Sub-contracting to Pakistan lead to the Taliban taking over in the first place. Getting Pakistan out of Afghani affairs would be a start to cleaning up Afghanistan.Expensive war.
The Americans should have sub-contracted the war to the Pakistani military. They would have done it for half the price.
hows that working out for you lately
NATO will sabotage any peace process just like they have been doing. That is the problem. Not only this but the NATO created Afghan government post invasion is heavily patronized by NATO. NATO came in to Afghanistan with strategic imperatives: destabilization of Pakistan; containment of China and containment of Russia. Pakistanis have got to realize this.
For more than a decade, it didn't work for Afghanistan or us. So what's going is to be new now
Yes let us agree to disagree.
New Recruit
This old truck can not be repaired. Leave it in the garage or sell by the weight.https://defence.pk/threads/victory-of-taliban-is-victory-of-islam.15387/
KABUL — More than a decade of war and billions in U.S. funds to build up an Afghan military force have failed to defeat a Taliban insurgency that remains a threat across the country, according to interviews with U.S., NATO and Afghan military leaders. Afghan govt says US, UK cannot defeat Taliban.
Following the end of the U.S. military's combat mission last year, the Islamic radical insurgents have overrun dozens of checkpoints throughout the country and threatened entire districts. The army has rushed forces to take back terrain, but it doesn't have enough troops to defend every place under assault.
"The enemy is fighting in almost every province," said Gen. Sher Mohammad Karimi, the Afghan army chief of staff.
Karimi said the Taliban is unable to mass enough forces to take over key cities or threaten the central government here. "In some places they win for an hour and lose in the next hour," he said.
Barring a political settlement between the warring camps, Karimi's assessment points to unending fighting with neither side gaining the upper hand — so long as the United States and its allies continue to spend billions a year to prop up the Afghan forces.
"The government is not strong enough to defeat the Taliban, but the Taliban can't beat the government," said Seth Jones, an analyst at RAND Corp. "What we're looking at is a stalemate that will go back and forth in some areas."
Voices: Today's Afghanistan resembles the 1985 version
The United States has a force of about 9,800 troops remaining in Afghanistan. Its primary role is to train and assist Afghan security forces and combat terrorism.
At the end of 2016, under the current White House plan, all that will remain is a staff of about 1,000 military and Defense Department civilian personnel attached to the U.S.
Embassy here.
The drawdown of U.S. forces has left the Afghan military largely without U.S. airstrikes for protection and helicopters for quick medical evacuation off the battlefield, vital support in the past.
The result: Afghan casualties have jumped 70% in the first 15 weeks of this year to record levels: 4,950 police and soldiers killed or wounded, up from 2,900 during the same period last year, according to the U.S.-led coalition command.
Afghan security forces suffer record casualties
German Brig. Gen. Andreas Hanneman, who commands the coalition training mission in Mazar-e-Sharif, a strategic city in northern Afghanistan, said it is not surprising that the Taliban would push hard against Afghan security forces this year.
"To assume that the enemy will not try to seize the opportunity when we are going out with our assets … seems to be a little bit strange," Hanneman said. "Minor crises are also part of warfare."
TOO LITTLE FOCUS ON WAR
A short visit to the base in the historical city highlights some of the challenges the Afghan military faces.
At an Afghan army engineering school, many of the classes focus on building dining facilities and repairing generators, raising questions about whether some commanders are more focused on the comforts of garrison life than fighting the enemy.
"Some of the units are not really prepared to do infantry warfare," said Swedish Lt. Col. Kenneth Persson, an adviser for the Afghan Army Corps based in Mazar-e-Sharif.
USA TODAY
Afghan president says conditions better for reconciliation with Taliban
Coalition officials now rely on what the Afghans report to them, because they have few troops in the field observing combat. "We can only report what our Afghan partners are telling us," said German Col. Wolfgang Kohler, another coalition adviser.
In Mazar-e Sharif, coalition advisers now fly daily from a coalition base outside the city to a camp where they spend only four hours each day with Afghan commanders they are mentoring.
The advisers had a chance to watch how Afghan military leaders responded to a broad attack last month, when insurgents swept through Kunduz, a province north of Mazar-e Sharif, overran police checkpoints and threatened district centers.
The local police are particularly vulnerable to attack, as they are lightly armed, have little training and are deployed in small teams to man checkpoints in areas that are hard to reach.
Often the police flee when they come under attack by well-armed insurgents. When the Taliban offensive begins, "the panic starts," Persson said. "The insurgents are highly mobile and find weak spots."
The lack of coalition air power has allowed the Taliban more freedom to move in mountainous provinces such as Kunduz. In previous years, coalition airstrikes could target militants or help ferry troops into remote areas throughout the country.
"They are more active in those (remote mountainous) areas," said Afghan Interior Minister Nur ul-Haq Ulumi.
When the Afghan army rushed a brigade to Kunduz in an effort to take back territory seized by insurgents, it was slowed by explosives planted by insurgents and an initial lack of coordination between the army and police in the area, Persson said.
Karimi said the army also has been thwarted by the heavily wooded terrain, which limits the effectiveness of artillery fire.
MORE TROOPS AND WEAPONRY
As Afghan and coalition officials brace for more fighting this summer, Afghan commanders say they have the advantage in personnel and equipment.
In northern Afghanistan, coalition officers estimate the region has about 4,000 insurgents facing 32,000 soldiers and police.
Hanneman, who commands the advisers in the north, said the Afghan forces are performing well. "You cannot expect from the start of the first year the long-term solution is already done," he said. "Give them a chance."
One exception to the drop-off in U.S. military assistance is the continued support of Afghan commandos, who conduct raids on insurgent leaders. U.S. military advisers are embedded with Afghan commando battalions, and U.S. airstrikes sometimes support the raids.
"A lot of the kinetic activity we're doing is for the (counterterrorism) mission," said Air Force Maj. Gen. John McMullen, who recently completed a tour in Afghanistan, where he was in charge of developing the country's air force.
Afghan officials acknowledge they would prefer to have a larger foreign military presence remain in their country, but understand U.S. political realities.
"The president of the United States has made a promise to the American people" to withdraw troops, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani said in an interview this month. "We need to operate within that framework."
Abdullah Abdullah, Ghani's former political rival who now serves in the government, said it was difficult to get the White House to agree to leave even a modest force this year. "To keep it at the level of 10,000, believe me, it took a lot of effort," Abdullah said.
Coalition officials said the international community will continue to finance Afghanistan's military for years to come. "We will move into a more long-term partnership," said NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg.
The money is critical. The coalition built a security force of 352,000 soldiers and police, which costs $5 billion a year to maintain, far more than Afghanistan's anemic economy can afford. The size of the force is likely to decline in the future, but the cost still will exceed Afghanistan's ability to pay on its own.
Overshadowing the decision to keep funding the military is the former-Soviet Union's experience here. The Soviet-backed government remained in power after Soviet forces began withdrawing in 1988. But after the Soviet empire collapsed and funding was cut off, the regime in Kabul collapsed, plunging the country into a four-year civil war that ended in 1996 with the Taliban takeover.
"One might have thought that partnership is measured by soldiers and boots on the ground," said Maj. Gen. Todd Semonite, who heads the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan. "I would say now that partnership is going to be measured by continued financial contributions."
It would depend upon vision and statesmanship....A good analysis of the Durand Line.
Durand Line status
MUHAMMAD MUSHTAQ JADUN — PUBLISHED 2 DAYS AGO
The writer is a civil servant.
WHENEVER Pak-Afghan ties are strained, the issue of the Durand Line surfaces. Host to over three million Afghan refugees, Pakistan sees thousands of Afghans enter daily — mainly through the Torkham and Chaman checkpoints, but also unregulated entry points.
Contrary to perceptions, the Durand Line Agreement (DLA), 1893 is not an isolated historical aberration thrust upon Afghanistan by the British Raj. A series of events, including the Anglo-Afghan wars, the Forward Policy, Russian advancement into Central Asia, and demarcating Iran’s borders are some events of the Great Game which culminated with its signing and that of subsequent treaties.
There are several myths regarding DLA, such as its validity for 100 years, and that it was signed under duress and isn’t applicable with regard to Pakistan.
In 1873, the British sought a reply from Russia over Badakhshan and Wakhan. The Russian-Afghan border was drawn in 1888 by the Russo-Anglo Joint Boundary Commission. Attempting to contain Russian advancement, Britain exerted pressure on Russia to demarcate the Russo-Persian frontier. Britain accepted their proposal and signed the protocol in 1887. Now it was Russia’s turn to have Britain demarcate Afghanistan’s southern frontier. Russia was equally suspicious of British desires and its intended expansion northwest.
In 1888, emir Abdur Rahman wrote a letter to Lord Dufferin, viceroy of India, requesting a mission to Kabul to settle the Indo-Afghan border. The DLA was signed, after hectic negotiations, by the emir and Sir Mortimer Durand in 1893 in Rawalpindi.
Bilateral pacts can’t be unilaterally revoked.
It must be mentioned that the British invaded Afghanistan in 1878 and forced the Gandamak treaty on them a year later — stripping their sovereignty. Afghanistan was to conduct its foreign relations according to the wishes of the British. DLA is the outcome of almost 80 years of British and Afghan wars, diplomacy, victories and reversals, which started with the 1809 Elphinstone Mission to Peshawar. In signing DLA, Afghanistan was allowed to purchase and import ammunition, and the emir’s subsidy was increased threefold.
Nowhere in DLA is the period of 100 years mentioned. It was not a one-time transaction; as per its mechanisms, active boundary demarcations continued up to 1908 and beyond.
Many Afghan, and some Indian, writers argue that DLA was signed with the British, not Pakistan. They contend the emir signed it in his personal capacity and, thus, was not between two governments. They also refer to the Afghan treaty, 1921, which stated that its provisions would remain in force for three years.
Critical examination of these objections indicates that, while the British did not recognise Afghanistan’s sovereignty as per the Gandamak treaty, DLA was nonetheless signed by Abdur Rahman as head of the Afghan government. It was ratified by emir Habibullah in 1905 and Afghanistan independence was recognised by the British. The Treaty of Peace, 1919 clearly ratifies the Indo-Afghan frontier accepted by Abdur Rahman. The 1921 treaty’s main focus was on maintaining good ties and trade concessions, which Afghanistan still enjoys in the form of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit and Trade Agreement, 2010. Its very signing by Kabul shows that the Durand Line is an international border.
DLA is independent and self-contained, ratified by successive Afghan governments in 1905, 1919 and 1921. Shah Wali Khan, Afghan legation in London, reaffirmed the 1921 treaty in 1930. Such bilateral pacts cannot be revoked unilaterally.
Pakistan is the successor-in-interest of the British Raj. This principle is enshrined in the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties, which declares that state successions cannot impact international borders resulting from agreements, including rights and obligations concerning such borders through such pacts.
Similarly, the ICJ maintains the principle of uti possidetis juris: bilateral pacts defining international borders with or between colonial powers are passed on to successor independent states. The Pakistan-Iran border, which both countries accept, was also drawn by the British. If we accept the contrary and reopen borders drawn by colonial regimes, almost the entire world’s political map will be redrawn. As result of DLA and subsequent treaties, Afghanistan has emerged as an independent nation and been given trade and transit concessions honoured by Pakistan.
It is correct that Pakistan’s tribal areas were, strictly speaking, not part of the British Raj. While suzerainty with regard to princely states and tribal areas lapsed on Aug 14, 1947, these states and areas voluntarily acceded to Pakistan. Tribal-elected representatives are the framers of our Constitution. There is need to differentiate between ‘disputed’ and ‘non-demarcated’ border areas.
Inbuilt mechanisms exist in DLA for demarcation; while some portions are still not demarcated, hardly any are disputed as claimed. It also provides a clear mechanism for resolving un-demarcated areas; through a joint commission that shall adhere to the greatest possible exactness to the line shown on the map.
The writer is a civil servant.
mmjadun@gmail.com
Published in Dawn, July 31st, 2016
http://www.dawn.com/news/1274316/durand-line-status
Unquote
As an impartial observer, I have only two comments.
No agreement & pact is "For ever" and any agreement is only valid as long as both parties are willing to abide by it.
Nevertheless, it is a 'Fait accompli' . It is therefore in the best interests of both the countries to abide by it and work towards peace & prosperity of their people. Pakistanis & the Afghans have very close cultural & ethnic bonds and given time Durand Line can become similar to Canada -US border making it irrelevant. It would however depend upon the vision & the statesmanship of the leadership of both the countries.
