February 09, 2011
PERHAPS it was Kevin Rudd's most impossible dream - a submarine fleet to face down China. But while the idea of building 12 of our own big boats is still government policy, experts argue the task is beyond us.
One solution canvassed this week is to go nuclear. The question is whether this would exchange one set of problems for another.
The centrepiece of the 2009 defence white paper was a fleet of 12 new submarines, capable of patrolling off north Asia and equipped with cruise missiles to be used to support US forces in any war with China. They would be conventional submarines and they would be built in South Australia.
The first of these submarines would need to be operational in the early 2020s, to begin replacing the navy's six Collins-class boats.
But alarm is growing among Australian shipbuilding experts about the extraordinary complexity of that project and the lack of time left to get these boats designed and built.
There's also deep concern Australia lacks the expert technicians to do even the basic design work.
An experienced British naval engineer with close experience of submarine construction and Australian defence projects tells The Australian that trying to produce a submarine able to carry out the sort of operations the government wants without help from a nation with a proven submarine industry is "a suicide mission".
"It's an enormous risk for Australia. My guess is that if they don't get help from somewhere it will be an enormous disaster and everyone will get very unhappy with the delays and costs."
The problem was put into sharp focus last week by the call from defence think tank the Kokoda Foundation for Australia to buy or lease 10 or 12-nuclear powered attack submarines from the US instead of trying to build a conventional fleet.
Kokoda founder Ross Babbage, a former defence official and senior academic, linked
the need for this force to the increasing military power of China, which he said was the greatest security challenge faced by Australia since World War II.
Babbage said in some ways
Chinese strategic thinking was similar to that employed by the Japanese in planning its attack on Pearl Harbor.
He said China was expected to extend its military reach to Australia's immediate surrounds during the next 20 years, which makes it crucial for Australia and the US to maintain close dialogue with Beijing.
But other defence experts and China watchers who have their own concerns about Beijing's military expansion are startled by Babbage's assessment.
The Kokoda report, Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030, details increasing Chinese defence spending on sophisticated aircraft, ships, submarines, missile systems that could destroy giant US aircraft carrier groups, as well as cyber warfare technology, and sets out how Australia should arm itself to deal with them.
But Paul Dibb, author of a previous white paper and emeritus professor at the Australian National University, says the Kokoda suggestions are based on misinterpretations of Chinese intentions.
Dibb says that because the Kokoda report claims the backing of senior Australian officials, Beijing was likely to take it seriously and the Gillard government should formally reject the document's key claims.
"It suggests we decapitate the leadership and foment revolt. This is a nuclear-armed power."
Dibb says while China was developing a sophisticated defence capability, as would any emerging power, it had not displayed any imperialist ambitions.
While it could buy the raw materials to feed its industrial expansion, it had no need to go to war to obtain them.
In any case, it would be many years before China's military power could match that of the US, Dibb says.
But the renewed China ruckus has put the spotlight firmly on the white paper and the ambitious submarine plan.
In the past, apart from deep political and social objections to nuclear power, key submarine experts have dismissed the idea of Australia opting for nuclear subs because of the cost, and because the nation has no nuclear industry to repair and maintain them.
The 2009 white paper gave no estimate of what 12 new conventional subs would cost but analyst Andrew Davies of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute suggested about $36 billion.
However, Babbage, a member of the government's advisory panel for the defence white paper, says the nuclear submarines could be acquired for much less than it would cost to build 12 conventional submarines.
Babbage tells The Australian that 10 of the US Navy's new Virginia-class attack submarines could be bought and equipped for a total of $28bn.
He says they could operate with US boats sharing an Australian naval base, and be maintained by US nuclear experts.
But the British engineer says that while buying a fleet of nuclear submarines was easy to suggest, it would prove extremely difficult and expensive.
"In many practical ways a nuclear submarine would be perfect for Australia, with it's almost infinite range and stealth, but it would be fraught with political difficulties."
For a start, the government would have to embark on a campaign to persuade the community that it should aspire to a nuclear fleet.
The US government would also be very reluctant to allow American companies to sell nuclear technology to a non-nuclear nation, so getting that approval would be an enormous and complicated process.
"The Americans have never done that before," the engineer says.
"And if they did agree, once you started getting the real numbers in, I think [it] would scare Australia off. I don't think anybody could argue that nuclear could be cheaper."
Ten nuclear submarines would probably cost $30bn to buy, he says. "But it would could cost you $100 million to deliver them and support them through life."
That would be well over twice the cost of obtaining and operating a conventional sub.
It seems the government has badly underestimated the complexity of its conventional submarine project, the level of skills needed to build the vessels and the time it would take.
To carry the supplies, fuel, missiles and other equipment through a vast operational area, the new submarine would need to be very large compared with existing conventional boats, "certainly beyond what anyone has achieved to date", the British expert says.
"You are taking on the most complicated engineering production project conceivable."
He says submarines are harder to build than even the most complex aircraft or spacecraft.
"Even NASA would say that's about the most ambitious project one could conceive."
Finding enough skilled workers would itself be a huge challenge.
To make it work, Australia would need to form an alliance with another nation with the industrial expertise and people to do much of the design and engineering work, the engineer says.
Davies says that in the white paper the government was keeping its options open to join the Americans in a conflict in the western Pacific - with China specifically.
"What the white paper describes is actually a very good match to a nuclear attack submarine, but it's not well matched to any conventional submarine that exists at the moment," Davies says.
"Either we'd have to design and build a very sophisticated, complex and probably very large conventional submarine, or we'll have to compromise on what we can achieve."
The Collins-class design could be developed into a sort of Collins Mark II, what the navy calls an "enhanced Collins", which could do some, but not all, of the things the government wants.
Davies says an option is to buy off-the-shelf European boats, assemble them in Australia and accept the capability limitations that come with that.
The Royal Australian Navy argues strongly that small European submarines would lack the range to cover the vast distances across which Australian submarines need to operate.
Davies suggests that to overcome the range limitations they could operate from a forward US base: for instance, Guam in the Pacific or Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
There are also serious issues about whether the new submarines could be built in time, he says.
"We have a Collins fleet that still has some question marks hanging over it in terms of sustainability," Davies says.
It would probably take 15 years to design and build a submarine from scratch and get the first of them operational.
The government wants the first boat in the water by the early 2020s, and there isn't enough time to do that.
Davies says there were very big decisions to be made and not a lot of planning had been done.
"We've probably eaten up a fair chunk of the time that was required," he says.
"Another possibility was to taking the existing Collins submarines and refurbish them with new diesels and whatever new systems the design would have room for.
"Given we're rapidly running out of time for the blank sheet of paper solution, it's going to come down to a choice between a Collins Mk II and a European boat."
"We've probably run out of time to design and build it - or if we haven't, then we soon will."
Davies says that although buying or leasing nuclear submarines from the US is an option, it raises the question of whether the Americans would be willing to part with them.
If Australia tries to operate nuclear submarines without a nuclear industry, it would run up against crippling regulatory and safety requirements, he says.
"Every time you take a spanner to a pipe up in the back end of the boat, you'd need a nuclear-qualified technician and a whole range of inspection regimes in place," Davies says.
"It would cost an arm and a leg and make the whole thing impractical.
"We're left with the aspirations for a submarine that looks like a nuclear submarine but isn't."
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. in other words i may say, Australia will even pay US's military to the extent US may resist China in Asia...... 
