likely to get reams of gushing commentary from candle-waving enthusiasts in coming days, as Firstpost‘s Praveen Swami noted, but there’s reason to go easy on those Aman Ki Asha dreams.

Pakistani politicians have a tendency to sound high-minded and statesman-like with India whenever an election is imminent, only to switch to opportunistic anti-India rhetoric when in power. Ahead of her election victory in 1993, Benazir Bhutto too sounded positively unctuous in her public pronouncements on relations with India, and the prospects for peace in Kashmir. But once in power, and fully in the pockets of the Pakistani Army and ISI apparatus, she clambered onto a truck in ****************** Kashmir and bayed for azaadi for Kashmiris.

The tragic reality of India-Pakistan relations is that history has imposed too heavy a burden for any one leader to make a dramatic difference, particularly when he does not enjoy the complete confidence of the Pakistani “deep state”. Although Nawaz Sharif’s re-election has inspired Aman Ki Asha hopes, it’s worth bearing in mind that even during his previous terms in office, India wasn’t entirely immune to terrorist attacks originating from Pakistani soil. For instance, it was under his watch that the ISI gave underworld kingpin Dawood Ibrahim sacnctuary after the 1993 serial blasts in Mumbai.

This time around, too, Nawaz Sharif doesn’t have the elbow room – in the form of a majority in Parliament – to stamp his authority decisively, and could be pushed into making compromises with fundamentalist parties that don’t share his evident goodwill for India. And as the deadline for the US withdrawal from Afghanistan looms, the Pakistani Army and the ISI will very likely inject themselves forcefully to secure their interests in the region, which will put them in conflict with India’s. Nawaz Sharif’s ability to walk the tightrope will be on test, but it’s unreasonable to expect him to seek political martyrdom another time by taking on the Army and the ISI.

In that sense, while it’s true that the democratic transition in Pakistan signals that the benighted country has possibly turned a corner, and the outcome of the election is rather more benign than it might have been, the outbreak of Aman Ki Asha-itis, so to speak, in India points to unreasonably heightened expectations on this side of the Wagah border.

The one saving grace is that, given that the UPA government is in a state of siege and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh‘s personal credibility is in tatters, there is insufficient room for them to go all-in on a narrative-changing peacenik overture with Pakistan. But the risk is that desperate governments are prone to desperate measures.

http://www.firstpost.com/world/paki...ts-go-easy-on-aman-ki-asha-dreams-775587.html

Haqqani says he won't work for Nawaz

Former Pakistan Ambassador to the United States Hussain Haqqani has ruled out the possibility of working for the Prime Minister-in-waiting, Nawaz Sharif, and said that the PML-N government was unlikely to bring about any substantial foreign policy shifts.
"I have not had a relationship or interaction with Nawaz Sharif since 1992, so that's about 21 years. And I also had the privilege of being one of the many people that Nawaz Sharif put into prison in 1999, so I don't think that there is going to be particular enthusiasm on either side," Haqqani told a Press conference call by the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations.
He was responding to a question whether he had any plans to return to Pakistan and work for Nawaz since he had served him as an Adviser in the past.
"We have a very civil relationship -- we've met a couple of times in between; we've spoken to each other," Haqqani added. "But I don't think there is any personal equation or relationship here."
Haqqani, who is close to the PPP, said that Nawaz Sharif may not back up his overtures towards the United States and India with substance when he assumes the office of Prime Minister. "He will say he wants good relations with the United States and there are individual Americans with whom he has very good relations," Haqqani said while giving his analysis of the post-election scenario.
"Similarly, he will go ahead and engage with India. But will he really crack down on the hardline groups, many of whom campaigned for him and supported him in this election? I'm not so sure," Haqqani said. "We will have a kind of a hug-hug, embrace-embrace, but no substantial changed attitude towards India," he said.
The former diplomat went on to say, "I think Nawaz Sharif will move to have relatively better relations with India, at least at a superficial level, cricket matches, cultural exchanges, speaking to Punjabis in Punjabi, on the Indian side.
"But strategically, will he say, let's put Kashmir on the back burner and move forward? I don't see that happening. Will he say that we need to actually implement the Most Favoured Nation agreement that the PPP reached, which has been held in a sort of limbo by the military?."
Haqqani also blamed Nawaz Sharif for the creation of Lashkar-e-Taiba, and noted that he was the then Prime Minister during the short Kargil war with India in 1999.
Nawaz Sharif later said that the Kargil conflict was engineered by the military under it’s the then COAS Pervez Musharraf, who later ousted him in a coup.

http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/15-May-2013/haqqani-says-he-wont-work-for-nawaz

 

[Bang Galore]

Dear Indians,

Take a hike.

Ya , btw, how was yours?

 

[RazPaK]

^

All Indian speculation and wet dreams.


Yawn.

 

[Bang Galore]

^

All Indian speculation and wet dreams.

Speculation, Yes. Wet dreams, No. That would apply if were imagining something pleasant, caution is the opposite of a wet dream.

 

[RazPaK]

Speculation, Yes. Wet dreams, No. That would apply if were imagining something pleasant, caution is the opposite of a wet dream.

Honestly you think too highly of yourselves.

The majority of Pakistanis from the establishment down to the common farmer hate you or do not think of you at all.

If these articles make you feel important, then great, keep posting and analyzing.

 

[fatman17]

Pakistan: Incoming PM Nawaz Sharif faces challenges in a rough neighbourhood


Nawaz Sharif is poised to return to power in Pakistan. How he fares against the country's deep problems will affect not just Pakistan, but the turbulent South and Central Asian region.



By: Olivia Ward Foreign Affairs Reporter, Published on Mon May 13 2013


Pakistan’s election winner Nawaz Sharif fought his campaign under the symbol of the tiger.


But whether he will prove a paper tiger — or one sharp in tooth and claw — after his expected return to power is a question hanging over not just Pakistan, but the turbulent South and Central Asian region.

The deep problems Sharif, a former prime minister, faces in boosting the near-bankrupt economy, rebooting relations with India, finding stable ground with Afghanistan, maintaining relations with widely resented aid donor Washington, reining in his military and quelling violent terrorist groups call for supersized savvy as well as strength.

“Pakistan has the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal and the world’s most dangerous terrorist syndicates,” says Haider Mullick, a provost fellow at Tufts University’s Fletcher School. “If it fails by becoming another North Korea, it will destabilize the entire region from Central Asia to China and India.”

Some say the odds may be on Sharif’s side.

“For the first time in history a duly elected parliament has completed its term and had an election that will produce a civilian government taking over peacefully,” says Kamran Bokhari, an expert on Pakistan at the Stratfor global intelligence firm.

“The parties have matured and the things that the military can’t control have grown by leaps and bounds. Even the milkman is tweeting from his motorcycle. Everyone has a political opinion.”

Early reviews for Sharif’s leadership are positive. Even Pakistan’s old enemy, India, welcomed his victory, and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has been more friendly with Islamabad than other American officials in recent years. The new premier of China, a staunch trading partner, is to visit Pakistan during his first foreign tour next week.

But serious doubts remain that Sharif can readily resolve Pakistan’s massive and destabilizing problems.

“Already ethnic pressures are building up,” says Husain Haqqani of Boston University, a former Pakistan ambassador to the U.S. “There are terrorist groups. Will Sunni extremists stop attacking Shia because of a new government?

“Will militant groups stop thinking about ‘liberating’ Kashmir? Will Pakistan prosecute the Mumbai (2008 terrorist attack) suspects? Will there be genuine accountability about why Osama bin Laden was living in Pakistan? The internal dynamic has changed but I don’t think the regional landscape will.”

Here are some of Sharif’s foreign policy challenges:

•India: In the late 1990s, Sharif began a peace process that was derailed by a war launched by the Pakistani military. He has publicly called for closer relations, and the Indian government responded with cautious optimism. The disputed territory of Kashmir is still unsettled, and the wounds of a Pakistan-launched terrorist attack on Mumbai have not healed.

•Afghanistan: Washington has urged Pakistan to warm relations with President Hamid Karzai and make a joint effort to push the Taliban toward peace talks before a foreign troop withdrawal next year. But a clash last week between Pakistani and Afghan security forces chilled prospects for a quick thaw.

•United States: Pakistan is embroiled in the Afghan conflict, with militants flowing across the border and settling in the lawless tribal areas amid accusations of Pakistani support. American drone strikes have killed more than 1,500 people on the borders, including civilians, escalating anger toward the U.S. and its “war on terror.” Meanwhile Washington spends more than $1 billion a year on military and development aid in Pakistan and Sharif will be pressured for deeper commitment.

•Saudi Arabia: The wealthy Gulf state is accused of funding terrorist groups that operate from Pakistan. But Sharif lived in Saudi Arabia for more than seven years after he was ousted from power in 1999 by Gen. Pervez Musharraf, and may have more influence over the ruling royals who call him “brother.”

Much of Sharif’s success or failure in stabilizing Pakistan depends on the military, which until recently dominated the country and threw out earlier leaders, including him. Musharraf is now under house arrest on a variety of charges.

“Sharif has had a bad history with the military,” said Bokhari. “But the army has also matured. Now it is saying, ‘We don’t want to do this any more.’ ”

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